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Almost any historical study of the Asian economies has to tackle one 
basic question, - their relatively unchanging character or 'stagnation'. 
Explanations of this phenomenon have been attempted on various levels, 
- oftener abstract and theoretical than concrete and empirical. Theo-
retical approaches to the problem have generally suffered from one 
serious limitation, namely, a failure to identify the precise extents of 
stagnation which evidently varied from region to region and period to 
period. Moreover, they have been concemed in the main with the 
subsistence sector of the economy where production was primarily for 
use or, at most, for limited exchange operations meant to secure the 
wherewithal for the payment of revenue in cash, there was no accumu-
lation of capital nor any localization of specialised productive activity. 
The one possible force of change that might be generated in this sector 
could consist in tensions threatening to break up the existing production 
relations. Recent research indicates that such tension was not absent in 
the Indian economy.l But even in the classic case of Europe, the con-
flicts within the structure of feudal production relations were not by 
themselves sufficient to alter the organisation and technique of pro-
duction. Positive forces at work in the commercialized sector of the 
economy provided the basis for the penetration of capital into produc-
tion and the vast changes which followed. In the Asian economies of 
the pre-industrial era, a monetized non-subsistence sector, - (which 
had close links with the subsistenee sector in Asia as much as in Europe), 
- marked by accumulation of capital and specialization of economic 
functions, was not absent. lts quantitative significance might not have 
been very considerable, but a study of the problem of stagnation cannot 
afford to ignore the fallure or otherwise of this relatively more developed 
sector to generate processes of change. 
The 17th century, - aperiod when Asia was exposed to the power-
ful impact of the European merchant capital, - offers a very convenient 
field for the study of the responses of the commercialized sector in the 
1 See Irfan Habib. Agrarian System of Mughal India (unpublished D. Phil. 
thesis. Ulliversity of Oxfordl. 
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traditional Asian economies to a positive external stimulus. The capacity 
for and proneness to innovation may be gauged, and the factors built 
into the structure of the economy which inhibited them identified, 
through an analysis of the reactions of a particular region to the opera-
tions of organized merchant capital. Comparison of the responses which 
appear to have varied from region to region may afford a deeper insight 
into the problem. 
The present volume is a case-study built around this basic query. 
The region selected is the coast of Coromandel, because its products 
were among the chief pivots of the seventeenth century Euro-Asian 
trade, and because the region had attained a high degree of commer-
cialization. Besides, the trade in Coromandel ware covered an extensive 
area from the Red Sea to Japan and thus offers an intimate glimpse 
of the workings of the Asian economies. The specific concern of this 
volume is with the trade relations of the Dutch East India Company 
with the coast. They provide a unifying theme which yields itself easily 
to detailed analysis of the interactions of European merchant capital 
and a traditional Asian economy. Besides, during the greater part of 
the 17th century, the Dutch played a dominant role in this vital sector 
of India's commerce which remains to be appreciated fuIly. Their 
activities dovetailed with those of other European nations operating in 
the same area, - sometimes in co-operation, oftener in rivalry, - and 
thus afford a vantage point for a study of the total complex of com-
merce in the region. The expanding efforts of the Indian traders appear 
as a significant element in this complex. 
The picture which emerges is of interest to the student of European 
mercantilism: it includes the workings of a monopolistic merchant com-
pany in an alien and highly individual setting, the concrete problems 
it had to encounter and the modifications in policy and technique con-
sequenced by them. To the student of Asian economies it is significant 
as revealing different levels of economie development within the broad 
framework of relative stagnation. Furthermore, the picture is one of 
growth-oriented impact, to use a very modem term, in the specific sense 
of expansion of production and productivity. This result appears to 
have been causally related to the competitive and expanding demand 
created by the expansion of the export market through the activities 
of the European companies and the absence of monopsonistic controls. 
The results of the query, pursued along the lines indicated above, 
are, however, far less statisfactory than one might desire. One gets at 
best hints towards an answer rather than the answer itself. Systematic 
IX 
quantitative data for production, import and export are not available. 
The sourees refer casually to the techniques and organisation of produc-
tion, rather than describe them at length. Conceivably, a person better 
equipped than the present author might construct from such elusive 
data a sharply outlined analytical account of the processes at work. 2 
I have preferred the more pedestrian approach, - the method of 
detailed narration comprising the significant data, - as being the more 
realistic in the circumstances. The conclusions which emerge have been 
brought together in the last chapter. Anyone using this volume may 
find it advantageous to read that chapter first. The volume includes a 
narrative account of the annals of the Company on the coast (Chapters 
11 - IV). This account contains details that are not of obvious economie 
significanee ; but, for a full understanding of the central story, I con-
sidered its inclusion necessary. Besides providing a chronological frame-
work, it illustrates the institutional background, the quick reactions of 
the economy to the political changes and the concrete situations within 
which the Company had to function. A description of the Company's 
administrative organisation and the social life of the Dutch on the coast 
has also been included, the former as an aid to the understanding of 
much that was happening, the latter, to give a glimpse of the complex 
human reality interwoven with primarily economie efforts. 
The present work is mainly based on the voluminous records of the 
Dutch East India Company preserved at the Algemeen Rijksarchief, 
The Hague. The full importance of this archival material for the study 
of Asian economie history is beginning to be appreciated only in recent 
years. Dr. Glamann's major work on the Dutch-Asiatic trade and the 
two excellent volumes on the Dutch in Ceylon,3 - all published within 
the last five years, - indicate the variety and volume of data contained 
in these records. For the student of Indian economie history in the 17th 
and 18th century, these records are at least as important as the English 
factory records. The information supplied is of ten much fuller and more 
detailed. The Dutch records are also better organised than their English 
counterparts and much more complete. It is hoped that this volume will 
convey some idea of the richness of this little-exploited souree material 
for Indian history. The Bibliography at the end describes the Dutch 
Company records at same length. 
l! One may refer in this connection to Mr. John Irwin's very able papers 
"I~dian Textile Trade in the Seventeenth Century", Journalof lndian Tutil; 
HJStory, No.s 1--4. 
3 See Bibliography. 
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A few remarks regarding the treatment of data and certain techni-
calities may be added here. The detailed quantitative data concerning 
the volume of the Company's trade contained in the old "negotie-
boeken" are no longer available. Sa only illustrative material, showing 
the general tendencies of export and import, have been given and no 
attempt has been made to measure the trends. The 'pound' in the 
present work refers to the Dutch or Holland pound (about 1.09 lb). In 
the statistical tables for the volume of trade, all fractional amounts have 
been left out. For the Dutch proper names as also Indian place names, 
I have used the forms of spelling commonly found in the old records. 
Finally, in the sub-title, the somewhat vague term, 'traditional economy' 
bas been used in the absence of a more suitable one to describe accu-
rately the economy of the region in the period under discussion. 
I have received help from many sources in writing this volume. I am 
particularly grateful to Dr. C. C. Davies, Reader in Indian History, 
University of Oxford, under whose supervision the first draft of the 
present work was prepared as a doctoral dissertation. My friend Mr. 
Martyn Webb, Lecturer in Geography, University of Oxford, kindly 
prepared the two modem maps at the end of the volume. Mrs. Meilinck-
Roelofsz and Dr. N. M. Japikse of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The 
Hague and Mrs. N. M. Japikse helped me throughout my work at the 
Hague Archives. But for their help, this volume could not have been 
written. Professor Hirendranath Ray of the Department of Humanities 
Durgapur Engineering College, W. Bengal, Dr. E. N. Komarov, Soviet 
Cultural Attaché, Calcutta, Dr. Sulekh Chandra Gupta, Assistant Chief, 
Agricultural Research Section, University of Delhi, Professor Daniel 
Thorner of the tcole Pratique des Hautes ttudes, Sorbonne, and 
Dr. Baron Dé of Nuffield College, Oxford, kindly went through the 
manuscript. I am grateful to them for many valuable suggestions. I 
have also profited much from discussions with Dr. K. A. Naqvi of the 
Delhi School of Economics and Shri Ranajit Guha of the Jadavpur 
University, Calcutta. lambeholden to the Koninklijk Instituut voor 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde for undertaking the publication of this 
volume. 
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The European accounts of the seventeenth century used the name 
'Coromandel Coast' somewhat loosely. In its widest sense, it embraced 
the entire east coast of the Indian peninsuIa. More specifically it was 
taken to mean the part of the coast lying to the south of the Godavari 
river and extending as far as Negapatam or even to the island of Manar, 
'which marked the limit of ordinary coastal navigation'. The coast to 
the north of the Godavari was known as the Gingelly coast, a name at 
times used as synonymous with the 'Orissa coast.' 1 
The Dutch East India Company's connection with Coromandel 
developed as a bye-product of its chief commercial interest which 
centred in the export of spices from the Indian Archipelago to Europe. 
During the greater part of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese enjoyed 
a monopoly of the sea-borne trade between Asia and Europe, - which 
mainly consisted in the export of spices from India, Ceylon and the 
Spice Islands, - and the Dutch were content to act as the principal 
distributors from Lisbon. When, in 1580, the crown of Portugal passed 
to the King of Spain, then at war with the provinces of the Netherlands, 
the Dutch were forced to seek a direct access to the spice markets in 
south-east Asia, a necessity which led to a series of voyages from 1596 
onwards and the eventual formation of the Dutch East India Company 
in 1602.2 
From its very beginning, Dutch commercial enterprise in the East 
had to face the problem of inadequate capita!. Mercantilist theory and 
a limited supply of precious metals acted as rigid checks on the quantity 
of bullion and cash specie which could be shipped to Asia and there 
was little demand in the Asian markets for any other exports from 
Europe. There was, however, one commodity which was readily accep-
table to the producers of spices and hence, if procured in adequatt" 
quantities, could make up for the shortage of precious metals. As 
Admiral Cornelis Matelief pointed out in 1607, throughout the East 
lRelations, p.51 and n; du Jarric, pp.31-32; Bowrey, pp.2-3; Hobson-
Jobson, pp.198-200. 
11 Cambridge History of India, V, pp.28 ff. 
Verh. dl. 38 
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Indies the people were clad in Indian cloth and would buy it "no 
matter what it cost".3 The requirements of the spice trade thus induced 
the Dutch Company early in its career to prospect for trade in India. 
The three chief sources for the supply of Indian textiles were Gujarat, 
Coromandel and Bengal. So long as the Portuguese, firmly entrenched 
in Goa, guarded the west coast of India with their powerful fleet, 
Gujarat was for all practical purpose out of bounds to the Dutch. 
Attempts to open trade with Gujarat as early as 1601 had, in fact, led 
to tragic failure and it was not until some years later that the Dutch 
could establish stabie commercial connections with this region. 4 In 
Bengal, the political conditions in the early years of the seventeenth 
century were too troubled to encourage commercial venture. Besides, 
there too the Portuguese settlements at Hugli and elsewhere controlling 
some of the chief waterways put further barriers in the way of any 
Dutch efforts to open trade with the country. The Indian textiles which 
were chiefly in demand in the East Indies came from the Coromandel 
coast. And fortunately for the Dutch Company the east coast of the 
Indian peninsuia, thaugh not entirely neglected by the Portuguese, 
played a comparatively unimportant role in their commerce and conse-
quently was less subject to their monopolistic control. When the Portu-
guese organised their eastern possessions under three governments, 
Coromandel was not included in any of them. Their two semi-
autonomous settlements on the coast were not strong enough to frustrate 
any attempts on part of the Dutch to open trade with the region. In 
fact, long before the Dutch arrived in India, van Linschoten found San 
Thomé and its trade in a state of progressive decline. Hence in the early 
years of the seventeenth century, the Dutch came to look upon Coro-
mandel as the most vital and a comparatively easy source of supply 
for Indian textiles.5 
A further important consideration was the convenient situation of 
Coromandel in the strategy of eastern trade. From the ports on the east 
coast of the Indian peninsuia the countries round the Bay and on the 
shares of the Indian Ocean were all quite easily accessible. The long-
established trade in 'coast cloth' had already chalked out the routes 
which the Dutch could now follow with ease. As later experience showed, 
3 Begin ende Voortgang, 11, c. Matelief's voyage, p.75; Relations, pp. xxi-xxii; 
"De Nederlanders in Voor Indie etc.", De Indische Gids, 1915, p.332. 
4 L.T., I., L.M., Document No. 502; Cambridge History of India, V. p.33. 
5 Koroma7ldel, pp.22-23; Begin ende Voortgang, 11, Matelief's voyage, p. 75; 
Linschoten, I, pp.82, 89. 
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the Company, with Coromandel as a chief centre of its enterprise, could 
conveniently prospect for trade with other countries round the Bay. 
Besides, the overland routes which connected Coromandel with other 
parts of India offered a chance of securing the products of Gujarat and 
North India without going to the additional expense of opening factories 
with those regions, at least for the time being.6 
Coromandel itself could supply a number of commodities besides cloth 
which were important for the inter-Asian trade. The 'Informatie' given 
to van der Hagen on the occasion of his voyage in 1603 took note of 
the fact that Masulipatam, with its rich hinterland, was very con-
veniently situated for revictualling ships. Two commodities exported 
from Coromandel, namely, iron and steel, were in great demand 
throughout south-east Asia and once trade with the coast was opened, 
the Dutch could also count on a variety of minor items to supplement 
their return cargoes. 
In the period when the Dutch first came into contact with the 
region, north Coromandel, - from the Godavari to the Pennar, - was 
included in the Quth Shahi kingdom of Golconda, one of the five 
Deccan sultanates which arose af ter the disintegration of the Bahmani 
Kingdom. The sultanate of Golconda, the easternmost of the five king-
doms, was established in 1612 and her territory extended roughly from 
the frontiers of Orissa in the north to the Pennar river in the south. 
On the west, it was bounded by the territories of Bijapur and Ahmad-
nagar. Throughout their history, the relationship between the five King-
doms was marked by 'kaleidoscopic alliances and aImost continual war' 
in the course of which Berar was absorbed by Ahmadnagar in 1574 and 
Bidar by Bijapur in 1619. 
With Akbar's attack on Ahmadnagar in 1596 and his subsequent 
annexation of a large part of the kingdom, the Deccan sultanates were 
first brought face to face with the menace of Mughal imperalism. The 
pressure on Ahmadnagar continued during the reign of Jahangir and 
Bijapur entered into a defensive alliance with the sister kingdom. Except 
for occasional pecuniary help to Ahmadnagar, Golconda remained aloof 
from the conflict. For Sultan Muhammad Quli (1580-1612) was con-
cerned more with the Carnatic, Orissa and Bastar, than with the devel-
opments in the north-west. These developments were however fuIl of 
serious implications for Golconda as weIl, a fact which became patent 
in the course of the next half century. 7 
6 De Jonge, 111, p.151; K.A.967, Lodewijk Ysaacx, 'Infonnatie enz.' 
7 C.H.I., 111, Chs. xvi-xvii, IV, pp.260 ff; Relations, pp. xiii ff, 10 and n. 
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The southern part of Coromandel was included in the Vijayanagar 
Empire,8 which was separated from its Muslim neighbours in the north 
by the Krisha and Pennar rivers. Probably founded a little earlier than 
the Bahmani kingdom in the first half of the fourteenth century, this 
Hindu empire of the south became the traditional enemy of the Muslim 
kingdom and its five successor states, some of whom, in their mutual 
struggles, formed an occasional alliance with the Hindu rulers. 
For more than two centuries, the power and wealth of Vijayanagar 
rivalIed those of the greatest empires of the time, until, in 1564--65, a 
confederacy of the Muslim powers, including Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, 
Golconda and Bidar, decisively defeated the Vijayanagar army at 
Rakshasa-Tangadi and destroyed the Hindu capital. Tbe empire never 
really recovered from this blow, though it continued an enfeebled 
existence for several decades, with its capital first at Chandragiri and 
then at Vellor. The Golconda and Bijapur kings, taking advantage of 
Vijayanagar's weakness, made repeated incursion and annexed large 
parts of its northern territories, of ten with the help of the treacherous 
local chieftains. The nayaks or provincial and district governors, the 
commanders of fortresses, the poligars or local chiefs vested with admini-
strative authority, and other hereditary chieftains also gathered power 
during the anarchy which followed the disastrous battle. Pre-eminent 
among such semi-independent feudatories were the nayaks of Gingi, 
Tanjore and Madura, part of whose territories covered a wide tract of 
south Coromandel. Their internecine wars and acts of defiance against 
the feebIe authority of the so-called emperor further weakened the state. 
In the course of his long reign, King Venkata 11 (1586-1612) suc-
ceeded in instilling once more some vigour into the decadent empire. He 
recovered most of the territories captured by Golconda, again pushing 
the frontier nearly as far north as the Krishna river. The attempts of 
many nobles and poligars to carve out independent kingdoms were also 
crushed. So great indeed was his power that du J arric, quoting Pimenta, 
described him as "still one of the most powerful monarchs of Asia'.' But, 
this was really an exaggeration, for his success was by no means unquali-
fied. The Kondavidu district still remained in the hands of Golconda. 
The power of the great nayaks was but little curbed. The Vijayanagar 
empire still remained a congeries of semi-independent principalities 
loosely held together by the suzerainty of an ineffectual overlord, who 
8 In the seventeenth century, the territory governed by the Vijayanagar kings 
was of ten referred to as the 'Carnatic kingdom', which name has been gene-
rally used in the present work. 
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had only a small territory under his direct contro!. Venkata's compara-
tively vigorous rule had merely postponed the total eclipse of the 
empire.9 
Besides the kingdoms of Golconda and Vijayanagar, the Dutch had 
also to reckon with the Portugese settlements of San Thomé and 
Negapatam, situated in the territories of the nayaks of Gingi and 
Tanjore respectively. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese sought 
to dominate the sea-trade of Asia by acquiring possession of a few 
strategic outposts, whence their fleets could control the main sea-routes. 
Their colonies at Malacca in the east and at Goa, Cochin and Colombo 
in the west were considered adequate for the purpose of dominating the 
Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, so that no territories were acquired 
on the east coast of India. Still, in the early decades of the sixteenth 
century, some Portuguese trading settlements grew up along the coast 
which "if not subject to, [were) at least inhabited and defended by the 
Portuguese." Nominally subject to the authority of the local Indian 
governments, these sttlements, - of which only San Thomé and Nega-
patam surived till the early years of the seventeenth century, - were 
independent for all practical purposes, and even had fortresses of their 
own. Besides, there were groups of Portuguese settlers in important 
centres of trade like Masulipatam. Their relations with the local author-
ities were generally friendly and the Dutch, during the early years of 
their trade in Coromandel, had to come up repeatedly against the great 
influence which the Portuguese had with the Indian princes and nobles. 
The relationship of these settlements with Portugal and Goa were some-
what vague and ambiguous. Du Jarric mentions that there was a Cap-
tain of the Coromandel Co ast, subject to the authority of the Viceroy 
at Goa in 1521-22, but does not specify the nature of his functions. 
A letter from the Spanish king in 1620 also refers to the appointment 
of a fidalgo of the royal household to this office. Again, in 1616, 
Viceroy de Azevedo sent Ruy Diaz de Sampayo to appease the prevailing 
disorders in San Thomé. At about this time, Barradas informs us, San 
Thomé liberated itself, taking advantage of the confusion which followed 
the death of King Venkata II in 1614 and the Viceroy of Goa took 
possession of it in the name of the king of Spain. The accuracy of this 
statement is however open to question. Methwold's assertion, th at the 
Coromandel Portuguese "neither assist in person or contribution the 
9 Purchas, X, pp.210, 217; du farric, pp.555 ff, 566; Relations, pp. xiv, xvi, 
2-3; Sewell, pp.211-12; Vijayanagar History, I, chs. xxiii-xxiv. 
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genera! affaires of India, but are, with their consorts the Portugals 
inhabiting Bengals, accounted Levantadoes del Rey,lO exempted from 
their Princes protection", seems to be nearer the truth. Following the 
establishment of the Dutch in Coromandel, Madrid and Goa took more 
interest in these outlying settlements in a combined effort to oust the 
hated rivals, but San Thomé and Negapatam do not appear to have 
been brought under any direct control of the Viceroy even then. ll 
Many of the problems which the Dutch had to face in Coromandel 
are traceable to the administrative conditions of the region. Here, again, 
there were basic differences between the southern and northern parts of 
the coast. 
Golconda was governed by an autocratie ruler who possessed a fair 
measure of centralized authority, though the degree of centralization and 
the extent of royal power depended largelyon the personality of the 
king. The king was assisted by a number of high functionaries with 
wide powers but ill-defined functions. The king's chief minister was 
known as the peshwa or peshwa-i-kul. Next to him, there was the mir 
jumla whose title literally meant "the chief of the collections". Strictly 
his office was that of finance minister, but his duties of ten embraced 
police and military functions. Similarly, the sar-i-khail, or chief of 
cavalry, had to discharge civil and revenue functions as weIl. Thus 
there was no clear demarcation between the functions of the three 
highest officers of the state and occasionally the same person held more 
than one of these offices at the same time. Such a system could lead 
to an extreme concentration of authority and render one man all-
powerful in the kingdom for a time, as was the case when the famous 
Mir Muhammad Sayyid became mir jumla. The king was also assisted 
by a council of advisers called the majlis, the members of which were 
known as majlisian. Then there was the larger body of courtiers or atten-
dants called mulaziman, many of whom enjoyed considerable power and 
influence in proportion to the degree of royal favour bestowed on them. 
For administrative purposes, the country was divided into districts or 
mahals, administered by governors called sar-samts. Apparently there 
were exceptions to this system and some regions were placed under the 
authority of military commandants called sar-i-lashkar. The districts 
10 Probably means 'rebels against the King.' 
11 Relations, pp. xx, 2n, 3, 5, 53, 69; Sewell, pp.230-31 ; PUTehas, X pp.l08--9; 
Gasparo Balbi, Viaggio dell' lndie Orientali (Venice, 1590), pp.81 ff; du 
JarTie, pp.518ff, 503ff, 548-49; Faria l' Sousa, 11, p.501, 111, p.249; 
intra, Chs. 11 and IJL 
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were divided into smaller administrative units governed by havaldars 
or local governors. 12 
Thus Masulipatam, administered by a havaldar, was a part of the 
larger district, Mustafanagar, governed by a sar-samt. The havaldar of 
Masulipatam, as the governor of the chief port in the kingdom, had a 
special importance and his office was of ten a stepping-stone to higher 
posts in the central government. Two other officials who were important 
in the local administration were the kot wal or the chief police officer 
of the town and the shahbandar, or the officer in charge of the port. 
The administration of the district and smaller units was closely linked 
up with the system of revenue-farming or chuda-dari. In theory, appar-
ently, there was no necessary connection between the farming of revenue 
and the governorship of an administrative unit, but in actual practice 
the governorships were auctioned annually as a revenue-farm and given 
to the highest bidder. A specified amount of the revenue was granted 
to the governor for the maintenance of his position and for the payment 
of those employed in the administration. Besides, he was free to keep 
for himself everything above the amount for which he had contracted. 
As there was little interference with the governor's administration so 
long as he paid the revenue, this system inevitably encouraged rack-
renting and violent oppression. The short and insecure ten ure of their 
office made the governors indifferent to the misery of the people under 
them. And the fear of heavy punishment or even execution in case of 
failure to pay the revenue at the end of the year urged them to still 
greater severity. The fact th at the governor's subordinates seldom 
received cash, but were "paid in unhusked rice, salt, or some other 
grain, reckoned at one-third at least above the true value," created a 
whole class of petty tyrants who added to the burdens of the poor. At 
times the governor would lease out the revenue-farms to other people 
at rates higher t:han what he had contracted for and such lesees in their 
turn would, of course, try to extort as much as they possibly could from 
the subjects. The system of farming was introduced into the sphere of 
trade and commerce as weIl, the right to trade in particular commodities 
or, later, with the European companies, being of ten farmed out to a few 
merchants as a monopoly. The reckless quest for immediate gain which 
resulted from the system of revenue-farming was the chief source of 
1'2 The Dutch referred to the sar-samt and havaldar as 'gr('at govemor' and 
'govemor' respectively. In the present work the tenn 'govemor' has been used 
for the officer in charge of the district and 'local govemor' for the officer in 
charge of the smaller administrative unit. 
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the troubles of the English and Dutch companies who had to wage a 
continuous struggle against the illegitimate demands and restrictive 
measures of the local authorities or buy their favours through expensive 
presents. 
In contrast to the rapacious local officers, the central government, 
eager to foster sea-borne commerce, was friendly and liberal in its 
attitude to foreign traders and complaints usually received a favourable 
hearing at the court. Missions to Golconda were however an expensive 
business and the European traders had to contend with obstructive 
governors and their influential friends at the capital.13 
The chief point where the administration of Vijayanagar in the seven-
teenth century differed from that of Golconda was that in the Hindu 
state centralised administration had practically disappeared. The admin-
istrative structure of the Vijayanagar empire, once held together by the 
personal ability of great rulers, contained seeds of disruption even in its 
best days. The provincial administration then had for its pivot a 
military officer called durga-dannaik, who maintained law and order 
from a number of forts under his commando The durga-dannaiks were 
recruited from a class of nobles called amaranayakas who held lands by 
military tenure (amaram), paying stipulated tribute and maintaining 
troops for the king. True, the amaranayakas were tenants at will and 
the durga-dannaiks held their office at the king's pleasure. But once 
defeat in war had weakened the hands of the central authority, the 
nobles and military governors, firmly entrenched in their forts and 
landed estates, wielded supreme power in their respective territories 
and not even the vigorous rule of Venkata 11 could effect any basic 
change in the situation. The poligars in the south also acquired a simiIar 
position of independence, though the nominal suzerainty of the king at 
Vellor continued to be recognized throughout the empire. 
The internal administration of the semi-autonomous principalities into 
which the bulk of the empire now disintegrated have so far defied 
attempts at reconstruction. It is only known that much of the confusion 
prevalent in southern India during the seventeenth century was due to 
the mutual struggles of these chieftains and feudatories. The nayaks 
with whom the Dutch came into contact in the early days of their trade 
in south Coromandel were those of Gingi and Tanjore. Pulicat, where 
13 For the administration of Golconda, see "Some Aspects of the Qutb Shahi 
Administration of Golconda", Journalof the Bihar Research Society, 1944j 
Relations, pp. xvii, 10-11, 54, 55-7, 77, 79, 81-3 j Floris, pp. xxii, 14 ff, 
17,19, 114-15j Th/venot, p.131j infra, Oh. 111. 
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the Company eventually established its chief factory, was in the territory 
directly controlled by the king and ruled at the time by a female 
governor, Condama, on behalf of a queen to whom the port town had 
been granted as a privy-purse. 
The system of revenue-farming, so widely prevalent in Golconda, was 
not unknown in the Hindu territory. Even in the old days, the revenue 
in many pI aces was farmed out to con tractors and the nayaks imitated 
the central government in this matter. In the seventeenth century we 
of ten find the great Hindu merchants taking large areas in lease in a 
way which suggests that a certain measure of governmental authority 
devolved on the revenue-farmers, but in the south the system never 
became so universal as in Golconda. The condition of the subjects, 
however, was not any better for that reason, as the system of taxation 
was extortionate in the extreme. There was little to choose between the 
kings and the nayaks in this respect and mass migration by the peasants 
was about the only check on governmental rapacity. The European 
companies had however a comparatively easy time in the south, because 
both the king and the nayaks, unlike the temporary gevernor-farmers of 
Golconda, were interested in developing the overseas trade of their 
country. 14 
Coromandel, like the rest of India, had a predominantly agricultural 
economy, but its pattern was not uniform throughout the region. North 
CoromandeI, - particularly the Masulipatam area and regions further 
north, - produced rich harvests of food crops, mainly rice, miIIets, and 
some wheat, which were exported in large quantities to other parts of 
the country. The region south of the Pennar, on the other hand, 
appears to have been a chronically deficit area and had to import 
provisions from north Coromandel and Orissa. Besides food crops, the 
coast also produced a quantity of dye-crops, used for dyeing textile 
products. Of these, indigo was grown in several parts of the country, but 
the products of the Masulipatam and Tierepopelier areas were con-
sidered the best. Chay-roots, used as red dye, came mainly from Pulicat 
and Petapuli and the best quality stuff was produced in Tambreve, a 
small island off Petapuli. The other chief agricultural products included 
tobacco, grown largerly for export, and cotton which was mostly pro-
duced in the inland areas. Provisions were cheap throughout the region 
even by contemporary standards. 
14 N. V. Ramanayya, Studies in the History of the Third Dyna;ty of Vijayana-
gam, (Madras, 1935), Chs. IV and V; Sewell, pp.213-214; B. A. Saletore, 
Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire (Madras, 1934), I, 
pp.329, 330, 354, 378, 379. 
10 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
Iron, steel and saltpetre constituted the chief mineral wealth of Coro-
mandel. Diamonds from the Gingi district and the Kollur mines in 
Golconda reached the coastal markets and eventually became, for some 
time, one of the chief exports of the Dutch. Bezoar stones, a supposed 
antidote for poison extracted from goats and some other animaIs, was 
also of some value as an export,15 
Among the industrial products of Coromandel, cloth was by far the 
most important and much in demand, not only in the local markets, but 
in most pi aces which had trade connections with the coast. The factory 
records of the seventeenth century mention a bewildering variety of 
names for the different types of cloth manufactered at the time. All 
these varieties, however, may be classified under two main heads: piece-
goods and ready-made clothing. The piece-goods, - sold either by the 
'piece' of conventional size, or by the 'corge', that is the score of pieces, 
- were plain cotton cloth marketed either brown, bleached or dyed 
red or blue. The two chief varieties were calico, a stout cloth, and 
muslin, which was thinner. These were "produced in various qualities, 
depending on the fineness of the yam, and the number of threads to 
the inch." Besides, Coromandel produced a quantity of sail-cloth, mainly 
for local consumption. Ready-made clothing which involved little tai-
loring, was also made of calico and musIin, but, unlike the piece-goods, 
was generally pattemed. The pattems were at times produced by the use 
of coloured yams, but it was more common to print them with wooden 
blocks or paint with a pen or stile. The printed variety was known as 
chintz and the painted as pintadoes or simply 'painted' cloth, the crafts-
men who produced the pattems on the latter being called 'painters' . 
Coromandel was famous for her 'painted' cloth which was the chief 
variety of pattemed cloth produced in this region. 
The most important article of clothing exported from Coromandel 
was the tapi or skirt, widely used by both sexes in south-east Asia. 
Shawls, turbans and sashes also had good market abroad. Textile pro-
duction had developed a certain amount of localisation in this period, 
and though both plain and pattemed goods were available throughout 
the coast, Golconda was the chief source of supply for the former while 
south Coromandel produced the best pintadoes.16 
15 Relations, pp.xxviiiff, 8, 32, 34ff, 54ff, 61, 68, 77; Purchas, X, p.I72. 
18 Relations, pp. xvii ff, 52 ff, 64, 80; Floris, pp. xix ff; Terpstra, "De Neder-
landers in Voor-Indie bij de stichting van het fort Geldria te Paliacatta". 
De Indische Gids, 1915. 
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Besides cloth, Coromandel also produced a fair amount of cotton 
yam, cordage and gun-powder, Masulipatam was the chief centre for 
the manufacture of gun-powder. Cordage, manufactured from coir, was 
available in quantities sufficient to meet the full requirements of the 
local ships. Naraspurpeta in north Golconda was the centre of a 
flourishing ship-building industry, and many Indian and Portuguese 
merchants built their ships there.17 
Industrial production in Coromandel, as in other parts of India, was 
mainly carried on by individual artisans working in their own homes. 
William Methwold referred somewhat vaguely to master workmen, who, 
apparently, had craftsmen working under them. Such a system, even if 
known, appears to have been rather exceptional. Normally the poor 
artisan, provided with very little capital, was largely dependent on 
advances from the buyers who could thus dictate the nature, quality 
and quantity of the goods produced. A full-fledged putting out system, 
involving a deep penetration of capital into production organization 
had not, however, emerged. The merchant or middleman buyer who 
advanced a part of the required capital remained outside the production 
machinery, being solely interested in the finished product. For enter-
prises which required comparatively large-scale organisation, as in 
diamond-mining, individual merchants employed an adequate number 
of labourers to work for them. The organisation of the ship-building 
industry at the time is unknown. Moreland, however, suggested that a 
merchant requiring a great ship probably "had to arrange the whole 
business himself... or at least to organise the services of contractors 
for all the separate branches into which the undertaking was divided." 18 
The rudimentary character of the production organisation and the 
poverty of the artisan which allowed little scope for the growth of 
inventories had an important bearing on the organisation of trade. 
Anyone wanting to make large purchase had to give advance in cash. 
The European companies had to procure their supplies mostly through 
the big merchants of the coastal towns, many of whom possessed vast 
resources and participated in overseas trade on a fairly extensive scale. 
In the south, the great merchant princes were Chettis or Hindus of the 
Komati caste, but in Golconda most of the richer merchants appear to 
have been Muslims, and were of ten of Persian origin. The big mer-
chants, whether procuring for themselves or for the European Com-
17 Relations, pp.63, 64. 
18 Relations, pp. xvii, 27; Floris, pp. xxiff; Moreland, India at the Death of 
Akbar, (London, 1920), pp.151 ff, 184-88; Tavemier, 11, pp.75 ff. 
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panies, were largely dependent on the Komati middlemen who, in the 
words of Methwold, 'by themselves or their servants, travell into the 
country, gathering up callicoes from the we avers, and other commodities 
which they sell againe in greater parcels in the port townes to merchant 
strangers, tak.ing their commodities in barter or at a price.' At times the 
big traders directly advanced money to the artisans or peasants, instead 
of operating through middlemen. 
The nobles and high officers of ten participated in trade, a fact which 
proved to be a source of many troubles to the Dutch. At times the 
govemors imposed their monopoly on some branch of local trade: at 
Petapuli, for instance, chay-roots were a monopoly of the govemor. As 
has been eXplained later in this volume, much of the trading by nobles 
and officials was in the nature of feudal exploitation 19 rather than 
usual commercial activity. 
Another problem connected with trade was the high rate of interest 
which could be as much as 4 % to 5 % a month. 20 Whether this was 
owing to an absolute scarcity of liquid capital or an excessively high 
demand for the same is not quite clear. As the Jan Company suffered 
from a serious shortage of capital needed for its investments on the coast 
during the early years of its activity, the high interest rate had an 
inhibiting influence on its volume of trade. 
Coromandel textiles provided the staple for a flourishing export trade 
and large quantities of plain and pattemed cloth were regularly shipped 
to all Asian countries which had direct trade connections with the coast. 
The demand for Coromandel cloth in Asian countries was highly 
specialised in nature. A particular market would only consurne certain 
specific varieties of cloth which were of ten manufactured exclusively in 
some specialised centres of production in Coromandel. Besides cloth, 
the Red Sea port of Mokha received supplies of rice, tobacco, rattan, 
iron, steel, indigo, benzoin and lac which eventually reached various 
parts of Arabia. Indigo, sent overland to the west coast, was shipped 
thence to Persia. Among the countries to the east, Arakan imported 
tobacco, iron and steel from Coromandel while quantities of cotton 
yarn were exported to Pegu and TenasserÏm. From Tenasserim, Coro-
mandel textiles and yams were carried overland to the interior of Siam. 
Iron, steel, and rice were exported to Achin, Tiku and Priaman on the 
19 The term 'feudal' has been used throughout this volume in the limited sense 
of a system wherein the producer is subject to non-economie demands. 
20 Relations, pp.16, 35, 78; Floris, ff. xxi-xxii; K.A.976, Lodewyk Ysaacx, 
"Informatie enz." 
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Sumatra coast and to }'·falacca, Queda and Perak in the Malay 
Peninsuia. Further east, in Java and the Spice Islands, there was a large 
market for Coromandel cloth, which was also regularly shipped in 
quantities to Ceylon and the Maldives and, along the coast, to Bengal. 
The demand for imported commodities was limited and inflexible, 
though in the context of the poverty of the masses, the total volume and 
variety of imports were not negligible. Cash specie and precious metals, 
used for minting coins, hoarding and purposes of display, were the 
commodities chiefly in demand. Besides, there was a ready market for 
a limited quantity of metals like copper and tin, used for manufacturing 
utensils, spices, pepper, several types of dye-woods and scented wood 
and a variety of luxury goods. 
The return cargo from Mokha mainly consisted of cash specie, -
Turkish sultanis and Spanish riais, - besides Arab horses and a fine 
cloth called camlet. From Arakan came gold, lac, and rice, while Pegu 
provided rubies, sapphires, large quantities of gold, some tin and quick-
silver, the best lac and large earthen-ware jars called Martabans af ter 
their pi ace of origin. Tin, eagle-wood, sappan wood used for dyeing, 
and various Chinese ware like porcelain, silk, aloes, satins, damascene 
etc. were imported from Siam via Tenasserim. Achin and the other 
Sumatra ports supplied pepper, benzoin, camphor, brimstone as also 
several products of China. Tin and sulphur were among the chief 
imports from the Malay Peninsuia while the islands further east sup-
plied pepper, spices, sandal wood, tortoroise-shell etc. Coir, used for 
manufacturing cordage, came from Ceylon and the Maldives, while 
Bengal and the Orissa coast supplied provisions, sugar, and certain 
varieties of cloth. 
The participation of Indian merchants in the trade between Coro-
mandel and other parts of Asia was confined to certain regions. The 
trade between Coromandel and Mokha was apparently monopolised by 
the Indian merchants, while both Indian and Portuguese traders of the 
coast took part in the commerce with other countries round the Bay 
of Bengal. As Malacca was a Portuguese possession where heavy tolls 
had to be paid, the Indian ships usually sailed to Queda and Perak on 
the Malay Peninsuia and to Achin, Tiku and Priaman in Sumatra, 
places controlled by Asian princes. Ships of Asian merchants from 
Arakan, Siam, Malay and Sumatra also sailed regularly to Coromandel 
in quest of cloth and other merchandise. The local princes of these 
countries of ten took a direct part in the trade with the east coast of 
India. The direct contact between Coromandel and China had practi-
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cally ceased, but Chinese traders still sailed regularly to Siam, Malay 
and the islands of the Indian Ocean as far as Sumatra and the required 
supplies of Chinese ware were secured from these places. Coromande!'s 
trade with Java and the islands further east in this period, however, 
seems to have been entirely in the hands of the Portuguese, who had 
successfully imposed a monopoly on all trade with the Spice Islands. 
Their trade throughout Asia was in decline and this must have adversely 
affected the volume of Coromandel's trade with the Indies. In this 
period, the Goa Portuguese procured only small quantities of Coro-
mande! cloth for buying spices in the Indies. Hence, it appears, that 
the chief trade between Coromandel and the islands of the Archipelago 
(excepting Sumatra, regularly visited by Indian traders ) consisted in 
the export of textiles etc. by the Coromandel Portuguese who secured 
in exchange commodities for the coast market only, and not for export 
to Europe. The volume of such trade could not have been very consider-
able. The Dutch East India Company was destined to play a significant 
role in this particular sector of India's commerce.21 
21 For Coromandel's overseas trade, see Relations, pp. xix-xx 4, 36 Cf; 52, 55, 
59ff, 69; Floris, pp.xxv, 116; Sewell, op. cit., pp.210-211; Moreland, 
op. cit., pp.197, 201, 210-11; Terpstra, p.IS. 
CHAPTER 11 
TUE FlRST PHASE, 1605-1629 
I 
1605-1616 
The interest of the Dutch in the Coromandel coast, if we are to 
believe Valentijn, dates back to 1603 when Zebald de Waard, Vice-
Admiral in the fleet of Admiral Wybrand van Warwyk, planned a 
voyage to this region. On his premature death at the hands of the king 
of Kandi, his successor Jacob Pietersz visited the coast with a ship. 
Though this account is not corroborated by any documentary evidence, 
an anonymous memoir in Dutch on Indian textiles dated 1603 mentions 
incidentally the author's commercial experiences in Coromandel. Thus 
it seems certain that even before the East India Company established 
îts first factories on the coast, individu al Dutch merchants, probably 
representatives of the 'Pre-Companies', had come into contact with the 
region. 22 
In 1603, the United East India Company of Netherlands sent a fleet 
to the east under Admiral Steven van der Haghen. In February, 1605, 
the yacht Delft, one of the fifteen ships in van der Haghen's fleet, sailed 
from Achin under the command of Paulus van Soldt and arrived at 
Masulipatam in the spring of the same year. With the help of a Jewish 
resident of Golconda named Assalan, van Soldt soon secured for the 
Dutch the right to trade at Masulipatam and several employees of the 
Company, with Pieter Ysaacx as the chief, were left by van Soldt at 
Masulipatam to organise the Company's trade there. 
In 1606, van Soldt made a second voyage to Coromandel from 
Bantam in the yacht Delft. It was during this voyage that the Dutch 
first came into contact with the south Coromande1 port of Pulicat, the 
22 Valentijn, V, 1, p. 57; G. P. Rouffaer and H. H. Juynboll, De Batik-kunst 
in Nederlandsch-lndie en haar geschiedenis, Bijlage 111, p. xiii; Begin ende 
Voortgang, I, Warwyk's voyage, pp.13 ff; Floris, pp. xix ff. 
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future seat of the Company's chief factory on the coast. Negotiations 
for opening trade there was broken off af ter it had made some progress, 
because the Dutch suspected a conspiracy between the local people and 
the Portuguese. Sailing further north, the Delft came to the port of 
Petapuli or Nizampatam in Golconda, where an agreement was presently 
concluded with the local governor. Thereby, the Dutch were granted 
freedom of trade at Petapuli, the toll being fixed at 4 % for both 
import and export, and there the Company presently established its 
first factory on the coast. Van Soldt next went to Masulipatam, where 
he found the Company's men involved in a conflict with the local 
governor, who demanded a toll of about 12 % on an average. To settle 
this vexatious question van Soldt and under-factor Pieter Willemsz 
went on amission to the court of Golconda and there, with the mir 
jumla's help, secured a farman from the king in August 1606, fixing the 
toll at 4 % for both import and export throughout the kingdom of 
Golconda. Further, as an exceptional favour, the Dutch were exempted 
from the chhap-dalali, i.e. stamp duty on cloth, which came to about 
12 % and had to be paid by all other traders including the king's 
subjects. Fortified by the royal farman, the Dutch now established a 
factory at Masulipatam.23 
An invidious trade privilege, giving a foreign monopolistic company 
an obvious advantage in competition even with local merchants, was 
thus secured in the earliest stage of the Dutch activities on the coast. 
Much of their subsequent effort was directed towards the extension of 
such privileges as an aid to their all-out attempt to secure an exclusive 
con trol on the local buyer's market. The eagerness of the political 
authorities to interest the Europeans in local trade appears to have been 
ubiquitous. Concessions involving immediate sacrifice of income were 
evidently expected to yield in the long run an increased revenue from 
an expanding trade. Only the local officials, of ten without any long 
term interest in the region that they temporarily governed, were eager 
to treat the companies as milch cows even at the risk of alienating them 
permanently. The desire to maximise the immediate income, with no 
thought for the consequences, was built into the system of revenue 
farming, an extreme form of feudal exploitation. Even the trading 
activities of the nobles and officials, protected from competition through 
28 For the voyage of the Delft and the establishment of the first factories, see 
Begin ende Voortgang, 11, Steven van der Haghen's second voyage, pp.40 ff; 
de Jonge, 111, pp.202, 213, 282 ff; Heercs, I, pp.45-6; Nederlandsch Indie, 
111, pp.53;; McLeod, I, pp. 54ff; Koromandel, eh. 11. 
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the use of political power, were in essence directly exploitative rather 
than an effort to seek profit through trade. The Company's chief 
problem, hence, was to establish trading rights, preferably exclusive, in 
the face of multiform feudal exploitation. 
For some time the two factories at Masulipatam and Petapuli, 
administered by Pieter Ysaacx and Dirk van Leeuwen respectively, were 
independent of each other, though consultations regarding commercial 
matters were quite frequent. In 1607, the mutual independence of tbe 
two factories was abolished and it was laid down that the head of each 
factory would preside in turn for a month over the Company's affairs 
in Coromandel. A further important change took place in 1608 when, 
by a decision of the General Council at Bantam, Pieter Ysaacx, the chief 
factor at Masulipatam, was made the "General head over both the 
places," Petapuli being placed under the authority of Masulipatam, 
despite the strong disapproval of the local factors. 24 This was an early 
manifestation of a tendency towards centralised con trol, an obvious 
necessity if a common trade policy was to be followed along the entire 
coast. 
Meanwhile, the situation at Masulipatam had not been very easy 
for the Duteh. Extortionate demands of the local officials and their 
desire for the monopolistic exploitation of the local market, - familiar 
phenomena in the 17th century trade history of India, - were at the 
root of the trouble. As the price for the ratification of the royal farman, 
Sidappa, the local governor, forced the Company to lend him 3000 
pagodas without interest. Hardly had he paid back the amount when, 
in 1607, he seized all the merchandise on board the Groote Sonne, worth 
about 100,000 florins, and demanded a fresh loan of 20,000 pagodas as 
the condition for releasing the cargo. Eventually Pieter Ysaacx had to 
grant a loan of 8,000 pagodas, and also to concede the demand that in 
future all duty-free goods imported by the Dutch would be sold 
exclusively to the local governor and the shahbandar. These troubles 
help up the Company's trade for three valuable months. Besides, only 
a fraction of the fresh loan granted to the havaldar was ever recovered, 
because the local governorship was farmed out to another person next 
year.25 
Before long, the new havaldar, Pylappa, encouraged by the example 
24 De Jonge, 111, pp.46 ff, 221, 282 ff, 287 ff; K.A.967, L. Ysaacx, "Memorye 
etc.", Bantam, 1.11.1608. 
25De Jonge, 111, pp.282ff; K.A.967, L. Ysaacx, 'Memorye', 1.11.1608, P. 
Ysaacx and van Wesick to Verhoeff, 14.1.1608, P. Ysaacx to I'Hermite, 
12.11.1608, 31.5.1608. 
Verh. dl. 38 2 
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of his predecessor, asked for a sizeable loan from the Dutch and when 
this was refused, demanded that the Company should pay stamp duty 
from which it had been specifically exempted by the royal farman. 
Eventually, chief factor van Wesick went to Golconda to place his 
complaints before the king. But, through Pylappa's machinations, he 
had to come back in January, 1610, leaving the question of stamp 
duties unsettled. 26 
At Petapuli, conditions were less uncongenial than at Masulipatam. 
But there, again, the local governor exercised an exclusive con trol over 
trade in a manner which severely restricted the Company's activities. 
The bulk of the red cloth, which constituted the chief attraction of the 
Petapuli trade, was purchased by the havaldar on the plea that he had 
to supply every year 1000 pieces of this particular variety of cloth to 
the king, who sent them to the Shah of Persia for the use of the 
latter's army. The famous Tambreve chay-roots were also a monopoly 
of the local governor. For the bulk of their trade at Petapuli, the Dutch 
had to enter into contracts with the havaldar himself or secure his 
express permission for dealing with local merchants, some of whom 
could trade with the company only in secret. In 1609, the havaldar, 
imitating the ways of his Masulipatam colleague, demanded 4,000 
pagodas as 'gate-money', i.e., additional toll on the Company's pur-
chases which came from outside the town, but the offer of a present 
soon pacified him.27 
Simultaneously with their efforts to consolidate their position in Gol-
conda, the Dutch were looking for new trade prospects in south Coro-
mande!. The great demand for Pulicat cloth in the spice islands was the 
chief reason for this venture. True, the Company did profitably secure 
quantities of Pulicat pintadoes through Khwaza Soheyder, their middle-
man at Petapuli, but it was evident that a direct contact with the souree 
of supply would considerably augment the profits. The establishment of 
trading posts in the Hindu territory would also render the Company 
less dependent on the favours of the Golconda havaldars, and a factory 
at centrally situated Pulicat would enable the Company to exploit fully 
the commercial opportunities both in north and south Coromande1.2B 
~II K.A.967, van Wesick and Schorer from Bhagnagar, 11.11.1609, 28.11.1609, 
Ysaacx and van Wesick to "Seignores N.N.", 1.2.1610, van Wesick to Masu-
lipatam, 19.10.1609. 
27 Baldaeus, p.161; K.A.967, L. Ysaacx, "Informatie etc.", van Wesick and 
Schorer from Bhagnagar, 11.11.1609, van Wesick from Bhagnagar, 24.11.1609. 
28 K.A.967, van Wesick to Ysaacx, 6.5.1608, 26.6.1608, van Wesick to Masu-
lipatam, 25.7.1608, Ysaacx and van Wesick to Verhoeff, 14.11.1608. 
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In 1608, the yachts Arent and Valek of Admiral Verhoeff's neet, 
sent to the coast under the command of Jacob de Bitter, were driven 
by contrary winds to Tegenapatam in Gingi territory. The local gover-
nor of Tegenapatam invited the Dutch to open trade there, but as 
de Bitter was not authorised to accept such offers, he could only 
promise to refer the matter to Admiral Verhoeff. De Bitter returned to 
Tegenapatam in November, 1608 and within a few days a Dutch mis-
sion to Gingi secured from the nayak a kaul permitting the Dutch to 
re-build the fallen Portuguese fortress at Tegenapatam and fixing the 
import and export duties at 4 %. The provisions required for the 
factory and all gold imported by the Company were exempted from 
duty.29 
The Tegenapatam fort, granted to the Dutch, was found uninhab-
itable and the Company decided instead to open its factory at the 
neighbouring township of Tierepopelier (Tirupapuliyur). Bourgonje 
was appointed chief of the new factory. The 'great Aya', who was the 
nayak's chief minister, guaranteed in writing that the painters, weavers 
and merchants along the entire Gingi coast would be free to deal with 
the Dutch without paying any tolls. The new factory, situated so far 
from the northern establishments, enjoyed a position of complete 
independence, a fact which was resented by the northern factors. 30 
Soon af ter the establishment of the Tierepopelier factory, the Dutch 
came into conflict with the 'great Aya' who 'borrowed' for a time some 
labourers working for the Company and practically kept them under 
arrest, thus holding up the work of the factory. The labourers were 
eventually allowed to return, but the Aya persisted in his refusal to let 
the Dutch continue the work of constructing a fort on the plea that the 
Carnatic king might object to it. In the spring of 1610, the Tierepopelier 
factors received instructions from Bantam to seek a renewal of the 
contract with the nayak and strengthen the defences of the factory. 
Accordingly the contract was renewed on March 29, 1610 and a building 
constructed for the safe-keeping of ammunition and merchandise. The 
toU payable by the Company was now reduced to 2 % for both export 
and import and the 'great Aya' undertook to force all weavers and 
29K.A.967, Ysaacx and van Wesick to Verhoeff, 14.11.1608, Bourgonje to 
Verhoeff, 12.12.1609, Bourgonje to l'Hermite May, 1610; Heeres, I, p.55; 
de Jonge, 111, 280 ff; Nederlandsch In die, 111, pp.64-65; MacLeod, I, 
pp.91 ff. 
ao K.A.967, Bourgonje to Ysaacx, 6.2.1609, same to l'Hermite, May, 1610, 
Bourgonje and Marcelis to North Coromandel, 16.2.1609, l'Hermite to 
Amsterdam, 10.11.1610, van Wesick to Bantam, 15.6.1609. 
20 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
painters to keep their contracts with the Dutch. More important still, 
the Portuguese and all other European nations were excluded from the 
Tegenapatam area, and the Aya promised to help the Company against 
its enemies. The Dutch were also given the right to trade at Porto Novo 
to the south of Pondichery. The Company, on its side, promised to 
supply the Aya at cost price all commodities from lands under its con-
trol. Tbe Aya and the nayak aIso reserved the right to buy sulphur 
from the Dutch before all other merchants. Indian ships saiIing with 
passes from the chief factor of Tierepopelier were to be allowed to go 
unmolested by the Dutch and the chief factor would be practically 
obliged to grant passes if the Aya wanted them for his own purpose. 
The contract is significant for more tban one reason: it indicates tbe 
increasing interest of the chiefs and nobles in trade as also their power 
to reduce the rigours of the passport system enforced much more rigidly 
in the days of Portuguese ascendency. 
It further indicates the willingness of Indian authorities to help a 
foreign company in enforcing the observance of contracts which were 
not by themselves a continuous incentive to production. A second Dutch 
mission to Gingi which followed returned with a letter from the nayak 
to the 'Duke of Holland' promising scrupulous observance of the con-
tract and requesting that ships he sent regularly to Tegenapatam.31 
The year 1610 witnessed another important landmark in the career 
of the Dutch Company in Coromandel. Plans to open trade with 
Pulicat, which had failed in 1606, were now once more taken up in 
earnest. The ka uI eventually granted by the Carnatic king closely resem-
bied the one secured for Tegenapatam: it conferred on tbe Company 
the right to construct a stone warehouse at Pulicat for merchandise and 
ammunition, fixed tbe duties at 2 % for both import and export and 
required the Company to supply at cost price any article ordered by 
the king from territories under its control.32 
In May, 1610, Maertssen and Fontaine went on amission to Vellor 
at the king's request for further negotiations. At the Carnatic capital 
tbe Company's representatives were accorded aregal reception ; but 
due to the machination of some Portuguese missionaries, matters did 
not proceed very smoothly, and it was only af ter considerable manoeu-
vring that the Dutch could induce the king to stick to his earlier decision 
31 K.A.967, 'Memorie', Bantam, 15.10.1609, Fontaine to l'Hermite, 31.5.1610, 
Nayak of Gingi to 'Duke of Holland', 22.4.1610; de Jonge, 111, pp.345 ff. 
32 K.A.967, Marcelis to Amsterdam, 31.5.1610; Heeres, I, pp.83 ff; de Jonge, 
111, pp.384 ff; Nederlandsch In die, 111 p.21O; MacLeod, I, pp.93-94. 
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and let them establish a factory at Pulicat. Hans Marcelis was now 
appointed chief factor at Pulicat, with four other employees to assist 
him.33 
Conflict with local officials, already a familiar phenomenon in north 
Coromandel, complicated matters for the Dutch at Pulicat as weIl. For 
a while, Indian traders were forbidden to have any dealings with them 
and the factory was besieged by sóldiers. One night Marcelis and his 
subordinates were thrashed by the shahbandar's men and the factory 
was plundered by the local people. The Dutch themselves were appar-
ently responsible for these troubles to some extent and they tried to 
placate Condama, the shahbandar's mother, by giving her presents. But 
the king, vexed by the reports of troubles, asked Condama to bring her 
son and the Dutch representatives to VeIlor.34 
The second Dutch mission to Vellor had to wait long before it was 
granted audience on August 30, 1610, when the king promised to 
redress the Company's grievances by appointing a new shahbandar. 
Meanwhile Portuguese emissaries were active at the Vellor court and 
the king was somewhat swayed by their plea that the trade of San 
Thomé would suffer if the Dutch were allowed to trade at Pulicat. The 
Company's representatives, however, turned down the king's request 
that the Dutch should adandon Pulicat and establish their factory at 
some other place, and their firmness eventually defeated the Portuguese 
machinations. Furthermore, the toU at Pulicat was reduced from 2 % to 
lY:z % and the neighbouring village of Averipaque [Kaveripak] was 
granted to the Company.35 
Soon afterwards, important changes were introduced in the organi-
sation of the coast factories. It had been felt for some time that the 
relations between the northern and southern factories were dangerously 
loose, specially in view of the oppressive ways of the local officers and 
the constant threat from the Portuguese. As a way out of this problem, 
the Council of the Indies at Bantam decided on December 3, 1610 to 
unify the administration of the four factories into one Directorate. Van 
Wesick, who had succeeded Pieter Ysaacx as the chief of the northern 
factories earlier in the year, was appointed the first Director of the 
33 K.A.967, Fontaine to l'Hermite, 31.5.1610, Marcelis to l'Hermite, 30.5.1610, 
Resolution on board the Cleyne Sonne, 29.4.1610. 
34 K.A.967, Marcelis and Fontaine to van Wesick, 30.7.1610, Resolution, Pulicat 
Council, 1.8.1610. 
35 K.A.967, Marcelis and Fontaine to van Wesick, 7.9.1610, 8.10.1610, same to 
l'Hermite, 23.11.1610. 
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coast factories and ordered to take up his residence at Pulicat which 
now became the Company headquarters (hoofdkantoor) in Coromandel. 
The yacht H asewindt, which had arrived from Europe with the news 
of the twelve year's truce, was sent from Bantam to Coromandel under 
the command of Wemmer van Berchem with detailed instructions 
regarding the proposed changes in administration. Further, as an eco-
nomy measure, the Petapuli establishment was to be curtailed as far as 
practicabie, if not altogether abandoned.36 With the appointment in 
1610 of one Director at the head of the Coromandel factories, the 
initial period of organisation came to an end. 
In June, 1612, the Pulicat factory was sacked by the Portuguese, soon 
af ter Wemmer van Berchem assumed charge as the Director of the coast 
factories. 37 A few months later some employees or the Company re-
tumed to Pulicat, encouraged by its leading citizens. In October, 1612, 
van Berchem led amission to the Carnatic capital, as a result of which 
a new ka ui was granted by the king on December 12, 1612. The chief 
feature of this agreement was an undertaking on part of the king to 
complete the new castle started by the Dutch at Pulicat at the expense 
of Queen Obayama [Abhayamma?], the owner of the town, on con-
dition that the Company should equally share the possession with him. 
Besides, the toll for Pulicat was fixed at 1 Y:z % for import and 2 % for 
export, and the Dutch were authorised to freely damage the Portuguese 
anywhere in the king's territories. The King also promised to send his 
brother-in-Iaw, Narpa-raja with several thousand soldiers to besiege San 
Thomé, while the Dutch attacked the stronghold by sea.38 Nothing 
tangible, however, resulted from this project.39 
Further to ensure the security of Pulicat, van Berchem went on a 
mission to the court of Jagga-raja, the feudatory overlord of the Pulicat 
region. There he found two Brahmin emissaries from San Thomé sent 
to secure the expulsion of the Dutch from Pulicat and it was only with 
great difficulty that van Berchem could induce Jagga-raja to confirm 
the kaul.4o Portuguese agents were also busy at other neighbouring 
36 K.A.967, l'Hennite to Amsterdam, 10.11.1610, 24.11.1610, 'Instructie' for 
the Director, the Coromandel coast, 12.12.1610. 
37 See intra, Ch. V. 
38K.A.968, 30.8.1613, f.151vo; Heeres, I, pp.l00-l04; van Dam, 11, ii, 
p.l0l-l02; van Dijk, p.27. 
39 Though the Dutch sources are silent on the point, a siege of San Thomé 
by the Carnatic king in 1612-1613, during which the ~ayak of Tanjore 
helped thc Portuguese, is mentioned in a Portuguese document. See L.T., 
I, L.M., Document No. 342, 7.3.1613. 
40 K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff.151vo ff. 
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courts in an effort to frustrate the completion of the Pulicat fort and 
actually succeeded in winning over several local chiefs to their side. 
The construction of the fort at Queen Obayama's cost was proceeding 
very slowly and van Berchem therefore decided to complete the work 
at the Company's expense, partly from a desire to evade the obligation 
to share the fort with the king. The fort, completed in 1613, was named 
Geldria, probably af ter van Berchem's native province, Gelderland. 
There was, however, more than one opinion at the time regarding its 
utility, and some feIt that it was "maintained at great expense and to 
litde profit." 41 
Hardly had the fort Geldria been completed, when it was faced with 
a serious danger. Jagga-raja's brother, Eti-raja, who had been won over 
to the side of the Portuguese, appeared before Pulicat with six to seven 
hundred men in July, 1613, bent on destroying the Dutch fort. The 
Carnatic king, in response to an appeal from van Berchem, promised 
every help to the Company and ordered Eti-raja to withdraw his troops 
on pain of severe punishment. Eti-raja still attacked Pulicat and was 
twice beaten back by the Dutch with the shahbandar's help. Eventually, 
through the mediation of the king's emissaries, he was reconciled with 
the Company, but van Berchem put litde faith in his professions.42 
The Company's trade in south Coromandel was severely affected by 
the prolonged civil war wich ensued on the death of King Venkata II 
in October, 1614. His nephew and chosen successor, Sriranga I1, was 
overthrown and subsequendy murdered by Venkata's brother-in-Iaw, 
Jagga-raja, who put his putative nephew on the throne. One Yacama 
Nayak supported by the nayak of Tanjore, took up the cause of Sriran-
ga's son, Ramadeva, while the nayaks of Madura and Gingi joined the 
side of Jagga-raja. Pulicat was repeatedly overrun by the riyal parties, 
and the Dutch followed a policy of strict neutrality, always admitting 
into the town the most powerful contestant provided no harm was done 
to the citizens. Throughout the Carnatic kingdom, trade came almost 
to a standstill as a result of the war.43 
Meanwhile, the coast factories went through some important admini-
strative changes. Hans de Haze, appointed 'visitadeur' in 1613 to visit 
all the factories, casdes and establishments of the Company, arrived at 
Masulipatam in November, 1614 and quickly carried through a number 
41KA.968, 30.8.1613, ff.153voCf; K.A.973, 29.3.1616, f.174; van Dijk, pp.29ff. 
42 KA.968, 30.8.1613, ff.153vo-154; van Dijk, p.30. 
43 KA.971, Hans de Haze, "Consideratie etc.", f.64vo; KA.973, 29.3.1916, 
f.174vo; Vijayanagara History, Ch. XXV; McLeod, I, pp.452 Cf. 
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of much-needed refOIms in the administration of the Coromandel Direc-
torate. Among other things, he had to deal with the question of aban-
doning the Tierepopelier factory, recommended by the Bantam Council. 
In view of the Company's limited capital, de Haze was in favour of 
abandoning the factory. Besides, the cargo procured at Tierepopelier 
was more easily available at Pulicat; and Masulipatam, as compared to 
Tierepopelier, offered some 33 % more by way of profit on the sale of 
the Company's merchandise. The great Aya's insatiable greed for 
presents and the heavy annual toU of about 2200 rials were further 
factors to be considered. But as the cloth supply at Pulicat was badly 
affected by the war, it was decided to continue the Tierepopelier factory 
until conditions were more peaceful. The proximity of Tegenapatam to 
the Carnatic diamond mines was also a factor in this decision.44 
The growing dissension between van Berchem and Samuel Kindt, 
second officer on the coast, was another issue de Haze had to investigate. 
In May, 1615, it was decided to relieve van Berchem of his office and 
Samuel Kindt was provisionaUy appointed President of the coast and 
commander of Fort Geldria. In 1616, the administration of the Coro-
mandel factories was constituted a 'Government' with Hans de Haze 
as the first governor and Samuel Kindt holding the office of President 
under him.45 It is not clear, however, whether thc change from a 
Directorate to a Government implied anything more concrete than a 
rise in status. But it was in any case the first formal recognition of the 
great importance of the coast factories in the pattern of Dutch trade 
in Asia. As such, it marked the end of one phase and the beginning of 
another. 
During 1610-1616, while the Company gradually consolidated its 
position in the south in the face of great difficulties, affairs in the 
Golconda factories also did not proceed very smoothly. Van Berchem, 
almost immediately af ter his succession to office, went on amission to 
Golconda to complain against the extortionate demands of the Masuli-
patam officers and the hostility of the Portuguese. Arriving at Golconda 
in August, 1612, he found Portuguese emissaries from Goa trying to 
bribe the king with presents so that he should expel the Dutch from rus 
territory and it was only with great difficulty that he secured an 
44 K.A.971, "Consideratie op het Comptoir TierepopeJier", 15.7.1615, ff.62-
62vo; K.A.973, 29.3.1616, f.174vo, Resolution, 25.4.1616, f.193; van Dijk, 
p.43. 
45 K.A.973, Resolutions, 1.5.1616, ff.194vcr-195; van Dijk, p.47; Nederlandsch 
lndie, 111, p.211; Floris, p.132 
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audience on August 10. At the Golconda court, his complaints were not 
received favourably. The mir jumla pointcd out that the Portugucse 
had done no damage to the Dutch in Golconda territory and hence 
no rcprisals could be pcrmitted within thc boundaries of the kingdom. 
Besides, thc king complained that the Dutch, contrary to their promise, 
had failed to bring rich cargoes from Europe - expcnsive clothes, fine 
mirrors, guns, various curios etc. as the Portuguese used to do before 
their arrival. His land, in consequence, was destitute of such commodities 
and the trade of Masulipatam was declining. Van Berchem replied 
that thc bulk of the merchandise formerly imported by the Portuguese 
came from Holland and the matter could be easily mcnded in future. 
A further difficulty was raised by the petition of an Armenian merchant 
who sought restitution of his goods seized by the Dutch from the 
Portuguese ship T anaseri. On being asked by the king to restore the 
goods, van Berchem replied that it was not in his power to do so. 
EventualIy, the king agreed to issue a new tarman which would ensure 
the Company's freedom of trade, but only on condition that the 
Armenian merchant's goods were restored, for he had already issued 
orders to that effect. Af ter considerable delay, the tarman was at last 
secured on September 15, 1612. The new contract, although later it 
proved a source of trouble, was very welcome at the time as it commuted 
the tolls for Masulipatam, previously fixed at 4 %, for a payment of 
3000 pagodas a year.46 
For the troubles which followed almost immediately afterwards, the 
Dutch were primarily responsible. Before the end of the year, to the 
great annoyance of the local authorities, they captured an empty ship, 
anchored off Masulipatam, belonging to the same Armenian merchant 
who had been the cause of so much trouble. Again in February, 1615, 
van Berchem captured at Pulicat a ship belonging to some Armenian 
merchants of San Thomé. Part of the cargo was claimed by a Muslim 
merchant of Masulipatam as his own and this was eventually restored 
to him for fear of alienating the Golconda king.47 
Soon af ter van Berchem's departure, the Dutch were faced with a 
serious situation in Golconda. The contract secured by van Berchem 
did not prove to be a panacea. Formerly, because of the small volume 
of trade, the toll payable at Masulipatam, though fixed at 4 %, seldom 
46 K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff.148vo-149, 14.2.1614, f.231; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, 
f.129vo; Havart, 11, p.l00; van Dam, 11, ii, p.142; van Dijk, pp.22-23. 
47 K.A.968, 30.8.1613, f.150; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, f.129; K.A.973, Resolution, 
10.8.1615, f.198vo. 
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amounted to more than 2,000 pagodas a year while the Company was 
now obliged to pay 3,000 pagodas annually under all circumstances. 
Further, the local governors, deprived of the toll, started inventing new 
methods of extortion. They now hindered by all possible means thc 
loading and unloading of merchandise, the transports of cargo to 
inland areas and the purchase of indigo. In violation of the royal 
farman, they claimed a 2 % tax on indigo brought to Masulipatam 
from inland areas. Complaints to the king on every occasion were 
hardly possible, as each mission to Golconda cost some 1,000 pagodas 
and letters were of little use as they had to pass through the hands 
of the great nobles, who were of ten the friends of the local governors. 
The situation worsened when the merchants were forbidden to enter 
into contracts for the purchase of the Company's merchandise so that 
the Dutch might be forced to sell their wares to the local governor, who 
made his payments in kind with poor quality articles valued at abnor-
mally high rates. Further, no merchants were allowed to deal with the 
Company until the annual toll had been paid at the beginning of the 
year. To deal with this situation, it was decided to sell part of the cargo 
to the havaldar at prices somewhat lower than the market rates and 
to pay him the toU in merchandise so that he might make a large profit 
on it before handing over the stipulated 3,000 pagodas to the king. 48 
At Petapuli conditions were generally better than at Masulipatam. 
But in 1615, havaldar Pyleppa secured a farman from the king requiring 
the Dutch to pay a toU of 6,000 pagodas, - half by way of arre ars 
for the previous and half as dues for the current year. The Company 
decided to fight this claim and demanded from the havaldar the pay-
ment of his outs tanding debts. De Haze, in accordance with his policy 
of 'rationalization', was actuaUy considering the abandonment of the 
Petapuli factory at the time, and threatened with this measure which 
would mean considerable loss of revenue, besides difficulties with the 
higher authorities at Golconda, Pyleppa soon adopted a more reasonable 
policy.49 
For the Dutch themselves these early years of their contact with 
Coromandel were of manifold significance. The most vital source for 
the supply of textiles was now open to them, though the small volume 
of trade witb the coast suggests that the spice trade in tbe Archipelago 
48 K.A.971, "Consideratien en descriptie van de plaetzen Mazulipatam en 
Petapoeli" 18.7.1615, 65-66; K.A.973, Resolution, 29.7.1615, f.197. 
49 K.A.971, "Consideratien etc." 18.7.1615, ff.66-67, K.A.971, 2.6.1615, f.238; 
K.A.973, Resolutions, 23.6.1615, 29.6.1615, ff.196vo. 197. 
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was not yet primarily dependent on the cloth supply from Coromandel. 
The chief factories in the region were already established and their 
importance in the pattern of the Company's trade was formally recog-
nised. Further, the conflicts with local officers and the civil wars had 
driven home the nature of the problems that would have to be faced. 
It was clear by 1616, that the local potentates, eager for the expansion 
of trade and for the steady supply of western curios and additional 
income from 'presents', welcomed commercial relations with the Dutch. 
The enormous capital resources of the Company offered prospects of a 
steadily expanding foreign market. Neither the declining Portuguese 
power nor the limited and disorganised resources of tbe Indian traders 
had anything comparable to offer. The latter, in fact, joined the kings 
and Clhieftains in welcoming the Dutch whose purchases on the coast 
impHed vast potentalities of profit in middleman trade. The commer-
cial rivalries between the Dutch Company and a rejuvenated Indian 
merchant class were things of the future. 
One fact, however, had already emerged: in sa far as the Dutch, 
unlike the Portuguese before them, did not establish invulnerable foot-
holds on the mainland of India and sought ins te ad peaceful commer-
cial relations with the local kingdoms, any attempt to exclude Indian 
competitors from the high seas through a continuation of the passport 
system had little chance of success. Their weakness on the mainland 
undermined all fitful efforts to take the law into their own hands. 
The comparative absence of Indian competition in the trade in 
Coromandel wares in the overseas market during this early phase is 
perhaps to be eXplained primarily in terms of the inhibiting af ter effects 
of the century-long exclusive con trol enforced by the Portuguese at 
gun-point. The Dutch quest for exclusive con trol over the market fol-
lowed more peaceful and, in the long run, more paying Hnes, namely, 
manoeuvrings for differential advantages over all trade rivals including 
the local merchants. Their success in securing such advantages combined 
with, and partly flowing from, their superior resources ensured the 
ascendancy of the Dutch Company in the coast trade until a riyal Com-
pany of monopolistic merchant capital outstripped them in the Magni-
tude of their investments in India. 
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1616-1629 
By 1616, the Dutch East India Company had firmly established itself 
in Coromandel. During the years to follow the problems encountered 
at the very inception of Dutch trade with the coast gained in intensity. 
The Company's efforts at expansion were imperilled by conflicts with 
local officers in Golconda, a devastating civil war in the Carnatic and 
the competition of other European nations and Asian merchants. The 
story of the years 1616-1629 is one of survival in the face of manifold 
challenge and of new experiments in commerce in response to a new 
colonial policy. 
In Golconda, the troubles started very early. By June, 1616 the 
Petapuli factory was abandoned as a counter-measure against the 
local governor's extortionate demands. This decisive step gave the Com-
pany a brief respite and also helped to secure from the king a new 
farman in July, 1616 guaranteeing freedom from interference so long 
as the stipulated annual toll was paid. But in a week, the local gover-
nor of Masulipatam secured a counter-order abrogating the existing 
contracts with the Company and its right to trade outside the city and 
requiring the Dutch to enter into fresh agreements with the governor. 
Immediately, the governor demanded that the Company should either 
pay 9% duty on imports and 11 % stamp-duty (chhap-dalali) for 
articles purchased inland or deposit the stipulated annual toll at the 
beginning of each year. He also farmed out tbe right to trade with the 
Company as a monopoly to a single merchant. This meant that the 
Company had to advance large amounts to this merchant, who of ten 
supplied products of a very inferior quality. With the inland indigo-
markets closed to the Company and the clotb trade encumbered by 
artifical restrictions, tbe Masulipatam clotb trade was hardly very prof-
itable any longer. An unfortunate brawl between 'a Dutchman and a 
Muslim led to the imposition of further restrictions: even suppliers of 
daily necessities were forbidden to visit the factory. Governor Hans de 
Haze now seriously threatened to abandon the Masulipatam factory. 
His firmness won the day and the restrictive orders were now quickly 
withdrawn.50 
A second round of troubles started in 1619 with attempts on part of 
the local governor's underlings to interfere with the loading of the com-
50Coen, VII, pp.96, 361; K.A.977, Hans de Haze to Amsterdam, 5.6.1617, and 
18.10.1616; Heeres, I, pp.547--48. 
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pany's ships, and the arrest of a Dutch under-factor on the charge of 
assaulting one of them. The Dutch retorted by seizing the person of the 
kot wal. An assault on the factory folIowed and in the skirmish several 
Dutch officers, including de Haze, were wounded. The Golconda 
authorities soon tried to patch up the matter by a show of friendliness. 51 
But de Haze, bent on stopping the continuous harassment by local 
governors, appealed to the governor, then residing at Golconda, for a 
new farman. The results were exactly the opposite of what de Haze 
had expected. The governor ordered that in future the Company was 
to deal with a single merchant, Lingua, nominated by him. This was 
the last straw. In June, 1619 de Haze ordered the abandonment of the 
Masulipatam factory, - a decision which was fully approved by 
Governor-General Coen. Plans were also made to seize the Indian ships 
returning from Mecca and Pegu. Such extreme measures were, however, 
found to be unnecessary. The king of Golconda, who could ill-afford to 
lose the benefits of his kingdom's trade with the Dutch, hastily opened 
negotiations with the Company. In the middle of these negotations, de 
Haze left Coromandel, installing Adolff Thomasz as the provisional 
governor. The king by this time had realized the fulI enormity of the 
situation, and in July, 1619 the local governor of Masulipatam was 
put under arrest. The governor Mir Qasim was replaced in his office 
by one Itimad Khan. The local Muslims also earnestly requested the 
Dutch to come back. FinaIly, towards the end of July, 1619 the Dutch 
returned to Masulipatam af ter receiving a new farman. 52 The next two 
and a half years were comparatively peaceful. Andries Soury who took 
over from Adolff Thomasz as governor of the coast factories in 
November, 1619 was on friendly terms with Mir Qasim, re-instated in 
his office in 1621. As a benevolent gesture Mir Qasim even abolished 
the practise of farming out the right to trade in coins and precious 
metals imported by the Dutch. "In Masulipatam," reported Coen to 
Amsterdam in 1621, "things are going reasonably weIl, but more through 
the fear of our power, than because of any respect for the farman 
which the king of Golconda has granted us." 53 
Coen's estimate of the Company's power in Coromandel, based excIu-
sively on the con trol over the sea-ways, ignored the hopelessly weak 
and defenceless position of the coast factories. Abraham van Uffelen,-
51 Goen, VII, p.235. 
52 Goen, I, p.516j VII, pp.428--29, 437, 438, 499j Heel"es, I, pp. 154-55 j 
Havart, I, pp.225-27 j Valentijn, V, 1, p.61. 
63 Goen, 11, pp.585, 611 j VII, pp.473, 751, 829-30. 
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nicknamed "Little Coen" by the English for his aggressive ways, - who 
succeeded Soury in 1621,54 made the same mistake. The tragic incidents 
of Little Coen's administration may best be understood in terms of a 
conflict between overmighty traders and an autocratie power. Clash of 
economie interests, caused by the rapacity of local governors, played 
only a minor role. 
Early in 1622 van Uffelen seized a Portuguese ship off Masulipatam 
and imperiously demanded of the loeal governor that all trading rights 
should be refused to the Portuguese. When the governor ordered a boy-
cott of the Dutch factory as punishment for violating the peace of the 
harbour, van Uffelen started warlike preparations whieh forced him to 
rescind the orders. But the king, on hearing of these incidents, took a 
sterner attitude. Eventually van Uffelen had to go on amission to 
Golconda, surrender a part of the booty seeured from the captured ship 
and release the Portuguese sailors who had been taken prisoner. Out of 
the whole business, the Company gained little but trouble.55 
But van Uffelen, no wiser by his experiences, continued in his 
arrogant ways. In 1623, against the express orders of the king, he 
publicly shipped a quantity of tobacco to Arakan. Worse still, he 
forcibly detained the shroff or money-changer, allegedly in order to 
coerce him into accepting an unfair rate of exchange for riais. Besides, 
he refused passes for Pegu to Indian ships. The king also believed th at 
he was not getting his legitimate share of the booty seized by the Dutch 
from Portuguese ships. 
The Golconda authorities decided to strike suddenly. In November, 
1623 van Uffelen, an under-factor and three of the Company's chief 
middlemen were arrested at Masulipatam and taken to Golconda in 
chains. Supply of food and water to the Duteh faetory was stopped by 
the governor's order. At Golconda, van Uffelen and the Company's 
middlemen were subjected to severe torture and their release was 
ordered only af ter 16,000 pagodas had been paid out of the Company's 
funds. The middlemen, however, were to pay back to the Company in 
kind their share of the ransom.56 
Van Uffelen died in February, 1624 as a result of the bodily injuries 
suffe red while in prison. Jacob Dedel, sent as "visitor" from Batavia, 
suceeeded as governor. On Dedel's premature death in August the same 
54 Coen, 111, pp.97-98, 783; E.F.I., 1622-1623, p.120. 
55 Coen, VII, 2, pp.984-85. 
56 K.A.994, 27.2.1625 ff.135; KA.995, Libenaer to Batavia, 10.1.1624, van 
Uffe1en to various people, 28.11.1623, 18.12.1623, 30.12.1623, 15.1.1624. 
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year, Marten Ysbrantsz became the governor of the coast factories. 57 
Meanwhile, no radical improvement in the situation had taken place. 
Towards the end of 1624, the right to trade with the Dutch company 
was farmed out to six merchants, "so that none (else), be they mer-
chants, artisans or even water-suppliers, could freely come" to the 
factory. Early in 1625, these trading rights, including even the right to 
sell victuals to the Dutch, were publicly auctioned by the governor and 
secured by three merchants on payment of 3,000 pagodas each. Besides, 
the traders had to pay something for every item they took out of the 
Company's factory. In consequence, the contractors refused to take 
merchandise in payment for their supplies and would only accept cash. 
Petapuli, at first free from these restrictions, was soon brought within 
the orbit of the sar-i-khail's policy of indirect exploitation. Because of 
such uncongenial conditions few merchants came to Masulipatam with 
adequate quantities of pagodas, the coin with which the bulk of the 
purchases had to be made, and the Company was threatened with a. 
serious shortage. Amission to Golconda for buying pagodas ended in an 
expensive failure through the sar-i-khail's machinations. A drunken orgy 
of factor Goeree at Masulipatam further complicated the situation. The 
factory was attacked by an armed mob and the transport of commodities 
to Dutch ships was prohibited for a time.5S 
The Masulipatam factors suggested a violent solution for the existing 
problems, namely, that the factory should be abandoned for two or 
three years and the consequent losses made good through the seizure of 
Muslim ships returning from abroad. Ysbrantsz considered this a feasible 
policy. Batavia, opposed to agression against anybody except an avowed 
enemy as being incompatible with the Company's constitution, recom-
mended on the other hand tbe practice of "discreet simulation". 
Amsterdam, extremely conscious of the importance of the Masulipatam 
trade, was in favour of a settlement "with honour" even if the Golconda 
government were actually in the wrong. Attempts to secure the lease 
of Masulipatam were recommended for the purpose.59 
There was a brief improvement in the situation towards the end of 
1625 when the governor, Inayet Khan, was recalled to Golconda and 
G7K.A.994, 27.1.1625, ff.135ff, Goeree and Libenaer to Amsterdam, 4.10.1624. 
58 KA.994, 27.1.1625, ff.138 ff; K.A.996, Goeree and Libenaer to Amsterdam, 
May, 1625; KA.997, Libenaer to Batavia, 29.12.1624 and 26.6.1625, Batavia 
to Coromandel, 26.7.1625. 
59 KA.999, "Projectie aengaende den handel van Masulipatam", 26.8.1626; 
KA.994, Goeree and Libenaer to Amsterdam, 4.10.1624, 27.1.1625, f.138vo; 
KA.998, 3.2.1626, ff.2vo-3; KA.I000, 28.18.1626, f.14-8. 
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the company's chief middleman, Malay, secured a certain relaxation of 
the pressure on the Company through an influential friend at the 
court. But when conditions were just returning to normal, the old king 
of Golconda died and was succeeded by a minor; the Company's old 
enemy, Muhammad Taqi, once more became governor of Masulipatam. 
The consequent feeling of insecurity was so widespread and intense 
that the merchant-middlemen broke thier contracts and refused to take 
delivery of the Company's wares. 60 
The following years witnessed a progressive deterioration in the situ-
ation. The three lease-holders and the governor himself were before long 
the only purchasers of the Company's wares. The former owed some 
27,000 pagodas to the Company and almost invariably failed to supply 
cloth according to specifications. By June, 1628, the Company was 
forced to sell the bulk of its cargo to the governor, while by September 
all wares imported by the European companies were allowed to be sold 
to him alone. He, in his turn, sold these at arbitrary prices, to the traders 
who formerly had direct dealings with the European factories. Late in 
1628 Muhammad Taqi, af ter a brief eclipse of his power, was appointed 
chief councillor to the king and as such exercised unlimited powers of 
exploitation through his underling, the new governor of Masulipatam. 
Soon afterwards, a number of traders, living outside the jurisdiction of 
Masulipatam, who had dealings with the Dutch were put under arrest 
and forced to yield up large sums under torture. Trade, except with 
the governor on unprofitable terms, was at a standstill. 6 1 
Against such heavy odds, the Company's policy of "discreet simu-
lation" was of no avail. As a tentative measure, Batavia had ordered 
that no cargo should be unloaded at Masulipatam before specific con-
tracts regarding prices were made. A more drastic policy was evidently 
called for. 62 As early as September, 1627 the English President Mr. 
Brown had discussed with Ysbrantsz the possibilities of combined 
operations against the local government. In June, 1628 Batavia finally 
consented to the use of force for the redress of grievances and sent 
detailed instructions for the blockade of Masulipatam. The instructions 
were remarkably fair-minded; cargoes were to be seized from the Indian 
ships retuming home, but only in quantities enough to make good the 
60 K.A.999, Ysbrantsz to Batavia, 5.12.1625 and to Amsterdam, 8.3.1626; 
K.A.lOOO, van Rossen and Pieters to Batavia, 15.6.1626; eoen, V, p.1181. 
61 Coen, VIh pp.1181, 1333, 1342-43, 1436-37, 1448, 1504, 1506, 1648 
6'lI Coen, V, p.297, VIh, pp.1436-37. . 
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losses suffered by the Company through tbe governor's tyranny and bad 
debts.63 
The stage was thus set for an open trial of strengh. Still Ysbrantsz 
would have preferred to wait so that he might strike at a time likely 
to yield the richest harvest. A particularly bad monsoon had forced most 
of the Indian ships to abandon their projected voyages; a blockade 
would hardly be very paying under the circumstances. The events of 
the next few months however forced the hands of the Dutch Company. 
The English, unwilling to suffer any longer "the evelI disposcion of the 
governor" abandoned their Masulipatam factory in September, 1628 
and captured some small boats early in February, 1629. Masulipatam 
was no longer a safe place for the Dutch, as they might be forced to 
pay for the crimes of the English. So on February 19, 1629, "in the dead 
of the night, yet armed, the Dutch (being some 30 persons ... ) made 
there escape abord the English ships, leaving their howse destitute of 
anyman". On March 1, on the arrival of some of their own ships, they 
sent off all their cargo to Pulicat and a regular siege of Masulipatam 
began.64 
Financially, the blockade was a failure. A large quantity of mer-
chandise was seized from a ship returning from Achin, but the bulk 
of it belonged to a friendly merchant and had to be restituted. Besides 
this, only cargo worth about 12,000 to 15,000 pagodas was captured 
from ships returning from Arakan. 65 As a political measure, on the 
other hand, the blockade soon had the desired effect. In April, 1629 
several important citizens of Masulipatam visited Ysbrantsz on board 
ship and requested the Dutch to return, promising to guarantee the 
repayment of debts. As there was little chance of recovering the losses 
through seizure of ships and the blockade was affecting the good rela-
tions with the Surat merchants, the Dutch were inclined to comply. 
Besides, the Company could ill afford to miss for long so important a 
source of cloth supply as Masulipatam, and it was considered better to 
have some trade in Golconda on an agreed basis rather than to risk all. 
Ysbrantsz however let it be clearly understood that he wanted not just 
another farman, but payment of the Company's outstanding claims.6 6 
63 Coen, V, pp.290 ff, VIh, p.1182. 
64 K.A.I012, 12.9.1629 ff. 63 ff; Coen, VIh, pp.1653 ff. 
65 K.A.I012, 12.9.1629 ff, 63 ff; Coen, VII2, pp.1653 ff. 
66 Coen, VII2, pp.1662, 1763; K.A.I009, 15.12.1629, ff.31vo ff; K.A.I012, 
12.9.1629, ff.63v0-64vo. 
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The way to an agreement was opened when the Company's chief 
debtors paid back 10,000 pagodas. Governor Mirza Rozbihan and the 
chief merchants of Masulipatam stood guarantee for the repayment of 
the balance of the claims by April, 1630 failing which the blockade was 
to be resumed. Further, all restrictive measures were to end. In return, 
the Dutch undertook to resume the granting of passes, but no ships 
would be allowed to sail until the outstanding debts were fully paid. 
Following this agreement, trade was resumed, though the reopening of 
the factory had to wait till instructions were received from Batavia.67 
On the return of the Dutch to Masulipatam, Mirza Rozbihan started 
for Golconda in November, 1629, in company of the Dutch emissary, 
Jacob de Witte, to apprise the king of the situation. He secured an 
audience for de Witte, despite Muhammad Taqi's efforts to prevent it. 
The king listened to de Witte with sympathy and promised a new 
farman guaranteeing unhindered trade throughout Golconda. But the 
bulk of the Company's financial claim amounting to 105,496 pagodas 
had to be written off as these could not be met from the royal treasury 
and Taqi had so wasted his fortune that nothing was to be had out of 
him. Only the 16,000 pagodas extorted in 1623-24 were to be grad-
ually refunded through a temporary reduction of the annual toll. The 
promised farman was issued on December 11, 1629. Further, the king 
requested the Company's help for all Indian ships sailing from Masuli-
patam and sent a robe of honour for Ysbrantsz to seal his friendship 
with the Dutch. The Company's triumph was practically complete.68 
The events of 1629 were full of ominous implications for the future 
of India's overseas trade, as they dearly demonstrated the consequences 
of the lack of sea-power. The share of Indian traders in this trade was 
once again at the mercy of the superior naval might of European 
nations. Even the weakness of the Europeans on the mainland had 
proved to be an inadequate guarantee against the possibilities of their 
interference with the sea-borne trade. What was more, their increasing 
investments had rendered the local merchants economically dependent 
on the European companies. The latter's naval superiority was thus 
reinforced by the acquisition of con trol over an essentialIever of econo-
mic power. The Dutch saw this point only too weIl. Before long, they 
were to exploit this advantage not only in legitimate steps for the remedy 
67 K.A.lO09, 15.12.1629, ff30 ff, 50vo; K.A.lOll, 7.3.1631, f.25vo; K.A.I012, 
12.9.1629, ff.64ff, 31.12.1629, f.65. 
68 K.A.lO09, 15.12.1629, ff.34 ff; K.A.lOll, 7.3.1631, ff.25vo ff; Heeres, I. 
pp.231-37, 245-46. 
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of grievances, but in efforts to eliminate Asian competition in the inter-
Asian trade. Because of the continued weakness of the Dutch on the 
mainland of India and the advantage of long experience enjoyed by the 
Asian traders, such efforts did not succeed immediately but led to cut-
throat competition and a prolonged see-saw struggle. 
During 1616 to 1629, the Company's troubles in South Coromandel 
were mainly the result of the protracted civil war which broke out on 
the death of King Venkata Il in 1614. Sriranga Il, Venkata's chosen 
successor, had already been killed in 1614. 
One Yacama Nayak, supported by the nayak of Tanjore, took up the 
cause of Sriranga's son, Ramadeva. The riyal party was led by Jagga-
raja, Sriranga's old enemy, and included the nayaks of Gingi and 
Madura. With the death of Jagga-raja and Ramadeva's marriage to 
the daughter of Eti-raja, Jagga-raja's brother, in 1619 the first phase 
of the war was over. The campaign against the nayaks of Madura and 
Gingi continued. The King's erstwhile supporter, Yacama and Damerla 
Venkata-pati in the North-East also rose in revolt. By the end of 1629, 
however, Rama-deva had the situation fuUy under control and the 
civil war was at last at an end.69 
During the civil war, neutrality was the key-note of the Company's 
policy, though at times the Dutch were forced to take sides. By astrange 
paradox the trade and population of Pulicat were on the increase in the 
early years of the war, because of the comparative security guaranteed 
by Fort Geldria. In fact, thanks to the influx of displaced manufacturers 
more patterned cloth was produced at Pulicat at this time than the 
Company could afford to purchase. "We are the masters there", de 
Haze announced in 1617, "the inhabitants do little or nothing without 
our counsel". A yacht was deployed to protect the trade of Pulicat and 
in 1618---19, thirty Indian ships visited Pulicat, while not one called 
at San Thomé. In gratitude, the local chief temporarily granted freedom 
from toU to the Company. Prospects of stabie employment and security 
in conditions of widespread unrest converted many of the seats of 
European commerce in India into prosperous urban centres in later 
times. Pulicat during the civil war in the Carnatic kingdom was an 
early and short-lived instance of such development. Even late in 1619, 
when heavy warfare affected production in the Pulicat region as weU, 
enough cloth was produced in the town itself to ensure adequate supply. 
69 Vijayanagara History, Chs. XXV and XXVI; McLeod, pp.452 ff. 
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Eti-raja's seige of Pulicat in 1620 ended in a peaceful settlement with 
the local governor and a friendly visit to the Dutch factory.70 
By 1624, there was a radical change in the situation. The trade of 
Pulicat, now continuously plagued by rivallocal chieftains, was in 
grave danger. In May, 1624 Eti-raja imprisoned his rebellious vassal, 
Pede-raja, the loca! chieftain of Pulicat, and marched on the town, but 
he was beaten by Pede-raja's men with the aid of the Dutch. In August, 
1624, the Company entered into a treaty of mutual assistance with the 
other local chieftains to forestall future attacks on Pulicat. A conspiracy 
between Eti-raja and the Company's interpreter, Groa, for capturing the 
Dutch factors was discovered at about this time and Groa taken into 
custody. For the rest of the civil war the Dutch at Pulicat were left in 
peace, but their policy was one of constant preparedness. "The best 
friends that we have here," remarked Ysbrantsz in 1625, "are God and 
our weapons". In the last years of the war, however, the Company's 
trade suffered mainly through poor demand for its merchandise and 
the necessity for cash payment for all purchases. In 1625, the Company's 
trade came almost to a stand-still at Pulicat. Shortage of capital, and 
not of supplies, was primarily responsible for the situation. 71 
Conditions in the Gingi territory throughout the war proved to be 
less congenial than at Pulicat. Even there, till 1617, there was a steady 
improvement in trade. Ramadeva's invasion of Gingi in 1618 however 
unsettled the economic life of the region, and in July, 1618, the Dutch 
were forced to leave Tierepopelier which was shortly captured by one 
of Ramadeva's generals. The latter requested the Dutch to return, but 
they evaded the request because most of the merchants had fled from 
Tierepopelier and a heavy toll had to be paid there whatever the 
volume of trade. Sometime af ter the reopening of the factory, in 1625, 
the general of the Gingi nayak plundered Tegenapatam and burnt 
Tierepopelier. As the Company's wares had already been removed, the 
loss suffered was negligible: only the purchase of saltpetre was hindered 
by these ravages. By the end of 1625, trading conditions in the Gingi 
territory returned almost to norm al. 7'2 
Following the pacification of his kingdom, Ramadeva presented the 
70KA.977, de Haze to Amsterdam, 18.10.1616; Coen, I, pp.517, 611, 708, 
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Company with a new contract in November, 1629. The first royal grant 
received at Pulicat af ter long years of trouble, it provided a de jure 
basis for the Company's de facto rights. Besides, it abolished the tolls 
for loading and unloading cargo fixed at 17'2 % and 27'2 % respectively 
in 1612. The Company also received the promise of a gift of a village 
in return for some presents to the king. 73 
Thus by the end of 1629 normal trading conditions had been restored 
in the south as weIl as in north Coromandel. In spite of the prolonged 
political insecurity, trade had suffered comparatively fewer hindrances 
in the southern factories. This was so partly because the Hindu lordlings 
had less power or inclination to trouble the Dutch. The comparatively 
unhampered course of industrial production under the protective care 
of fort Geldria was another congenial circumstance. 
By the 'twenties of the seventeenth century, the Jan Company had 
definitely emerged as a power in the land, strong enough to enforce 
their demands in case of necessity and to protect their own interests in 
conditions of unrest. They had successfully resisted feudal exploitation, 
when it went beyond endurance, by an open resort to arms. PotentiaIly, 
their weakness on the mainland could not thus be an inhibiting influence 
on attempts to exclude Indians from the high seas by force. The 
direction of Dutch commercial policy in India did not, however, lie that 
way. The events of 1629 were an object lesson for all concerned; but 
for the Dutch it was an object lesson only in the sense that under 
exceptional circumstances they could now hope to secure redress of 
their grievances by violent means. 
73K.A.1012, 31.12.1629, f.65vo; Heeres, I, pp.230-31. 
CHAPTER III 
YEABS OF EXPANSION, 1630-1658 
I 
1630-1642 
In the 'twenties of the seventeenth century the Dutch had consolidated 
their position in Coromandel in the face of many difficulties. In the 
'thirties, with increased resources, they could further develop their trade 
and extend it to other regions from the coast, though wars, famine and 
official rapacity continued to plague them. The policy of making the 
inter-Asian trade pay for itself, which had found general acceptance, led 
to the establishment of close commercial links between Coromandel and 
other parts of Asia. From a weak commercial body desperateley fighting 
for survival, the Company became something of a power in the land. A 
bold act of aggression against the Portuguese in 1642 symbolised this 
changed state of affairs. 
During 1630-42, the Coromandel factories witnessed a rapid change 
of governors. In 1632, Marten Ysbrantsz handed over charge to Arent 
Gardenys, but had to come back the same year for a second term of 
office as Gardenys was suspected of participation in illegal private trade. 
In 1635, Carel Reyniersz succeeded Ysbrantsz and was in office till 1638 
when Gardenys, acquitted of the charges brought against him, once 
more became the governor of the coast factories. 74 
In the early 'thirties, the Golconda factories were faced with a new 
danger more serious than anything encountered before. In 1630, follow-
ing three bad seasons, a famine on an almost unprecedented scale -
"of whose like in these parts no former age hath record," - spread 
over the entire northern Deccan, severely affecting trade and industry 
throughout the region. "The poor mechaniques, weavers, washers, 
dyers, etc.," reported the English factors from Surat, "are abandoning 
their habitacions in multitudes, and instead of relief elsewhere have 
74 K.A.1016, 1.12.1632, f.18; K.A.1019, 15.8.1633, ff.18vo, 22 f; K.A.1028, 
4.1.1636, f.44; K.A.1031, 28.12.1636, f.46; K.A.1036, 22.12.1638, f.173vo. 
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perished in the feilds for want of food ... " The more desperate among 
the famine-stricken organised marauding bands and plundered caravans 
on the highways. "From Gujarat to the Golconda coast the land became 
one vast chamel-house".75 
Despite the desolation all around the Coromandel factories managed 
to carry on a certain amount of trade and in some ways the con-
ditions were even favourable. Muhammad Taqi had fallen out of 
favour with the king, partly as a result of de Witte's complaints, and 
with his death in May, 1631, the Company was rid of its 'greatest 
enemy'. Still the Dutch followed a cautious policy in the Golconda 
kingdom and avoided investing any large amount of capital at Masuli-
patam for quite some time.76 
For nearly six years, with the friendly Mir Muhammad Sayyid as the 
govemor of the Masulipatam region, the Company's affairs in Golconda 
proceeded without any hindrance from the local authorities. But in 
1636, in a desperate attempt to collect the amount due to the royal 
treasury, Mir Muhammad adopted the familiar policy of extortion, 
accused the Dutch of paying too little by way of toll and put under 
arrest one of their middlemen at Petapuli. Owing to subsequent mis-
understandings the havaldar's men attacked the Petapuli factory but 
had to retreat with some loss of lives. The factory was next besiegcd 
for several weeks, during which no merchants or handicraftsmen were 
allowed to have any dealings with the Company. At Musulipatam, too, 
Mir Muhammad tried to play the same game and demanded that thc 
Dutch should surrender the booty scized from a Portuguese ship in 
1629. In reply the Company lodged complaints with the king and 
received from him a new tarman in November, 1636, guarantecing all 
its rights and privileges. As Mir Muhammad, presently raised to the 
office of sar-i-khail, once more became friendly to the Dutch, their 
troubles in the Masulipatam region were temporarily at an end.77 
Again in 1637 the new govemor, Sher Muhammad Khan, asked the 
Company to pay an additional 50 % as lease-money for the village of 
Palicol which had been leased to them the previous ycar. Further, as 
a result of his extortions at Palicol and Dacheron, the Dutch could 
75 E.F.I., 1630-33, pp.20, 79, 122, 129; D.R., 1631-34, p.33; KA.I015, 
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procure no cloth in those two villages for some time and were even-
tually forced to placate the governor by partly conceding his demand.78 
In 1639, however, they gave up the lease of Palicol which had rendered 
a loss of 5134 florins in 1638--39 and abandoned the Dacheron factory, 
because the cloth available in these places could be more profitably 
procured from south Coromandel. 79 
In December, 1639, the king of Golconda visited Masulipatam with 
his nobles and was pleased with the presents offered by the Dutch. But 
any hope of peaceful trade raised by this friendly contact were soon 
destroyed. Early in 1640, Mirza Qasim, the local governor of Petapuli, 
wanted the Company to buy some of his chay-roots at an exorbitant 
price and on its refusal to do so ordered all handicraftsmen and traders, 
including even water-carriers, to stop visiting the Dutch factory. Normal 
trading conditions were restored in March, 1640, but only af ter the 
Company threatened to abandon Petapuli and Masulipatam and its 
chief middleman, Chinanna, agreed to accept in chay-roots part of the 
money owed him by Mirza Qasim.80 
In the early 'forties, the Company got involved in a far more serious 
conflict in which they had to contend, not with petty temporary 
havaldars as before, but with the sar-i-khail Mir Muhammad Sayyid 
whose increasing participation in commerce was the basic factor in the 
troubles. The enormous political power wielded by Mir Muhammad, 
- popularly known as the 'small king' in Golconda, - added to the 
difficulties of the situation. In view of the extreme importance of his 
friendship, the Company followed a conciliatory policy as far as prac-
ticable and lent him gunners and sailors for his ships to Gombroon, 
though this was inconsistent with its monopolistic policy. In January, 
1640, a request for some cannon was turned down and, in consequence, 
the sar-i-khail's friendship with the Dutch cooled down distinctly. 
The first open conflict took place in 1641 when the Masulipatam 
factory was asked by the local governor to stop selling cloves, mace and 
benzoin as the king and the sar-i-khail wanted to buy the entire stock. 
This promised purchase, however, did not take place and the real 
reason for the order, according to the Dutch, was the sar-i-khail's desire 
to revive the demand for spices by stopping all competition, so that he 
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might make good profit on his unsold stock of cloves and other spices. 
As the order was a direct infringement of the rights guaranteed by the 
royal farman and meant serious losses for the Dutch, they decided to 
blockade the Golconda coast and seize Muslim ships returning from 
Persia by way of reprisal. This time they were more confident than in 
1629: the Masulipatam factors were not to be withdrawn even during 
the blockade, for no attack on the factory was feared. The situation 
worsened when in December, 1641, the Palicol factory was attacked and 
occupied for a few days by some Hindu princelings, aIIegedly at the 
sar-i-khail's instigation. The threat of blockade, however, soon had the 
desired effect: the embargo on selling spices at Masulipatam was with-
drawn and an officer sent to enquire into the incidents at Palicol. The 
first round of the conflict with Mir Muhammad thus ended tri um-
phantly for the Dutch, but this was only the beginning of a prolonged 
struggle in which the sar-i-khail's monopolistic aspirations, backed by 
political power, came into sharp clash with the Company's growing 
trade.81 
In the northernmost part of Golconda, the Company's activities were 
hampered by minor wars near the Orissa frontier. An invasion by the 
Mughal governor of Orissa in 1630-31 was withdrawn at Shahjahan's 
order. A fresh outbreak of war in 1638 left a trail of devastation along 
the frontier and severely affected the Company's trade at Dacheron. 
Furthermore, alocal raja plundered Bimlipatam and carried away, 
among other things, a quantity of merchandise brought there by the 
Dutch for sale. Attempts at the recovery of these goods apparently 
faiIed. 82 
During 1630-35, conditions in south Coromandel were far more 
uncongenial than in the north due to the recrudesence of civil war on 
the death of the young king, Ramadeva, in May, 1630. Timmaraja, an 
uncle of the late King, forcibly seized the government, refusing to 
acknowledge the succession of Venkata 111 who was supported by the 
nayaks of Gingi, Tanjore and Madura, in this struggle. The situation 
was further complicated by squabbles among the nayaks themselves, and 
the resulting conditions in the Carnatic were Iittle short of anarchy.83 
By 1632, the Dutch at Pulicat were directly affected by the war. 
81 K.A.1042, 2.11.1639, f.421vo, f.448; K.A.1044, 3.10.1641, ff.269 ff; K.A.1047, 
"Verhael uyt de advyzen etc.," ff.417, 419voff; K.A. 768, 3.4.1641, ff.81, 85. 
!l2K.A.1036, 22.12.1638, f.173; K.A.1037, 14.5.1638, f.217, B. P. Saksena, 
HistOTy of Shahjahan of Dihli (Allahabad, 1932), p.171. 
83 Vijayanagar History, I, pp.339-40; MacLeod, IJ, p.492-93. 
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Timmaraja conquered the neighbouring fortress of Katur that year and 
an attack on Pulicat itself was only prevented by a timely offer of 
money. A captain of the rebel general blockaded the highway linking 
Pulicat with the hinterland and carried on regular plundering operations. 
The supply of cIoth was practically stopped, for in these uncertain 
times the middlemen would not enter into contracts for procuring wares 
according to specifications or at any appointed time. In the areas 
around Pulicat agriculture suffered heavily through the war and the 
price of cotton-yarn went up in consequence. Many of the villages 
which produced superior quality cIoth were burnt down. The Dutch 
generally refused to get involved in this internecine war, but at least 
on one occasion they helped Venkata's supporters with arms and ammu-
nition, while their chief middleman, Chinanna, actively participated in 
the war against Timmaraja. With the latter's final defeat and death 
in 1635, the war ended in the Carnatic kingdom, though the ensuing 
peace was not destined to last very long.84 
A problem of a different, but no less serious nature, was encountered 
by the Company in south Coromandel when Malaya, its trusted middle-
man and the richest merchant of the region, died in March, 1634. The 
Dutch were still very much dependent on the Indian middlemen for 
the supply of their return cargo to which Malaya, more than anyone 
else, had attended ably for nearly two decades. His brother, Chinanna, 
and his cousin, Kesava Chetti, who jointly inherited his business, had 
littIe experience in commerce. Chinanna, primarily interested in politics, 
spent most of his time fighting against Timmaraja, and could hardly 
even afford to visit Pulicat. Still, the Dutch tried their best to retain 
the friendship of Malaya's heirs by seIIing them arms and ammunition 
for their ships. But with the passage of time Malaya's loss was feIt more 
and more seriously and the Company's trade suffered throughout south 
Coromandel. 85 
A family squabble between Chinanna and Kesava in 1637 further 
complicated matters. The English, taking advantage of the situation 
entered into a contract with Kesava's son, Lakshmana Nayak, who 
undertook to supply cIoth from Pondicherry and governor Reyniersz 
84K.A.1016, 1.12.1632, ff.20vo, 82; K.A.l017, 20.10.1632, f.l81vo; K.A.l018, 
7.2.1633, f.5vo; K.A.l023, 20.2.1634, f.268\'0; K.A.1025, 29.5.1634, f.318; 
K.A.l028, 4.1.1636, f.41; K.A.1029, 19.6.1635, f.669vo, 10.6.1635, f.675vo; 
E.F.I., 1630-33, p.203. 
85 K.A.1025, 29.5.1634, f.318; K.A.l028, 4.1.1636, f.46; K.A.1031, 8.10.1636, 
f.1124; K.A.l034, 1.3.1637, f.665. 
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secured annulment of this contract only with great difficulty. Reyniersz 
next tried to mediate a settlement between the two cousins, but 
achieved little tiII 1638. The foIIowing year governor Gardenys visited 
Pondicherry, the main centre of Kesava's activities, and induced the 
latter to enter into negotiations. By 1640, a fairly stabie compromise was 
effected; the two cousins were to deal with the Company separately and 
maintain friendly relations with each other.86 
Early in 1637, the short-lived peace in the Carnatic kingdom ended 
with the outbreak of an internecine war in which the nayak of Gingi, 
eventually supported by Venkata lIl, fought against the combined 
power of Tanjore and Madura. The supply of return cargo, specially 
saltpetre and patterned cIoth, was once more seriously affected and for 
nearly two years Coromandel could provide only about half the 
required quantity of pintadoes for Java. The profits at Batavia suffered 
a proportionate decline. In 1638, Krishnappa, the general of the nayak 
of Gingi, devastated Tegenapatam, the chief centre of Chinanna's 
trade, as a punishment for the latter's refusal to pay him a large amount 
of money. For a while, Tegenapatam, one of the Company's main 
sources of supply, was wiped out from the commercial map of Coro-
mande!. The port was reconstructed af ter the establishment of peace 
in 1638 and normal trade was resumed towards the end of that year.87 
In 1638 the trade at Pulicat suffered further hindrance when Ranga-
pede Raja, alocal governor, occupied the fortresses of Katur and Kulur 
and began to plunder the neighbouring regions on the pretext of retalia-
tory measures against a feudatory chief. The transport of merchandise 
to and from Pulicat now became impossible and in despair the Com-
pany abandoned the island of Erikan and the viIIage of Wansiwake 
granted by the king. Normal trade was restored at Pulicat only af ter 
Rangapede Raja was deprived of his office.88 But again in February, 
1642 Ayappa Nayak, the king's brother-in-Iaw, sacked Wansiwake. The 
king, however, on receiving complaints from the Dutch asked Ayappa 
to stop further depredations and Wansiwake was soon restored to its 
previous state. "I have always understood," the king assured Gardenys, 
86 K.A.I034, 25.5.1637, f.675, 9.12.1637, f.170; K.A.I039, 18.12.1639, f.78vo, 
8.10.1638, ff.987-88, 30.9.1639, f.967, 22.12.1638, f.1030; K.A.I042, 
30.5.1640, f.461vo. 
ST K.A.1034, 20.12.1637, ff.624-24vo; K.A.I036, 22.12.1638, ff.172-72vo; 
K.A.1037, 6.1.1638, ff.227, 228vo; K.A.1039, 8.10.1638, f.986; Vijayanagara 
History, I, pp.340-41; MacLeod. 11, p.170. 
88K.A.1036, 22.12.1638, f.175vo; K.A.I037, 6.1.1638, ff.228vo-29; K.A.I039, 
8.10.1638, f.984, 22.12.1638, f.l027, K.A.765, 28.2.1639, f.lt6. 
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"that Pulieat is our own town and that you are our merchants. 80 if 
anybody seeks to do harm to that town, it is our own loss." 89 
Meanwhile an indirect but by no means negligible threat to the 
'Company's interests had developed in the Carnatic kingdom. Early in 
1640 Krishnappa suddenly imprisoned Kesava Chetti, his son Laksh-
mana and Chinanna's nephew, Konera and sent some men to besiege 
Chinanna's house at Tegenapatam. Eventually Chinanna managed to 
remove his family from Tegenapatam, but all his effects including 
100,000 Ibs of salpetre belonging to the Dutch and the cash with which 
he had intended to procure cloth for the Company were seized by 
Krishnappa. Lakshmana was released sometime later and allowed to 
resume trade on his agreeing to pay 40,000 pardaus. Kesava died in 
1642 and Konera regained his freedom only af ter Krishnappa had fallen 
Joulof the Carnatic king and was forced to flee from Gingi. The goods 
seized by Krishnappa were not recovered.90 
During the later years of Venkata III's rule, invasions from the neigh-
bouring Muslim states once more disturbed the peace of the Carnatic 
kingdom. In 1638, a Bijapur army of over 90,000 men penetrated as 
far as Bangalore and Venkata had to purchase a temporary truce at 
a heavy price the following year. Fresh invasions in 1640 and 1641 led 
to the annexation of extensive territories by Bijapur and on one 
occasion the general, Randaula Khan, arrived within twelve miles of 
Vellor.91 
In April, 1642, a large army from Golconda invaded the much-
harassed kingdom and marched along the coast, capturing a series of 
fortresses. At th is critical juncture king Venkata III died in October, 
1642.92 
The continuous troubles at home, aggravated by invasions from 
abroad, had greatly disturbed the economie life of the Carnatic king-
dom. By 1641-42, owing to the insecurity of the roads, the merchants 
from inland areas no longer came to the coastal harbours to buy the 
Company's wares. While large parts of the country were ruined by 
the depredations of the invading armies, the demand for taxes in-
creased to meet the expenses of war. Unable to bear the excessively 
89 K.A.1047, "Verhael etc.", ff.423, 424, 435vo, 445. 
90 K.A.I0H, 25.8.1640, ff.292 ff; K.A.I047, "Verhae1 etc.", fA48, 4.10.1642, 
f.715vo. 
91 Vijayanagara History, I, pp.342-47; MacLeod, 11, p.173; K.A.I039, 
6.4.1639, f.l049, 10.7.1639, f.l095; K.A.1042, 3.3.1640, f.462vo. 
92 Vijayanagara History, I, p.347; K.A.I047, "Verhae1 etc.", ffA23, 424, 440. 
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heavy taxation, hundreds of weavers and dyers fled from Tegenapatam, 
Pondicherry and Trimelivas, which severely affected the supply of 
cloth. At Poneri, near Pulicat, some handicraftsmen, who had accepted 
a large amount from the Dutch as advance for manufacturing patterned 
cloth, suddenly ran away because of increase in taxes. To add to the 
many woes of the unhappy kingdom, a prolonged drought affected food-
supplies from Orissa and prices of all commodities rose sharply in conse-
quence.93 
During the years, 1630--1642, the Dutch set up no new factory on 
the coast of Coromandel. Rapacity of the Golconda officers discouraged 
expansion. In the Carnatic kingdom, civil wars had reached a level 
where production and prices were seriously affected. These were the 
years when, understandably enough, the Company's activities, - at the 
instance of the Coromandel factors, - underwent significant expansion 
in other regions round the Bay. In the process the economic relations 
between Coromandel and the countries across the Bay acquired a new 
depth. And despite discouraging circumstances Dutch investments on 
the coast increased substantially. This meant an increased incentive to 




In the 'forties and 'fifties of the seventeenth century, as the Company's 
inter-Asian trade paid increasing diviciends, a steady flow of capital 
from all over Asia enabled the Coromandel factories to consolidate their 
position. This period witnessed a marked increase in the volume of 
return cargo, the establishment of new factories, the acquisition of 
administrative authority and the conquest of a Portuguese colony. And 
all these were achieved amidst devastating wars which radically altered 
the political map of the region and totally unsettled for a while im-
portant sectors of economic life. Confident of their strength, the Dutch 
tried to regulate Indian overseas trade to their own advantage and thus 
came into conflict with the great nobles and merchant-princes interested 
in that commerce. 
93 K.A.I047, "Verhael etc.", f.423vo, 15.6.1642, f.724vo. 
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Two major developments in the political life of the region had im-
portant bearings on the history of the Coromandel factories in this 
period: in Golconda, Mir Muhammad Sayyid rose to a position of 
supreme importance, governing "the king and consequently the coun-
try"; in the south, continual invasions by Bijapur and Golconda resulted 
in the final disintegration of the Vijayanagar empire. 
Sriranga lIl, who succeeded Venkata to the throne of Vijayanagar 
in 1642, pursued a vigorous policy of defence against the Muslim in-
vaders in collaboration with bis great nayaks. Still, by 1644, large parts 
of the Western Carnatic were annexed by Bijapur. Sriranga was more 
succesful in checking the agressive efforts of Golconda in the Eastern 
Carnatic, but a rebellion of the nayaks of Gingi, Tanjore and Madura 
in 1645 undermined his war efforts and the following year, Mir 
Muhammad who, as mir jttmla, had acquired almost unlimited power 
in Golconda, led a fresh attack against the Hindu monarch. An agree-
ment between Bijapur and Golconda for the eventual partition of the 
Carnatic kingdom further weakened Sriranga's position. In December, 
1646 Pulicat and the adjacent areas were occupied by Mir Jumla, and 
in a few months Sriranga made peace with the Muslim invaders ceding 
the occupied territories and paying a large indemnity. 
The invaders now turned their attention to the territories of the 
southern nayaks, and by 1649 Gingi was annexed by Bijapur, while 
Tanjore and Madura also accepted the suzerainty of the Adil Shahi 
king. In 1652 a war broke out between Bijapur and Golconda over the 
Carnatic territories. Sriranga recovered some of his possessions from, 
Bijapur during these disturbances but was forced to surrender all his 
territories excepting Chandragiri in 1653. For the European companies, 
the most significant result of these complicated developments was the 
emergence of Mir J umla as the virtual ruler of northern Carnatic, and 
his participation in both internal and overseas trade on a large scale 
created new problems the like of which had not been encountered 
before. The growing power of this over-mighty subject presently roused 
the hostility of Qutb Shah and in order to save himself Mir Jumla went 
over to the Mughals in 1655. In July, 1656 Northern Carnatic was 
conferred on the mir as his personal jagir by emperor Shahjahan, but 
the troubles in this region were by no means at an end. Soon af ter 
Mir Jumla's departure to northern India, Sriranga and Qutb Shah 
tried to seize parts of his territories, while in many pi aces the Hindu 
chieftains rose in revolt. It was only af ter 1658 that all traces of Sriran-
.ga's authority disappeared from the east coast. The bulk of northern 
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Carnatie remained in the hands of Mir Jumla's men until, on his death, 
the entire territory was absorbed into the Golconda kingdom.94 
The main problems eneountered by the Company in Golconda in this 
period, despite their superfieial resemblanee to earlier ones, resulted 
from very different eireumstanees. Now the Duteh had to deal not with 
the short-sighted rapacity of temporary governors, but the monopolistie 
designs of an all-powerful nobie, Mir Jumla. Batavia's new poliey of 
excluding Indians from the trade with Achin and the 'tin areas' of the 
Malay peninsula also sharpened and altered the nature of the existing 
conflicts, while some of the older problems resulting from political 
insecurity and the tyranny of local officials continued to plague the 
Company. 
In 1642, the Company had forced Mir Jumla to remove all restric-
tions on the sale of its wares. But the very next year his offer to pur-
chase the entire stock of the Company frightened away all other pros-
pective buyers, and the demand for Dutch imports suffered a serious 
decline though ostensibly there were no restrictions on their sale. The 
efforts of Arnold Heussen, - who succeeded as governor on Gardenys' 
death in July, 1643, - to secure some relaxation of Mir Jumla's thinly 
veiled efforts to establish a monopoly were of little avail. A new com-
plication developed in 1646 when the governor of Masulipatam, Mir 
Sa'id Ali, a subordinate of Mir Jumla, suddenly seized the Company's 
return cargo on the ground that its cloth supplies had evaded the 
payment of legitimate customs duties for years and he would not release 
the stock until the arrears were cleared. As a matter of fact, the Com-
pany's middlemen had been enjoying somewhat irregularly the exemp-
tion from internal customs duties to which only the Company's em-
ployees procuring merchandise from inland areas were entitled. The 
Dutch had abetted this practice as it helped to keep down the prices, 
and occasionally the middlemen also smuggled into Masulipatam quan-
tities of cloth in the Company's name without paying customs for 
selling them to other buyers.95 
In 1647, the Batavia authorities, in a desperate attempt to neutralise 
Indian competition in the Malay peninsuia and in Sumatra, decided 
to refuse passes for those regions, or at least to make the Indian ships 
04 For the rise of Mir Jumla and fall of the Vijayanagara empire, see Mir Jurnla, 
Chs. U-IV; Vijayanagara History, Ch. X; "Srirangarayalu - the last 
emperor of Vijayanagar," Journalof lndian History, 1939. 
95 K.A.I051, 22.12.1643, ff.26, 39ff; K.A.I054, 23.12.1644, f.537vo, 13.5.1644, 
f.604vo; K.A.I062 (vervolg), 21.10.1646, ff.783ff, July, 1646, f.981vo. 
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pay the same tolls as were paid to the Portuguese when the latter were 
in possession of Malacca.96 Accordingly, Mir Jumla's request for passes 
for the Indies was turned down and a quantity of tin worth 2,000 rials 
was seized as toll from one of his ships off Perak. The governor of 
Masulipatam demanded restitution of these goods and the situation in 
Golconda looked extremely ominous. Relations became once more 
amicable when in 1648 the Company promised to return the cargo 
seized and sold its entire stock of cloves and a quantity of copper to 
Mir Jumla. In 1648-49, the only difficulties encountered in Golconda 
were due to the depredations of a robber, "Mencappa", in the Dacheron 
area and interference with the purchase of cloth at Palicol by Malik 
Muhammad, the governor of Elur and Rajamahendri. But these trou-
bles were at an end by April, 1649, when Mir Jumla also offered new 
privileges to the Dutch in the territories wrested from the Carnatic king 
and a sharp reprimand from the king of Golconda brought Malik 
Muhammad to his senses.91 
The next two years conditions were peaceful on the surface, though 
there was astrong undercurrent of ill-will on the part of Mir J umla 
which led to a recrudescence of troubles in the latter part of 1651. The 
tin seized from the Mir's ship had not been returned, a friendly letter 
to Batavia had not been answered and the Company was charging high 
prices for its wares, which was ascribed to its reluctance to trade with 
Mir Jumla. In July, 1651 the Dutch were suddenly ordered to produce 
their account hooks in connection with the charges of tax-evasion against 
their middlemen. The governor of Masulipatam, a subordinate of the 
Mir, took a number of measures apparently intended to bring the entire 
trade of the Company under his master's con trol. The procuring of 
cloth was openly obstructed, merchants intending to trade with the 
Dutch were bullied on flimsy pretexts and no one was allowed to visit 
the factory without the governor's express permission. Factor Caulier's 
efforts to come to an understanding with the Mir proved fruitless and 
Dutch threats to blockade the coast were also ignored. 
For a while the Company toyed with the idea of seizing Muslim ship 
by way of reprisal, but eventually milder counsels prevailed and it was 
96 For the Company's poliey vis-à-vis Asian traden in this period, see in/ra, 
Ch. VI. 
97 K.A.I064 (vervolg), 1.6.1647, f.765; K.A.I066, 14.10.1648, f.451vo, 7.10.1648, 
f.466; K.A.1048,21.12.1659, ff.63 ff, K.A.I068 (vervolg) 27.2.1649, f.492vo, 
13.4.1649, ff.544 ff, 28.5.1649, ff.548vo ff, 18.5.1649, ff.555vo ff; for the 
developments in north Carnatic af ter its eonquest by Golconda, see in/ra. 
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decided to send commissaris Dirck Steur, who had arrived in 1651 on 
amission to Mir Jumla. Steur was received by the Mir at Gendikota in 
November, 1651 and the restrictions on the Company's trade were with-
drawn foUowing an agreement. It was decided that the Company's 
middlemen would pay a toU of 1200 to 1500 pagodas a year, Mir Jumla 
would get back the tin seized from his ship and in certain specified 
plaees the Dutch would buy thcir return cargo of cloth only from his 
representatives. Thc commissaris next proceeded to Golconda with 
friendly letters of recommendation from the great noble and received 
a new farman from the king confirming the rights and privileges already 
promised by Mir Jumla.98 
There was a further improvement in the Company's relations with 
Mir Jumla in 1652 af ter some initial difficulties. In June, 1652, factor 
van der Meyde was sent to the Mir with complaints against the 
governor of Masulipatam who had extorted obsolete custom duties from 
their middlemen. The negotiations which foUowed were highly successful. 
The toU payable by the middlemen was finaUy fixed at 212 % and any 
amount taken in excess of that rate was to be returned. Van der Meyde 
also secured a very profitable contract for supplying a large quantity of 
merchandise to Mir Jumla, bcsides a loan of 400,000 florÏns without 
any interest. The lease of Palicol was once more granted to the Company 
at 1000 pagodas per annum though the Mir himself would have to pay 
1200 pagodas annually to the royal treasury for the township. In return, 
the Company lent him some gunners, permitted his representatives to 
buy elephants in Ceylon and agreed to bis suggestion that the com-
modities which he had agreed to purchase would not be sold to any 
other merchant. 99 
The agreement of 1652, however, did not stablize relations with Mir 
Jumla. Even before its conclusion, one of his ships, the Nazareth, had 
been captured by the Dutch off Malacca, as it was sailing under a 
Portuguese nag af ter the termination of the Dutch-Portuguese truce. 
The Company was willing to restore the ship and its cargo, but con-
sidered Mir Jumla's claims too excessive. A second question at issue 
was the Company's refusal to lend passes for the Portuguese-occupied 
territories in Ceylon, Jaffnapatam in particular. As Mir Jumla pointed 
out, Indian merchants had formerly traded with these places even 
D8K.A.I074, 24.1.1652, ff.4ff; K.A.I076, 11.9.1651, ff.175, 180vo, 13.7.1651, 
f332, 6.7.1651, ff234voff; K.A.1079, 21.1.1652, ff.226vo ff. 
DO K.A.I080, 24.12.1652, ff.49 ff; K.A.1086, 8.1.1652, ff,476, 14.7.1652, ff.488vo 
ff, 12.8.1652, f.50vo; Heeres, 11. pp.53-54. 
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during the Dutch-Portuguese wars and hence no interference with this 
traditional right could be tolerated. 
The financial transactions were also not proceeding very smoothly. In 
1652, Mir Jumla returned the vermilion and copper supplied according 
to contract, partly because he had purchased a quantity from the 
English. The Dutch, on their side, refused to sell cloves at prices already 
agreed on. Negotiations for further loans also ended in failure because 
the parties could not agree on the rate of interest. 
Matters came to a head in 1653 when Mir J umla threatened to 
attack fort Geldria and charge 5 % interest on the money lent by him 
unless the Nazareth and its cargo were immediately restituted and passes 
granted for the Portuguese territories in Ceylon. Governor Laurens Pit, 
who had succeeded Heussen in 1650 100 sought Batavia's advice on the 
matter and it was eventually decided to meet part of Mir Jumla's claim 
regarding the cargo of the Nazareth. Besides, as a compromise measure, 
passes were to be granted to all subjects of Golconda for ports in the 
territory of the king of Kandi and also for Achin, on condition that 
in case of any blockade by the Dutch, ships sailing to Achin should 
proceed to some other destination approved by the Company. The 
repayment of a part of the loan with interest and the sale of a quantity 
of cloves to Mir Jumla also helped to ease relations. By the end of 1653, 
purchase of cloth once more proceeded smoothly in the territories under 
Mir Jumla, who also granted the Company a fresh loan of 4,000 pagodas 
at an interest of 1 Y:z % a month,lOI 
During 1654-55, the difficulties encountered by the Dutch in their 
relations with Mir Jumla were mainly due to the restrictions imposed 
by the Company on the Mir's overseas trade. One of his ships sailing to 
Macassar was diverted to Batavia at the request of the Dutch. The 
nakhoda or agent on this ship complained on his return to Masulipatam 
of unfair treatment, unduly heavy tolls and unsatisfactory business 
transactions at Batavia. In consequence, Mir Jumla demanded that a 
higher price should be paid for the cloth purchased from his ship and 
the Dutch were forced to agree. Soon afterwards the Mir was incensed 
by the Company's refusal to grant a pass for Bantam or Batavia and 
100 In 1650, Pit succeeded Heussen as director and president. Jacob de Wit, sent 
as govemor in 1651 died shortl}" af ter rcaching Coromandcl and Pit was 
formally appointed govcmor in 1652. See K.A.I076, August 1651, f.135vo, 
20.9.1651, f.138; K.A.1086, 16.10.1652, f.51ï. 
101 K.A.1086, 16.10.1652, f.517; K.A.1087, 19.1.1654, ff.229, ff.243vo, 261vo-
262; K.A.1091, 5.2.1653, ff.256 ff; K.A.1094, 2.1.1654, fA17. 
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was eventually pacified only when the Dutch agreed to purchase the 
cargo procured for the intended voyage. The dispute over the restitution 
of the goods captured from the Nazareth had also remained unsettled 
and in September, 1655, factor Pavilioen and the Company's Brahmin 
agent, Padmanabha, went on amission to Mir J umla to settle this 
vexatious question. Though this mission proved a complete failure, a 
relatively stabie agreement was reached towards the end of 1655. 
Laurens Pit now agreed to pay the compensation demanded for the 
Nazareth and Mir Jumla prohibited his own ships from sailing to 
Jaffnapatam in view of the Dutch-Portuguese war. The Dutch also 
conceded to him the right to trade with Macassar, Bantam and Queda 
within certain limits and allowed some of his wares to be sent to 
Malacca on their own ships.102 
Conditions in Golconda during 1656-58 were congenial for the 
Dutch, except for some temporary difficulties in 1657. In 1656, Mir 
Jumla granted an additional loan of 50,000 pagodas at 1 % interest 
and the total debt to him now amounted to 972,160 florins. Early in 
1657, the Mir was highly aggrieved when the Company refused to grant 
a pass for Achin because the Dutch were at war with that kingdom, 
and he was pacified only af ter a quantity of benzoin and eagle-wood 
were sold to him at less than cost price. Later that year he also insisted 
for a while on the repayment of the loans due to him, but soon showed 
a more accomodating spirit and the Company's relations with him 
remained very friendly for the rest of the period. In 1658, Dutch trade 
throughout Golconda was in a flourishing state and a farman from 
Qutb Shah abolishing the 2~ % toIl payable by the Company's middle-
men further strengthened its position.10 3 
The Dutch possition in Golconda during the 'fifties was in fact strong 
enough to warrant the establishment of a new factory in that kingdom. 
In 1651, Iliyas Beg, the sar-i-lashkar of the Gingeli coast, requested the 
Masulipatam factors to trade in the territory under his commando As 
large quantities of rice and dungri cloth - both required for Ceylon -
were more easily available in that region than at Masulipatam, under-
factor Gerrit Backer was sent with a present to secure from the sar-i-
lashkar the right to open a factory at Bimlipatam or Vizagapatam. The 
102 K.A.I094, 15.9.1654, ff.452 Cf, 23.9.1655, f.459, 17.10.1655, f.466, K.A.II00, 
24.12.1655, ff.77 ff, 7.6.1655, Cf.345 Cf; K.A.1I01, 15.2.1655, f.348. 
103K.A.ll04, 4.2.1656, ff.39ff; K.A.1I07, 31.1.1657, f.57; K.A.llll, 16.1.1658, 
f.38, 19.11.57, f.669, 24.2.1657, f.526vo, 22.10.1657, f.596; K.A.l1l5, 
14.12.1658, ff.73 ff, 81vo. 
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fact that ships built in these places could be used for transporting cargo 
to Ceylon was a further inducement for the Dutch and eventually, by 
August, 1651, a factory was established at Bimlipatam,104 
In 1656, the foundations were laid for still another factory in the 
Golconda kingdom. As the prevailing political insecurity and Mir 
Jumla's monopolies interfered with the sale of spices on the coast from 
time to time, the Company decided that year to sell part of its cargo 
at the capital, Golconda, and this measure proved a success.105 
The situation in south Coromandel throughout this period was rather 
different from that in the north. War, anarchy and famine, - and, 
only to a lesser extent, commercial rivalry with local officials, - were 
the chief difficulties with which the Dutch had to contend. The political 
turmoil in the Carnatic kingdom, however, contributed to two positive 
developments. It induced and helped the Company to acquire partial 
administrative authority in some places and forced it to look for new 
centres of activity in the comparatively peaceful regions further south. 
The situation in the north Carnatic quickly deteriorated af ter 
Sriranga's accession because of the depredations of the Golconda army 
and internecine troubles. By 1643, the procuring of cloth for the Com-
pany was seriously affected and the sale of its wares nearly stopped. In 
April that year, the king visited Pulicat and granted a new ka uI to the 
Company: The Dutch were now exempted from the payment of import 
and export duties at Pulicat and granted half the toll due from all 
ships visiting the port. Their relations with the king became even more 
friendly when in 1644 they helped his men to beat back an attack on 
Pulicat by the Golconda army. As aresuit new agreements were con-
cluded with Lakshmana-nayak, the lease-holder of Pulicat, which con-
siderably reduced the internal custom duties for the Company. Any 
advantages which the Dutch might have gained from such agreements 
were, however, neutralised by wide-spread devastation of the country 
and the famine which followed in its wake. As the Golconda army 
approached Pulicat, all semblance of organised government disappeared 
from that region, while the local chieftains turned into rapacious war-
lords and organised regular plundering expeditions. The Company's own 
middleman, Chinanna, became hostile to the Dutch in 1645, collected 
an army and tried to starve out Pulicat, though not with any great 
success. By 1646, trade in north Carnatic came to a standstill and the 
104 KA.I074, 24.1.1652, f.l1vo; K.A.I076, 6.7.1651, f.241vo; K.A.1079, 
1.9.1651, f.250vo. 
105KA.I104, 4.12.1656, f.4Ivo. 
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Company could only wait for a better opportunity to resume its normal 
activities. In May, 1646, however, the Dutch decided to accept the 
lease of Pulicat for 8,000 pagodas a year. The king also granted them 
the income of a number of villages dependent on the port, while the 
villages of Erikan and Wansiwake continued to be in their possession 
as before. Thus for the first time the Company acquired administrative 
authority over an important region on the coast.106 
Conditions in north Carnatic improved af ter 1647, when the entire 
region including Pulicat came under the rule of Golconda. Peace re-
turned to the land af ter many years, normal trading conditions were 
restored and, by 1648, the famine was also at an end. In January, 1647, 
Mir Jumla granted the Company a kaul recognizing its existing rights 
at Pulicat, except that the internal custom duties payable by the Dutch 
were raised by 25 %. In 1649, as a further favour, the Mir exempted 
the Dutch from a third of the toll payable at Armagon and granted 
them trading rights at Allamparwa, north of Pondichery, a place which 
was expected to attract the cloth-manufacturers from Gingi. The only 
drawback was the danger that Golconda, in accordance with its general 
policy, might prohibit a foreign nation from holding any fort in its 
territory. Batavia's recommendation that Geldria should be fortified 
against any possible attack was unacceptable to the local factors be-
cause the fort was in no position to withstand a siege. Fortunately for 
the Company, however, the threat to Geldria did not materialise.107 
Despite occasional conflicts with Mir Jumla which had their reper-
cussions in north Carnatic as weIl, the Dutch had a fairly easy time in 
this region until 1656 when Sriranga's efforts to recover his lost domains 
once more seriously hampered trade in the Pulicat and Armagon area. 
At this stage they definitely sided with Mir Jumla's men and as a 
reward, in 1658, the Company was again granted the lease of Pulicat 
which had been in the hands of the Mir's agents for some years. 108 
In the early 'forties, trade in the Gingi territory was seriously affected 
106 K.A.I051, 22.12.1643, ff.38, 41; K.A.1055, 20.1.1645, ff.7 ff; K.A.1056, 
3.6.1643, f.776vo, 9.7.1643, ff.782vo, 785vo, 786vo; K.A.I059, 5.10.1644, 
ff.276 ff; K.A.I060, "Verhael enz.", ff.196vo ff; K.A.I062 (vervolg), 
28.2.1646, ff.801-802, 3.5.1646, ff.824ff, 24.5.1646, ff.988 ff; Heeres, I, 
pp.403-405, 424-29. 
107 K.A.I064 (vervolg), 2.8.1647, ff.675vo If, 5.3.1647, f.697vo; K.A.I066, 
3.3.1648, f.484; K.A.I068, 31.12.1649, f.59, 18.5.1649, I.5555; Heeres, I, 
pp.486-89, 514. 
108 K.A.llll, 25.12.1656, ff.516 ff, 28.12.1656, f.520, 24.2.1657, f.524; K.A.1115, 
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by clashes of interest with General Krishnappa, who had become more 
powerful than the nayak and secured con trol of the coastal region, 
including the three important centres of commerce, Porto Novo, 
Tegenapatam and Pondicherry. As a result of Krishnappa's monopolistic 
policy, the Company, by 1642, temporarily suspended its activities in 
Gingi. Early in 1643, negotiations were started with Krishnappa's 
representatives for reopening trade and a very favourable contract, 
granting the Company exclusive trading rights in Gingi, was soon 
secured. Besides, Krishnappa also gave the Company a village near 
Tegenapatam, which yielded about 1000 pagodas a year. However, 
when a ship with cargo worth some 35,000 florins was sent to Tege-
napatam at Krishnappa's request, the latter offered prices much lower 
than those agreed upon so that the Dutch refused to unload their wares 
and returned to Pulicat. In November, 1643, however, following a 
Dutch mission to his headquarters, the general entered into a new 
contract with the Company guaranteeing the scrupulous observanee 
of all trade agreements. In April, 1644, the nayak of Gingi permitted 
the Dutch to establish a factory at Porto Novo, while Krishnappa 
exempted them from the payment of import and export duties at 
Tegenapatam, Pondicherry and all other places under his contro!. The 
very same year, when Chinanna and his nephew, Konera, secured the 
lease of the Gingi ports, the situation actually took a turn for the worse. 
The Chettis, in an attempt fo force an unfavourable contract on the 
Company, stopped all merchants and manufacturers from visiting the 
Dutch factory, seized some of their merchandise, arrested a Dutch 
merchant and expelled the Company's representative from Porto Novo. 
In November, 1644 Chinanna's men beseiged the Tegenepatam factory. 
A struggle between the Dutch and the Chettis continued until 1646, 
when a decline in Chinanna's fortunes once more forced him to seek 
the Company's favour,109 
During 1647-49, a new and far more serious menace threatened 
the Company's trade in Gingi. Bijapur's war of conquest against the 
nayak's territory resulted in famine, pestilence and depopulation and a 
consequent dislocation of commerce and industry. Tegenapatam, where 
the Dutch had their chief factory in Gingi, was devastated during the 
109 K.A.I054, 4.5.1644, f.567vo, 3.3.1644, ff.575vo---576; K.A.I056, 17.2.1643, 
f.750vo, 3.4.1643, f.764, 3.10.1643, f.798vo, 3.6.1643, ff.775 ff; K.A.I057, 
10.12.1644, ff.173 ff; K.A.1057, 17.12.1645, ff.35 ff; K.A.I059, 5.10.1644, 
f.283; K.A.I062 (vervolg), 16.8.1646, ff.984 ff; Heeres, I, pp.394 ff, 417 ff, 
426 ff. 
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war. In Gingi, as in north Carnatic, conditions improved with the 
return of peace. In 1649, the Bijapuri commander in charge of Gingi 
and Madura granted the Company areassuring kaul and the following 
year the newly-appointed governor gave further assurances that its 
trading rights in Gingi and further south would be duly respected. In 
1651, farmans from the king and the commander-in-chief of the Bijapur 
army, Khan-i-Khanan, formally guaranteed the Company's trading 
rights and fixed the tolls for Tegenapatam at 212 %, which was only 
about half the previous rate. 110 
In Gingi the Company's policy vis-à-vis Asian traders soon collided 
with the commercial ambitions of the great Muslim nobles of Bijapur, 
who, like their counterparts in Golconda, were anxious to develop 
their trade with the countries to the east, now that Bijapur had direct 
access to the Bay. In 1651, the Dutch seized a quantity of tin from one 
of Khan-i-Khanan's ships off Malacca, but were eventually forced to 
return it. In 1652, Khan-i-Khanan's request for passes to Achin and 
Queda was turned down by the Company. The offer of passes for 
Tenasserim and Pegu instead did not quite satisfy him and he decided 
to send one ship to Achin without a pass. Again in 1655, one of his 
ships returning from Achin without a pass was attacked by a Dutch 
ship cruising in the Bay. Such incidents were a source of continuous 
tension despite Khan-i-Khanan's generally friendly attitude towards the 
Company.ll1 
From 1656 to 1658, peace in the Gingi area was once more disturbed 
as the Khan-i-Khanan feIl out of favour with the Bijapur king, who 
sent his Maratha general, Shahaji, father of Shivaji, to bring Gingi 
under direct roya! contro!. The civil war which followed had an adverse 
effect on trade, particularly at Tegenapatam. Further north, Shahaji 
looted the factory at Sadraspatam, probably established in 1655. Khan-
i-Khanan was treacherously killed late in 1657, but as his men continued 
to hold out against the royal army, conditions remained insecure even 
long af ter his death.112 
The difficulties encountered by the Company in north Carnatic and 
Gingi were directly responsible for the opening of new factories further 
110 K.A.1066, 25.5.1648, f.556vo, 31.12.1649, ff.58 ff; K.A.I068, 10.2.1649, 
ff.523 ff; KA.I076, 30.9.1651, f.165vo, 18.5.1651, ff.209-209vo; Heeres, 
11, 8 ff, 25 ff. 
111 K.A.1076, 10.12.1651, f.l38; KA. 1086, 16.10.1652, f.518vo; K.A.II00, 
24.12.1655, ff.78 ff. 
Ul! K.A.1I04, 4.12.1656, ff.43ff, 1.1.1656, f.209vo: KA.lIll, 27.1.1658, f.687, 
24.5.1657, f.541, 12.9.1657, f.580vo; van Dam, 11, ii, p.231. 
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south at Tanjore and Madura, where the conditions were more peaceful 
and congenial to trade. Adriaen van der Meyde, sent to Tanjore in 
1645 with costly presents for the nayak, however, failed to secure any-
thing more than vague promises of good treatment, largely as aresult 
of the machinations of Chinanna who did not want to lose his lucrative 
business of supplying Tanjore cloth to the Company. In the same year 
on the other hand the Dutch were permitted to establish a factory at 
Karikal. The chief problem they had to face at this place was the 
hostility of the Negapatam Portuguese and as a security measure the 
Company opened a smaller establishment at Trimelevas at a safe dis-
tance from the Portuguese colony. By 1648, the Dutch had obtained 
a firm footing in Tanjore, but the arrival of the Bijapur army near the 
Tanjore frontier and the hostility of the local authorities, caused partly 
by Portuguese influence, induced them to reduce their investments at 
Karikal to a minimum in 1648.113 
With the Tanjore nayak's acceptance of Bijapur's suzerainty, the 
threat of war receded and the Karikal factory was included in the 
kauls granted by the Bijapur authorities in 1649 and 1652. Particularly 
beneficial for the Company was the clause fixing the toll at 2Y:z %, 
because by 1651 Karikal had become one of the chief centres for the 
supply of cloth at prices 20 % to 25 % cheaper than in the regions to 
the north. Conditions at Karikal, however, remained insecure owing 
to the persistent enmity of the Negapatam Portuguese. The nayak's 
demand that passes for Achin and the Malay peninsuia should be 
granted to the Hindu inhabitants of Negapatam became a further 
source of embarrassment. Towards the end of 1652, the Dutch decided 
to withdraw their representatives from Karikal and continue their trade 
with that port through a few employees stationed at Dansborg, by 
agreement with the Danes. As this step seriously affected the trade and 
revenues of Tanjore, the nayak earnestly requested the Company to 
reopen the Karikal factory and join him in a combined attack on 
Negapatam. It was not until 1657, however, that normal trade was 
resumed at Karikal. Little faith was placed in the nayak's proposals 
regarding Negapatam and the Dutch conquest of the Portuguese colony 
in 1658 actually provoked his hostility.114 
113 K.A.1057, 9.7.1645, ff.15 ff; K.A.I060, "Verhae1 enz", ff.225 ff; K.A.1062 
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In Madura, the Dutch had a comparatively easy time. In 1645 gover-
nor Heussen sent Adriaen van der Meyde on amission to the nayak of 
Madura, partly in response to the latter's eagerness to have trade 
reJations with the Dutch. The facts that c10th and saltpetre were 
available in Madura at rates much lower than in Gingi and the former 
region could supply cheap provisions for Ceylon were also important 
considerations. On receiving a ka uI which granted them trading rights 
in any place they chose to the exclusion of other nations, the Dutch 
opened a factory at Coilpatam late in 1645 and sent a prospecting 
mission to Cape Comorin for the purchase of Malabar pepper. Their 
trade at Coilpatam proved very profitable, despite the poor demand 
for the Company's wares and the hostility of the Portuguese trading 
in Madura, because Coilpatam was the only place where certain 
varieties of c10th were available.115 
In 1658, at the suggestion of Admiral Rijcklof van Goens, Batavia 
considered two aIternative administrative changes in the CoromandeJ 
factories. One was to transfer the headquarters from Pulicat to J affna-
patam in northern Ceylon and consolidate the Company's position by 
wresting Tanjore from the hands of the nayak. The other was to transfer 
J affnapatam, Manar and the places dependent on them to the Coro-
mandel government. The undesirability of having two administrative 
authorities in the same island, governor Pit's reluctance to abandon the 
Pulicat factory as headquarters or burden it with additional responsi-
bilities and Batavia's general objections to any aggressive policy finally 
led to the abandonment of such plans, though the idea of the eventual 
fusion of the CoromandeJ and Ceylon governments was not dropped.116 
The 'forties and 'fifties were exceptionally significant years in the 
history of the Company's activities and the commerce of Coromandel. 
The conquest of Negapatam, in itself a minor episode, symbolised the 
ascendancy of the Dutch. The right to establish factories in Madura, to 
the exclusion of other European nations, further emphasized this ascend-
ancy as an established facto Their expanding capital resources enabled 
them to set up new centres on the coast itseJf amidst conditions of 
extreme insecurity. This insecurity itself was exploited to secure admini-
K.A.II00, 24.12.1655, f.81; K.A.l104, 4.12.1656, f Hvo; K.A.llI0, 
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strative authority, a very convenient aid to exclusive control on com-
merce. The Indian background had meanwhile developed certain new 
features. The Company's conflicts with Mir Jumla and the Bijapur 
officers were no simple struggle between foreign merchant monopolists 
and native feudal exploiters. Participation of Indians, - Indian nobles 
in particular, - in India's foreign trade had acquired considerable 
magnitude, perhaps aided by the influx of European capital and in-
spired by the examples of the Companies' trade. Their effort to expand 
their share in this foreign trade met with serious resistance from the 
Dutch, who were now eager to enter into commercial relations with the 
merchant nobles, so long as the latter could be prevented from becoming 
dangerous rivals. 
CHAPTER IV 
mOM PROSPERITY TO DECAY, 1659-1690 
I 
1659-1674 
The conquest of Negapatam in 1658 symbolized in a spectacular 
fashion the Company's triumph in the face of manifold problems 
encountered during the first half century of its career on the coast. The 
victory over the French at San Thomé sixteen years later indicated a 
further accession of military might and politica! power. During the 
intervening years the volume of trade was also maintained on a level 
hardly lower than that of the preceding period, and the comparatively 
peaceful conditions in the greater part of Coromandel offered a wel-
come change from the wars and anarchy of earlier years. Vet all was 
not weIl with the Dutch position on the coast. A rapid expansion of 
English and Asian trade undennined the superior position which the 
Dutch had secured af ter hard struggles. Financial difficuIties and a 
preposterous monetary policy adopted by the Golconda government 
hampered normal commercial operations, while the heavy expenses of 
an unprofitable factory developed into a serious predicament. 
In Golconda and the northern Carnatic no violent upheavals threat-
ened the Company's trade. Conflicts which had their roots in mutually 
opposed economic interests also receded into the background because 
the struggle for ascendancy in the South-East Asian markets was now 
fought out mainly on a commercial plane, though the familiar political 
weapons were occasionally used. Minor clashes with officials and the 
central government occured from time to time, but their roots seldom 
went deeper than the avarice of some general or temporary governor. 
A brief and not very serious famine in Golconda in 1659 undennined 
the demand for the Company's wares, but conditions soon improved. 
The demand for wares in the capital city of Golconda was so great 
that the Company feit justified in establishing a factory there in 1662. 
As Golconda had close commercial links with several inlands marts of 
the Deccan and northern India, th is new factory proved a very profi-
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table source of income, except during years when the approach of the 
Mughal army or Sivaji's depredations in western India rendered the 
trade-routes unsafe. An expccted difficulty arose in 1669 when general 
Zafar Beg, governor of the Masulipatam region, stopped the transport 
of the Company's merchandise to Golconda and besieged the Masuli-
patam factory in an attempt to extort money. Eventually, the govern-
ment of the region was taken away erom the general through the 
influence of a courtier who was friendly to the Company and con-
ditions at Masulipatam returned to norm al. There was a recrudescence 
of trouble in 1672 af ter Zafar Beg was restored to his governorship, but 
the Company was determined to resist his claim for additional to11s, and 
preparations to defend the Masulipatam factory induced him to give up 
his aggressive intentions. 
Such recurrent troubles and the fact that both the English and the 
French had secured freedom from to11s in the Golconda kingdom 
prompted the Company to appeal for a farman granting duty-free trade 
in return for a large tribute. Negotiations undertaken with this object 
were interrupted by the death of king Abdu11a Qutb Shah in 1672, 
but the new king, Abul Hassan, soon offered to exempt the Company 
from all customs duties in return for a payment of 100,000 rupees. The 
decision to accept the offer was later altered in view of the insecurity 
resulting from hostilities with the French. And though nothing came of 
these negotiations in the immediate future, in 1674, as a reward for 
the expulsion of the French from San Thomé, the king graciously 
exempted the Dutch from the payment of their annual to11 at Masuli-
patam and presented them with the village of Palicol, long held in lease 
by the Company. This meant an annual saving of 4,000 old pagodas, 
i.e., 36,750 florins.1l7 
In northern Carnatic, the last embers of resistance were crushed when 
Tupaki Krishnappa, who had put up a struggle against the authority 
of Golconda on behalf of Mir Jumla, was taken prisoner in 1659. With 
the establishment of one stabIe authority in the region, peace returned 
to the land. The Golconda officials, however, showed a marked tendency 
towards extortionate practices and the Dutch factors wished in vain for 
a return to the days of Mir Jumla. The lease of Pulicat enjoyed by the 
117K.A.1122, 26.1.1661, f.431vo; K.A.1124, 22.12.1661, f.111; K.A.1142, 
30.1.1666, f.188vo; K.A.1160, 2.11.1669, ffA12 ff, 431 ff; K.A.1169, 
19.12.1671, f.175vo; K.A.1175, 11.12.1672, f.48vo, 31.1.1673, f.247, 
19.11.1672, f.395vo; K.A.1181, 28.6.1673, f.507; K.A.1187, 19.1.1675, 
ff.246 ff; van Dam, 11, 11, pp.163-4. 
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Company for years was now taken away. The king only promised that 
the Duteh would be eonsulted in all important matters relating to 
Pulieat. Things eame to a head in 1668, when the governor of Pulicat 
established a monopoly on the sale of grains and vietuals, forbade all 
import of these eommodities from the inland areas and laid down that 
all dues to the government must be paid in grain. In eonsequence, there 
was a mass exodus from the town and, though the Company's trade did 
not eome to a stand still, it suffered eonsiderable hindranee. Eventually, 
many of the eitizens retumed on hearing of the likelihood of the gover-
nor's dismissal. Several heads of castes went to Golconda, eneouraged by 
govemor Pavilioen,l1S to negotiate a settlement and it was eventually 
agreed that the monopoly would be abolished on payment of 7,000 
pagodas. When the citizens refused to abide by this contract, sixty heads 
of castes were thrown into prison. To ensure that its authority in the 
intemal affairs of Pulicat acquired during the war did not go by default, 
the Company secured the release af the arrested men by force of arms. 
This led to a siege of Geldria which was raised only af ter represen-
tations had been made to the local general, Nekman Khan. Again, in 
1670, a Golconda general overran Pulicat and demanded a ransom 
from the Dutch, but withdrew when the Company prepared to attack 
him.119 
The new factory at Sadraspatam, with its ample supply of rice, cloth, 
eoir and ray-skins, proved very profitable for the Company and the 
Dutch secured the lease of the place in the early 'sixties. General 
Neknam Khan, jealous of any administrative or political authority 
acquired by foreign nations in Golconda territory, took away this lease 
from the Company in 1666. In 1668, he also stopped all traders from 
visiting the Duteh factory, because of his mistaken belief that the 
factory was being fortified. When the Dutch retaliated by stopping the 
issue of passes, the restrictions were withdrawn, and the Company was 
once more granted the lease of Sadraspatam. New difficulties arose in 
1671, when the local govemor demanded tolls for the wares loaded and 
unloaded at the port, particularly the stones which were being quarried 
for export to Batavia. The Company admitted that the original farman 
for Sadraspatam entailed the payment of the toll, but the relevant 
clause had been allowed to fall into disuse by a tacit understanding. 
118 Cornelis Speelman secceeded Laurens Pit as governor in 1663 and was follow-
ed by Anthoni Pavilioen in 1665. 
119K.A.1119, 10.12.1659, fUHf; K.A.1121, 11.10.1659, f.795; K.A.1156. 
7.11.1668, f.499, 26.6.1668, K.A.1159, 17.11.1669, ff.l06 ff, K.A.1164, 
24.6.1670, ff.581 ff. 
62 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
It was decided to resist the claim, for it was now considered necessary 
to defend the rights of the Company not merely as a trading body, but 
as representatives of the Dutch state. This policy of strength once more 
had the desired result. Tbe claim for new tolIs was dropped and the 
Company's lease of the port extended for a further period.120 
In 1665, the Company tried to open a new factory at the inland town-
ship of Ramelepatam, halfway between Pulicat and Masulipatam, where 
commodities like cloth, iron and gunny-sacks could be procured cheaply. 
A twelve years' lease of Ramelepatam was secured from the local nayak 
and the construction of a factory was started. This project had to be 
eventualIy dropped because Neknam Khan, in whose jurisdiction the 
town was included, regarded it as the beginning of an autonomous 
foreign enclave. Dutch interests at Ramelepatam were entrusted to a 
Brahmin agent. 121 
At Bimlipatam, on the Orissa coast, difficulties arose from time to 
time mainly because of the almost exclusive monopoly of the rice trade 
enjoyed by the local governor and the sar-i-lashkar of Sicacol [Srikaku-
lam]. As the government of the place was farmed out at exorbitant 
rates, the temporary governors were practicalIy forced to extort money 
by aII possible means and this unwholesome system was at the root of 
all troubles. Procurement of rice, which was the chief purpose of the 
Bimlipatam factory, involved constant haggling over prices and when 
there was a change of governor, it was of ten difficult to secure the full 
quantity paid or contracted for. In 1665 the factory was temporarily 
abandoned as a protest against such treatment. Again in 1666 a Dutch 
factor was arrested and forced to pay a large amount because the 
Company was suspected of complicity in an attack on the Orissa coast 
by a Portuguese ship. Later, in 1668, a fracas between the Dutch and 
the governor's men led to the siege and temporary occupation of the 
factory by the sar-i-lashkar's men. Despite such frequent troubles, the 
Dutch held on to the Bimlipatam factory as it was one of the chief 
sources for the supply of rice to Ceylon.122 
120 K.A.1124, 22.12.1661, f.lOO; KA.793, 19.4.1666, f.131, 10.6.1666, f.251, 
K.A.1l56, 7.11.1668, ffA99 ff, 22.1.1669, f.487vo; K.A.1l60, 10.7.1669, 
f.476; KA.ll69, 19.12.1671, f.178, 7.8.1671, f.792vo; KA.ll75, 19.11.1672, 
f.395vo; Heeres, 11, p.256. 
121 K.A.1l42, 6.11.1665, f.1408, KA.1143, 5.3.1665, f.309; Heeres, 11, pp.301-
302. 
122 K.A.1l22, 16.12.1660, f.433vo; K.A.1143, 5.3.1665, f.271; K.A.1l47, 
31.8.1666, ff.695vo-96; KA.1l56, 7.11.1668, f.499vo; KA.ll60, 28.6.1669, 
f.456; Heeres, 11, pp.327-28. 
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The conditions in Gingi and Tanjore during these years was far 
from peaceful. The troubles started with a punitive expedition under-
taken by Bijapur against the nayak of Tanjore. Later, Shahaji Bhonsla, 
who was left in charge of this campaign came into conflict with the 
Bijapur general Balbulla Khan in Gingi, and the coastal towns of 
Tegenapatam and Porto Novo got involved in the civil war which 
followed. In February, 1661, Shahaji secured possession of Tegenapatam 
and the consequent insecurity seriously hindered trade, though the 
general did not in any way directly damage the Company for fear of 
reprisals against one of his ships which was then being loaded at Porto 
Novo. In 1662, Balbulla Khan recaptured Porto Novo from Shahaji 
and besieged Tegenapatam and for several months no trade was possi-
bie in the region. Fortunately for the Company, Shahaji was reconciled 
to the Bijapur authorities the following year and normal trading con-
ditions were restored. Later, in 1670, peace in this region was once 
more disturbed by an expedition against the local nayak who was in 
possession of Gingi, but this time only the sale of the Company's wares 
was seriously affected, the procurement of cloth being maintained more 
or less on the normal level. 
An unusual problem encountered in Gingi in this period was the 
free minting of janums of very poor alloy by the Bijapur officers in 
charge of the different districts. The face value of these small copper 
coins which constituted the chief currency for day-to-day purposes, was 
now fixed at a level much higher than their intrinsic worth. The 
officers forced the people living under their jurisdiction to accept this 
debased currency and made large profits on the transaction. In an 
economy still for the most part non-monetized, where the value of coins 
was equivalent to the intrinsic value of their metallic content, such 
measures did not imply the introduction of a token currency, but were 
merely a form of arbitrary exploitation. Fanums minted in a particular 
district became quite unacceptable in other parts. Besides, the Com-
pany was of ten forced to make their payments in old pagodas, which 
alone had any credit in the Gingi markets and had to he purchased at 
this time at exorbitant rates. There was a general rise in the price-Ievel 
as a net result. The fact that the Dutch records do not mention this 
problem af ter 1661 probably indicates that this indiscriminatc minting 
of debased janums was stopped af ter a time. 
In 1669, Sher Khan Lodi, the governor of Gingi, forced the weavers 
at Tegenapatam into a contract for supplying cloth exclusively to him-
self. The Dutch retorted by stopping their trade at Tegenapatam and 
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warned Sher Khan that all Bijapur shipping would be attacked at sea 
unless free procurement of cloth was soon allowed. This threat had the 
desired result. In all probability Sher Khan Lodi had a hand in the new 
troubles encountered by the Company in connection with their supply 
of cloth. In the middle of 1669, a conflict developed between the 
master weavers at Tegenapatam and the Company's middlemen, which 
led to a combined action on part of the producers to safeguard their 
economic interests. The weavers jointly decided to stop supplying cloth 
to the Chetti merchants and to deal directly with the Company so that 
they themselves might enjoy the profits which had previously gone to the 
middlemen. This proposition was considered disadvantageous, not only 
to the Chettis but to the Company as weIl, for direct dealings with the 
craftsmen would increase their bargaining power. Besides the weavers, 
altogether unprovided with capital, could not be depended upon to 
maintain a regular supply. In fact they were entirely dependent on 
advance payments from the middlemen, and the Company did not have 
adequate capital to be able to replace the Chettis in this respect. Sher 
Khan Lodi now offered to provide the necessary advance to the weavers, 
so that he might become sole supplier to the Company, but his clever 
scheme was resisted by both the Company and the weavers. The Dutch 
began to consider seriously the possibility of procuring cloth from the 
leaders of the weavers. The governor, who was losing heavily in revenue 
through the long stoppage of the Company's trade, came to the aid of 
the Company in August, 1669. He entered into an agreement with the 
Dutch to suppress the craftsmen's revolt and make them manufacture 
for the Chettis as before; and by the end of the year conditions in 
Tegenapatam returned to normal. 123 
In Tanjore, the period started inauspiciously with the invasion of 
the Bijapur army in 1659. The widespread devastation carried out by 
the invaders resulted in one of the most serious famines experienced 
in that region. All trade came to a standstilI excepting the purchase of 
slaves. The depopulation was so extensive that by 1661 even slaves were 
no longer available. To add to the Company's burdens, Shahaji plun-
de red Karikal that year and carried away some of the merchandize 
procured by the Dutch. By 1662, the situation improved in Tanjore; 
123 For the situation in Gingi in this period, see K.A.1122, 16.12.1660, f.73vo, 
26.1.1661, f.430; K.A.1l24, 22.12.1661, ff.95, 98 ff; K.A.1128, 26.12.1662, 
f.197; K.A.1132, November, 1663, ff.668ff; K.A.1159, 17.11.1669, ff.105ff, 
28.6.1669, ff.46S ff; K.A.1160, 2.11.1669, f.413vo; K.A.1164, 24.6.1670, 
f.580vo; K.A.1l69, 19.12.1671, ff.178ff. 
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only tbe newly conquered settlement of Negapatam turned out to be a 
liability rather than an asset. The nayak's anger at the military action 
undertaken by the Dutch in his territory had died down on the receipt 
of suitable presents and in 1661 the Dutch secured from him a very 
advantageous kaul. The Company was granted the income from the 
ten villages formerly owned by the Negapatam Portuguese, exempted 
from the payment of half the usual toll and pcrmitted to mint pagodas 
on payment of only 50 % of the usual duties. The following year, the 
nayak's representative tried to collect full tolls from the Dutch, but the 
Company forced him to give a written statement agreeing to abide by 
the nayak's kaul. 
Still, Negapatam remained a burden for the Company. The famine 
had dispersed the manufacturers of cloth from the area and the little 
cloth that was available there was in poor demand in the Indies. By 
1664, some 100 families of weavers and painters returned to Negapatam 
and the adjoining villages, partly at the instance of the Dutch, and 
in 1665 the factory also made a small profit for the first time on the 
sale of its wares. But again in 1667 and 1668 the expenses of the 
factory outbalanced the profits by 16,445 and 27,404 florins respectively. 
Batavia's numerous suggestions for making the factory a more profitabie 
concern all proved impracticable for one reason or another. The chief 
reason why the Dutch still held on to Negapatam was the prestige 
value of its fort, which would provide shelter if the Company were 
asked to quit Geldria. In 1667 the Dutch began to send their wares 
from Negapatam to two inland marts in Tanjore and Madura, but the 
improvement resulting from this step was soon cut short by the outbreak 
of war between Madura and Tanjore which affected tbe security of 
the inland trade routes. The Tanjore-Madura war ended in 1669, but 
the heavy indemnities paid by the nayaks to Bijapur in 1670 as the 
price of peace induced them to undertake a policy of severe exploitation. 
The consequent sharp rise in the price level severely affected tbe Com-
pany's purchases. In 1671, Serca Thevar, a vassal of the Tanjore nayak, 
occupied lower Tanjore, which included Negapatam and Trimele-
patam, a place taken in lease by the Company in 1666. When the Dutch 
turned down the Thevar's demand that the dues for tbe two places 
should be paid to him, he threatened an attack on Negapatam but 
eventually assumed a more friendly attitude. The situation changed 
suddenly in 1673 when the Tanjore nayak and his family killed them-
selves during a siege of their capital by the nayak of Madura, and the 
whole territory virtually passed into the latter's hands. That year, to 
Verh. dl. 38 5 
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relieve the Coromandel government of the burden of the Negapatam 
factory, both Negapatam and Trimelipatam were transferred to the 
hands of the Ceylon government, an arrangement which was destined 
to last for several years.124 
The Company's annals in Coromandel during the years 1659 to 1674, 
considered from the view-point of mere political relations, contained 
nothing significantly new, despite their spectacular victory over a power-
ful enemy. The real arch-enemy now was a riyal in commerce with in-
creasingly superior resources and the story of the Company's struggle 
against them is told elsewhere in this volume. The situation inland was 
marked as before by extensive anarchy and ingenious forms of exploi-
tation. Despite all this, the local market for the Company's imports and 
the machinery of production were apparently resilient enough in the 
North to encourage a new venture, - the establishment of a new 
factory in the inland city of Golconda. 
11 
1675-1690 
The factors which led to the decline of the Company's trade in 
Coromandel were already operating on an extensive scale in the late 
'sixties and early 'seventies of the seventeenth century. Still during those 
years the Dutch, with their enormous resources and the advantage of 
an ascendancy enjoyed for decades, managed to keep their heads above 
water. The peace which prevailed 'in the greater part of Golconda and 
the Carnatic was also of great help to the Company. During the last 
quarter of the century the Mughal invasion swept across Bijapur and 
Golconda into the Carnatic, leaving a trail of desolation and dis-
locating the economic life of the region. The expansion of the Maratha 
power to the eastern parts of peninsular India and its bitter struggle 
with the Mughals once again undermined peace and security in much-
harassed Tanjore and Gingi. The Company, with its position already 
weakened in the preceding decade, feIt the blow most severely. The 
124 KA. 1 119, 24.7.1659, ff.884vo; K.A.1121, 30.6.1959, ff.655-57, 11.9.1659, 
f.795; KA.1124, 22.12.1661, f.95; 24.1.1662, ff.169vo-70vo; KA.1128, 
26.12.1662, ff.193, 197; KA.1136, 4.8.1664, f.264vo; KA.1152, 6.2.1667, 
ff.150 ff; KA.1I56, 7.11.1668, f.500, 19.12.1668, ff.262 ff; K.A.1164, 
24.6.1670, f.581; KA.1I61, 10.9.1671, f.748; KA.1169, 13.2.1169, 13.2.1671, 
f.781vo; K.A.1181, 29.4.1673, f.575, 31.1.1674, ff.131 ff; Heeres, 11, pp.334-
5,514-17. 
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English with their increasing resources and the Indians with their low 
cost trading technique, on the other hand, actually achieved an ex-
pansion of their commerce despite such heavy odds. The Dutch failed 
to respond to the manifold challenge with sufficient vigour and their 
'chances were finally ruined by a heavy burden imposed on the Coro-
mandel government through an ill-conceived measure, - the transfer 
of the headquarters to Negapatam. 
Vet, in 1675, the Company's prospects did not look gloomy. In Gol-
conda in particular its prestige was very high and Qutb Shah actually 
offered the township of San Thomé to the Dutch. The Company 
politely refused for as a centre of trade San Thomé was not worth the 
expense that the maintenance of a garrison, - essential under the 
circurnstances, - would involve. In January, 1676, the young king came 
on a pleasure trip to Masulipatam and was regally entertained by the 
Dutch. The 66,458 florins spent on presents for the king and rus 
entourage were amply repaid by the nine farmans which the king 
granted on the eve of his departure in February, 1676. The most 
important concession secured was the exemption from the payment of 
tolls at Sadraspatam and Bimlipatam. This meant th at the Company 
was granted freedom from tolls practically throughout Golconda terri-
tory. Besides, orders were alro passed for giving the Company the 260 
bahars of rice due from the former governor of Bimlipatam. Negotiations 
for securing the possession of Pulicat, started in 1675, however, did not 
yield any results. In December, 1678 the king paid a second visit to 
Masulipatam but was not pleased with the presents given by the Com-
pany. So the various petitions put up by he Dutch including one asking 
for the ownership of Pulicat were tumed down. 125 
The implementation of the farmans granted in 1676 did not prove 
easy. The sar-i-Iashkar of Srikakole refused to abide by the orders for 
the restitution of the rice due from the former governor of Bimlipatam 
and forcibly collected tolIs, in contravention of the farman. Failing to 
obtain satisfaction by peaceful means the Dutch organised a blockade 
of the Gingelly coast in 1677 which resulted in a complete stoppage of 
rice exports, the chief trade of the region and this affected the food 
supply to Masulipatam and the adjacent regions. Pressure from the 
Masulipatam and Golconda authorities, the seizure of one of his ships 
125KA.805, 24.7.1678, f.596; KA.1196, 23.11.1675, f.88; KA.1202, 21.2.1675, 
ff.182vo-83; KA.1204, 30.9.1676, ff.40voff; KA.1230, ff.38vo, 444; KA. 
1237, 25.3.1679, ff.l118 ff; Heeres, lIL, pp.12-23; Havart, I, pp.182-90, 
van Dam, 11, ii, pp.236 ff. 
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and the heavy losses resulting from the stoppage of trade eventually 
induced the sar-i-lashkar to accept the Company's terms, and the Dutch 
returned to Bimlipatam in 1678. It was some time before normal trade 
could be resumed at that factory, for many of the weavers working for 
the Dutch had taken to agriculture through lack of employment.126 
Soon afterwards, rlle rebellion of MO Hindu rajas again hindered trade 
at Bimlipatam and tbe Company removed the bulk of its effects from 
the factory to Masulipatam until the return of peace in 1682,127 
The factories in the northern Carnatic also had to cope with a variety 
of troubles. In 1676, the Sadraspatam factory was pillaged by some 
unknown marauders, probably sent by Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapuri 
governor of Gingi. As the port lay within Golconda territory, the Com-
pany claimed compensation from Qutb Shah for the damages in 
accordance witb the law of tbe land but secured nothing more than 
vague promises of investigation.128 A more dangerous situation devel-
oped in 1677 when governor Jacques Caulier, who succeeded Pavilioen 
in October, 1676 took the extreme step of arresting the havaldar of 
Pulicat as a result of some disputes. The Muslim govemor of the lower 
Camatic besieged the Company's establishment at Sadraspatam by way 
of reprisal, and the siege was withdrawn only af ter the havaldar had 
been released. Batavia took a dim view of the whole episode and 
recommended greater circumspection in future in all dealings with 
local autborities,129 
It was in Golconda proper that tbe Company encountered the most 
serious threat to its commerce. During 1677-79, Bijapur was repeatedly 
invaded by the Mughal armyand in September, 1677 an expedition was 
sent to Golconda as weIl. The prevailing atmosphere in Golconda and 
tbe adjacent regions was one of extreme insecurity and the Company's 
trade at Masulipatam and Golconda suffered heavily in consequence. 
Late in 1678, the rebellion of some discontented nobles further affected 
the security of the Golconda trade-routes,130 
The ambitions of two Brahmin brothers, Madanna and Akkana, who 
rose to a position of supreme importance in tbe Golconda kingdom by 
the late 'seventies, constituted a more direct threat to the Company's 
interest. Madanna as wazir and Akkana as sar-i-khail jointly controlled 
12°K.A.1212, 20.11.1677, ff.420-22; K.A.1222, 10.11.1678, ff.548---49vo. 
127 K.A.1232, 9.11.1679, ff.486-86vo; K.A.1262, 13.11.1682, f.392. 
128 K.A.1204, 30.9.1676, f.38vo, 28.11.1676, f.153vo. 
129 K.A.1205, 5.10.1676, f.523; K.A.1212, 24.11.1646, ff.172 ff. 
130 Sarkar,Aurangzib, IV, Chs. XII-XIII; K.A.1220, 13.2.1679, ff.294ff. 
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the affairs of the kingdom and were tying to increase their financial 
resources by methods similar of those of the erstwhile mir jumla, Mir 
Muhammad Sa'id. In 1683, Akkana began to pay his soIdiers in copper 
instead of silver coins and intended to set himself up as the sole pur-
chaser of copper, of which the Company was one of the chief importers. 
The right to mint copper coins was at this time held in lease by a 
money-changer, Chirum Chodenda, for long the chief purchaser of the 
Company's gold in Golconda. Akkana first tried to secure con trol of 
Ohodenda's mint through friendly overtures. As his efforts were frus-
trated mainly through the indirect resistance of the Dutch, the sar-i-khail 
secretly encouraged his subordinate officials to obstruct the Company's 
trade. Matters came to a head in 1685 when Chodenda was suddenly 
thrown into prison on a flimsy pretext and the mint was seized by 
Akkana. The Company received no payments for the copper supplied 
to the mint and Akkana now openly took severaI measures against the 
Dutch. Throughout northern Golconda weavers were forbidden to 
supply cloth to the Company and boats loaded with the Company's 
return cargo were seized by the sar-i-khail's men. Qnly the friendly 
attitude of the governor of Masulipatam enabled the Dutch to have 
any trade at all during these troubles. Complaints to the Golconda court 
did not secure any redress and negotiations with Akkana were eventua!ly 
opened through the sar-i-lashkar of northern Carnatic. The terms offered 
by the sar-i-khail were unacceptable to the Company and he remained 
unmoved by the Dutch threat to abandon their factories in Golconda. 
Evenually governor Laurens Pit 131 went on amission to the capita! 
with a view to straightening out matters through direct negotiations with 
the king. I t was decided to abandon the factories at Dacheron and 
Palicol and seize Masulipatam in case the negotiations failed to produce 
the desired results. Late in 1685 Madanna and Akkana were murdered 
at Golconda through the machinations of some Muslim nobles. The 
hopes roused by the elimination of the Company's worst enemies were, 
however, not realised. Pit returned to Masulipatam failing to secure any 
guarantee for unhindered trade and no payments were received for the 
copper seized by Akkana.132 
Meanwhile a steady deterioration in the politica! and economie 
131 Jacob Jorisz Pits suC'ceeded Caulier as governor in 1681 and was followed 
by Laurens Pit, jr. in 1685; see KA.1242, 29.4.1681, f.270; KA.1297, 
11.12.1685, f.151vo. 
132KA.1271, 31.12.1683, ff.203voff, 225; K.A.1283, 30.11.1684, ff.l08ff; 
K.A.1297, 11.12.1685, ff.168vo-I90vo; Sarkar, Aurangzib, IV, pp.353ff; 
Havart, 11, pp.154-64. 
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situation in Golconda had brought the Company's trade almost to a 
standstill. The Mughal invasion of Bijapur and Golconda in 1685-86 
and the eventual conquest of Bijapur in 1686 severely affected all 
trade between Golconda and the regions to its west and north. Famine 
followed in the wake of war and a prolonged drought. Heavy taxation, 
necessitated by the large tribute payable to the Mughal emperor, added 
to the sufferings of the famine-stricken people of Golconda. Rajas and 
chieftains in the Carnatic and Orissa rose in open revolt, merchants 
and weavers left the kingdom in large numbers and thousands of men 
and women sold themselves in slavery. In conditions such as these the 
obstructive policy of the Golconda authorities became all the more 
irksome to the Dutch and they decided on extreme measures af ter the 
failure of Laurens Pit's mission. 
In July, 1686 the Dutch abandoned the Dacheron and Palicol fac-
tories and with the aid of reinforcements from Ceylon captured 
Masulipatam without any bloodshed. The local officers thereupon laid 
siege to the town but the Golconda army fared badly in a skirmish which 
took place on the 13th August. In September, 1686 the king opened 
negotiations with the Dutch and the siege of Masulipatam was aban-
doned. Eventually, in November, 1686 an agreement was reached where-
by Qutb Shah undertook to return in the course of five years the 120,000 
pagodas claimed by the Company for the copper seized from Chodenda 
and also guaranteed the restoration of all privileges enjoyed by the 
Company.133 
The concessions secured from Qutb Shah with so much trouble proved 
to be of little avail. In October, 1687 af ter a prolonged siege the fort 
of Golconda surrendered to the Mughal army and the entire territory 
of Golconda including the Carnatic passed into the hands of the 
emperor Aurangzeb. The effects of the war of conquest were disastrous 
for the entire trade of the northern Coromandel. High prices, famine 
and pestilence, the usual accompaniments of war in India, affected the 
region on an unprecedented scale. Trade at Masulipatam, deserted by 
merchants, came to a dead stop. Transport of goods to Golconda be-
came impossible because of the insecurity of the roads and unavaila-
bility of 'beasts of burden. The factory at Nagelwanse, an important 
souree for the supply of cloth, was plundered by a marauding band of 
133K.A.1312, 30.9.1686, ff.7-16; K.A.1327, 11.12.1686, ff.10nf; Heem, 111, 
pp.414-23; Havart, I, pp.211-13, 11, 164-65; Valentijn, V, i, Choro-
mande!, pp.67-8; van Dam, 11, ii, p.166. 
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Mughal soldiers. Only at Bimlipatam the Company's trade was main-
tained on a normal level. 
The Orissa factory, chiefly useful for the procurement of rice, was 
hardly an effective substitute for the factories in Golconda. Johannes 
Bacherus, sent on amission to Aurangzeb in 1689, secured from the 
emperor a confirmation of the privileges enjoyed in the days of the 
Qutb Shahi kings, but the Mugha! emperor refused to pay the balance 
of the compensation due from the Golconda government. And no 
imperia! farman could help to resuscitate the trade which was on 'a 
point of collapse through a general dislocation of the entire economy 
of the region. Reporting to the Heeren XVII on the state of the Com-
pany's Coromandel trade in March, 1691, the Batavia authorities wrote 
dismally of the desolation still prevailing throughout the northern terri-
tories. Of the return cargo required for the South-East Asian trade 
only a small proportion could he procured and there was no prospect of 
a return to normal conditions for years to come.134 
Conditions in the south throughout the period were not much better 
than in the north. In 1676, the governor of Gingi declared in favour 
of the Mughal emperor against the Bijapur Sultan and the consequent 
troubles affected the Company's trade at Tegenapatam. Further South, 
the efforts of Shivaji's half-brother Ekoji, a Bijapur officer, to expel the 
Madura nayak from Tanjore territory had a similar effect on the trade 
of Negapatam, still under the Ceylon government,135 
In 1677, Shivaji wrested Gingi from the hands of Bijapur and the 
fonowing year added parts of northern Camatic including Vellor to 
his possessions. The presence of Shivaji's army nearby prevented the 
Dutch from disembarking their cargo at Tegenapatam and, for some 
time, no trade was possible in the Gingi area. Subsequently amission 
to Shivaji in 1678 secured a confirmation of the privileges granted by 
Bijapur, only the purchase of slaves being forbidden. The Maratha 
conquest intensified a problem formerly encountered only in a mild 
form. The Bijapur authorities had frowned on the Company's policy 
of refusing passes to merchants sailing from Porto Novo. Shivaji's men 
threatened reprisals if this policy was not soon abandoned. 136 
134K.A.1330, 27.12.1688, ff.257, 261vo; K.A.1346, 30.12.1689, f.299; K.A.1347, 
14.3.1690, f.126vo; K.A.1352, 10.4.1689. f.136; K.A.1355, 26.3.1691, f.394; 
Heeres, Hl, pp.516-23; Aurangzib, IV, Ch. xlvii. 
135 K.A.1204, 28.11.1676, f.157, 5.7.1677, f.693; Diary and Consultation Book 
of Fort St. George, 1678-79, p.118. 
136 K.A.1212, 24.11.1677, ff.l08vo, 117, 169 ff; K.A.1220, 13.2.1679, f.295; 
Heeres, 111, pp.125-26; J. Sarkar, Shivaji and his times, Ch. XII. 
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Tanjore, wrested from the hands of the Madura nayak, had become 
virtually a possession of Ekoji who was ruling the territory in the name 
of the Adil Shahi Sultan. Following Shivaji's conquest of Gingi, the 
territorial link between Bijapur and Tanjore was severed. Ekoji was 
forced to accept the suzerainty of his brother, who nominally confirmed 
him in hls possession of Tanjore. In actual practice, the administration 
was taken over by Shlvaji's men. At Negapatam, which had been 
returned to the Coromandel government in 1680, the Maratha admini-
strator began to create difficulties in 1683, forbidding the export of 
riee to Ceylon and extorting a capitation tax from the inhabitants of the 
Company's villages. He was pacified only af ter receiving an expensive 
present. l3T 
In 1680 S'hlvaji died and was succeeded by his son, Shambhaji. In 
1684, the Mughal army in a determined effort to crush the Maratha 
power, pushed into Gingi and penetrated further south to the frontiers 
of Ekoji's territory. The Maratha havaldar of Tegenapatam now tried 
to extort 'loans' from the Company and there was an unfriendly en-
counter between his forces and the Company's men. At Negapatam, the 
Company continued to suffer losses as no sales were possible so long as 
the Mughal army was in rhe vicinity of the Tanjore territory. The 
Mughal conquest of Bijapur in 1686 further affected trade in Gingi and 
Tanjore. Still in 1687 the difficulties in southern Coromandel were less 
serious than in the North. In 1688 trade in Gingi actually improved for 
a while, helped by a fresh kaul from Shahaji, Ekoji's son, who had 
acquired rhe government of Gingi af ter his father's death in 1685.138 
The developments in rhe Mughal-Maratha war af ter Shambhaji's 
execution in 1689 affected the political stability of the entire region 
within the Maratha sphere of influence. In September, 1689 Rajaram, 
the new king, escaped from his capital Raigad and made Gingi his new 
headquarters. The Marathas carried the war into the northem Carnatic 
and temporarily secured possession of Pulicat. The long-desired owner-
ship of Pulicat was now offered by them to the Company, but the Dutch 
prudently refused, for fear of offending the Mughals. In 1690, the 
Mughal siege of Gingi began, and this was followed by a large-scale 
exodus of peasants, handicraftsmen and traders from all the neigh-
137 K.A.1242, 29.4.1681, ff.293 ff; K.A.1271, 31.2.1683, f.239; G. S. Sardesai, 
New History of the Marathas, I, eh. X. 
138 K.A.1282, 31.5.1684, ff.l04vo, 114; K.A.1283, 30.11.1684,f.114; K.A.1307, 
13.12.1686, ff.290ff, 302, K.A.1320, 23.12.1687, ff.248vo-249; K.A.1330, 
27.12.1688, f.257; K.A.1333, 27.2.1689, f.1477. 
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bouring regions. Conditions in the sou th now resembIed those in the 
north and, in fact, were worse in certain ways. In the north, at least the 
wars of conquest were over; in the south, the year 1690 only saw the 
beginning of the widespread guerrilla warfare which eventually drained 
the resources of the Mughal empire and jeopardised the economy of an 
extensive region, including Gingi and the Carnatic. No wonder, in 1691, 
Bataviadrew a very gloomy picture of the Company's prospects through-
out Coromandel.139 
Minor vexations, arising out of the Company's internal administrative 
arrangements, gave further causes for worry during this period and 
necessitated certain readjustments. The trade at Negapatam as run by 
the government of Ceylon had endangered the sale of areca nuts and 
some other branches of the local commerce at Tegenapatam and the 
consequent difficulties were solved by the restitution of Negapatam to 
the Coromandel government in 1680. The troubles with the Ceylon 
government over the question of the line of demarcation between her 
commercial jurisdiction and that of Coromandel continued until 1683 
when the right to trade with the southernmost part of the PeninsuIa 
was assigned to Ceylon. 140 
In 1687, Adriaan van Rheede van Meydregt tot Drakensteyn, -
appointed Superintendent hy the Heeren XVII and invested with 
extraordinary powers of enquiry, supervision and punishment, - came 
to the coast. As the Seventeen explained to the Coromandel government, 
they were deeply dissatisfied with the state of affairs on the coast and 
suspected widespread corruption. Van Rheede went into a detailed 
investigation of this alleged corruption, suspended and punished many 
officers, aften without stating reasons and left voluminous instructions 
before his departure. He decided, in opposition to the commonly ac-
cepted view on the coast, that Negapatam was potentially a most 
profitable centre of trade and eminently suita:ble to he the headquarters 
of the Coromandel government. Accordingly, in 1690, tbe headquarters 
were transferred from the centrally situated Pulicat, one of the most 
important centres for the supply of cloth, to Negapatam, not very far 
from the southem extremity of the peninsuIa, and a place which had 
caused seldom anything but loss to the Company. At the instance of 
van Rheede a stone castle was constructed at Negapatam at the expense 
of one million florins and arrangements were made for stationing a 
large garrison tbere. The transfer of the headquarters from Pulicat 
139 K.A.1346, 26.3.1691, ff.392vo, 402 ff; G. S. Sardesai, op. cit., eh. XVI. 
HO K.A.1220, 13.2.1679, f.297vo; K.A.1271, 31.12.1683, ff.239 ff. 
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took place in July, 1690 and a long era in the history of the Company 
thus came to an end. Hl 
Both van Dam and Havart, writing shortly af ter the transfer of the 
headquarters to Negapatam, looked askance at the measure though 
they were too prudent to directly question the sagacity of the great 
man. U nable to place his finger on the real problems, which were per-
haps beyond remedy in any case, van Rheede satisfied himself with a 
grandiose gesture. Negapatam was surely not a more suitable place than 
Pulicat either as a commercial or as an administrative centre. The 
factory, even previously a burden on the Company, became very much 
more so, now that the heavy expenses of the castIe and the garrison were 
added to the usual losses on trade. Whether the transfer of the head-
quarters to an unsuitable place would have alone ensured the decline 
of the Company's commerce may be a doubtful question; but that the 
measure was one of the chief contributory factors to the process of 
decline seems fairly certain.1 42 
For the -basic factors in the Company's decline and fall in Cora-
mandel one has, perhaps, to look to regions other than the coast or even 
Asia. In au open competition for exclusive or nearly exclusive con trol 
between Companies of monopolistic merchant capital, backed by power-
ful nation-states, tbe major issues were being decided elsewhere and 
on terms other than relative success or failure in tbe management of 
distant factories. The situation on the coast did, however, furtber under-
mine the economic basis of an al ready weakened Company. Steadily 
losing their ground in trade rivalry with tbe English, the Dutch were 
all the less able to live down the effe cts of paralysing wars and tbe 
aggressive demands of a buoyant Maratha empire for the virtual 
abolition of the passport system. The two sets of uncongenial circum-
stances reacted on and intensified each other, together hastening the 
end of Dutch ascendancy in the Coromandel trade. 
141 K.A.460, 1.12.1688, f.514; K.A.1320, 23.12.1687, f.247; K.A.1347, 14.3.1690, 
f.132vo; K.A.1355, 26.3.1691, f.405vo. 
142 Havart, I, p.15; van Dam, 11, ii, p.ll0. 
CHAPTER V 
TRADE WIm OTHER REGIONS 
The Dutch policy of making the inter-Asian trade pay for itself and, 
to a substantial extent, for the return cargo to Europe, had one 
important consequence: the intensification of commercial relations be-
tween the different parts of Asia, involving a more thorough exploi-
tation of the existing markets than was possible earlier because of the 
limited availability of capita!. In the new map of inter-Asian trade 
whieh emerged in consequenee, Coromandel, - with her textiles vir-
tually treated as the Company's ehief medium of exchange, - eame to 
occupy a position of strategie importanee. While the Duteh carried the 
products of the coast practically to all parts of Asia and brought back 
in return nearly every commodity which could be in demand in Coro-
mandeI, much of this trade was carried on via Batavia or other im-
portant centres of the Company's commerce and not directly from 
CoromandeI. A direct and particularly close commercial relationship, 
however, developed between Coromandel and certain other regions. In 
certain places around the Bay the factories set up by the Company were, 
for some time at least, directly under their Coromandel "government". 
In certain other regions, the initiative in developing trade was taken 
by the Coromandel factories. 
Bengal, with its rieh supplies of rice, saltpetre and slaves, early 
attracted the attention of the Dutch. There was a ready market for its 
cIoth in the Indies and Europe and for its sugar in Persia. And to oust 
the Portuguese from the Bay it was essential to penetrate Bengal where 
they were strongly entrenehed. The very strength of the Portuguese in 
this province, however, comhined with the prevailing state of unrest, 
rendered the task of opening trade with Bengal extremely difficult for 
the Company. Between 1618 and 1629, ships were sent from Coro-
mandel to Bengal on severaJ occasions to cruise against Portuguese 
shipping and to purchase rice, slaves, saItpetre, cloth and sugar. But the 
conviction became increasingly stronger that no substantial trade was 
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possible with Bengal so long as the Portuguese were finnly entrenched 
there.143 
The Dutch efforts to make headway in other regions round the Bay 
with Coromandel as their base first attained notabIe success in the 
'thirties of the seventeenth century. Trade with BengaI, which had long 
allured the Dutch, now acquired a special importance in their eyes as 
they expected to find through it a partial solution of their problem of 
inadequate cash capital. Moreover, the rivers connecting Bengal with 
the trade-marts of northem India offered cheaper means of transport 
than the expensive kafilas to and from Surat on which the Dutch 
depended almost entirely for their trade with Hindustan. The erroneous 
belief that the Ganges linked Bengal with "the world-famous emporium 
of Cathay" strengthened the desire for commercial connection with 
BengaI.144 
While the strong position of the Portuguese in Bengal had earlier 
frustrated Dutch efforts to open trade with tbe province, even af ter the 
fonner's expulsion from Hugli in 1632, the poor demand for the Com-
pany's wares and high price of Bengal cloth and sugar continued for a 
while to render profitable trade practically impossible. 145 In 1632 
for the first time a Dutch yacht from Coromandel sailed up to Hugli 
and, in 1635, factor van der Plas secured from the govemor of Bengal 
farmans granting freedom of trade in tbe province and tbe right to 
establish a factory at Hugli. A farman granted by Shahjahan the same 
year further strengthened tbe Dutch position,146 Attempts to establish 
trade were, however, frustrated by tbe hostility of the Muslim merchants 
of Hugli, who resented foreign competition, and a new farman from 
Shahjahan in 1636 did not help matters. The hostility of the local 
merchants, a phenomenon not encountered in Coromandel at least in 
this early phase, derived mainly from one fact: the Bengal merchants 
were active in the coastal trade with Coromandel and were reluctant 
to admit powerful competitors in this sphere. In January, 1637 the 
Dutch left Hugli for PipIi, then under the authority of the govemor of 
143 Coen, I, p.781, V, pp.120, 129,384, VII, p.358, VII2, pp.1221, 1440, 1444; 
K.A.754, 26.3.1624, fAO; K.A.755, Batavia to Coromandel, 24.9.1625; 
K.A.995, Dedel to Batavia, 2.7.1624; K.A.999, Ysbrantsz to Amsterdam. 
8.3.1626. 
144K.A.1016, 1.12.1632, f.21vo; K.A.I022, 15.8.1634, ff.34vo-35; Heeres, I, 
p.268. 
145 K.A.I012, 2.2.1630, f.69; K.A.1016, 1.12.1632, f.21vo; K.A.I025, 29.5.1634, 
ff.316vo---317vo. 
146 K.A.I029, 19.6.1635, f.667; Heeres, I, pp.266-69. 
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Orissa. There, too, they encountered stiff opposition from the Muslim 
merchants, but through their persistenee and with the aid of fresh grants 
from the emperor the Pipli factory became a stabie and profitable con-
cern by 1639. The Company could now ignore for rhe time being 
requests from the gavernor of Bengal for reopening the Hugli factory. 
In 1638 the Dutch also obtained the right to buy saltpetre, cIoth and 
other wares from Patna and in 1642 an imperial farman granted the 
Company freedom from toIls on rhe roads and waterways connecting 
Bengal with Agra.1 47 Conditions in Bengal again became unfavourable 
when Prince Suja tried to monopolise some sectors of the province's 
overseas trade and made himself the soIe purchaser of elephants, one of 
the chief items in the Company's list of imports. The demand for the 
Company's wares,at no time very good, was further affected by large 
suppIies brought from Tenasserim and other pIaces by Asian trad ers 
whiIe Portuguese competition continued to present a far more serious 
problem in Bengal than in Coromandel. In 1645 the Company's interests 
were threatened even more seriousIy when the Danes began to seize 
ships beIonging to the merchants of Bengal by way of reprisaI for injuries 
suffered at the hands of the IocaI authorities. The Dutch were asked 
to stop the depredations of their fellow Europeans or leave the country. 
Representations to prince Suja eventuaIly secured the withdrawal of 
th is drastic order. The fIight of the merchant-middIemen from the 
chief ports to escape the exorbitant toIls imposed by the prince posed 
new problems for the Dutch which they tried to soIve by posting per-
manent agents at the sourees of suppIy like Patna and Kasimbazar. By 
1647 same of their worst difficulties were over. The prince was more 
friendly in his attitude, the free saIe of elephants was aIlowed and there 
was a general improvement in the supply of return cargo.1 48 
With 'the recrudescence of Danish piracy in the Bay in 1649, the 
authorities once more demanded that the Dutch should guarantee the 
security of Bengal ships on the high seas. The refusal to grant passes 
for Suja's ships, in accordance with the new policy, also alienated the 
prince. A farman from the emperor Shahjahan helped to ease the situ-
147KA.765, 28.2.1639, ff.119-20; KA.767, 14.4.1640, f.132; KA.1031, 
28.12.1636, ff.58-60; KA.1034, 10.2.1637, f.623, 9.12.1637, f.178, 25.5.1637, 
f.675vo; KA.1036, 22.12.1638, ff.171-171vo; D.R., 1640--41, pp.91, 216; 
Heeres, I, pp.280-84, 329 ff, 339 ff, 390 ff 
148 KA. 1054, 4.5.1644, ff.569 ff; K.A.1055, 20.1.1645, ff.9 ff; KA.1058, 
17.12.1645, ff.37 ff; K.A.1060, "Verhael etc:", ff.186 ff, 192vo, 232vo; 
KA. 1062, 15.1.1647, ff.10vo-11. 
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ation and, in 1651, Suja himself granted a favourable farman guaran-
teeing the Company's freedom of trade. For a few years things pro-
ceeded smoothly and the growing importance of Bengal in the pattern 
of the Company's Asian trade was recognised by Batavia. Again in 1653 
the reluctance of the Dutch to grant passes for some regions, Suja's 
desire to monopolise the middleman trade with the Company and the 
hostile influenee of Malik Beg, the governor of Orissa, led to a fresh 
round of troubles. Purchase taxes from which the Company had been 
specifically exempted were now demanded, the godown at Pipli was 
sealed by order of the local governor and the Dutch feit obliged to 
temporarily abandon the Hugli factory in order to escape from Suja's 
monopolisic designs. The Pipli godown was reopened in 1654 at the 
insistence of the local merchants who were very much dependent on 
the Company's trade. The prince also once more became friendly on 
receiving the passes he had asked for. With Malik Beg's fall from power 
in 1655 the Company's position in Bengal became quite secure except 
for the Arakanese raids along the coast which severely affected the 
province's trade. Dutch prestige in Bengal was, however, now at its 
highest and in recognition of the great importance of the Bengal fae-
tories, they were organised into a separate direetorate independent of 
Coromandel in 1655. In August, 1655 with the appointment of Pieter 
Sterthenius as the director of the Bengal factories, their direct link with 
the coast government came to an end.149 
The Dutch attempts to open trade with the Gingeli coast, rich in 
very cheap rice and provisions, were successful at a comparatively early 
date. In spite of poor demand for their wares in this region, an invest-
ment of 1000 pagodas in 1618 yielded a gross profit of 2500 pagodas. 
In 1628-29, steps were taken to organise this trade on a regular 
footing by deploying one or two large ships for the purpose.1 50 
The trade with the Orissa coast, centring round the import of riee 
from that region to Coromandel, continued during the 'thirties. In 
1630, the Company also procured 100 slaves from Orissa. Following the 
example of the English, the Dutch tried to open a factory at Hariharpur 
in 1633 but soon gave up the attempt discouraged by the poor demand 
for their wares and the uneconomic price of local cloth. From 1635 
149 K.A.1068, 31.12.1649, f.61vo; K.A.1074, 24.1.1652, f.12vo; K.A.I079, 
21.1.1652, f.235; K.A.I087, 19.1.1654, Cf.249 Cf; K.A.I091, 21.3.1655, 
f.290vo; K.A.ll00, 24.12.1655, Cf.86 Cf. 
150 K.A.977, de Haze to Amsterdam, 18.10.1616. 
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onwards, however, certain varieties of c10th were regularly procured 
from Orissa.1 51 
The Dutch efforts to open trade with other countries round the Bay 
in the early years of the seventeenth century were partly the result of 
unsatisfactory trading conditions on the coast and the consequent desire 
to find more fruitful channels of investment for their capita!. The 
"Informatie" given to van der Hagen as a guide to Eastern trade 
mentioned Bengal cloth and Pegu rubies as possible sources of profitable 
commerce. The best arak in the whole of 'India' came from Arakan and 
Bengal and the much sought north Indian indigo could be brought down 
the river from the Delhi and Agra region to the Bengal coast and 
Chittagong in the kingdom of Arakan and thence shipped to Coro-
mandel.152 
It was from such considerations that in 1607, Pieter Willemsz and 
Jan Gerritsz Ruyl were sent from Coromandel to Arakan with a good 
cargo. Early next year king Minya-zagyi, then engaged in a struggle with 
the Portuguese settlers of Chittagong, offered the Dutch free trade not 
only in Arakan, but also in Bengal and Pegu, territories to which he 
laid claims; in return, he wanted the Dutch to help him against the 
Portuguese. As the Dutch were not inclined to get involved in this 
conflict, nothing came of the king's offer until 1610 when Jacob Dirksz 
Cortenhoeff went to Arakan and opened a factory at Mrohaung. The 
king now offered Dianga to the Company, but the Dutch were reluctant 
to build a fort there as desired by him. Till 1614 the Dutch gained 
very little from their commerce with Arakan as the country was at 
war with the kingdom of Ava and consequently trade in the inland 
areas was at a stail.dstill. The Company's interest in the Arakan trade 
increased af ter 1615, when Dutch ships aided king Minhkamaung to 
beat back an attack of Sebastian Gonzales Tibáo, the notorious Portu-
guese freebooter of Sandwip. Van Berchem, who was always in favour 
of increased trade with Arakan, feit encouraged by this catastrophic 
rout of the Portuguese. As he pointed out, Coromandel wares rendered 
50 % profit in Arakan whence gold and rubies could be brought to the 
coast as return cargo. Van Berc!hem's plans however proved rather 
ineffectual at the time. His suggestion that factories should be opened 
151 K.A.1012, 4.12.1630, ff.133--4; K.A.l019, 25.12.1633, ffAO-41; K.A.1023, 
20.2.1634, f.268vo; K.A.1025, 29.5.1635, f.316vo; E.F.!., 1630-33, p.xxxi. 
152 K.A.967, Ysaacx to l'Hermite, 31.5.1608; de Jonge, 111, pp.151-52, TiJl 
1615, the Dutch do not appear to have attached much importance to the 
purchase or rice and stones from Arakan, which became an important feature 
of their trade in later years. 
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in Bengal and Tenasserim was also turned down by the authorities in 
Holland who were opposed to any further splitting up of the Company's 
limited capita1,153 
The bid to eventually control the entire trade of the Bay of Bengal 
gave a fresh momentum to the Dutch activities in Arakan despite 
persistently discouraging circumstances. The results were however not 
very impressive. The volume of trade with Arakan as late as 1617 was 
very smaIl, partly as a result of the extremely limited demand for the 
Company's merchandise in this kingdom. At times the amount spent 
on sen ding ships exceeded the value of the return cargo, and in 
accordance with Amsterdam's instructions to abandon superfluous fac-
tories the Company's representative was actually recalled from Mro-
haung in 1619.154 
The growing demand for slaves and rice for the Company's factories 
in the spice districts and lucrative offers from the king soon led to a 
revival of interest in Arakan. In 1624, ships were sent both from Batavia 
and Coromandel to prospect for trade in Arakan. The regular marauding 
expeditions undertaken by the Arakanese against Bengal for the capture 
of slaves had turned their country into one of the chief slave-marts of 
Asia. This now was the main reason for the Company's interest in this 
country. In 1624, the king promised to sell 2,000 to 3,000 slaves per 
annum to the Dutch. Early in 1625 a factory was opened at Mrohaung 
with Paulus Cramerheyn as the chief factor. There were high hopes that 
the bulk of the 10,000 slaves recently captured by the Arakanese from 
Bengal would be sold to the Company. But an epidemic killed off some 
4,000 of these captives and, in consequence, towards the end of 1625 the 
Dutch were forbidden to buy slaves in Arakan. The Company's agents, 
with the exception of two, were now withdrawn as there was little 
point in retaining a factory there. An occasional Dutch ship continued 
to visit the country in the quest of rice and elephants. In 1627 a large 
return cargo of rice and slaves was also secured. But while the Asian 
traders regularly purchased a large number of elephants, the Dutch 
efforts in this direction were a total failure. In September, 1628 the 
remaining agents of the Company were recalled from Arakan. Though 
153 K.A.967, 'Instructie' for Cortenhoeff, Masulipatam, 1610; K.A.968, 30.8.1613, 
ff.150, 157 ff, 20.2.1614, 233vo; K.A.973, 29.3.1616, f.176; de Jonge, 11, 
pp.86 ff, 111, pp.77 ff, 291 ff; van Dijk, pp.13, 31-32; Nederlandsch Indie, 
11, pp.208---9, 213; MacLeod, pp.90, 98, 215 ff; "Studies in Dutch Relations 
with Arakan", Journalof the Burma Research Society, 1936, pp.2-3. 
154 Coen, 11, p.296, VII, pp.93, 100-101, 234, 243, 358, 423, 470; K.A.977, 
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JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 81 
in May, 1629 an assistant was sent there witth a small capital, regular 
trade was not resumed until some years later.155 
The need for rice and victuals which persisted during the 'thirties, 
despite the virtual abandonment of Coen's colonial policy,156 induced 
the Company to seek closer trade connections with Arakan, but the 
main initiative in this respect was taken by Batavia, not Coromandel. 
Unlike the factories in Bengal and Pegu, rhe Mrohaung factory, which 
remained closed. for years during this period, was not placed under the 
authority of Pulicat. Except for providing quantities of cloth, iron and 
tobacco to supplement the cargo from Batavia to Arakan and receiving 
in return occasional supplies of rice, the Coromandel factories had very 
litde direct share in the Company's trade with this region af ter the 
'thirties.157 
The Company's efforts to open trade with Burma were intially even 
less successful. Two frigates sent with this object in 1619 failed to 
achieve anything. In 1616-17, attempts were made to establish direct 
trade links between Coromandel and Siam through Tenasserim but to 
little purpose. 
It was only in the 'thirties that the Company eventually succeeded in 
opening trade with Burma. Marten Ysbrantsz sent a ship to Pegu with 
a sizeable cargo in 1634 and in 1635 the first Dutch factory in the king-
dom was estahlished at Syriam, soon followed by another at the capital 
city of Ava. But the conditions of trade were not favourable. Since the 
removal of the capital to Ava, trade had declined at Syriam and at 
Ava itself, there was no demand for spices. Of the chief exportabie 
commodities, gold could be secured only in exchange of silver or local 
bell-metal coins called ganza, and rubies were extremely dear. Lac and 
ganza, for which there was some demand in Coromandel, could be 
exported only with the king's special permission.158 
Still, for a few years, the Company's trade with Pegu showed a steady 
135 K.A.754, 26.3.1624, fAO, 25.6.1624, f.72vo; K.A.755, Batavia to 
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increase; its investments rose from 35,988 florins In 1634 to 156,491 
florins in 1639, and its profits, from 28,703 florins in 1635 to 83,690 
florins in 1639. True, the Company's profits in Pegu were only 7,862 
florins and 30,751 florins in 1636 and 1638 respectively. But these 
slumps in trade were mainly due to the import of large quantities of 
piece-goods by Indian merchants.159 
Rubies, gold, tin, paddy, chillies and Martaban jars were the commo-
dities chiefly exported by the Dutch from Pegu. Besides, they also 
obtained thence some pagodas and 'hills of exchange payable in Cora-
mandel which supplemented the Company's still slender cash resources. 
The minor items of export from Burma included ivory, lac, dried ginger, 
cardamom, musk, deer skin, Chinese gory plates,160 buffalo homs and 
ganza. Of these various articles, two very different items, - rubies and 
chillies, - were most in demand throughout Coromandel. But attempts 
to export Burma rubies to Europe and chillies to Batavia did not prove 
very profitable. The commodities sold by the Company in Pegu in-
cluded pepper, Bengal cummins, Calitura wood, gold yam and ray-
skins. A quantity of European pearls secured very high profit in 
1639--40, but this line of trade could not he developed because of 
inadequate supply.161 
Following a period of brief prosperity, the Company's trade in Burma 
was at a low ebb by the early 'forties. The competition of Indian and 
Portuguese merchants, royal monopoly of particular lines of trade, losses 
through bad debts, inexperience of the Company's employees, - all 
these various factors were responsibie for the situation. By 1642, thc 
profits in Pcgu feIl to a mere 24,901 florins, while thc middlemen 
owed to the Company some 50,000 florins, most of which was bad debt. 
In Coromandel, the demand for rubies and chillies, subject to frequent 
fluctuations, was in a sharp decline and the coast factories were bur-
dened with unsaleable rubies worth 82,000 florins. Gardenys was now 
definitely in favour of abandoning the Pegu factories but Batavia, 
encouraged by a letter from the king of Pegu, decided to continue the 
trade. The Company's efforts in Burma like those in Arakan, however, 
159 K.A.I031, 28.12.1636, f.57; K.A.1039, 18.12.1639, f.79vo; K.A.I042, 
19.5.1640, fA53. 
l'Xl Green service plat es which, according to populair belief, would crack if any 
poisoned food was served on them. cf. van Dam, 11, ii, p.454. 
161K.A.767, 5.9.1640, f.560; K.A.768, :.!8.5.1641, f.172: K.A.1029, 10.6.1635, 
f.671vo; K.A.1031, 5.2.1636, f.1095; K.A.1034, 25.5.1637, f.679vo; K.A. 
1039, ff.l050-51; K.A.1042, 19.5.1640, f.453, 30.5.1640, f.462vo; P. v. d. B., 
p.121. 
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never achieved any great success.162 Royal monopolies continued to 
shackle the Company's efforts and the permission to export elephants, 
which alone would have constituted a profitable return cargo, was not 
granted. Although the market for Coromandel and Bengal textiles in 
Pegu was of considerable importance, the large supplies brought by 
Indian and Portuguese merchants caused a glut. The opening of English 
factories in 1647 further worsened the situation. The idea of abandoning 
or at least curtailing the Company's establishments in Pegu was very 
much in the minds of the authorities at Batavia and Pulicat at this 
time. But their desire to prevent their rivals from securing the con trol 
of a market actually induced them to increase the investments.163 Still, 
compared to the 'thirties, the average capital investment as weIl as 
profits per year were smaller. 
In 1651, in an attempt to boost this trade, it was decided to concen-
trate on the commerce between Bengal and Pegu. This new policy 
achieved some success as the merchandise from Bengal fetched relatively 
larger profits. But the basic problem, viz., the lack of adequate return 
cargo, remained the same as before. As a last resort in 1653-54 the 
factors at Pegu were directed to invest their capital in gold and silver 
rather than let it !ie idle, though these metals rendered an average loss 
of 30 % to 35 %. Besides quantities of small Chinese tin coins called 
pitjes were also imported in the hope that they would find a good 
market in Bengal and Coromandel. But they had to be eventually sent 
to Malabar, where alone they fetched a good profil, the Coromandel 
market being glutted by the English supplies. Some hides, buffalo horns 
and catechu were also procured for the Japanese market. In 1657 the 
Company decided to participate in the freight trade between Pegu and 
HJ2K.A.765, 11.7.1639, f.415; K.A.770, 20.8.1643, f.597; K.A.I04·7, "Verhael 
etc.", ff,444v0-45; K.A.1048, 12.12.1642, f.59. 
163 The following statistical data are available for the Company's Pegu trade, 
1644-1658: 
Year Value of capital Value of Net profit on the 
sent to Pegu return cargo sale of the 
Company's wares 
1644 34,299 florins 33,560 florins 23,675 fis. 
1646 18,912 43,337 " 10,334 " 1648 32,703 " 
52,830 24,129 
" 1649 38,908 20,184 " 1652 
1653 223,664 " 1656 69,791 " 
68,636 58,200 " 
1657 81,761 " 1658 127,304 
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Coromandel and thus break the exclusive con trol of their Indian and 
English competitors. The abandonment of the Pegu factories by the 
English in 1656 was expected to help the Company's trade, particularly 
in rubies, but such hopes proved to be illusory, though the capital supply 
was greatly increased in 1658. In view of the closer trade relations 
between the coast and Burma, it was decided not to organise a separate 
directorate for Pegu, though the question was discussed in 1655. Thus, 
for years to come, the Pegu factories remained a burden on the Coro-
mandel government.164 
The Company's trade with Burma showed an unexpected improve-
ment in 1659-60. Cargo worth 790,271 florins was brought from Pegu 
to Coromandel in 1659 and it included items like catechu and namrak 
which were selling profitably in Japan, besides 81,292 Ibs of gumlac 
which had a good market in Persia, Mokha and Holland. Tin, ivory, 
ganza, pitjes and cardamom imported from Pegu also fetched good 
profits in Coromandel and a quantity of petroleum was shipped to 
Batavia. But this boom in the Pegu trade proved very short-lived. 
Late in 1659, the supporters of the last Ming emperor of China, Yung-li, 
- who had taken shelter in Burma, expelled from his kingdom by the 
Manchu conquerors, - attacked Ava and created such havoc in Pegu 
that for nearly two years no trade was possible there. Siamese raids in 
south Burma further complicated the situation. In 1662, Yung-li was 
handed over to the Manchus by the Burmese king and things gradually 
settled down af ter that.165 
But the main problem, - shortage of profitable return cargoes, -
which had earlier shackled the Company's efforts in Burma soon 
reasserted itself. The various commodities which appear in the Com-
pany's bills of lading from Pegu at different times were either available 
only in small quantities or had only a limited market abroad. In any 
case, af ter 1664, ganza, lead and pitjes were the only articles procurable 
in Pegu which the Dutch hoped to sell with profit. Of these, the first 
164K.A.1051, 22.12.1643, f.39vo; K.A.I058, 17.12.1645, f.37; K.A.I062, 
15.1.1647, ff.lOvo-l1; K.A.I026 (vervolg), 2.4.1646, ff.810 ff; K.A.I064, 
31.12.1647, ff.68ff; K.A.1066, 18.1.1649, f.89vo, 25.5.1648, ff.559ff; K.A. 
1068, 31.12.1649, 60vo; K.A.I080, 24.12.1652, ff.55, 56; K.A.I086, 8.6.1652, 
f.472vo; K.A.I087, 19.1.1654, ff.245 ff; K.A.I093, 26.1.1655, f.189vo; K.A. 
1094, 15.9.1654, f.436; K.A.Il04, 4.12.1656, f.47vo; K.A.Il07, 31.1.1657, 
f.59vo; K.A.IIlO, 27.1.1658, f.683vo; K.A.IlI5, 14.12.1658, ff.78ff. 
165 K.A.IIl9, 24.7.1659, ff.883 ff; K.A.1l20, 11.1.1660, f.282; K.A.1l22, 
19.1.1661; K.A.1133, 22.6.1663, ff.1309-11; D. G. E. Hall, Burma, (London, 
1950), pp.67-9. 
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two had to be smuggled out of the country as there was a strict embargo 
on their export. Trading in rubies, as the experience of the Muslim 
merchants indicated, had definite potentialities, but the Company's 
employees knew too little about it to make it profia:ble. Attempts to 
procure indigo and saltpetre proved fruitless. The bulk of the Company's 
exports therefore consisted of gold and silver, which could he sold only 
at a heavy loss on the coast. Af ter 1670, the king permitted the export 
of a limited quantity of ganza and lead, besides which the Dutch con-
tinued to smuggle out la:rge amounts as before. Bulk of the ganza and 
pitje was exported to Bengal, where the latter gave a profit of 80 % 
in 1671. But presently the volume of export to Bengal had to 'he reduced 
as the la:rge supplies by the Dutch and the English were causing a glut 
in the market. The demand for these cheap metal coins at Golconda 
whither the supplies were now diverted was found to be limited. A 
further problem was the very poor demand for the Company's wares 
in Burma resulting mainly from the excessive supplies brought by the 
Indians and the English. In consequence, the Dutch had to concentrate 
mainlyon the freight trade hetween Coromandel and Pegu, but it does 
not appear to have yielded more than 15,000 florins in any single year. 
Th~re too the cheaper rates and better service offered by the English 
spoiIed the market for the Dutch. Bad debts were another difficulty the 
Company had to deal with and in 1674 large amounts had to be 
written off. At about this time the Company began to consider the 
question of abandoning the Pegu trade, if it did not show any more 
promise.166 The decision to abandon the factories was taken as early 
as 1676, and it was finally given effect in January, 1678. By 1680, the 
Company's wares left behind in Pegu were brought back to Masulipatam. 
Two local traders authorised to collect the Company's bad debts which 
amounted to 30,941 florins succeeded in recovering 4,417 florins in 
1683,167 
The quest for new avenues of trade in and around the Bay led to 
an interesting venture in 1659 when an attempt was made to carry 
out a project long under discussion, namely, the opening of trade with 
the Andaman islands, wrongly believed to be a good source for the 
166 K.A.791, 10.7.1664, f.246; K.A.797, 22.4.1670, ff.t83 ff; K.A.798, 22.10.1671, 
f.729; K.A.801, 19.10.1674, f.500; K.A.1l42, 6.11.1665, f.1409, 5.3.1665, 
f.295; K.A.1l52, 24.6.1667, ff.603vo-604; K.A.1l55, 10.2.1667, f.367vo; 
K.A.1156, 25.6.1668, ff.752, 755; K.A.1l60, 1.2.1669, f.425; K.A. 1169, 
18.7.1671, f.778, 19.12.1671, f.150vo; K.A.1175, 31.1.1673, ff.242 ff. 
J61K.A.1204, 13.2.1677, f.447vo; K.A.1220, 13.2.1679, f.68;K.A.1242, 29.4.1681, 
f.270; K.A.1271, 31.12.1683, f.198vo. 
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supply of gold. A ship and a sloop sent under skipper Jan WiIIemsz, 
however, failed to induce the natives of one viIIage to enter into 
negotiations. In another island, the Dutch had a skirmish with a savage 
tribe and then decided to return to Coromandel, abandoning as hopeless 
the project of trade with the Andamans.l 68 
Another inconsequential venture was made in 1647, when the Com-
pany sent a yacht to the Maldives mainly to procure cowries for Bengal. 
Af ter considerable difficulties the yacht returned with a cargo of cowries 
and coir ropes worth 11,716 florins. This experiment, however, does 
not appear to have been repeated.169 
The Coromandel factories also played an important role in the early 
years of Dutch trade with Ceylon. The Company's contact with the 
island dated back to 1602 and in 1610 the Dutch concluded an agree-
ment with the king of Kandi which granted them trading rights in the 
island. In 1612, Marcelis Boschhouwer concluded a new agreement 
which secured for the Dutch the right to build a fort in Ceylon; in 
return, Boschhouwer promised military assistance against the Portuguese, 
though he had no authority to do 50. The Coromandel factories had 
their first contact with Ceylon in 1608, when emissaries arrived from 
the king of Kandi to request the Company's aid against the Portuguese. 
Aware of the prospects of a lucrative cinnamon trade in Ceylon and 
the island's convenient position for provisioning ships, van Wesick and 
Ysaacx had encouraged the king's hopes, though there were too few 
Dutchmen on the coast to offer any effective help. Later, when Bosch-
houwer thoughtlessly promised aid to the king, van Berchem was 
rather in favour of an agreement on that basis. In 1614, a quantity of 
cIoth was sent from the coast to Boschhouwer who was asked to send 
cinnamon in return. But later that year the home authorities asked 
Coromandel not to send any more cargo to Ceylon hefore the Molucca 
islands were fuIly provided.170 
By the 'thirties the Coromandel factories' participation in the trade 
with Ceylon, - where steel and opium from the coast now found a 
ready market, - increased considerably. OccasionaIly, the island also 
obtained supplies of stores and provisions from the coast. The return 
cargo to the coast mainly consisted of elephants and areca nuts, besides 
168 KA.1121, 25.2.1659, ff.645 ff, 10.1.1659, f.638vo. 
169 KA. 1064 (vervolg), 1.6.1647, ff.764 ff. 
170 KA.967, van We~ick to Masulipatam, 25.11.1608, same to Ysaack, 29.11.1608, 
12.12.1608; KA.968, 30.8.1613, f.152vo; Nederlandsch lndie, 111, pp.214-
15; MacLeod, I, pp.91, 97, 22 ff. 
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some cinnamon, chay-roots and coir. Indian merchants were granted 
passes for Ceylon, and the Company would of ten buy up the cargo 
Ïmported by them.171 
The trade between Coromandel and Ceylon developed further during 
the 'forties. The Company's factories in the island and the regions under 
their con trol became increasingly dependent on Coromandel, Orissa 
and Bengal for their supply of rice. The volume of this demand may 
be gauged from the fact that 1200 lasts were ordered for 1655. As early 
as 1644 Batavia laid down that orders for rice from Ceylon should be 
given first priority. Gunpowder was another important item of export, 
but steel and opium, shipped in quantities in the preceding decade, no 
longer appear in the bills of lading for Ceylon. Elephants were still the 
chief item imported from the island. A growing market for elephants 
was now found in Bengal. The losses suffered through their high death 
rate were amply compensated by the spectacular profits fetched by the 
sale of these anÏmals. The import of Ceylon areca nuts also increased, 
particularly af ter the opening of the new factories in Madura and 
Tanjore where they were in good demand. 967 ammanams [1 ammanam 
= 24,000 pieces] were imported in 1655, as compared to 190 ammanams 
in 1652. But the market for cinnamon was found to be limited and 
700 bales of this commodity, which lay unsold on the coast, were sent 
to Batavia in 1655.17'2 During the subsequent decades the trade with 
the island followed broadly the same lines. 
Soon af ter the opening of the Dutch facto!"'j at Gombroon, the coast 
factories were called upon to provide cloth, Bengal sugar and Pegu 
gumlac for export to Persia via Batavia. Before long direct trade links 
were established between Coromandel and Gombroon. An important 
factor behind this development was the decision taken in 1638 to carry 
in Dutch ships Indian passengers and cargoes on freight from Coro-
mandel to Persia. In that way the Company expected to break the 
English monopoly of the freight-trade to Persia, improve its finances by 
earning some much-needed cash and, incidentally, obtain valuable 
information regarding the Coromandel-Persia trade from the activities 
of Indian merchants. 
From 1639 onwards Dutch ships plying between Batavia and Persia 
l7lK.A.1042, 3.3.1640, ff.431-31vo, 19.5.1640, ff.453vo,-54; K.A.I047, "Ver-
hael etc.," ff.422vo-23. 
172 K.A.770, 20.8.1643, ff.592-93; K.A.771, 17.4.1644, f.131; K.A.1056, 
17.2.1643, f.747vo; K.A.I059, 5.10.1644, f.287vo; K.A.1071, 19.10.1649, 
f.218; K.A.I086, 8.6.1652, f.472vo; K.A.II04, 5.8.1655, f.253vo. 
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regularly called at the Coromandel ports, but the outlook for this new 
trade was not very promising during the early years. The market for 
rose-water and tahle fruits, the chief imports from Persia, was already 
glutted, thanks to the supplies brought hy the Indians and the English. 
Persian pearls could be sold on the coast only at a loss of 10 % to 15 %. 
The silver coins called abbasis also rendered a loss of 18 % in 1641. 
'Persian horses constituted a comparatively profitable item of return 
cargo and were very useful as presents for kings and nobles. 
The demand for Coromandel wares in Persia was also below expec-
tation and in 1639 coast cloth could be sold there only at a loss though 
the Indian trad ers, with their greater experience of market conditions, 
managed to carry on a profitable trade. To cope with the situation, the 
Company began to procure several varieties of Bengal cloth most in 
demand in Persia and intensified efforts to supply cloth for Mokha as 
weIl. By 1643 the Company expected to make a profit of 40 % to 50 % 
on coast cloth at Gombroon and recommended an investment of 100,000 
to 150,000 florins in the varieties which were in demand there,17'3 
By the middle 'forties, trade between the Coromandel factories and 
Persia attained significant proportions. In 1644, cloth worth 100,000 
florins was procured for Persia and it gave a gross profit of 50 %. Af ter 
a brief slump around 1647, caused mainly hy internal troubles, the 
demand for Coromandel cloth and Bengal sugar revived once more 
and they rendered a gross profit of 87 % and 250 % respectively in 
1649. Gumlac and ivory from Pegu were also in some demand in Persia. 
In 1651 a total amount of 151,000 florins were invested at Masulipatam 
and in Bengal for this trade. Freighting of goods and passengers to 
Persia also proved quite profitable and yielded as much as 13,020 florins 
in 1652. The very limited demand for the merchandise procurable from 
Persia constituted a serious difficulty. Silver and silver coins, the main 
items of return cargo, also rendered a loss of about 27 % on the coast 
until 1658, when a revival of demand for silver in the Golconda king-
dom gave a fresh impetus to the Company's Coromandel-Persia trade. 
But even when Persian silver sold at a loss in Coromandel, it was 
considered worthwhile to develop the trade as it provided much-needed 
173 For the trade between Coromandel and Persia, see K.A.760, 13.8.1635, f.488, 
13.10.1635, f.577; K.A.764, 4.2.1638, f.55; K.A.765, 11.7.1639, f.411, 
24.8.1639, ff.511-12; K.A.768, 9.8.1641, f.326, 28.5.1641, f.178; K.A.770, 
20.8.1643, f.590; K.A.1031, 2.7.1636, ff.1108, 1115, 3.5.1636, f.1103vo; KA 
1034, 25.5.1637, f.G75; K.A.1037, 9.5.1638, f.198; K.A.1039, 30.7.1639, 
f.1093. 
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cash capital. Besides the silver was at times diverted to Surat, where 
it sold at a profit.174 
The Coromandel factories' direct trade with other regions throws 
some interesting side-lights on the stages of economic development in 
different parts of Asia and certain features of the inter-Asian trade. 
The efforts to open trade with areas like Arakan and Maldives proved 
futile, because their markets for import were practically non-existent 
and the range and volume of their possible exports were extremely 
limited. Even by contemporary standards such regions were relatively 
underdeveloped, in the sense that they provided typical instances of 
economic self-sufficiency based on a rudimentary level of organization, 
technique and standard of consumption. Characteristically enough, the 
one item of export from Arakan which acquired any mentionable mag-
nitude was rice. The fact that a large part of this rice went to Coro-
mandel, fast developing as a big exporter of manufactured commodities, 
suggests a modern parallel which should not, however, be overstretched. 
Regions like Coromandel and Bengal had in fact already developed a 
large and, to a certain extent, varied export trade primarily in manu-
factured and semi-manufactured commodities, a practically unlimited 
import market for bullion and a much smaller, but by no means 
insignificant, one for metals, spices etc. One may describe the economies 
of such regions as relatively developed in the specific sense that they 
had attained a high degree of commercialisation, and a certain level of 
specialisation in productive functions though the base remained pri-
marily agricuIturaI. Half-way between them and areas like Arakan one 
can perhaps identify a third type: regions like Burma and Persia, -
with a limited import market for textiles and some other items and a 
small volume of export of luxury items, agricultural products and 
metal, - or Ceylon, with a flourishing export trade in specialised cash 
crops and animaIs and an import market for textiles and victuals. This 
analysis, however, does not imply that lack of commercial development 
necessarily resuIted in a corresponding lack of development in technique, 
organisation and consumption standard. The relationship was in fact the 
other way round: commercial backwardness was itself a function of the 
rudimentary character of the economy. There is evidence to show that 
such a relationship in the context of seventeenth century Asia was 
174 K.A.774, 27.7.1647, ff.371-72, 374; KA.777, 11.8.1650, f.294; K.A.1054, 
23.12.1644, f.82; KA.1068 (vervolg), 18.5.1649, f.557; K.A.1076, 6.7.1651, 
f.234; KA.1086, 8.6.1652, f.473vo, 16.10.1652, f.533vo; K.A.1111, 16.1.1658. 
f.675vo. 
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empirically valid, but a detailed analysis of this phenomenon is outside 
the seope of the present study. Viewed from this angle, the intensifieation 
of inter-Asian trade imp lied a growing interdependenee between regions 
in different stages of economie development, some of whieh showed 
definite tendencies towards speeialisation in economie aetivity. The trade 
of the Dutch in Asia, partieularly of their eoast faetories, was one of the 
major catalytie agents in this proeess. 
CHAPTER VI 
RIVALS IN TBADE 
The activities of the Jan Company in Coromandel acquire significance 
only as a phase in the effort of European merchant capital to engross 
world trade on the basis of monopolistic and monopsonistic control 
wherever possible. Even their impact on the indigenous economy can 
best be understood in this particular context. The seventeenth century 
merchant capitalists, no believers in free commercial competition, first 
carefully secured by charter from their own national governments the 
right to exclusive trade with specified regions for their monopolistic 
joint stock companies and then tried hard, openly or surreptitiously, to 
exclude not only all other traders from their own country but similar 
monopolistic companies of other nations as weIl, from all share in the 
trade of the area assigned to themselves. The weapons used in this 
struggle were as of ten political or even military as commercial. This was 
particularly true of Coromandel in the first half of the seventeenth 
century. The issue of the struggle was however eventually decided by 
the relative magnitude of capital resources and flexibility of commercial 
organization. While the struggle lasted, the economy of the coast 
undoubtedly benefited therefrom in so far as it gave greater bargaining 
power to the middleman as weIl as the producer, an advantage that was 
lost with the establishment of the unquestioned ascendancy of a single 
buyer in the market. 
The Portuguese 
The Portuguese settled at San Thomé and Negapatam and active all 
along the coast were the first rivals that the Dutch encountered in 
Coromandel. The Coromandel Portuguese were no representatives of 
any chartered company nor even of the Spanish-Portuguese State. Their 
hostility to the Dutch derived primarily from a desperate struggle for 
survival of a sorely pressed trading community in an alien background. 
Though the mother country had little direct interest in the coast settle-
ments, the latter had benefited from the Portuguese hegemony in the 
92 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
Asian waters and long enjoyed a position of advantage in Coromandel's 
overseas trade. Their commercial interests were similar to those of the 
local merchants in so far as they sought profit from both import and 
export and, unlike the Dutch, were not primarily concerned with 
securing commodities for export on advantageous terms. The reason why 
the Portuguese did not try to co-opera te with the Dutch in the same 
way as the local traders appears to be two-fold. The 10ng-estabIished 
political enmity was a barrier to any such development and the active 
instigation of the Spanish state made it even more so. The question of 
the local Portuguese seeking secure and profitable trade as the Com-
pany's middlemen and suppliers hen ce could not arise. Besides, in the 
oo.rly years of the seventeenth century, the Coromandel Portuguese 
apparently had a much greater share in the trade with the Indies 
than was available to the local merchants. The decline of Portugal and 
the advent of the Dutch threatened this lucrative commerce. The coast 
Portuguese had to fight the new-comers for the secuirty of their livelihood. 
Lacking in adequate economic power, they used the weapons of diplo-
macy, intrigue and adventurist action to thwart the hated riyal. 
From the earliest days of the Company's contact with the coast, the 
Portuguese did their best to secure the expulsion of their arch-enemies 
from the Golconda ports. In Coromandel the Dutch, in fact, had fired 
the first shot, for the yacht Delft on its second voyage to the coast in 
1606 had bumt three Portuguese ships anchored off San Thomé. The 
conflict between the rising power of the Dutch Company and the 
decadent Portuguese settlements in Coromandel was an unequal one, 
and by the middle of 1608 the local populations of Masulipatam and 
Petapuli had been definitely won over to the side of the new-comers. 
That year the Portuguese captain at Masulipatam was taken prisoner 
by order of the mir jumla, as a reprisal for Portuguese piracy against 
Muslim ships in the Bay and such misfortunes of their arch-enemy 
further strengthened the Dutch position in the Golconda kingdom. 115 
In south Coromandel the Portuguese tried to in duce the Carnatic 
king and the Gingi nayak to expel the Dutch from Tierepopelier and 
would have succeeded but for the influence of the 'great Aya'. In 1609 
they scored a point over the Dutch, when for 1500 pardaus they secured 
the lease of Tegenapatam and seven viIIages though the Company had 
offered double the amount. The ascendancy of their enemies in the 
175 Begin ende Voortgang, 11, van der Hagen's voyage, p.60; K.A.967, van Wesick 
to Ysaacx, 26.6.1608. 
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neighbouring harbour seriously affected the Company's trade at Tiere-
popelier. But the failure of the Portuguese to carry out their promises 
to the nayak led to their expulsion from Tegenapatam in December, 
1609, an incident in which the Dutch had some hand. Still they retained 
sufficient con trol over the neighbouring sea-routes to force the Tiere-
popelier factors to abandon their plans to secure Pulicat cloth by sea.176 
The Portuguese, having failed in their diplomatic manoeuvres, now 
decided to launch a direct attack on the newly established factory. On 
May 29, 1610 some Portuguese ships approached Pulicat but were 
beatenback by the Dutch who captured two of the ships with all tbe 
men on board. At about the same time an encounter near Masulipatam 
led to the capture of two more Portuguese ships. When three ships from 
I'Hermite's fIeet came to Coromandel in the spring of 1610, rumours 
about the twelve year's truce with Spain concluded in Europe had 
already reached the East. But as l'Hermite's instructions were to con-
tinue hostilities against San Thomé until more definite news was re-
ceived, the Dutch captured and bumt a few more Portuguese ships near 
the coast. l 7'7 
The truce with Spain concluded at Antwerp on April 9, 1609 was 
to be implemented in the East twelve months later. It enjoined mutual 
friendship between the subjects of the two states and guaranteed the 
right "to frequent and remain in the places of either side, and follow 
out there the trade and commerce in all security." Besides, the Dutch 
were to be allowed to seek trade "in tbe places of all other princes, 
potentates and peoples" without any hindrance from the Portuguese. 
But shortly before the conclusion of the truce the king of Spain had 
sent secret instructions to his subjects in India asking them to prevent 
the Dutch "by all possible means" from securing admission to the ports 
of the neighbouring kings.178 As subsequent developments showed, the 
Coromandel Portuguese were inspired more by the spirit of these secret 
instructions than by the terms of the truce. 
The Portuguese menace assumed dangerous proportions soon af ter 
Wemmer van Berchem succeeded Jan van Wesick as the Director of 
176 K.A.967, Bourgonje to Ysaacx, 6.2.1609, Bourgonje to North Coromandel, 
17.6.1609, Bourgonje to van Wesick, 7.4.1609, Bourgonje and Marcelis to 
North Coromandel, 13.1.1610, Bourgonje to l'Hermite, May 1610; KOTO-
mandel, p.1l6; de Jonge, 111, pp.345 ff. 
177 K.A.967, Marcelis to Maertssen, 31.5.1610, l'Hermite's 'Memorie', 15.10.1609, 
Bourgonje and Marce1is to Ysaacx, 3.3.1610, van Wesick to Bantam 15.6.1610. 
178 Dumont, Corpus Universal Diplomatique, V, 2, p.99; L.T., I, L.M., Docu-
ment No.s 86, 122. 
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the Coromandel factories in 1612.179 On June 9, 1612, when van 
Berchem was away on amission to Golconda, the Portuguese of San 
Thomé, inspired by their bishop, Dom Frey Sebastiiio de Siio Pedro, 
attacked and destroyed the Pulicat factory, killed three of the Company's 
men and carried away six, including factor Adolff Thomassen, as 
prisoners while the rest took shelter in the neighbouring villages. The 
king of Spain in his letter to the Viceroy of Goa commended the action 
of the San Thomé Portuguese and emphasized the need to frustrate 
Dutch efforts to procure Coromandel cloth and thereby undermine their 
south-east Asian trade. Van Berchem, on his return, opened negotiation 
with the Bishop and Captain of San Thomé for the release of the Dutch 
prisoners but it was not until January, 1616 th at they were all freed. 1SO 
The Portuguese, frustrated in their efforts to destroy fort Geldria, 
now tried to secure the desertion of the Company's men through bribery. 
But two Dutch sailors who went over to the Portuguese we re imprisoned 
at San Thomé as suspects and this acted as a sufficient warning to 
potential traitors. Next, the Portuguese induced some of their underlings 
to take shelter with the Dutch as fugitives with the object of poisoning 
the Pulicat factors. The conspiracy was, however, discovered in time 
and two of the enemy agents were hanged. A second attcmpt of the 
Portuguese to poison the Dutch factors also ended in failure. In 1613, 
the San Thomé Portuguese were preparing a fresh attack on Pulicat 
and a fleet sent from Goa to help them tried to capture the Dutch 
ship Star anchored off Pulicat. But the attack was successfully beaten 
back and the Portuguese had to withdraw with heavy casualties.181 
In 1613 the Portuguese also tried to induce Krishnappa Nayak of 
Gingi to deliver Franco van der Meer, chief factor of Tegenapatam, 
into their hands. The 'great Aya', won over to their side, began to 
harass van der Meer and two ships were sent to Tegenapatam to rein-
force thc threatened factory. Eventually the Aya gave up his hostile 
intentions on receiving a large present from the Dutch.1 S2 
By 1614, the tide had definitely turned against the Portuguese on the 
179 K.A.967, Resolution. Bantam Council, 18.5.1611, Statement of Joost Mar-
cellus, 15.12.1612; van Dijk, pp.14, 18. 
1RO K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff.146-46vo, 159vo-160, 165; KA.969, 16.8.1614, 
f.127; KA.973, 29.3.1616, f.174; L.T., I, L.M., Document No.s 326, 424; 
van Dam, 11, ii. p.l0l; van Dijk, pp.21, 24; Floris, p.67. 
181 KA.968, 30.8.1613, ff.156, 160 ff; KA.969, 16.8.1614, f.131vo; 20.2.1614, 
f.141; van Dijk. pp.30-31, 35-36. 
lR:2 K.A.969, 30.8.613, ff.146vo, 152, 154; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, f.127vo; KA.971, 
Hans de Haze, "Concideratie van de Cust etc." f.62; KA.973, 29.3.1616, 
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Coromandel COast. The trade of San Thomé had been on the decline 
ever since the arrival of the Dutch. Conditions became worse af ter the 
establishment of fort Geldria. In the old days, large number of ships 
came to San Thomé every year from Malacca, Goa, Cochin, Burma and 
Siam,but few traders arrived there between 1612 and 1614 and in 
1615 only one ship came from Malacca. The Dutch were confident 
that continual cruising by their ships along the coast would eventually 
achieve the complete ruin of Portuguese trade. Against the persistent 
hostility of the Dutch their enemies could retaliate but feebly by the 
occasional capture of some Indian provision-boats on their way to 
Pulicat. The conquest of San Thomé was now considered a deCinite 
possibility and Narpa-raja invited the Dutch to join him in an attack 
on the Portuguese colony. But this would involve the eventual obligation 
to settle at San Thomé which the Company with its limited resources 
was not in a position to undertake, and consequently the Dutch evaded 
the request.1 83 
In the early decades of the century the Portuguese were not merely 
political enemies but able to compete commercially, though only to a 
limited extent. The heavy establishment cost of the Dutch Company 
forced it to seek always a wide margin between their purchase and sale 
prices, i.e., a high rate of gross proCit. This fact was of ten a source 
of advantage to competitors who had to spend less on their establishment 
and could therefore afford both to buy dearer and sell cheaper. The 
Dutch generally purchased only cloths of specific size and quality which 
fetched high prices and ensured a wide margin of gross profit. The 
Portuguese on the other handbought up all available supplies some-
what indiscriminately, a small margin of gross profit per unit being 
enough to cover their costs and leave a residue of net profit. In conse-
quence the Company was at times Corced to buy poor quality cloth, just 
to maintain its hold on the buyer's market. Manufacturers and middle-
men also complained with truth that the Portuguese paid at higher 
rates for all products. Unless the Company could meet this challenge, 
there was a real danger of the Portuguese recapturing the Coromandel 
cloth trade.1 84 In the local seller's market also, Portuguese activities 
undermined the prospects of the Dutch. Asian and Portuguese ships 
from Malacca, Achin, Siam, Arakan and Bengal flocked in large num-
183 K.A.968, 20.2.1614, f.234; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, ff.128vo, 137; K.A.971, Hans 
de Haze, "Consideratie van de Cust etc.", f.64; L.T., I., L.M., Document 
No. 502; K.A.973, 29.3.1616, f.176. 
184 K.A.968, 30.8.1613, f.159; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, f.128vo. 
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bers to the Portuguese colonies on the coast; the large volume of their 
imports of ten adversely affected the demand for the Company's wares 
and caused sharp decline in prices.185 
To expel the Company from Pulicat and eventually from Coromandel 
and tbus "deprive the Dutch of the greatest outlay which support them 
in the south" long remained a cherished object of the Spanish king. 
The Viceroy of Goa consulted Captain Manuel de Frias who led the 
attack on Pulicat in 1612 and opened negotiations witb alocal prince 
in an attempt to fulfil the king's wishes. In 1620, a fidalgo of the king's 
household was appointed Captain of San Thomé and Captain-Genera I 
of the Coromandel coast with specific instructions to expel the Dutch. 
But nothing came out of these grandiose plans and ships deployed for 
the purpose had to be recalled as they failed to secure provisions from 
the coast guarded by Dutch cruÏsers. In 1623, "some gentlemen well-
known as persons of worth" were permitted by the Viceroy at their 
own request to equip ships for cruising against the enemy aIong the 
Coromandel coast. But these Portuguese free-booters, powerless against 
tbe Dutch, started indiscriminate attacks on Indian shipping and so the 
permission had to be quickly withdrawn. In 1628-29 the Captain 
of San Thomé resumed negotiations with a local prince for the .:apturc 
of Pulicat, but to little purpose. Only in June, 1629 the Portuguese from 
San Thomé "ventured into Pallicatt Roade and burned a juncke, not-
withstanding the Dutch forces." 186 
Frustrated in their designs on Pulicat, tbe Portuguese started regular 
crusing in 1616-17 against Indian boats which carried provisions from 
Orissa to Pulicat, and for a time successfully prevented them from 
reaching their destination. As a counter-measure, the Dutch deployed 
some ships to protect Indian shipping sailing to Pulicat and attack 
those going to the Portuguese settlements. Provision-boats were diverted 
in large numbers from San Thomé to Pulicat. In consequence, food 
shortage became so serious at San Thomé that 70 families came over to 
Pulicat as refugees. The Dutch - Portuguese conflict in Coromandel 
once more revealed tbe consequences of India's naval weakness. Indian 
ships were diverted from established routes and their trade forced to 
suit tbe convenience of foreign traders, while the Indians gratefully 
185 K.A,451, 'Remon.<tratie' of Franco van der Meer, 12.4.1617, ff.199-200. 
1S11 L.T., 1., Document No. 869, 21.3.1617, Document No. 936, 20.1.1618, L.M., 
XII, 16.3.1619, f.26, L.M., XIII, 26.3.1620, f.87, L.M., XV, 20.2.1621, 
f.21, L.M., XVII, 5.1.1623, ff.48 ff, L.M., XIX, Jan. 1624, f.47, L.M., XXI, 
16.2.1625, f.59; L.M., XXV, 22.3.1628, f.13; L.T., 11, L.M. XXVI, 
20.3.1629, f.162; E.F.I., 1624-29, p.343. 
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accepted the protection of one European nation against the ravages of 
another. The Dutch organised intensive cruising against Portuguese 
ships along the entire coast and as far as Point de Galle. Ships sailing 
to and from Bengal, Orissa, Cochin, Malacca, Manilla and Macao were 
captured in large numbers. This became a regular souree of income for 
the Company. "It appears," reported the Dutch in 1621, "as if no 
Portuguese would navigate these quarters any more and that they have 
yielded the sea-way to us." "At St Thomé they are worne threadbare," 
commented the English, "besides dare not pepe out att their doores, 
are growen so generally poore that they have allmost nothing left them 
att least to oppose such fortunes." The Bishop of San Thomé secretly 
confessed his fears of "Iosing the city of Meliapur, both on account of 
the vicinity of the Dutch and by reason of the weak government". Naval 
and commercial supremacy in the Bay had definitely passed from 
Portuguese to Dutch hands by the mid-'twenties. The final extinction 
of Portuguese power in this region was now only a question of time.187 
By the 'thirties the power of the Portuguese was definitely in decline 
throughout Asia and an attack on Negapatam by the nayak of Tanjore 
in 1632 further weakened their position in Coromandel. The regular 
cruising of the Dutch ships against the Portuguese along the Coromandel 
and Ceylon coasts yielded a large and steady income. The booty seized 
from Portuguese ships during 1630-32 was valued at 24,851 florins, 
while during the same period the Dutch suffered a total loss of 1,260 
florins through Portuguese counter-cruising,188 By 1637 the field of 
operation was extended to the more distant parts of the Bay in a bid 
to clear the seas of the Portuguese pirates who infested the Bengal coast. 
In May, 1640 the Batavia authorities decided that all Indian ships 
carrying Portuguese wares to Pegu, Achin and other places were to be 
accosted by Dutch cruisers and forced to surrender the enemy's mer-
chandise.189 The Orissa coast, which acted as a rice-bowl for Coro-
mandel, was now closed to the Portuguese as none dared navigate there 
without a Dutch passport. San Thomé and Negapatam suffered from a 
perpetual shortage of foodstuffs in consequence. Describing San Thomé 
in 1635, its Bishop lamented, "That city which was formerly one of the 
187 K.A.978, de Haze to Amsterdam, 8.5.1617; K.A. 981, de Haze's instructions 
to A. Thomasz, 21.7.1619; eoen, VII, pp.232-33, 355-56, 371, 422, 430, 
747, VII2, pp.499, 753, 1663; E.F.I., 1622-23, p.102; L.T., 1., L.M., XVI, 
13.11.1621; Relations, p.3. 
188 K.A.1015, 12.7.1631, f.136vo; K.A.1016, 1.12.1632, ff,21vo-22, 23vo; K.A. 
1017,20.10.1632, f.184vo. 
189 K.A.767, 20.5.1640, f.135; K.A.1034, 9.12.1637, f.178. 
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most opulent in India, has fallen so low that it has but few residents 
and no capital". The Coromandel Portuguese, who once controlled a 
large part of the overseas trade of that coast, failed to send abroad a 
single ship in 1640--41.190 
Despite their fallen state, however, encouraged by the Viceroy at 
Goa they continued to intrigue feverishly with the Carnatic king for the 
capture of the Dutch factories. But fleets sent from Goa for the purpose 
in 1631 and 1633 had to return disappointed. In 1634 a secret agree-
ment was concluded with the Carnatic king for the joint siege of Pulicat, 
but the proposed attack was never carried out, and two years later, 
while Venkata declared to the Portuguese his determination to make 
war on the Dutch, his emissaries to Pulicat carried reassuring messages 
of friendship at the very same time. By 1639 the Portuguese lost all 
hopes of any joint action with the king.191 
Their position in Coromandel was, however, strengthened to some 
extent by the Anglo-Portuguese non-agression pact in the East concluded 
in 1635. Besides in 1638 the Danish captain at Tranquebar offered 
them not only fort Dansborg but also the services of Danish ships for 
bringing re lief from Malacca, Ceylon and other places. The sale of 
Dansborg did not take place as the Portuguese had doubts regarding its 
utility. A good understanding with the Danes was, however, maintained 
and they undertook to supply the Goa authorities with secret intelligence 
regarding the movements of the Dutch in Coromandel.192 
Still, such minor advantages made no basic change in the situation 
and in 1642 the Dutch, confident of their superiority, planned a light-
ning attack on San Thomé and Nagapatam with a view to destroying 
them completely. The Portuguese got wind of these plans and made 
all possible preparations for defence with the assistance of Goa. But 
when on April 12, 1642 a Dutch fleet from Ceylon under commanders 
Blau and Bouwens arrived at Negapatam, the settlement, unable to 
offer any resistance, was forced to sue for terms as most of the citizens 
had taken to flight. By an agreement signed on April 13 the Dutch 
formally took over Negapatam which was described in the document 
190 L.T., 11, L.M., 32, 24.2.1635, f.57, L.M.,45, 30.11.1638, ff.269 ff. 
191 L.T., 11, L.M. 27, 14.3.1630, f.22, L.M.29, 20.10.1631, f.197, L.M. 32, 
20.1.1635, f.9, 24.2.1635, f.57, L.M. 33, 29.2.1636, f.253, L.M. 37, 2.11.1636, 
rf.15 ff, L.M 44, 4.3.1639, ff.257 ff; K.A.I031, 2.7.1636, f.I117, 8.10.1636, 
f.1130; K.A.1036, 22.12.1638, f.l72vo. 
19'1 L.T., 11, L.M. 45, 30.11.1638, ff.269 ff, L.M. 48, 3.8.1641, ff.70 ff, 30.11.1643, 
f.1H, G. R. Boxer, "A glimpse of the Goa Archives," Bulletin of the School 
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as a Dutch town'. On April 17 a Portuguese fleet sent from Jaffna-
patam to help the threatened colony was defeated by the Dutch in a 
combat near Negapatam. The Dutch also beat back an attack of 
general Timappa sent by the nayak of Tanjore to punish them for the 
violation of his territory. But eager to retain the nayak's good-will which 
was of great importance for its cloth-trade, the Company decided to 
withdraw from Negapatam and abandoned the project of attacking 
San Thomé. On April 22 the Dutch left Negapatam with aransom 
worth 10,000 pagodas and two hostages as security for the payment of 
anOther 40,000 pagodas. At the same time they assured the Tanjore 
nayak in reply to his angry letters that they had no aggressive intentions 
against him, but w~uld defend themselves against any attack.193 
Meanwhile in Europe, following the revolt of Portugal against Spain 
in 1640, a ten years' truce had been concluded between Holland and 
Portugal in June, 1641. In October, 1642 Batavia called upon all the 
Dutch factories in Asia to a:bide by the terms of the truce, but Nega-
patam was to be considered outside its scope until the stipulated 
ransom had been paid.194 
The circumstances of the attack on Negapatam finally proved the 
hopeless inability of the Coromandel Portuguese to defend themselves 
against their rivals. True, their colonies managed to sUIvive for some 
more decades. But from this time onward they were very much at the 
mercy of the Dutch. From 1642 to 1652 the Dutch and the Portuguese 
were officially at peace with each other in the East. But when the 
Portuguese violated the truce in 1643 by capturing a Dutch boat, two 
Portuguese boats were seized 'by way of reprisal. Otherwise things 
remained peaceful on the surface and the Company abandoned as 
futile its claims for the balance of the ransom due from Negapatam. 
The main conflict af ter 1645 centred round the new factories in 
Tanjore and Madura which vitally affected Portuguese trade, because 
the cloth supply from Coilpatam was one of its staples. Their machi-
nations in the nayaks' courts at times adversely affected the Dutch 
position. But the Company with its superior resources could retaliate 
by drawing away the weavers and painters of cloth from San Thomé. 
In 1647 the Portuguese seized one of Mir Jumla's ships which carried 
193 K.A.I047, "Verhael ete", ff.425-432, 436v0-439\'o, HOvo, 4.10.1642, f.714, 
Resolutions, 16.4.1642, 17.4.1642, ff.768-69; K.A.I048, 12.12.1642, ff.ll-
15; L.T., II, L.M. 51, 22.5.1642, ff.1I8 ff, L.M. 48, 20.12.1643, f.lI8, 
10.12.1643, ff.1I9 ff. 
194 K.A.768, 9.8.1641, f.322; K.A.769, 20.10.1642, ff.708-9; K.A.770, 1.4.1643, 
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a Dutch passport, but such violations of the truce were rather excep-
tionaI. More of ten the Portuguese ships helped Indians to evade the 
restrictions imposed on the latter's trade with Achin and the 'tin areas' 
by carrying their merchandise to the forbidden places. Yet in view of 
the weakness of the Coromandel Portuguese such efforts had little 
more than a nuisance value. In 1649 they made a vigorous attempt to 
revive their trade, - particularly with Pegu and Macassar, - but to 
little purpose. In fact so low was their credit that their bills of exchange 
sent from Golconda were not honoured at Goa. In 1652 the Dutch 
reported home with contempt that the activities of the Portuguese were 
hardly worth describing.195 
In July, 1652 the Coromandel factories learnt that the ten years' 
truce had ended and that the two nations were once more at war. The 
Portuguese on the coast, conscious of their weakness, were however 
reluctant to resume hostilities and protested in vain against the capture 
of their ships. For some years the hostilities in Coromandel assumed no 
more serious a form than cruising and counter-cruising along the coast 
in which the Portuguese fared badly. Meanwhile the nayak of Tanjore 
was persistently urging the Dutch to join him in an attack on Nega-
patam. Pulicat's suggestion that the Company should undertake this 
indepenclently was turned down hy Batavia in 1657. But the following 
year Rijcklof van Goens, who had been appointed commissaris for Surat, 
Persia, Ceylon and Coromandel and was in charge of the operations 
against the Portuguese in these areas, decided to attack the enemy 
colonies on the coast.196 
On July 20, 1658 Jan van der Laan arrived with afleet hefore 
Negapatam and even before van Goens could join him, as had been 
planned, the colony surrendered to the Dutch on July 23 without any 
resistance on condition the Portuguese inhabitants were allowed to 
leave for Goa with all their moveable property. The Tanjore nayak, 
enraged at the prospect of the Dutch securing a foothold in his land, 
came to the vicinity of Negapatam with a large army, but the Company's 
firm attitude eventually induced him to withdraw. The intended attack 
195 K.A.I056, 3.4.1643, f.764vo, 3.10.1643, ff.795 ff; K.A.1060, "Verhael enz.", 
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on San Thomé was however not carried out as Krishnappa, now 
one of Mir Jumla's generais, - had taken the colony under his pro-
tection. The Batavia authorities were at first inclined to abandon 
Negapatam as being unprofitable, but subsequently changed their mind 
at the instance of van Goens, who pointed out the possibilities of the 
place as a 'provision store' for Ceylon and Batavia.197 
Not satisfied with the capture of Negapatam, Laurens Pit and Rijcklof 
van Goens secretly came to an understanding in 1661 to conquer San 
Thomé before the peace with Portugal was concluded in Europe. But 
the news somehow leaked out and San Thomé was taken under the 
protection of the Golconda king, who sternly warned the Dutch against 
any attack on his protégés. The Company, therefore, had to change 
its tactics and af ter some negotiation Qutb Shah agreed to expel the 
Portuguese from San Thomé and permit the Dutch to establish a 
factory there. Accordingly in April, 1662 General Neknam Khan laid 
siege to the town, while the Dutch on their own initiative sent three 
ships to blockade the sea-passage so that the Portuguese were forced 
to surrender on 1 May, 1662. But the Golconda authorities ignored 
the assistance given by the Dutch and the only advantage which the 
latter derived from the whole business was the final expulsion of the 
Portuguese from the coast as a political power. Later when Golconda 
got into trouble with the Goa authorities over the question of San 
Thomé and Qutb Shah's ships were attacked in the Arabian Sea, thc 
Company's help was sought on the false plea that the Portuguese 
settlement had been conquered really for the sake of the Dutch. The 
Company evaded such requests and decided not to open a factory at 
San Thomé. By 1667 the Portuguese definitely gave up all ideas of 
recapturing the town. Most of the old settlers now took shelter at 
Madras or Porto Novo and from there carried on a certain amount 
of trade, mainly with Sumatra and Siam. But its volume was not large 
enough to cause any serious worry to the Company. By the middle 
'sixties, the Portuguese had ceased to be a factor in Coromandel trade 
so far as the Dutch were concerned.1 98 
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The English 
While the Dutch - Portuguese relations on the coast were more 
overtly hostile, the competition with the English East India Company 
implied a far more serious threat to the Jan Company's commercial 
interests. The real and potential capital resources of the English Com-
pany, the support of the buoyant English nation-state, use of tech-
niques similar to those of the Dutch for the establishment of exclusive 
control on the market were all factors full of ominous significance for 
the future of the Dutch on the coast and indeed throughout Asia. 
As early as 1611 the English East India Company had established a 
factory at Masulipatam and, a little later, also opened trade at Petapuli. 
In June, 1613 an English ship, the Globe, visited Pulicat in the quest 
of trade but had to leave disappointed as van Berchem reminded the 
local authorities of the exclusive trading rights al ready granted to the 
Dutch. In other places the Dutch tried to buy up all available cargo as 
far as practicabie before the arrival of the English ships, but were of ten 
hindered in this effort by the inadequacy of their capital resources. The 
order of the States General, however, required them to follow a friendly 
policy and not to obstruct in any way the trade of the English. Van 
Berchem promised to abide by this order though he would have pre-
ferred to oppose the esta:blishment of any further English factories in 
Coromandel, for otherwise, in his opinion, "the English would shear the 
sheep and we, the Dutch, the pigs." 199 The conflict between state 
policy and local commercial interests, a familiar and determining in-
fluence in the history of European trade with Asia in the 17th century, 
thus became evident even in the initial stage of the Jan Company's 
activities in Coromandel. 
However, despite van Berchem's gloomy prognostications, the English 
for a long time were in a position of comparative disadvantage. Their 
capital resources were still much smaller than those of the Dutch. They 
had little con trol over the supply of spices which alone could make up 
to some extent for the shortage of cash specie in Coromandel. They 
were thus in no position yet to compete effectively with the Dutch. 
Indeed, in 1617-18, the English were in despair over the trade pros-
pects in Coromandel which the Court of Directors considered "dis-
tasted as unprofitable". Vet at times the Dutch feit rather badly the 
pressure of English competition. The rivalry of the two Companies 
forced up the price of indigo at Masulipatam and gave the Indian 
199 K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff.158vo, 163; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, ff.130, 130vo, 133; 
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cultivators and middlemen a superior bargaining poSltlOn until an 
agreement between the English and the Dutch altered the situation. 
When in November, 1617 the Dutch declared war on the English in 
the Moluccas, Banda and Amboina, the Company followed a policy 
of cautious vigilance on the coast, and there were no actual hostilities. 
In fact the Coromandel factors with their hands sufficiently full with 
the Portuguese would have preferred more friendly relations with the 
English.200 Their earlier eagemess to expel the English at gun-point 
checked by a contrary state policy had given place to a willingness to 
co-exist at a time when the two nations were at war. The conflict he-
tween state policy and local commercial interest persisted, though the 
circumstances had changed radically. The State's control, in varying 
degrees, over the commercial policies of chartered companies in distant 
lands, a familiar feature of the Mercantilist era, hampered in this 
instance the adoption of measures which might have proved most sound 
economicaIly. The Dutch Company, conscious of the power of their 
rivals, was evidently seeking the establishment of a limited dual control 
on the buyer's market which would have eminently served their ultimate 
purpose of reducing the bargaining power of local suppliers and elimi-
nated the effects of powerful competition. 
The manner in which co-operation with the EngIish was eventually 
forced on them was something they had neither expected nor desired. 
In June, 1619 a 'Treaty of Defence' terminated the Anglo-Dutch war 
and inaugurated a partial partnership between the two companies. 
Among other things, the Companies were to share the trade of Pulicat 
as also the expenses of Fort Geldria. A detailed agreement to regulate 
the Pulicat trade and joint management of the fort was drawn up at 
Batavia in April, 1621 and on June 9, 1621 the English came to the 
southem port, abandoning their Petapuli factory in order to reduce 
expenses.201 
This was an arrangement foredoomed to failure. The employees of 
the Dutch company in the East, whatever the attitude of their masters, 
were not ready to give away entirely through a partnership the definite 
advantage they had over their rivals. Coen, who seldom minced matters, 
2OOC.S.P., 1617-21, pp.58, 182; Let. Rec., VI, pp.49, 207; E.F.I., 1618-21, 
p.17; Coen, I, pp.515 ff, VII, pp.94, 230-31, 356; K.A.977, Resolutioll, 
Masulipatam, 16.1.1617, 'Memorie' of Raphael Olyva, f.90; K.A.978" A. 
Thomasz to Amsterdam, 8.5.1617. 
\lOl E.F.I., 1618-21, pp.xlii-xliii, 253; Coen, IV, pp.38, 423 ff, 426, 684; 
K.A.249, f.500. 
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enquired if their Honours in Amsterdam had been lacking in good 
counsel. To his mind, friendship with the English was an impossibility; 
for it would mean that the Dutch "would have to quit not only the 
Indies, but the world". 
In tune with this spirit, he instructed the Coromandel factors not to 
trust the English in anything, zealously to guard the rights and prero-
gatives of the Company and carefully preserve the secrets of the cloth 
trade. It is to he noted, however, that the Coromandel factories at this 
stage were not in full sympathy with Coen's extreme attitudes inspired 
by his ambition to establish a vast and exclusive colonial empire. Cen-
tralisation of control over local commercial policy, with two of ten 
warring centres of authority at Amsterdam and Batavia, frequently 
frustrated attempts to adopt rational economic measures and was in fact 
one of the basic weaknesses of the Dutch East India Company.202 
The English in the East also feIt that this co-operation with a power-
ful riyal would only mean numerous encumbrances and surrender of 
legitimate rights. As early as March, 1622 the English Council at 
Bata'\>'ia reported to London that the partnership with the Dutch in 
Coromandel was working very badly and asked the home authorities 
to "consider whether to be free from them may not be more beneficial 
for your trade than to live under their subjection and take their leavings." 
The English, with a much smaller capital at their disposal, found it 
impossible to trade on a basis of equality with the Dutch. With a 
larger seller's market under their con trol, the latter could also afford 
to buy up much larger quantities of return cargo. Besides, they refused 
to undertake joint investments and rejected the plea that purchases 
should be shared equally, insisting that each Company would get a 
share of the return cargo proportionate to their respective capitais. The 
English were, of course, free to invest independently. But with their 
limited knowledge of local markets they hesitated to do 50. At times, 
the Dutch bought up all the available supplies, including those for 
which the English had advanced money. The heavy expenses of Fort 
Geldria were also a serious strain on the slender resources of the English 
and, in their opinion, disproportionate to the benefits derived. A con-
ference to settle the differences and a complaint to Batavia led to the 
redress of some minor grievances. But such tinkerings were of little 
heIp in an unworkable partnership of two companies with vast differ-
ences in resources. For "no concessions ... could make up for the want 
200 Coen, I, pp.543 ff, 735, lIl, p.75. 
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of an adequate supply of capital". A joint control with no qualifications 
was obviously unworkable under the circumstances. 
The 'massacre of Amboina' and the subsequent withdrawal of the 
English from the Moluccas, Siam and elsewhere practically closed for 
the English many markets for Coromandel cloth in South East Asia. 
The authorities in London were now inclined to listen to their 
subordinates' plea for the termination of the Anglo-Dutch partnership 
in Coromandel and on July 1, 1623 the English withdrew from Puli-
cat. 203 
The policy now recommended by Batavia to Coromandel was t.o 
leave the English in peace "so long as they do not first give trouble". 
But in matters of trade the Dutch tried to oust the English from the 
Coromandel spice market by undercutting prices. Only the price of 
pepper was kept high enough to prevent the English from buying up 
supplies for Europe. English attempts to open a new factory in south 
Coromandel, at Pondicherry, were foiled through the influence of the 
Company's middleman, Malaya. But at Armagon the English succeeded 
in securing the right to establish a factory, to the exclusion of their 
rivals, despite Dutch machinations. 
Armagon soon threatened to grow into a serious riyal of Pulicat and 
the English efforts to draw away the textile manufacturers from the 
latter place were successful to some extent. But through shortage of 
capital they failed to provide adequate employment for the textile 
workers thus lured away. The weavers of Armagon had to secure 
permission from their nayak to work for the Dutch in order to maintain 
themselves. In 1629 there was a serious danger of armed conflict be-
tween the two nations when the English forced provision boats sailing 
from Orissa to Pulicat to go to Armagon instead. This was stopped only 
when the Dutch offered the Indian boats the protection of their armed 
frigates. 204 The same year the Dutch and the English were forced to 
co-operate at Masulipatam in the face of a common danger. But such 
an alliance, forced by exigencies of circumstance, was essentially tem-
porary. 
In the 'twenties of the seventeenth century the Dutch enjoyed a 
position of distinct advantage over their European rivals in Coromandel. 
203 C.S.P. 1622-24, pp.3 ff, 25; E.F.I., 1622-23, pp.xxxvii, 47, 55 ff, 63, 
83ff, 102, 119ff, 126ff, 141, 146,338; Coen, 111, pp.187, 323ff, 859ff. 
204 E.F.I., 1622-23, p.l05, 1624-29, pp.xliii, xlviii, 128, 130, 131, 133 fi, 
358; K.A.754, 26.3.1624, f.40, 25.6.1624, f.74vo; K.A.994, Ysbrantsz to 
Amsterdam, 12.10.1624; K.A.I000, 28.10.1626, ff.147vo ff. 
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The power of the Portuguese was on the wane and that of the Danes 
was insignificant. The English with their limited resources and com-
parative inexperience were still lagging far behind. The Dutch had 
arrived on the scene a few years earlier and, profiting by this fact, now 
jeaIously guarded their trade secrets. For decades to come, they were 
destined to maintain this position of ascendancy and effectively replace 
the Portuguese as pedlars of Coromandel ware in the markets of Asia, 
only on a much larger scale. But already the English had given enough 
evidence of their potential strength and once the problem of capital 
supply was solved, they would be more or less on an equal footing with 
the Dutch. For though the latter long continued to dominate the trade 
of East and South East Asia, the markets of Europe were equally open 
to both. 
OfficiaIly, the relationship between the two companies continued 
to be friendly, but there was a strong undercurrent of hostility, specially 
af ter the conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1635. The Dutch 
suspected that the English were plotting against them with the Portu-
guese and had a hand in their troubles with the sar-i-khail.205 In 1633, 
the English began forcibly to divert the Orissa provision-boats to 
Armagon away from their usual destination, Pulicat. This affected 
the food prices at Pulicat and there· was a general exodus of cIoth 
manufacturers to Armagon where living was now cheaper. Eventually 
the Dutch had to deploy a cruiser to escort the provision-boats to Pulicat 
and by 1636, "the vexations from the ... English near Armagon had 
ceased as they realised that our people the Dutch had resolved to with-
stand force with force. 206 The Dutch efforts to prevent collusion be-
tween the English and the Portuguese were in fact more aggressive. In 
1639 the Portuguese owners of a yacht carrying English nag, which 
had taken shelter in Armagon, were forced to abandon the boat so 
cIosely did the Dutch pursue and watch it. The same year an English 
ship was accosted off the coast in the belief that it belonged to the 
Portuguese.207 
But the techniques adopted by the Dutch in their rivalry with the 
English were mainly commercial rather than political or military in 
nature, and centred in efforts to prevent their competitors from pro-
205 K.A.I029, 19.6.1635, f.664vo; K.A.1028, 4.1.1636, f.44;K.A.1031, 28.12.1636, 
f.37, 3.5.1636, f.ll05; K.A.1039, 28.12.1639, f.ll; D.R., 1640-41, pp.89, 
185; E.F.I., 1637-41, pp.xxxvii-xliii, 156, 266. 
206 K.A.I019, 15.8.1633, ff.21vo-22; K.A.I038, 4.1.1636, f.H. 
207 K.A.1039, 28.12.1639, f.11, 23.5.1639, ff.l081, 1094. 
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curing Coromandel cloth with a view to undermining their spice trade. 
At Amboina, the chief source for the supply of cloves, the Dutch 
could exercise a monopsonistic control to the exclusion of other Euro-
pean nations, but wcre powerless to prevent the trade of Asian traders 
from Malay and Macassar, from whom the English and the Danes 
in their turn procured their supplies in exchange of coast cloth. So the 
Dutch tried to buy up in Coromandel all varieties of cloth which might 
he required by their rivals for Malay and Macassar and to under-cut 
the prices of all commodities which tbe latter offered for sale on the 
coast. Still when the English had adequate capital - which, however, 
was not a frequent occurence at this stage - they, like tbe Asian 
merchants, would purchase cloth somewhat indiscriminately in order 
to capture tbe market and prices went up in consequence, to the great 
inconvenience of the Dutch. At times, tbe Company used its political 
influence to exclude its competitors from the cloth market and for quite 
some time the Pulicat region, which was farmed out to Malaya's 
relaions, was out of bounds to the English, whose contract witb the 
Conjiveram weavers for procuring cloth was also undermined through 
Dutch intrigues. Lack of capital hampered all English efforts to counter-
act such hostile manoeuvrings and in 1640, - the year in which the 
Madras factory was established by the EngIish, - the Coromandel fac-
tors, while fully aware that English trade might seriously affect their 
position in future, confidently reported to Batavia tbat they had litle to 
fear until their rivals had more capital.208 
The danger of increasing English investments on the coast took quite 
same time to materialise. Meanwhile the superior resources of the Dutch 
frustrated all efforts of tbe English Company to extend its trade south-
wards and were of ten a serious hindrance to the procuring of return 
cargo. The English, depending chiefly on the supply of merchandise 
from Europe, could hardly hope to compete with a nation which con-
trolled the trade of East and South East Asia and could tbus procure 
the commodities in demand on tbe coast. The Dutch thus had tbe 
advantage of an additional means besides liquid capital for procuring 
the return cargo. Still, with supplies of capital from England and Ban-
tam, the English factories in Coromandel did their best to maintain a 
hold on tbe market and enjoyed a short-lived advantage in north 
208 K.A.I018, 7.12.1633, f.5vo; K.A.I019, 15.8.1633, ff.18vo-20; K.A.1028, 
4.1.1636, ff.43vo-44; K.A.1034, 9.12.1636, f.625, 1.3.1637, f.664vo; K.A. 
1036, 3.3.1640, f.430; K.A.I042, 30.5.1640, f,461vo; K.A.I043, 8.1.1641, 
f.24; K.A.I047, "Verhael etc." f,445; E.F.I., 1634-36, p.220. 
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Camatic during the Company's troubles with Chinanna in 1645. During 
1649 to 1652, the Dutch records report an improvement in the state 
of English trade on the coast, but as the English themselves recognised, 
it was "of small consequence in respect of the Dutches vast traffique 
in these parts." 209 
The position of the English in Coromandel deteriorated considerably 
af ter 1652, despite the fact that for a time they enjoyed a certain 
advantage over the Dutch, thanks to their friendly relations with Mir 
Jumla. In 1653-54, all English factories on the coast excepting 
Masulipatam and St. George were abandoned as being unprofitable. 
Early in 1653 the news of the Anglo-Dutch War in Europe reached 
Coromandel and though no actual hostilities took place on the east 
coast, the English ships practically stopped sailing for fear of the Dutch 
until peace was once more esta:blished in November, 1654. During 
1657-58, the English Company's troubles with Mir Jumla, which led 
to actual attacks on Madras, further helped the Dutch to maintain 
their ascendancy.210 
In the 'sixties, for the first time, the activities of the English became 
a serious threat to the Company's Coromandel trade. By 1660, English 
investments in the imported varieities of cloth were large t'nough, not 
merely to cause a rise in prices, but to induce the Company's own middle-
men to supply the English with cloth which they had already con-
tracted to supply the Dutch. English agents now went far inland to 
procure cloth and in consequence the Company's supplies for Persia feIl 
far short of the required quantity. The sale of coast cloth in Malacca 
and adjacent regions was seriously affected as supplies brought by the 
English to Achin eventually reached Johor and other places and caused 
a glut in the market. For several months in 1661 not a bale of Coro-
mandel cloth could be sold in Malacca and only 30 bales were there-
fore ordered for the following year. In the 'seventies, the impact of 
English competition was feIt in the cloth trade in Java as weIl. The 
demand for the Company's wares on the coast also varied with the 
volume of supplies brought by the English. Further, the lucrative freight 
trade between Coromandel and Persia suffered a decline as the English, 
209K.A.I055, 20.2.1645, ff.7vo--8; K.A.I060, "Verbae1 enz.", ff.181vo, 19,1; 
K.A.I066, 18.1.1649, f.88vo; K.A.I068, 31.12.1649, 59vo; K.A.I080, 
24.12.1652, f.56; E.F.I., 1641-45, pp.154, 288ff, 1651-54, p.22. 
21°K.A.780, 1.6.1653, I.160; K.A.782, 16.4.1655, f.133; K.A.I091, 5.2.1653, 
ff.260 ff, 28.3.1653, ff.297 ff; K.A.ll00, 24.12.1655, ff.85 ff; E.F.I., 1651-54, 
pp.xxx ff; Mir Juncla, pp.143 ff. 
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unlike the Dutch, now agreed to accept payment at the end of the 
voyage.211 
Anglo-Dutch rivalry in Coromandel was not confined to the sphere 
of commerce in this period. In August, 1665 Batavia communicated to 
the coast factors the news of the outbreak or war with England with 
instructions to do all possible damage to the enemy. But three yachts 
sent from Pulicat under Peter de Lange to capture the English ships, 
anchored oH Madras, merely succeeded in seizing near Masulipatam 
a small ship belonging to an English private trader. This action was 
taken by the Golconda authorities as an unlawful violation of the 
peace of the harbour and temporarily involved the Dutch in serious 
difficulties. But Batavia was inclined to ignore the warnings of Indian 
powers against hostilities in their harbours or near ther coasts. Accor-
dingly, in June, 1666 the Dutch ships posted near Madras to keep watch 
on enemy shipping pursued an English ship, the Constantinople Mer-
chant, to the harbour of Masulipatam with the intention of capturing 
it. As the Masulipatam factors feared an attack on the Dutch factory 
by the numerically superior English garrison, Pulicat decided to postpone 
any decisive action until further orders from Batavia. But the officers 
responsible for th is decision were subsequently summoned to Batavia 
to answer charges of disobeying instructions. This measure was partly 
meant to impress the Golconda authorities with the seriousness of the 
Company's intentions against the English, and the accused were even-
tually acquitted. In 1668, instructions received from Holland again 
enjoined that enemy shipping should be attacked in neutral harbours, 
but much to the relief of the Coromandel factors the news of peace 
with England came soon afterwards.212 
Late in 1672, Coromandel was informed by Batavia of the renewal 
of war with England and in September, 1673 a naval engagement took 
place sou th of Masulipatam between a Dutch fIeet of four ships, under 
Admiral Cornelis van Quaelbergh, and an English fleet of ten. It ended 
in a decisive victory for the Dutch with the capture of three EngIish 
ships. Emboldened by this success, the Coromandel factors now fully 
approved of Batavia's recommendation that in time of war no heed 
211 KA.799, 14.4.1672, f.244, 15.7.1672, f.536; K.A.1l22, 19.1.1661, f.418vo, 
16.12.1660, f.432; K.A.1l24, 24.1.1662, f.170vo; KA.1l28, 26.12.1662, 
ff.204 ff; K.A.1l56, 22.1.1669, f.487. 
212 K.A.793, 3.11.1666, ff.653-54; KA.1l42, 6.1l.l665, ff.1407, 1413 ff, 
15.11.1666, f.659vo, 31.8.1666, ff.692 ff; K.A.1l56, 19.12.1668, ff.261 ff; 
7.11.1668, f.500vo; E.F.I., 1665-67, ff.241 ff., 250. 
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should he paid to GoIconda's prohibition of hostilities in her waters. 
But no further hostilities with the English took place before the termi-
nation of the war in 1674.213 
By the late 'seventies the situation had definitely changed in favour 
of the English. The Dutch, now inadequately supplied with capital, had 
to depend on credit for a large part of their business. The English on 
the other hand were supported by increasing supplies of capital from 
home and could afford to make large purchases for Europe. In 1678, 
for instance, the capitaI imported by the EngIish, as estimated by the 
Company, amounted to 3,000,000 fIorins besides 600,000 imported by 
the private traders; the capital supplied to the Dutch factories for the 
same year was probably around 20z million fIorins. By now, the Dutch 
openly admitted that the ascendancy in the Coromandel trade had 
passed to the English. The situation had two particular implications for 
the Company. First, they oould no longer procure from Coromandel 
cloth of the right quality in adequate quantity and wamings to the 
Iniddlemen prohibiting the supply of cloth to the English directly or 
indirectly was of no avail. The Masulipatam market was now fully 
under English con trol, while the Company was heavily in debt there. 
A second consequence of the English ascendancy on the coast was that 
the Dutch were also ousted from the market for Coromandel cloth in 
Europe. The English procured new varieties of pattemed piece-goods 
in acoordance with samples sent from Europe. Dutch efforts to follow 
their example were handicapped by inadequacy of capita!. Samples of 
guinea cloth purchased by the English on the coast were sent to Holland 
in 1681 to see if they would secure enough profits. But the profits 
fetched by this item, - 35 % on the unbleached and 63 % on the 
bleached varieties, -- were considered inadequate, and it was decided 
to stick to the usual purchases which gave more profit. Later, in 1683, 
the policy was modified to some extent and the purchase of the oom· 
paratively less profitable varieties authorised, in order not to cede the 
European market entirely to the English. The English private traders 
and interlopers, particularly the latter, satisfied with even lower rates 
of gross profit per unit than the English Company, were oonsidered 
the most dangerous competitors of the Dutch. As a net result of this 
increased capital investment by their rivals, the Dutch entirely lost 
their control over the Coromandel market. The ahandonment of Bantam 
213 K.A.799, 3.11.1672, f.901; K.A.1181, 30.9.1673, ff.523ff, 13.10.1673, f.547; 
K.A.1182, "sschriftelijk rapllOrt etc." ff.140ff; K.A.1187, 22.11.1674, f.204; 
Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, I, ff. 358 ff; E.F.I., New Series, 1I, pp.ix, 70. 
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by the English and their war with the Mughals in 1689-90 roused 
false hopes in the minds of the Dutch. But the English had never been 
primarily dependent on the South-East Asian trade and no temporary 
calamity could effectively destroy their ascendancy based on the solid 
foundation of a large capital supply.214 
The change in the position of the Company vis-à-vis the English was 
not the result of any basic alteration in the economie situation or the 
pattem of trade. Formerly, the Dutch with their larger capital and 
their command over the Souh-East Asian market had an advantage 
over their rivals. Their chief weakness then, as later, was the heavy 
burden of administrative and military expenses whieh forced them to 
trade exclusively for a high margin of gross profit per unit. So long as 
they controlled the Coromandel cloth market by virtue of superior 
capital resources this weakness was not a very great handicap, for they 
could afford to bind up the manufacturers and middlemen and make 
them procure the required commodities strietly according to specifi-
cation. They lost their position of advantage when their chief rivals, the 
English, surpassed them in the volume of capital import. The inade-
quacy of capital created a vicious circle.215 It prevented the Dutch from 
procuring cloth at profita:ble rates and this in its turn undermined the 
profits in Europe and Asian markets though this was by no means the 
only reason for the shortage of capital. As a net result, the English 
214 K.A.458, the Seventeen to Batavia, 19.5.1679,21.10.1676; K.A.812, 14.8.1683, 
ff.1216 ff; K.A.1220, 21.12.1678, ff.67vo, 69, 13.2.1679, f.295; K.A.1242, 
29.4.1681, ff.302 ff; K.A.1222, 10.11.1678, f.547vo; K.A.1271, 31.12.1683, 
f.183; K.A.1346, 30.12.1689, f.319; Master, I, p.297. 
2111 The following data regarding the value (in florins) of thc capital supplied 
to Coromandel from various regions douring 1675--'90 are taken from the 
"Generale Missiven". 
Year Bata1lia Far East Malacca PerBta Oelllon Peg", Total 
1675 1,435,807 
1676 661,049 786,141 160,879 239,402 
1677 420,815 150,000 35,723 
1678 1,289,510 ça 900,000 
1679 1,104,495 222,518 
1680 702,585 1,052,397 161,254 ça 2,500,000 
1683 1,937,624 309,154 268,595 2,978,035 
1684 617,321 583,371 100,384 
1685 331,163 11,694 
1686 1,281,401 
1687 321,626 850,114 
1688 1,163,717 
1689 543,382 
1690 992,377 176,857 
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captured both the huyer's market in Coromandel and the seller's 
market in Europe hy virtue of their larger capital. The fact that the 
Dutch still enjoyed a position of advantage in South-East Asia -
especially af ter the English left Bantam - made little difference to the 
situation. The English had found in Europe an alternative market for 
Coromandel cloth which was potentially much bigger than the Sou th-
East Asian market ; and so long as they could provide enough capital, 
they could control the source of supply. In the economy of the region, 
the commerce of the English replaced that of the Dutch as the most 
decisive external influence. 
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The Danes 
While the trade of the English and, to a lesser extent, that of the 
Portuguese, were serious problems for the Dutch, the activities of the 
Danes on the coast were no more than a minor irritant. Still, when 
Roelant Crape of the Danish East India Company secured the cession 
of Tranquebar port from the nayak of Tanjore in 1620 and built their 
fort, Dansborg, the Dutch could do little to prevent it. By 1625, the 
Danes secured freedom of trade at MasuIipatam, took Pondicherry in 
lease and established a factory at Pipli in Bengal. It appeared, com-
mented governor Ysbrantsz, "as if they wanted to buy up the whole 
world". 
With little capita! and less support from home, the Danes, as compe-
titors of the Dutch, had only a nuisance value. Still their offer of high 
prices for saltpetre, indigo and Coromandel pepper pushed up the 
prices of these commodities, while their intrigues of ten caused serious 
hindrance to Dutch trade. Having a smaller burden of expenses to 
bear, they aIso sold Coromandel cloth at comparatively cheap rates in 
Sumatra and Celebes and thus spoilt the market for the Company. They 
were friendly to the Portuguese and carried on their ships Portuguese 
cargo from Benga! to CoromandeI, which the Dutch cruisers were 
powerless to prevent. But shortage of capita I and troubles with the 
Masulipatam governor and the nayak of Tanjore soon forced them to 
assume a humbier attitude. In 1628, they sold their stocks of indigo and 
saltpetre to the Dutch and in 1629 Crape actually offered to sell Dans-
borg to the Company. Though Ysbrantsz had been in favour of securing 
the fort, Coen turned down the offer as he considered any more estab-
lishments unnecessary in CoromandeI.216 This proposa! was considered 
from time to time until it was finally dropped in 1659 to avoid any 
further addition to the Company's burdens.217 
By 1629 the affairs of the Danish Company were in such a sad state 
that they leased out fort Dansborg to Malaya who administered it 
apparently until his death with the help of a few soldiers supplied by 
the Dutch.218 But the Danes continued to import cloves, sandal wood, 
radix china, tortoise shelI, sugar and silk stuffs from Macassar and 
216 E.F.I., 1618--21, p.xlv; van Dam, 11, ii, p.118; Coen, V, pp.383, 581 ff., 
VII, pp.1218, 1334ff, 1443, 1511; D.R., 1624--29, p.134; K.A.994, Ysbrantsz 
to Amsterdam, 12.10.1624; K.A.996, Ysbrantsz 10 Amsterdam, 28.4.1625; 
K.A.998, 3.2.1626, ff.2vo, 4; K.A.999, Ysbrantsz to Batavia, 5.12.1625, same 
to Amsterdam, 8.3.1626. 
21TK.A.1119, 16.12.1659, f.46. 
218 K.A.I012, 25.1.1630, f.68vo. 
Verh. dl. 38 8 
114 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
bartered these for Coromandel cloth, and also traded coast tobacco for 
Bengal sugar which was then exported to Persia. Their import of cloves 
did adversely affect the price of the commodity in CoromandeI and the 
Dutch had to under-cut prices in order to retain their hold on the 
market. 219 The secret Danish - Portuguese entente was a source of still 
greater embarrassment. The Danish ships brought to MasuJipatam a 
steady stream of Portuguese emigrants from Bengal and Macassar and 
the practice stopped only af ter severe threats from the Dutch.220 In 
1641, the Danes, reduced once more to a precarious position, renewed 
their periodical overtures for the transfer of fort Dansborg to the Dutch. 
The Company entered into these negotiations with great caution and 
was guided by Batavia's recently formulated obiter which required all 
intercourse with the rival nations to be reduced to a minimum.221 
The activities of the Danes in Coromandel, by the middle 'forties, 
ceased to have even a nuisance value so far as the Dutch were con-
cerned. With little support from home and an irregular trade with Java 
and Macassar which hardly covered the expenses involved, the Danes 
were once more forced to resume their interminabie negotiations for the 
transfer of Dansborg to the Dutch. The authorities both at Batavia and 
in Amsterdam were now seriously interested in the deal, particularly 
af ter the Muslim conquest of the northern Carnatic, because they 
wanted some place to fall back on in case the Golconda government 
prohibited the Company from holding forts in their territory. But the 
Danes, still expecting the arrival of adequate capital from Europe, 
failed to come to a decision and af ter the capture of Negapatam the 
Company also lost its interest in Dansborg. 
The relations between the two nations on the coast in the 'fifties 
were, however, doser than ever before. To the great chagrin of the 
Portuguese, the Karikal factors were allowed to reside in Dansborg in 
1653 as a precautionary measure. Arrangements for the delivery of 
Karikal cloth to Tranquebar, for which 1 % duty was paid to the 
Danes, worked very satisfactorily and the Company employed twelve 
soldiers for the protection of the Danish fort. In 1657, there was a 
temporary hitch owing to the seizure of a Danish boat by the Gompany, 
but eventually the Dutch decided to return the boat and maintain their 
'.119 K.A.1023, 27.12.1634, f.96vo; K.A.I036, 22.12.1638, f.178vo; K.A.I042, 
2.11.1639, ff.421-421vo 
22oK.A.I036, 22.12.1638, f.95vo; K.A.I039, 18.12.1639, f.81, 8.10.1638, 
ff.992-93, 20.6.1639, ff.l082-83, 30.7.1639, f.l092. 
'.121 K.A.l044, 12.12.1641, f.78; K.A.768. 3.4.1641, f.77. 
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garrison at Dansborg, lest the fort might he taken over hy the English.222 
The trade of the Danes was evidently aUowed to survive on sufferance 
and this was a small price to pay for a political and military alliance 
against powerful enemies. 
By the 'sixties, the trade of t1re Danes was altogether morihund though 
with occasional assistance from Europe they continued to send their 
ships to Macassar and Japara, and later to Bantam and Manilla as 
weU. In 1659, Laurens Pit wanted to withdraw the Company's soldiers 
from Dansborg, hut eventuaUy allowed the Danes to retain a small 
Dutch garrison provided they paid for its upkeep. At times, as in 1673, 
their supplies of painted cloth affected the prices at Bantam, while 
their import of copper to Coromandel caused a glut in the market. In 
the main, however, Danish trade counted for little.223 
222K.A.456, 16.4.1658, f.27, 5.9.1658, f.211; KA.782, 21.7.1654, f.279; K.A. 
1056, 3.6.1643, f.769; K.A.I062, (vervolg) 28.2.1646, f.804; K.A.I068, 
31.12.1649, f.60; K.A.I074, 24.1.1652, f.17; K.A.I087, 19.1.1654, f.238; 
K.A.I093, 26.1.1655, f.l02; KA.I100, 24.12.1655, ff.81 ff; K.A.ll1O, 
17.12.1657, fA3 
223 K.A.796, 24.4.1669, f.337; KA.800, 27.3.1673, f.312; K.A.1120, 16.1.1660, 
f.17vo; K.A.1122, 14.8.1660, ff.384ff. 
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The French 
It was the cherished object of Dutch policy to exclude, so far as 
practicabIe, all other European nations from a share in the Coromandel 
trade. Early French efforts to open trade with this region were 
frustrated mainly as a result of this policy. In June, 1617 the ship 
St. Michel,belonging to La Compagnie des Moluques, organised by the 
merchants of Dieppe, Rouen and St. Malo, anchored off Pondicherry 
and wrote to the Dutch at Tierepopelier enquiring a:bout trade pros-
pects. The French received only a hostile reply and their attempt to 
secure trading rights in Gingi were foiled through Dutch machinations. 
But they did eventually succeed in opening trade with Pondicherry. 
As Pondicherry produced no cloth and the Dutch prevented supplies 
from Tierepopelier, the French were however soon forced to leave 
Coromandel. In 1621, a Frenchman sent by Beaulieu, the commander 
of a French fleet which had sailed from Honfleur, tried to secure 
trading rights at Masulipatam and failed, apparently owing to Dutch 
intrigues.224 
Nearly five decades later, in 1670, the French East India Company 
appeared on the coast and made its début at Masulipatam. The Com-
pany did not have much to fear from the French as commercial 
competitors though the latter secured the right to duty-free rade in the 
Golconda kingdom. But the repercussions on the coast of the Franco-
Dutch wars in Europe constituted a threat to the Coromandel factories 
and the Company's shipping. When in July, 1672 the French forcibly 
seized the town of San Thomé from the Golconda authorities and 
Golconda forces laid seige to the town, the Dutch feit seriously con-
cerned about their future security, and their fears were aggravated 
by the French attack on the Masulipatam harbour.225 Following two 
decisive defeats in February and March, 1673 the Golconda army prac-
tically abandoned their seige of San Thomé and withdrew to a safe 
distance. But for the intervention of the Duteh, the San Thomé episode 
would have ended in a decisive victory for the French. 
In June, 1673 Rijcklof van Goens, appointed Admiral and Super-
intendent for the war against the French both on the east and the 
west coast of India, arrived before San Thomé with his fleet from 
224 Coen, 11, pp.201, 298, 338; K.A.978, Lefebvre to Amsterdam, 24.9.1617, 
S. Luys to Symon Joosten, 17.6.1617, 19.7.1617, Symon Joosten to de Haze, 
3.8.1617; Kaeppelin, p.2; Sen, The French in India, p.5. 
225 K.A.1159, 31.1.1670, f.432vo; K.A.1164, 29.9.1670, f.608; K.A.1169, 
19.12.1671, f.l80; K.A.lI75, 19.11.1672, f.396. 
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Ceylon and induced the Golconda authorities to resume the siege while 
the Dutch blockaded all outlets to the sea. The French Viceroy, de la 
Haye, who had gone south with some of his ships, tried to run the 
blockade without success and it was only some weeks later that he 
managed to evade the Dutch men of war and re-enter San Thomé. 
As the Golconda authorities were still lukewarm about continuing the 
war against the French, van Goens left San Thomé in June, 1673. The 
second siege of San Thomé began in September, 1673 when van Goens 
not merely organised a naval blockade but sent a large contingent to help 
the Golconda force besieging the town. The local Muslim officers were 
still reluctant to take part in the campaign and were at times positively 
obsructive. The siege was apparently carried on chieflybecause of the 
insistence of the Dutch. Eventually, it was recognised that the defences 
of the town were too strong for any successful assault and the only hope 
of the besiegers lay in starving out the French. So the siege now took 
the form of a prolonged trial of patience, with occasional skirmishes and 
foraging expeditions by the French. As the supply of food ran short, 
a steady stream of deserters from the French camp came over to the 
Dutch. François Martin, who later founded the French settlement at 
Pondicherry, induced Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapuri govemor of upper 
Gingi, to enter into an agreement for secretly supplying provisions to 
San Thomé. But Dutch threats soon forced the govemor to give up the 
idea. In August, 1674 van Goens retumed to Negapatam with the bulk 
of the fleet, leaving Govemor Pavilioen in charge of the siege. About 
a month later, de Ia Haye, the Viceroy, surrendered San Thomé to the 
Dutch on condition that he and his men would be allowed to sail to 
France on ships lent by the Company. Accordingly, on September 23, 
1674, the French vacated the town and the Dutch and the Golconda 
forces moved in. San Thomé once more passed into the hands of Gol-
conda and Qutb Shah decided to destroy the city, so that it should not 
attract the undesired attention of any European nations in future. The 
Dutch, as mentioned earlier in this volume, were rewarded byexemption 
from all tolls payable at Masulipatam and a grant in perpetuity of the 
township of Palico!. Besides, the victory at San Thomé meant a 
tremendous accession to the Company's prestige. It did not, however, 
lead to the expulsion of the French from Coromandel nor imply any 
basic improvement or alternation in the Dutch position on the coast.226 
226 The siege of San Thomé and thl' Franco-Dutch War in Coromandel" 
1673-74, have been discusscd in grcat detail in several works, - e.g., 
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Kaeppelin's Les Origines de l'lnde Francaise (Pt. I, Ch. V), Castonnet des 
Fosses, L'lnde Française avant Dupleix (pp.101 ff), S. P. Sen, The French 
in India, Chs. VI-X, - on the basis of the French and English lOurces. 
The Dutch archives contain a wealth of material on the subject which corro-
borate in the main the story already known, except that they contain further 
details about the diplomatie background and military operations. While they 
are of importanee to the military historian, such details are irrelevant to the 
general theme of the present work, for the siege of San Thomé was litde 
more than an episode in the history of the Dutch in Coromandel. For the 
Dutch sources see K.A.1181, 13.11.1673, ff.30 ff, 28.6.1673, ff.504ff, 
29.4.1673, f.513vo, 23.11.1673, ff.493vo--502; K.A. 11 82, 11.7.1673, ff.261 
vo--:!64vo; K.A.1188, Resolutions, 23.7.1674 -- 29.7.1674, ff.278-284 and 
letten written from June to September, ff.609-643; Ceylon Government 
Archives, Colombo Records, Journalof the voyage of Rijcklof van Goens 
(No. 3399), ff.725-851; Heeres, 11, pp.505-13. For the French sources, 
Mémoires de François Martin, (Edited by A. Martineau), I, Chs. VI-IX, 
The Travels of the Abbé Carré (translated by Lady Fawcett), Chs. IV-VII 
and letten of François Martin, Bayon and othen, 5.2.1673 to 6.9.1674, in 
the A.rchives Nationales, Paris CII62 (Correpondance générale) , ff.197-
210, 239-243vo. 
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Asian Traders 
The competition of the Indian and other Asian merchants, destined 
to become a source of great worry to the Company, did not present any 
very serious problem initially. Compared to the magnitude of available 
supplies and the markets for the same, the volume of the Company's 
trade and capital resources was somewhat limited at the outset and 
consequently there was little clash of interest between the Dutch and 
Asian traders. And so long as the Company's resources did not increase 
substantially, attempts at monopsonistic con trol were bound to fail. The 
trade between Coromandel and the East Indies, however, was fast 
becoming a monopoly of the Dutch as it had been of the Portuguese 
to a more limited extent for many decades. But occasionally the Dutch 
ships carried small quantities of merchandise to the Indian Archipelago 
onbehalf of the great Coromandel merchants, - some of whom com-
bined offices of state with their trading activities, - and these were 
sold by the Company's agents, the proceeds being paid to the owner 
in merchandise, mainly spices. But such infringernents of the Company's 
monopolistic policy were permitted rather reluctantly and, in fact, 
avoided whenever possible.227 
The regions with which the Coromandel merchants had direct trade 
relations were Pegu, Arakan, Tenasserim and Sumatra in the East and 
Mokha and Mecca in the West.228 With their relatively Iimited capital 
resources and unwillingness to undertake more than they could manage, 
the Dutch considered the lands bordering the east coast of the Bay of 
sornewhat secondary importance. In these countries, the Indian mer-
chants were in a position of advantage, - an advantage they really 
never lost. In contrast to the erratic and half-successful efforts of the 
Dutch, their trade with both Arakan and Burma was steady and suc-
cessful, though limited in range and volume. In the early decades of 
the century, the Dutch feIt the impact of Asian competition in Coro-
mandel rnainly at the time when Indian and Asian ships were loaded 
for voyages abroad. Procuring cloth for the Company was very difficult 
at such times. The Dutch tried to tackle this problem by purchasing 
their return cargo beforehand. Besides, occasionally, in some countries, 
!l2T K.A.968, 30.8.1613, f.164; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, ff.136vo. 
!l28 A letter from Coromandel (Coen, VII, p.l02) mentions the arrival of two 
Chinese junks at Masulipatam from Bantam in 1616. The local governor 
seized them as prize. Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, the 
Hague, suggested to the present writer that these junks probably belonged 
to Chinese settlers in Java. 
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there was discrimination against them in favour of Indians. In 1621, 
for instance, tbe king of Achin allowed pepper to he sold at compara-
tively cheaper rates to the Masulipatam merchants. 
The world of Asian trade was still found wide enough for the Dutch 
and Asian merchants and in Coromandel at least there were no attempts 
as yet at monopsonistic contro!. As to exclusive control on the over-
seas trade, the system of 'passes', a legacy of the era of Portuguese 
domination, requiring Indian ships to take passports from the Dutch 
factories as guarantee against attack by Dutch ships, was already tbere. 
But tbe extent to which the system was generally accepted is uncertain. 
At times passes were refused to merchants or nobles who, as late as 
1628, were in no position to retaliate; but the seizure of a Surat ship 
off Point de Galle for not carrying a pass involved the Company into 
considerable trouble and greater circumspection in future was recom-
mended hy Batavia. On tbe other hand, the Coromandel factors dis-
couraged Coen's idea of making tbe Indians pay toll for the use of 
tbe sea-ways. The eventual exclusion of all Asian shipping from the 
eastem seas, recommended by Coen in 1623, was approved in prin-
ciple hy tbe Seventeen. But cruising against Indian ships carrying 
Portuguese ware was the only practical way in which this poliey was 
implemented in Coromandel. In fact tbe Dutch ships of ten had to 
carry cargo for influential Indians to Batavia despite the repeated 
instructions of the Govemor-General and Council to the contrary. It was 
only in the later decades of tbe century that the Dutch, with increased 
power and an uncompromising policy of monopoly, tried to exclude 
Indian traders from all direct share in overseas trade.229 
By the sixteen thirties, there was a distinct change in the situation. 
Dutch attempts to establish exc1usive control over both tbe buyer's and 
the seller's market for Coromandel ware clashed with tbe Indians' 
eagemess to expand their trading activities. Tbe Company's aims were 
rendered feasible by an increased supply of capita!. The new commercial 
ambition of the Indian merchants was the result of a series of com-
plex and related circumstances: end of Portuguese hegemony, European 
investments increasing tbe capital resources of Indian merchants and 
the example of profitabIe trading by Europeans in various lands witb 
Coromandel ware as their stapIe. Besides Indian merchants from the 
229 Goen, 111, p.74, V, pp.293, 297, 381, VII, pp.356, 423-24, 749, Vlh, 
1179, 1180, 1221-22, 1447, 1457; K.A.994, Goeree and Libenaer to Amster-
dam, 4.10.1624; K.A.996, Ysbrantsz to Amsterdam, 28.4.1625; K.A.999, 
Ysbrantsz to Batavia, 16.10.1625; K.A.I009, 15.12.1629, ff.37-37vo. 
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inland areas of Golconda, Bijapur and Hindustan fIocked as hefore to 
the CoromandeI cIoth-marts and their indiscriminate purchases pushed 
up the price of all textile products. The Company, now keen to con trol 
the local market on advantageous terms, found this highly inconvenient. 
Thanks to the stimulus to CoromandeI's overseas trade provided hy 
European commercial activity the number of Indian ships saiIing from 
the coast to other parts of Asia was steadily on the increase. Profiting 
by the Company's shortage of capital, a problem which had not been 
entireIy solved, the Indian traders purchased cIoth at high prices all 
along the coast for export to Achin, Pegu, Tenasserim, Malay and other 
regions. The trade of one single merchant, the Company's chief supplier 
Chinanna, with Ceylon, Arakan and Pegu was large enough to he 
considered detrimenta! to Dutch interests. 
Particularly thriving was the cIoth trade of the CoromandeI mer-
chants with Siam and Sumatra through the ports of Tenasserim and 
Achin respecively. The prices offered by the Indian merchants in these 
markets were so low that the Dutch could in no way hope to compete 
with them successfully. The kings of Siam and Achin also regularly sent 
their own ships to Coromandel to procure c10th in exchange of the 
wares of their own countries. In consequence, the Company barely 
managed to continue its precarious trade in Siam, while at Achin, in 
view of the overwhelming Asian competition, they decided in 1634 to 
abandon the effort for some years.230 
Tin, one of the commodities which the Dutch hoped to seIl very 
profitably in CoromandeI, was imported in large quantities by the 
Indian and Siamese traders from Siam. This metal could be brought 
to CoromandeI from Malay via Batavia by the sea-route far more 
cheaply than from the inland areas of Siam via Tenasserim. Vet the 
Asian traders, who, being unburdened with heavy establishment costs, 
could afford a small margin of gross profit per unit, successfully under-
cut prices and maintained their hold on the CoromandeI market against 
Dutch competition.231 
The incipient commerce of the Dutch with Persia was also threatened 
by the growing trade of the CoromandeI merchants with that country. 
Mir Kamaluddin (?),232 a Masulipatam merchant with whom the 
230K.A.I019, 25.12.1633, f.39; K.A.I023, 27.12.1634, f.96; K.A.I025, 29.5.1634, 
f.317vo, 25.6.1634, ff.320, 324; K.A.I031, 28.12.1636, ff.61, 186; K.A.768, 
3.4.1641, f.79; K.A.ï69, 9.4.1642, f.132. 
231 K.A.I031, 3.5.1636, f.ll02. 
23'2 This seems to be the most likely Indian fonn of the name mentioned in the 
Dutch records as 'Mircomaldy'. 
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Dutch had extensive trade relations, regularly sent to Persia large 
cargoes of cloth, Bengal sugar as also sappan wood purchased from the 
Dutch themselves. HelpIess against this competition, the Company had 
to content itself with merely stopping the sale of sappan wood to 
Kamaluddin. 233 
Already by the 'thirties, Batavia's avowed policy was to reduce Asian 
competition in the Coromandel trade by exploiting the Company's con-
trol over the sea-routes. Accordingly passes were no longer granted 
gratis to Indian ships and altogether refused whenever possible. Af ter 
the fall of Malacca, ships from Coromandel and elsewhere sailing to 
that port were made to pay to the Company the tolIs previously paid 
to the Portuguese. To facilitate colIection of tolIs, passes were of ten 
granted only for Malacca, ships sailing to the Malay peninsuIa being 
thus forced to caU there. The customary permission granted to Indian 
traders to sail in Dutch ships from Coromandel to Batavia was now 
withdrawn and the practice of lending Dutch sailors and gunners to 
Indian merchants generally discontinued.234 
But such measures were at best a half success. In 1635, Batavia urged 
the authorities at Amsterdam to accept Asian participation in the 
Coromandel trade as an established fact. In 1640, the refusal of passes 
to Bengal and Masulipatam traders, accustomed to sail to Tenasserim 
and the ports of Malay, was also considered inopportune. The Company 
wanted Chinanna to abandon his trade with Pegu in return for a 
contract giving him the sole right to purchase Dutch imports from Pegu 
to Coromandel. But the point was not pressed for fear that Chinanna 
might otherwise go over to the English. The Dutch ships continued to 
carry Indian passengers and cargoes on freight to Persia, Pegu and 
even to Batavia despite strict instructions to the contrary. Refusal to 
help Muslim ships with sailors and gunners was also not always possible 
in practice. In short, the Dutch graduaUy accepted Asian competition 
as a 'habitual plague' and concentrated more on ousting their European 
rivals. 235 
233 K.A.I019, 15.8.1633, fA3; K.A.I022, 15.8.1634, f.30; K.A.I028, 4.1.1636, 
fA2. 
234 K.A.759, Batavia to Coromande1, 28.6.1633; K.A.762, 17.2.1637, ff.124-25; 
. K.A.768, 3.4.1641, ff.78-79; K.A.769, 31.5.1642, f.288, 20.10.1642, f.709; 
K.A.I011, 7.3.1631, f.27; K.A.1019, 15.8.1633, f.21; K.A.I025, 20.9.1634, 
f.326vo. 
235K.A.760, 13.8.1635, fA88; K.A.767, 14.4.1640, f.131; K.A.I017, 20.10.1632, 
f.187; K.A.1028, 4.1.1636, fA2; K.A.I047, 4.10.1642, ff.704-5; van Dam, 
11, ii, p.133 and n. 
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But the 'habitual plague' soon assumed dangerous proportions and 
constituted a serious threat in more than one sector of the south-east 
Asian trade. The increasing participation in this trade of powerful 
officials like Mir Jumla, Khan-i-Khanan and Krishnappa, and the 
acquisition of administrative authority in the Carnatic by merchant-
princes like Chinanna and Koneri Chetti, facilitated by the anarchie 
conditions in the Carnatie, gave a fresh edge to the Company's commer-
cial rivalry with the Indians. In Achin and the 'tin areas' around 
Malacca, as also in Burma and Siam, the Company's trade suffered 
badly from the competition of the Indian merchants, who "were satisfied 
with small profits and were much subtler than the Company's servants 
in the matter of procuring cloth and other merchandise". They glutted 
the markets with all varieties of cloth, evaded the payment of the 
'Malacca toll', whieh was compulsory in the days when the Portuguese 
were in possession of Malacca, and made it impossible for the Company 
to secure the quantity of tin required for its trade in Coromandel and 
elsewhere. The large volume of return cargo brought back by these 
merchants to the coast undermined the demand for the Company's 
wares. The growing tendency on part of the king of Queda and the 
traders of Achin, who were mostly of Indian origin, to send ships to 
Coromandel, despite Batavia's refusal to grant passes, intensified the 
existing problems and the Company's authorities were more and more 
inclined to believe that they could maintain their hold on the south-east 
Asian market only by the use of force. 236 
In 1647, Batavia finally decided on a drastic measure. The factories 
in Coromandel and other places in India were forbidden to give passes 
to any Indian ships for Achin, Malacca, the 'tin quarters' of Perak, 
Queda, Oujang-Salang (Junk Ceylon) etc. and any other places there-
about or further east. All ships sailing to these prohibited regions would 
he seized as legitimate booty.237 
This policy achieved a temporary and very limited success. For a 
year or two, comparatively few Indian ships sailed to the south east. 
But the widespread resentment provoked by the new measures threat-
236 K.A.771, 9.8.1644, f.542, 23.9.1644, f.638; K.A.772, 15.3.1645, ff.128---29, 
133; K.A.774, 27.7.1647, f.378; K.A.I051, 22.12.1643, f.39vo; K.A.1054, 
23.12.1644, f.541vo, 4.5.1644, f.569vo; K.A.I056, 3.6.1643, f.775vo, 
26.9.1643, ff.791vo--92. 
231 These detailed instructions are contained in a letter from Batavia to Coro-
mandel, dated July 27, 1647 (see K.A.774, f.378). But a similar decision 
with regard to Mir Jumla and some others had been taken in the previous 
year (see K.A.I062 (vervolg), 24.8.1646, ff.833vo ff.). 
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ened the very basis of the Company's trade in Coromandel and thus 
neutralised the rather doubtful gains which were expected to follow 
from them. Mir J umla and the Golconda authorities in the north, the 
Tanjore nayak, and, af ter 1649, the representatives of Bijapur on the 
east coast vigorously protested against these restrictions and even threat-
ened reprisals. Contrary to Batavia's expectation, the Indian merchants, 
partieularly powerful nobles like Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Khanan, did 
not pay mueh heed to the Company's prohibitions and, by 1649, began 
to send their ships freely to these forbidden areas. The Indian merehants 
of Negapatam, at times helped by the Portuguese, played a leading role 
in this respect. The Company's prestige suffe red a serious de cline 
through sueh open violation of its orders. Pulicat urged an abandonment 
of Batavia's ineffective poliey as early as 1648, and the Bengal factories 
actually granted passes for the forbidden regions despite Batavia's orders 
to the contrary. In 1651, the Indies Council deeided to withdraw the 
restrietions as far as Achin was concerned beeause of the great hatred 
they had provoked and their general ineffeetiveness. The prohibitory 
orders with regard to Malaeca and places further east were also can-
eelled before long, the ships sailing to those regions being only made to 
pay the 'Malaeea tolI'. Besides, during the war with Macassar, ships 
destined for that kingdom were diverted to Batavia at the Company's 
request. The general poliey henceforward was to grant passes on a 
selective basis, ehiefly to nobles who were too powerful to be alienated. 
Still, the oecasional refusalof passes to influential nobles or traders and 
the collection of the 'Malaeca tolI' led to recurrent troubles. This was 
only to be expeeted, when not only the Bijapur and Golconda nobles, 
but emperor Aurangzeb himself began to send ships to Ceylon and 
South East Asia from the Coromandel ports. Even worse for the Com-
pany was the growing practice of sending ships without Dutch passes 
adopted by some Indian traders, particularly those of Negapatam, who 
now knew by experienee that they could defy the Company with impu-
nity. A poliey which was intended to increase the Company's power and 
improve its finanees thus resulted only in the lowering of its prestige and 
the subversion of its authority. The danger of Asian eompetition now 
assumed a more formidable character.238 
238 K.A.776, 13.8.1649, f.116vo; K.A.778, 16.6.1651, ff.208-9; K.A.782, 
21.7.1654, ff.280 ff, 16.4.1655, f.149; K.A.784, 8.9.1657, f.463; K.A.1066, 
3.3.1648, f.485vo, 5.10.1647, ff.519 ff; K.A.1068, (vervolg), 2.4.1649, f.536; 
K.A.1071, 25.7.1650, f.201; K.A.1072, 10.2.1650, ff.58ff; K.A.lOH, 
24.1.1652, f.15vo; K.A.l094, 2.1.1654, f.416vo; K.A.1100, 24.12.1655, f.78. 
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The price of cloth rose sharply on the coast as a result of this com-
petition and the volume of supply for the Company was also affected. 
The demand for tin went down considerably as the Indians brought 
large quantities from Malacca and the adjacent regions. In the early 
Iseventies, the profits on copper, which were formerly very high, also 
declined because the Indians imported large supplies from Siam, where 
the metal was now brought by Chinese traders in increasing quantities 
from Japan. The trade in Ceylon areca nuts, which had once been very 
promising, was undermined by the Coromandel traders who sent their 
ships to the sources of supply, although this was strictly prohibited. 
The Company's greatest worry, however, was the effect of this grow-
ing Indian overseas trade on the South-East Asian market, particularly 
on the sale of cloth, still the chief medium of exchange for procuring 
spices for Europe. In Siam, Achin, Malacca, Bantam, Java, Japara and 
Macassar the Company's profits on the sale of cloth suffered heavily 
through the import of large quantities of comparatively cheap cloth by 
Indians from the coast. The Indian merchants sold their cloth which 
was of ten of a poor quality at a profit of only about 20 % and took 
back gold and Japanese coubangs on which they made another 15 % 
profit in Coromandel. Unable to trade for such a small margin of gross 
profit per unit, the Company was helpiess against such competitors. At 
times the Indians increased their profits by smuggling out gold which 
was subject to a 10 % toll in the Company's territories. To improve the 
sale of their cloth, the Dutch lowered the price and tried to procure it 
comparatively cheaply from Coromandel. The old technique of building 
up large inventories and releasing them at low prices when the com-
petitors arrived with their supplies was also tried. The coast factors 
further sought in vain to compel groups of handicraftsmen to supply 
cloth exclusively to the Company. Offers of exemption from payment 
for sea-passes were made to Indian merchants on condition they would 
not import painted cloth to Java and Malacca. But eventually, in the 
'seventies, the Dutch were forced to stop the import of some varieties 
of cloth in a desperate effort to boost sales. 
In Coromandel itself, in face of this menacing situation, the Company 
was forced into an over-all retreat from its policy of strength. In the 
early 'sixties, the general policy was not to refuse passes for any pi ace 
as far east as Malacca for it would have been impossible to do so. But 
severe restrictions were imposed on Indian trade with regions further 
east, though frequent exceptions had to he made in favour of powerful 
applicants and, by the 'seventies, the poliey of refusing passes appears 
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to have been thoroughly discredited. The Company encouraged Indians 
to trade with Malacca rather than any other region, for though the 
profits there were affected by Indian imports, the Dutch hoped partially 
to make up for their losses through the collection of the 'Malacca tolls'. 
But the Indians of ten evaded these tolls by successfully smuggling mer-
chandise out of Malacca and the adjacent regions. The necessity for 
sending provisions on freight to Ceylon in Indian ships, owing to short-
age of available shipping space, also forced the Company to allow 
Indians to procure elephants from the island without paying any tolls, 
contrary to the general custom. This policy however had the additional 
advantage of boosting the sale of Ceylon elephants without any expense 
to the Company. 
The custom of taking sea-passes from European nations which had 
been long accepted with little protest by Indian merchants and poten-
tates, came to be challenged in the mid-sixties. The increase in the 
amount charged for the passes granted by the Company, - from 100 
rials to 100 pagodas each, - was only partly responsible for this. The 
wars between the European nations now rendered the system more 
irksome for the Indians than ever before, because passes had to be 
secured from each of the belligerent nations at a given moment. Even 
the Danes, who earned little by honest trade, threatened to seize Indian 
ships unless separate passes were taken from them as weIl. No wonder 
the Indians began "to understand better their right to freedom of 
navigation". As a letter from the Pulicat factory pointed out in 1667, 
the Indians found it increasingly irksome that they dared not send their 
ships from their own ports across the open sea to the coast of friendly 
countries without purchasing passes from the different foreign nations 
whom they had generously allowed to trade in their lands. It was 
reported that in future the Dutch might be denied their freedom of 
trade on the coast if they insisted on the system of passes. 
The final breakdown of the system, in fact, seemed near at hand. 
In 1666, the Qazi of Srikakole sent a ship to TenasserÏm with an English 
pass only, and one of Sayesta Khan's ships sailed from Masulipatam 
with an outdated pass. A Hindu merchant sailed to Malacca without 
any pass at all. The Dutch tried to cope with the situation by relaxing 
the conditions for granting passes and authorising the dependent fac-
tories to issue them, so that it was no longer necessary to apply to Puli-
cat. But such measures did not affect the basic problem which was 
rooted in a far-reaching clash of interests.239 
239 Fot the competition with Indian merchants, 1660-1670, see K.A.789, 
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Fundamentally, the problem of Indian and other Asian competition 
was also linked up with tbe questions of capital resources and the 
ability to trade for a small margin of gross profit. Only it was more 
complicated by the Indians' ability to exert political pressure and their 
traditional acquaintance with the techniques of trade in various parts of 
South-East Asia. The total capital resources of the very large number 
of. Indian merchants who now regularly sent their ships abroad were 
evidently not negligible. Their volume of export was indeed of impres-
sive magnitude. In 1681, 28 ships are reported to have sailed from 
Porto Novo alone for Achin, Queda, Manila, and Bengal with more 
than 12,000 packs of cloth. The policy of refusing passes had become 
thoroughly discredited and the Seventeen's obstinacy on the point merely 
made the Dutch obnoxious to the local rulers. Indian merchants now 
appealed for passes to other European nations or went through a 
pretence of selling their ships, so that Indian ships under European flags 
sailed to all parts of South-East Asia including Bantam.240 The effects 
of this trade in the Coromandel cloth market were similar to those of 
the English competition. In 1685-86, the Dutch failed to procure a 
single piece of cloth at Palicol for nearly a year, because the weavers 
were paid at much higher rates by Indians procuring cargo for Manila. 
Even during the Maratha wars in the South, the Indian merchants 
14.8.1662, f.346; KA.791, 11.4.1664, f,43, 10.7.1664, f.245; KA.792, 
6.4.1665, ff.47-8, 21.10.1665, f.566; K.A.793, 10.6.1666, ff.252 ff, 9.10.1666, 
ff.735vo-36; K.A.794, 29.3.1667, f.124; K.A.797, 30.7.1670, f.432, 
17.10.1670, f.633; K.A.798, 13.11.1671, f.825; K.A.799, 15.7.1672, f.537; 
KA.800, 27.7.1673, f.633; K.A.1120, 16.1.1660, ff.17vo-19; K.A.1121, 
30.6.1659, ff.661v0-62vo; K.A.1122, 26.1.1661, ff.430vo, 433 ff; KA.1123, 
26.9.1660, 31vo; K.A.1128, 26.12.1662, f.218; KA.1152, 24.6.1667. ff.593 ff; 
K.A.1169, 6.9.1671, f.799. 
240 The following figures are available for the number of Indian ships which 
sailed to various parts of Asia from the different Coromandel ports in 
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continued to buy Up all available cloth for Achin and Manilla. 241 A 
letter from Pulicat in 1680 stated with deep regret that the days when 
the Company was the chief buyer of cloth on the coast were gone for 
ever and the Indian merchants purchased the bulk of the available 
supply in many places. Of the 23 ships equipped at Porto Novo that 
year, 16 were owned by Indians. The monopoly of particular varieties 
of cloth formerly enjoyed by the Dutch was now thoroughly undermined, 
because the Indians offered higher prices for all items and of ten pur-
chased from the weavers the very cloth they had undertaken to supply 
to the Company. The growing trade with Manilla, whence Spaniards 
also now frequently visited the coast in quest of cloth, was partly 
responsible for tbis increased demand, and the Company's representatives 
saw no chance of any improvement unless that trade could be stopped.242 
The mass of evidence provided by the factory records proves beyond 
doubt that in the latter half of the 17th century the trade of tbe Coro-
mandel merchants had become one of the major facts in Asian com-
merce. They explored not only the regions directly or indirectly familiar 
to Indian traders, but at least one new field, - the Philippines. In the 
last quarter of the century this expansion of trading activities continued 
steadily in the face of immense problems thrown up by wars, famine and 
pestilence, - a testimony to the resilience of the Indian commercial and 
production organization. Nothing inherent in this proces of expansion 
itself suggests the possibility of an early eclipse. One wonders whether 
further developments, both quantitative and qualitative, might not have 
followed but for the exclusive con trol eventually established by a single 
company of monopolistic merchant capital which reduced independent 
traders to the position of middlemen and financiers. It is, however, to 
be remembered that against the competition of a buoyant joint-stock 
company with vast potentiatities of steadily increasing resources, indivi-
dual merchants, however resourceful or capable, did not have much 
chance. Besides, the Indian merchants had not leamt one important 
lesson: to invest capital in production itself which alone could ade-
quately reduce cost and expand the volume of produce. The European 
companies, on the other hand, were already introducing the manufacture 
system on tbe coast. The relative success of the Indians in their com-
petition witb the Dutch was largely a result of the Company's over-all 
241 K.A.806, 2.5.1679, f.277; K.A.1244, 6.11.1680, ff.379vo-380; K.A.1249, 
25.3.1680, ff.1472voffj K.A.1220, 21.12.1678, f.67voj K.A.1242, 29.4.1681, 
ff.280 ff, 285 ff; K.A.1307, 13.12.1686, f291 j K.A.1355, 26.3.1691, f.393. 
242 K.A.I244, 6.11.1680, ff.379vo-381; K.A.1258, 24.7.1681, f.1466vo. 
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decline and an inefficient organisation. Against the English, with their 
new ascendancy in world commerce, there was hardly any possibility in 
the long run of such success in trade rivalry. 
Verh. dl. 38 9 
CHAPTER VII 
TUE EXPORT mADE: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS 
The story of the Jan Company in Coromandel is essentially one of 
expanding capital investments for procuring cargo for the markets in 
Asia and Europe until they were gradually ousted from this lucrative 
commerce. Their trade and its impact acquired significance in propor-
tion to the magnitude of these investments. 
The capital available for purpose of investment was, however, limited 
particularly in the earliest years of the Company's trade in Coromandel. 
Plans of expansion had to he shelved in consequence, even the mainte-
nance of two factories being considered by some an impermissible luxury. 
The facts that precious metals were practically the only imports from 
Europe acceptable on the coast and the Dutch had not yet begun to 
trade extensively in Asian products in demand there were partly res-
ponsible for the situation. Compared to the limited resources of the 
Company, the available supply of cloth was almost unlimited. In 1610, 
chief factor Marcelis reported from Pulicat that he could easily invest 
there ten times the capital at his disposal. Again, in 1615, de Haze 
pointed out that Masulipatam and Pulicat alone could consume three 
times the capital annually imported to Coromandel. The problem be-
came so serious in 1614 that the weavers and painters employed by the 
Company at Pulicat had to he kept on half pay owing to a shortage 
of cash. There was a slight change in the situation, though not in a 
very desirabie way, when the civil war hindered the supply of cloth at 
Pulicat and consequently part of the capital set aside for the cloth trade 
remained idle.243 
The supply of capital was however gradually on the increase. In 1608, 
Coromandel was provided with a cash capital of 22,000 rials, while in 
1610 the yacht Hasewindt brought 42,000 rials to the coast. In 1612, 
243 K.A.967, P. Willemsz from Arakan, 6.3.1608, L. Ysaacx's 'Memorye' etc., 
Marcelis and Fontaine to van Wesick, 8.10.1610, Bourgonje to Ysaacx. 
6.2.1609; K.A.969. 16.8.1614, ff.129, 130vo. 134vo; K.A.971, "Consideratien 
etc .... 15.7.1615. ff.62-62vo; K.A.973, 29.3.1616, f.175vo. 
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the capital imported was worth at least 87,847 florins. But still the 
supply feIl far short of the annual requirement which, according to van 
Berchem's estimate, was somewhere around 400,000 rials.244 The impli-
cation of such estimates is not very clear. They may indicate simply 
the scope for investment or the amount required for the purchases 
ordered or even the capital needed to control the buyer's market. 1t is 
even possible, though not very likely, that the constant complaint re-
garding the inadequacy of capital was only an excuse for the coast 
factors' failure to implement the export policies laid down by the higher 
authorities. 
The problem of inadequate capital was accentuated by the poor 
demand for the Company's wares. If the quantity of merchandise im-
ported by the Dutch to Coromandel was very limited, the market for 
them was even more so. As bullion and cash specie were the only items 
for which there was any steady demand and their supply was strictly 
limited, the Company was left with little means to supplement its 
insufficient resources. To make matters worse, the Dutch, through their 
inexperience, at times imported merchandise for which there was no 
demand and consequently for months part of their capital remained 
idle.245 
With the expansion of the Asian trade, the coast factories' capital 
requirements were also steadily on the increase. In 1616, the Coromandel 
factories required capital worth 32,000 to 40,000 rials [1 rial = 2~ 
5 
florins] every year. By 1626, 400,000 florins were needed only to buy 
cloth for the 1ndies and only a much larger capital would cover all the 
other necessary purchases for the markets in Asia and Europe. Some 
180,000 to 200,000 florins of this total requirement could be supplied 
through import of spices, and a variety of minor imports supplemented 
it to a small extent. The remaining gap had to be filled chiefly with 
coins and precious metals. Japan was a potential source for the supply 
of silver; but it could be procured thence chiefly in exchange of Chinese 
ware and trade with the mainland of China had not been opened yet. 
Bulk of the Japanese silver procured at the time had to he invested in 
Formosa, where the Dutch factory suffered from chronic shortage of 
244K.A.967, Ysaacx and van Wesick to Verhoeff, 14.11.1608; Ysaacx to l'Her-
mite, 12.11.1618, Bourgonje to Ysaacx, 6.2.1609, Bantam Council to van 
Wesick, 13.12.1610; K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff.143, 150, 156vo, 162vo. 
245 K.A.967, l'Hennite's "Memorie", Bantam, 15.10.1609, Bourgonje and Marcelis 
to Ysaacx, 3.3.1610. 
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capita!. The China trade, once opened, was also expected to supply large 
quantities of much needed gold for Coromandel. Thus the requirements 
of the coast trade stimulated Dutch efforts in the Far East. Meanwhile, 
the Coromandel factories had to depend largelyon supplies from 
Holland, which were far from adequate.246 
During 1630-34, the famine in Deccan, - an exceptional but re-
current phenomenon which was of ten a decisive factor in the economic 
life of the region, - created an unusual problem for the Company: 
even its limited capital could not be fully invested owing to lack of 
supplies, for both agricultural and industrial production had been 
temporarily dislocated. Wars in the south, quarreis between Chinanna 
and his cousins and occasional heavy rains continued to ham per supplies 
even af ter 1634. But in this later period, until 1641, the basic problem 
once more was not of limited supply, but of inadequate capital. The 
requirements of the growing spice trade in the Indies implied an in-
creasing demand for Coromandel textiles, but Batavia had no funds 
to cope with pressing necessity and a larger supply of cash capital 
from Holland was not to be expected. In the Far East, the profits in 
Japan were admittedly on the increase, but still had to be invested 
almost entirely in Formosa. In 1639, when the expected supply of 
Chinese gold did not reach Batavia, the supply of capital to Coromandel 
had to be reduced to such an extent that the volume of return cargo 
declined dangerously. 
To side-track the problem of limited cash capital, the Company tried 
to boost the sale of its merchandise by providing the coast with large 
inventories and drastically reducing prices. But the Coromandel markets, 
with their limited demand for imports, reacted feebly to such blandish-
ments. 
As a last resort, Batavia sanctioned in 1637 the policy of raising short 
term loans on the coast, though the rates of interest were as high as 
24 % to 36 % a year. By 1639-40, the Company was burdened with 
a loan of 75,000 pagodas and paid more than 52,000 florins as interest 
in a single year. The local credit supply, which was by no means 
unlimited, was pactically closed to the Dutch when Batavia ordered 
in 1641 that no loans should be incurred at more than 12 % per annum. 
But assistance from the Far East came to the rescue of the Coromandel 
factories at this juncture and they could send a large return cargo in 
1642 despite very adverse conditions.247 
246 Coen, VII, p.99; K.A.1001, 27.6.1626, ff.81 ff. 
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The income of the Coromandel government was augmented to some 
extent in this period by a further development of the freight trade. Both 
passengers and goods were now regularly carried in the Company's ships 
to and from Persia, Pegu and Bengal. The freight trade between Persia 
and Bengal was particularly paying and it made up to some extent 
for the losses on Persian coins.248 
By the mid-forties, however, there was a distinct improvement in the 
situation. Closer trade relations with various regions and the Company's 
growing trade in the Far East provided the Coromandel factories with 
a supply of capital much larger than before and thus made possible a 
spectacular increase in the volume of Dutch trade with the coast. 249 
It was now the avowed object of Batavia to provide adequate capital 
for the Coromandel trade, "one of the chief pillars" of the Company's 
commerce, from one source or another. The Dutch could now invest in 
Formosa the increasing profits from their ]apanese trade and thus, in 
turn, secure enough Chinese gold for Coromandel. Malacca and Persia 
247 For the problem of limited capital and measures taken to solve it see 
K.A.I031, 15.8.1633, f.19; K.A.I034, 9.12.1637, f.168; K.A.I036, 22.12.1638, 
ff.169vo-I70, 171vo; K.A.I039, 18.12.1639, ff.75vo-77, 78vo, 30.7.1639, 
f.l091; K.A.I041, 8.1.1640, f.8; K.A.I043, 8.1.1641, f.20vo, 9.9.1640, f.240vo; 
K.A.I044, 12.12.1641, f.76, K.A.1048, 12.12.1642, f.57vo. 
248 K.A.I060, "Verhael etc.," f.232; K.A.I066, 5.10.1647, f.516vo, 25.5.1648, 
f.560vo; K.A.1068, 31.12.1648, f.61; K.A.I071, 9.7.1650, f.196. 
249 The following data are available regarding the value (in norins) of the 
capital exported to Coromandel from various regions during 1643-58. 
Though not exhaustive, they give an approximate idea of the increase in 
the volume of capital supply, as compared to previous periods. The statistics 
are taken from the sections on Coromandel in the Generale Missiven: 
Year Batavia 
1643 712,300 
Form08a Malacca PeT8ia 
292,710 
1644 975,744 600,000 
1645 801.681 823,560 
1646 407,715 1062,913 81,470 384,569 
1647 421,605 883,898 7,984 538,048 
1648 125,513 915,055 28,302 -192,569 
1649 782.646 1713,857 24,221 
1650 1220,751 813,603 18,642 
1651 445,785 810,438 
1652 638,410 788,721 27,502 
1653 725,327 
1654 373,539 1481,468 781,107 309,305 
1655 809.431 1140,347 




















1657 373,475 944,375 
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and, to alesser extent, Ceylon, also helped to augment the supplies to 
the coast. In case of necessity, part of the capital sent to Surat was 
subsequently diverted to Coromandel, chiefly in the form of bills of 
exchange. The available statistics indicate that af ter 1643 the tota! 
capital supply per annum was roughly between 1,500,000 and 2,500,000 
florins, which compares very favourably even with the figures for 
1641-42, when the first effective supplies from the Far East reached 
the coast. 
Still, in a way, the capital provided was not adequate for the growing 
needs of the Coromandel factories. It was estimated in 1644 that about 
3,000,000 florins a year were required to procure the return cargo for 
Asia besides another 600,000 to 700,000 for the cargo to Europe. Though 
the Company's credit on the coast was very high at this time and loans 
at 12 % interest could be secured without much difficulty,250 Batavia 
was genera!ly against the policy of raising loans and there was a con-
sequent shortage of cash until 1646. The statement which frequently 
occurs in the documents of the later years, - that the coast was pro-
vided with adequate capital, - may have two a!ternative implications: 
either the estimate made in 1644 of the capita! required for the coast 
trade was exaggerated or the market for the Company's exports from 
Coromandel had declined subsequently. In view of the growing com-
petition of Indian and other Asian traders one is inclined to believe that 
the latter is a more likely explanation.251 
The profits on the sale of the Company's wares showed a certain 
improvement in the sixties and thus further eased the problem of 
capita! supply. This was mainly because gold once more sold at a 
profit in Coromandel af ter several years of depressed demand. The 
Negapatam factory, however, had to be maintained at aloss, for during 
200 This, incidentally, was a great improvcment on the situation prevailing as 
late as 1641, when no loan was available at 12 % interest. Since there was 
no slackening of demand, the change t)bviou~ly indicates a greater supply 
of capital in response to the expanding market. 
251 K.A.I051, 22.12.1643, ff.36 ff; K.A.1054, 23.12.1644, f.99; K.A.1056, 
11.6.1643, ff.778 ff; K.A.I062, 15.1.1647, ff.8, llvo. The value (in florins) 
of the cargo annually required from Coromandel for different regions 
according to a detailed estimate, dated 1652, is as follows 
Indian 
Holland Archipelago Malacca Oeylon Persia Mala oor Total 
798,400 1,424,900 190,000 80,700 100,000 30,000 2,624.000 
see K.A.1079, ff.256-7. Thus, in a good year, by ad ding to the supplies 
received around this time the profits made on the coast the Coromandel 
factories would have enough capital to provide for the return cargo. 
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the famine in Tanjore and even afterwards, very little merchandise 
could be sold at the place. The net loss shown in the accounts of the 
Coromandel factories in 1661-62 and 1672-73 resulted from this 
heavy burden.252 The advantages otherwise gained were neutralised 
to a certain extent by this form of uneconomic expenditure. 
The sale of Dutch imports as weIl as the procurement of return cargo 
in the Golconda kingdom were hindered by an unusual problem which 
was first encountered in the 'forties. The royal order that in Golconda 
territory all dues to the government must be paid in old pagodas, -
coins minted 50 to 60 years back, - was enforced with increasing strict-
ness. The total volume of these coins, which were of varying quality and 
generally inferior to the current pagodas in intrinsic value, was not 
very large. In consequence, the entire available supply went into the 
royal treasury in course of a year or two and were then re-issued to the 
open market through money-changers and the price of the old coins in 
relation to the new rose every time the process was repeated. The ratio 
in 1659 was 125 new pagodas to 100 old; in 1669, it was as high as 200 
to 100. In effect, this amounted to an exorbitant form of indirect 
taxation. At Masulipatam and Golconda, all major transactions were 
now carried on with old pagodas; or rather, the commodities were valued 
in old pagodas, payments being made in current coins on the basis of the 
ratio prevalent at the time. As Cornelis Speelman pointed out in 1667, 
the new pagodas were really the legal tender, while the old coins were 
a commodity monopolised by the king, who forced his subjects to 
purchase it. The net results were a general rise in the price level and 
a decline in demand for all inessential commodities, -- the usual 
reaetions to exorbitant taxation. 
The Company was affected by the situation in several ways. The sale 
of its imports suffered a decline and higher prices had to be paid for its 
purchases. Besides, the amount payable for the lease of Palicol (4000 
old pagodas) as weIl as the custom duties at Masulipatam had in effect 
been nearly doubled by 1659. In order to adjust its policy to the changed 
circumstances, the Company decided to take a more realistic view of 
the ratio between new pagodas and stuivers. Formerly a pagoda was 
valued at 84 stuivers in the Company's accounts; the exchange rate of 
the pagoda was raised to 96 stuivers in 1664 and to 105 stuivers in 
1666. Secondly, the Company entered into an agreement with the sup-
252 See jrJfra, Appendix B, and the discussion on the price or" bullion in Cora-
mandel in Chapter IX below. 
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pliers that whatever the market rate of the old pagoda, they would 
accept a certain ratio for a specified period, so that the Company would 
not suffer from the consequences of sudden price fluctuations. In other 
words, though the commodities supplied to the Company would he 
valued in old pagodas, payments would be made in current coins on the 
basis of a ratio already agreed upon. The ratio was thus fixed at 125 
new for 100 old pagodas until 1668, when it was raised to 137Y2 new 
for 100 old. But this did not really solve any problem, for whenever 
the middlemen feared any losses owing to the difference between the 
market rate of old pagodas and the ratio accepted by them, they charged 
the difference on the price of the commodities supplied. 
The Company tried to circumvent the problem by concentrating on 
areas outside Golconda proper, where the order regarding payments to 
government in old pagodas was not operative and hence market con-
ditions were normal. Besides, it was helped by the fact that the weavers 
and painters accepted payment in nevels, small coins the value of which 
had suffered comparatively little from the rise in the price of old 
pagodas. To improve the sale of its wares, the Company decided to 
accept payment in silver and silver rupees, the price of which was 
steadily declining throughout Coromandel; the silver thus acquired was 
exported to Bengal, where it was in good demand. But while the Dutch 
succeeded in maintaining a high level of procurement through con-
tacting the actual manufacturers and paying increased prices, even the 
decision to accept payment in silver helped little to improve sales, be-
cause it did not affect the general demand for commodities.253 An 
unusual policy of exploitation thus had the indirect result of accen-
tuating the Company's problem of capital supply. But the increasing 
profits of the Far Eastern trade enabled the Dutch to keep their head 
above water in Coromandel. 
The problem again became really serious when wars in China drasti-
cally reduced the Company's profits in Formosa. Attempts were made 
to fill the gap with increased supplies from Holland and Persia and 
occasionally by diverting part of the capital sent to Surat through bills 
of exchange payable in Golconda. Gold procured from Tonkin also 
helped to ease the situation. Still, by the mid-'sixties the shortage of 
capital reached dangerous proportions. For the wars in Europe severely 
253 K.A.791, 21.7.1664, f.262; K.A.795, 20.4.1668, f. 176; K.A.1l20, 6.1.1660, 
f.20; K.A.1l36, 15.12.1664, f.398vo; K.A.1l46, 25.1.1667, f.192; K.A.1l52, 
6.12.1667, ff.149 ff; 14.10.1667, ff.616 ff; K.A.1l56, 7.11.1668, f.497; 
K.A.1I60, 28.6.1669, f.469vo; K.A.1l64, 24.6.1670, f.584. 
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reduced the supplies from Holland and the profits in Persia suffered a 
set-back because enough cloth could not be exported from the Coast 
owing to the inadequacy of funds. Tonkin could provide only a limited 
quantity of gold. On the other hand, the demands for return cargo 
increased steadily as the Company imposed an embargo on the export 
of cloth by Malabar and Madura merchants to Ceylon and the con-
sequent vacuum had to he WIed by the Company's own supplies. Besides, 
the coast was occasionally required to make up the deficits in the 
capital provided for Bengal. As a last resort, raising loans at 12 % 
interest per annum was sanctioned. But this was no longer an easy 
matter and by 1666 "not a pagoda was available on loan," a situation 
which was partly a result of the Golconda government's policy regarding 
pagodas. The supplies to Holland and Persia, as also to Ceylon and the 
Indies, had to he reduced considerably in consequence. In the late 'six-
ties, the Company opened negotiations for trade with the Chinese main-
land, but secured nothing more than the right to send a ship to the 
Chinese coast once every eight years. The permission granted in 1668 
for the export of an unlimited quantity of coubangs from Japan, how-
ever, afforded some relief and for a year or two the full orders for 
return cargoes were supplied by the Coromandel factories. But this 
improvement was very short-lived, because the European wars once 
more affected supply of capital from Holland so severely that in 1673 
Batavia was forced to use up a large proportion of the coubangs meant 
for the coast. In 1674, a monopoly established by the governor of 
Nagasaki further resulted in reduced supplies from Japan and Coro-
mandel had to be supported by loans from Ceylon and bills of exchange 
from Bengal, while the total debt to the local middlemen amounted to 
1,727,168 florins. 254 In the last quarter of the century, the problem of 
inadequate capital supply ceased to be a headache because of the 
general decline in Dutch commerce and the consequent loss of market 
for the Company's exports from Coromandel.255 
Though subject to short-term fluctuations, the long-term trend in 
the Coromandel factories' export trade was steadily upward until the 
last quarter of the century. Though the data are not adequate for 
precise quantification, the information available is enough to authorise 
this conclusion. In the context of the vast market, the increasing volume 
of capital investment and the Company's relative success in holding its 
254 See page 142. 
255 See in/ra, Chapter VIII. 
138 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
own against its competitors, - partly a result of the former phenome-
non, - were the ehief factors which determined the trend. For the 
earliest years, the quantitative data, though inadequate, are not without 
significance. The yacht Delft brought back from Coromandel in 1606 
altogether 500 packs of cargo, including 122 packs of cloth, 200 Ibs 
of steel and some riee and lentils. In 1607-1608, the exports from 
Coromandel included 250 packs of cloth and 2,413 pagodas worth of 
rubies and the total value of the return cargo was at least 19,761 
pagodas. The return cargo in 1610 consisted of 331 packs of cloth, 24 
packs of cotton yam and 72 packs of indigo, while in 1612-13 the 
Coromandel factories exported 869 packs of cloth, 3 pots of butter and 
3 candis (1 candi = 480 Ibs) of iron nails for the eastern trade and 
595 packs of cloth and indigo for Holland, the tota) cargo costing about 
254 The data available in the 'Generale Missiven' regarding capital supply from 
different regions to Coromandel, 1659-74, are as follows (in florins) . 




















































AllO see KA.789, 25.7.1662, f.292, 22.9.1662, f.522; K.A.796, 26.5.1669, 
f.429; KA.1120, 16.1.1660, f.23vo; KA.1l22, 16.12.1660, ff.72vo, 74vo; 
K.A.1123, 24.3.1660, f.15; KA.1136, 4.8.1664, f.263; KA.1142, 30.1.1666, 
f.188vo, 6.11.1665, f.1408; K.A.1146, 25.1.1667, f.201, 27.1.1666, f.841; 
KA. 1159, 15.12.1669, f.433; K.A.1169, 19.12.1671, f.176; K.A.1181, 
13.11.1673, ff.26 ff; KA.l187, 31.1.1675, f.331, 19.1.1675, f.247. 
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102,961 pagodas.256 A steady increase in the volume of exports is thus 
indicated. 
Even in the 'twenties, full trade statistics are available only for one 
or two years. But if the total capital worth 638,000 florins imported in 
1628 is any indication of the average annual investment, the volume 
of trade continued to increase despite very adverse conditions. The 
total value of the return cargo was 693,337 florins in 1625 and 717,355 
florins in 1628. Compared with the export figures for 1612-13, - viz., 
360,500 florins - this indicates an increase of about 91 % to 95 %. It 
is significant that the troubles of 1628-29 apparently did not affect 
the volume of export, though the profits on the sale of merchandise that 
year were comparatively very low.257 
The spectacular expansion of Dutch trade from Coromandel to other 
regions round the Bay and the establishment of doser trade-links be-
tween the coast factories and their sister establishments in other parts 
of Asia in the 'thirties can best be explained with reference to the Com-
pany's "indisputable supremacy in the Eastern trade" . "In the Malay 
Archipelago they were easily the first, and, but for the fact that Bantam, 
Achin, Jambi and Macassar still remained free ports, they would have 
completely monopolised the commerce of those regions".258 In Japan, 
they were the only Europeans and the opening of the China trade 
seemed to be a possibility in the near future. Their enormous capital 
resources and control over the supply of spices and other wares of South 
East and East Asia gave them a position of advantage over their rivals 
and considerable staying power in the face of great difficulties. 
The magnitude of increase in the volume of exports was however not 
very impressive until 1641.259 This was necessarily so, for until the Far 
Eastern trade began to pay sizeable dividends, the Company's capital 
resources in Asia, and consequently its investments on the coast, did not 
increase substantially. True, in 1635, the Company shipped a compara-
256 K.A.967, Ysaacx to de Bitter, 30.10.1608, L. Ysaacx's 'Infonnatie', 1608 
van Wesick to Bantam, 15.6.1610; K.A.968, 30.8.1613, f.162vo; Begin en de 
Voortgang, 11, van der Hagen's voyage, p.69. 
257 For the available statistical data, which are far from exhaustive, see Coen, I, 
pp.282, 290-91, 515-16, 587, 671, 759, IV, p.409, V, pp.27, 382, 384, 
580, VII, pp.208, 476, VII2, pp.985, 1062, 1175, 1180, 1221, 1332, 1342, 
1365, 1448, 1512; K.A.994, 27.1.1625, ff.135vo, 136; D.R., 1624-29, 
pp.99, 181, 197, 221, 239, 305, 324, 335. 340, 341, 360, 362; also in/ra 
Appendix B. 
258 E.F.I., 1630-33, pp.xxxvii-xxxviii. 
259 See page 144. 
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tively larger capital of 982,398 florins to the coast; but this was an 
exceptional measure intended to support the new venture in Bengal. In 
1641, for the first time, a ship went directly from Formosa to Coro-
mandel carrying, in the main, supplies of Chinese gold. This new 
development explains the enormous increase in the volume of capital 
supply to the coast 1641 onwards. The profits of the Far Eastem trade 
also stimulated the Company's trade in the Archipelago and thus con-
tributed to an increase in the supply of capital from Batavia as weIl. 
The increase in the volume of return cargo from 1640 is to be attributed 
partly to the larger capital, and partly to the opening of new sources 
of supply in Bengal and Burma, the cargo thence being shown as a part 
of the coast cargo, so long as the Bengal and Pegu factories remained 
under the control of the Coromandel "government". 
The upward trend achieved by the early 'forties was maintained 








































The available figures for the return cargo in 1634 are probably not exchaus-
tive. See K.A.I0ll, 7.3.1631, ff.25-25vo; K.A.I016, 1.2.1632, ff.23, 80; 
K.A.I019, 25.12.1633, ff.36-37vo, 15.8.1634, f.34; K.A.I023, 15.8.1634, 
f.99; K.A.I028, 4.1.1636, fA5; K.A.1031, 28.12.1636, ff.54-6, 69; K.A.I034, 
9.12.1637, ff.165-7, 180; K.A.1036, 22.12.1638, f.169, 181vo; K.A.1039, 
18.12.1639, ff.76 ff, K.A.I043, 8.1.1641, ff.22 ff, 9.9.1640, f.240vo; K.A.I044, 
12.12.1641, ff.76, 78; K.A.1047, "Verhael etc.", f.422; K.A.I048, 12.12.1642, 
ff.58vo, 61-61vo. 
For the estima.te of annual profits and expenses, see intra, Appendix B. 
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during the years which followed, despite the severe effects of the politi-
cal disturbances on the economie life of the region. 260 
During 1645 to 1652, - years for which comparatively detailed 
statistics are available, - the value of the return cargo varied roughly 
between 1,500,000 and 2,300,000 florins. Compared to 1640 and 1641, 
these figures indicate over 50 % to 120 % increase in volume and the 
increase was much greater compared to the 'thirties. This development 
is to be partly eXplained by the larger supplies now available from 
Bengal and the newly established factories in Tanjore and Madura. 
Besides, industrial production along the coast gradually adjusted itself 
to the conditions of insecurity despite severe set-backs and could respond 
to an increased demand, which offered means of livelihood to a larger 
number of handicraftsmen affected by war and famine. A concentration 
of industrial producers around the een tres of export definitely appears 
to have taken place around this time. In fact the economie effects of 
the wars, so far as the Company was concerned, were felt much more 
in connection with the sale of imported wares than with regard to the 
procuring of return cargo.261 
In the 'sixties and early 'seventies, shortage of capital was repeatedly 
2110 The cargo exported to Batavia and Malacca included supplies meant for 
different parts of South East Asia and the Far East. The exports to Malabar 
mainly consisted of opium from Bengal, besides some cash capital originally 
received from other sources. The imports to Bengal 1657 onwards were 
mostly silver and silver coins received from Japan and Persia. 
The Generale Missiven provide the following data regarding the value 
(in florins ) of the cargo exported from Coromande1 to various regions during 
1643-58. 






















1656 968,945 118,446 
1657 1,267,688 52.055 












261 K.A.1058, 17.12.1645. ff.36 ff. 
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cited by the coast factors as their major handicap in the export trade. 
The volume of return cargo per annum on an average, however, does 
not appear to have suffered any noticeable decline as compared with 
the preceding decade. 262 So the shortage of capital really implied a 
failure to cope with the needs of an expanding market or rather to 
retain control over the market against increasingly severe competition. 
The Company could hope to oust its rivals from the South-East Asian 
market only by buying up the bulk of the available supply sa that even 
price-cutting in the sellers' market could affect only a fraction of the 
total demand. The repeated complaints about the inadequacy of capital 
can best be understood in this context. 
By the mid-seventies, however, the competition of the Asian mer-
chants and the European companies began to affect seriously the Jan 
Company's trade in Coromandel ware, particularly textiles. Despite the 
Company's failure to run the cloth trade on a sufficiently profitable 
basis, the volume of export from the coast was maintained on a high 
level till 1687, af ter which year the Seventeen and Batavia decided to 
cut their losses.263 In the early 'eighties, in a desperate effort to capture 
the market, the export of cloth was artifically boosted as far as possible 
in the belief that the maintenance of large inventories would eventually 
secure some definite advantage over the rivals in trade. Later, when 
such measures proved to be futile, the annual exports were reduced to 
an absolute minimum so that no inventory would be carried over from 
262 The 'Generale Missiven' provide the following data regarding the value 
(in florins) of the cargo exported from Coromandel to various regions 
during 1659-74: 
Year Batavia Malacca Persia CeyZon BengaZ Peg", TotaZ 
1659 1,213,147 73,546 157,598 194,616 41,426 
1660 1,358,533 1,019,722 
1661 935,634 60,675 
1662 973,291 40,984 10,100 
1663 682,052 150,396 40,000 
1661 1,997,058 71,514 13,160 426,536 62,206 2,508,270 
1665 2,190,928 109,013 154,909 44,779 181,378 2,839,361 
1666 2,394,228 121,457 63,341 75,000 2,564,026 
1667 1,940,961 125,455 116,529 145,787 
1668 1,686,784 168,701 153,331 86,564 24,751 1,421,049 
1669 2,128,986 146,418 145,067 651,545 
1670 
1671 1,579,062 75,045 135,853 
1672 1,936,201 59,738 125,172 178,888 2,300,000 
1673 1,181,455 300,000 14,450 
1674 1,371,338 197,206 
263 See page 147. 
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one year to another. The Company's set-back in the cloth market was 
not compensated by the growth of demand for any other commodity. 
No new items were added to the list of exports. The large numher of 
slaves procured during the famine of 1686-87 was an exceptional 
phenomenon hardly adequate for filling the gap created by the loss of 
the main export market. The continued complaints regarding the short-
age of capital during these years can have but one meaning. The coast 
factors found it nearly impossible, in the face of strong competition, to 
procure the return cargo unIess they had enough capital to recapture 
the buyer's market by outbidding their rivals and buying up a very 
substantial portion, if not the bulk, of the available supply. By the late 
'eighties, the attempt to meet the demand of the coast factors had to he 
given up. The loss of control over the seIler's market necessarily entailed 
an abandonment of the buyer's market as weIl. The field was now open 
to the English East India Company. Their European rivals, provided 
with litde capital, were no match for them. As to the Indian merchants, 
whatever the potential strength of their collective capital resources, in 
the absence of adequate organisation to pool these, they too stood no 
chance in any competition with the John Company. The way to monop-
sonistic control on the coast market, with all its implication for pro-
duction and distribution, was thus prepared. 
The machinery for the procurement of the Company's return cargo 
and the changes in its structure over a period of time are significant 
as characteristic features of the 17th century commercial organisation 
and also by virtue of their impact on the economy of the region. By 
263 The value (in nonns) of the annual export from Coromandel during 1675---
90, as given in the "Generale Missiven": 
Year Batavia Malacca Persia Oeylon Bengal PegK Total 
1675 1,403,416 109,199 20,766 
1676 1,453,954 133,267 116,037 64,169 16,657 
1677 517,006 114,334 
1678 1,732,647 
1679 1,153,195 388,013 
1680 2,066,631 136,876 80,918 35,516 2,284,425 
1683 2,725,672 116,321 21,794 




1688 110,868( ?) 
1689 566,505 
1690 699,548( ?) 
Also see, intra, Chapter VIII. 
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1616, th·J machinery had been organised on a stabIe basis. For the 
bulk of their trade, the Dutch had to depend on the local merchant-
middlemen. In the Golconda kingdom, the Persian and other Muslim 
merchants acted as the Company's middlemen and procured the re-
quired cargo from the Komatis and the actual manufacturen while in 
the south, the Dutch dealt with the Chetti and Komati traders. Money 
and merchandise were advanced to the middlemen some four to six 
months before the time when the commodities were to be delivered. 
For procuring the main item of the return cargo, cloth, the middlemen 
in their turn advanced some money to the weavers and 'painters' cover-
ing the cost of materials and, for the rest, paid them daily wages. In 
other words, a substantial part of the Company's cargo was secured 
through an advanced form of the putting out system. The daily wage 
system for bulk of the supply appears to have been an innovation in the 
economy of the region. The Company provided the merchants with 
samples of required cloth sent hy the authorities at Bantam and both 
parties agreed upon a price at the time when the contract was made. 
Failing this, the Company might he supplied with inferior cloth which 
it would be forced to accept for want of any hetter. At Pulicat, the 
merchants had to be paid mainly in cash, while the Masulipatam traders 
were ready to accept a large part of their dues in merchandise. Masuli-
patam's close trade links with Golconda, which with its court and 
nobility provided a good market for imported luxuries, probably 
explains this difference in commercial behaviour. But in Golconda itself 
cash payments were essential for procuring indigo and cotton yam, 
partly because these were of ten purchased directly from the producers 
by the Company's employees sent inland for the purpose. 
In theory, the Company's right to contact freely all brokers and 
merchants was guaranteed by royal farmans both in Golconda and the 
Carnatic kingdom. But in actual practice, whenever the local officials 
and nobles in Golconda wanted to profit directly by the Company's 
trade, the Dutch were forced to deal with them to the exclusion of 
other merchants. At Petapuli, in particular, the most important lines 
of trade were a monopoly of the local governor and dealings with other 
merchants also were subject to his approva1.264 As described above, 
monopolies of powerful nobles were a persistent feature of the coast 
trade. 
2114 K.A.967, L. Ysaacx's "Informatie"; K.A.971, Hans de Haze, "Consideratien 
etc.," ff.64, 67; Begin ende Voortgang. 11, van der Hagen's voyage, p.66; 
Heeres, I, pp.45-6. 
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Part of the Company's return cargo, as already mentioned, was 
procured directly from the manufacturers and even produced under its 
supervision. The farman granted by the king of Golconda in 1606 
guaranteed that tbe weavers, dyers, and other people in the employ of 
the Company would be allowed to work undisturbed and many of the 
later contracts between the Dutch and the lndian powers contained 
similar guarantees. As early as February, 1608, the weavers of some 
unspecified village in the Golconda kingdom, who were unable to pay 
their taxes to the governor, received the required sum from the Dutch, 
"for which, however, they were obliged to work". Later, a large part 
of the clotb procured at Tierepopelier were actually manufactured at 
the Company's factoJ'}', where thirty 'painters' were employed for the 
purpose. At Pulicat, the Dutch constructed a building where two or 
three hundred 'painters' worked for the Company. It appears, however, 
that all the processes involved in the manufacture of pintadoes were not 
undertaken in these factories, but only tbe partly finished products were 
brought there to be painted by the expert craftsmen in the employ of 
the Company. But at Masulipatam, the Dutch also employed a number 
of weavers and dyers for manufacturing plain cloth.265 Thus already 
by the second decade of the century, the manufacture system had been 
introduced in the coast under the Company's auspices, though quantita-
tively on a very limited scale. 
The techniques of trade adopted by the Dutch in Coromandel con-
formed, in all essentials, to those already prevalent in the region. The 
Company had, however, introduced two new elements into the familiar 
pattern. While the Asian and Portuguese merchants continued to buy 
from the manufacturers the best they could get at any given time, the 
Dutch, forced as they were to trade for a high margin of gross profits per 
unit, insisted on the supplies conforming to samples, and thus introduced 
the idea of specific standardization which was apparently a novelty in 
this region. Secondly, the rudimentary organisation for comparatively 
large-scale production in the Dutch factories, - the actual investment of 
capital in production controlled by merchant capitalists, - foreshad-
owed the developments of a much later period when European com-
265 K.A.967, L. Ysaacx's "Infonnatie", Bourgonje to Ysaacx, 6.2.1609; K.A.971, 
de Haze, "Consideratien etc.," f.67; K.A.973, Resolution, Pulicat, 25.7.1615, 
f.197vo. As an instanee of the skill of the 'painters' employed at the Pulicat 
factory, Cour pieces of cloth were sent to Governor-General Both in 1614 
with his coat of anns, the Pulicat factory and Fort Geldria painted on them, 
Cf. K.A.969, 16.8.1614, f.137vo. 
Verh. dl. 38 10 
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panies played a direct and significant role in the industrial production 
of the country. 
Speaking generally, the Dutch activities and commercial organization 
in Coromandel in the first two decades of the century had introduced 
no significant changes in the life of the region. The volume of trade was 
still too small to affect the local economy in any conspieuous way and 
the Company's exports and imports in no way altered its pattern. 
By the 'twenties, however, the pattern of Dutch export trade in 
Coromandel had undergone significant changes. lt had increased con-
siderably in volume. New items had been added to the list of exports. 
A shift in emphasis, destined to prove temporary, had led to a con-
centration on slave-trade. What is more important, its efforts to secure 
an increasing quantity of indigo directly from the producers stimulated 
production and led to an extension of cultivation, dependent exclusively 
on the export market.266 An increased production of gun-powder in the 
Company's own factory was another qualitatively significant result. 
Decades later, in the early 'sixties, a significant innovation in the 
organisation for procuring doth was introduced by governor Laurens 
Pit. As a result of the increasing demand for fine coast cloth in Holland, 
a substantial proportion of the order of ten could not he met or the 
quality of the supplies would prove to be sub-standard. Besides, the 
orders placed with various middlemen, who competed with each other, 
gave the weavers and painters considerable bargaining power and push-
ed up the prices. As aresult the Company, rather than the middlemen, 
ultimately suffered. To obviate such difficulties, Laurens Pit organised 
the chief suppliers of one particular variety of doth, viz., 'Ternate 
cloth', into a 'Company' (gezelschap) with twelve partners, bound by 
contract to supply the Dutch with the required cloth. Soon other. 
'companies' were organised for the supply of different varieties of doth. 
The partners of such 'companies', under the auspices of the Dutch, 
pooled together their resources in common funds to which all con tri-
buted equallyon a profit sharing basis. Every such 'fund' was adequate 
to meet the particular orders for which they were created. This new 
arrangement had several important consequences. Advances to the 
manufacturers were made from the central fund and it was no longer 
necessary for the Dutch themselves to advance any money to these 
middlemen. Secondly, supplies no longer feIl short of the orders, however 
large, hecause they were no longer dependent on the uncertain resources 
266 See in/ra, Chapter VIII. 
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of individual merchants and the 'Companies' could easily afford to 
supply on credit in times of necessity. Besides, the competition in the 
buyer's market among the Company's middlemen having been elimi-
nated the bargaining power of the weavers and painters was considerably 
reduced, and the expropriation of the surplus, to be shared by the Com-
pany and its middlemen, was thus facilitated. Dnly for the procurement 
of painted cloth in the south, the old system of trading had to be 
continued. The painters, destitute of capital, required advance payments 
at each stage of their work, - first for purchasing the cloth, then for 
procuring the dye-stuffs and later a part of their wages while actually 
painting. An uncomplicated organisation with a limited central fund 
for advancing to the weavers only a portion of the required capital, 
the greater part of the price being paid when the goods were delivered, 
could not cope with such a complex system of production.267 Despite 
their relatively simple structure, however, the 'companies' of cloth sup-
pliers organised by the Dutch marked the beginning of a new develop-
ment. Before long, the English, probably influenced by the example 
of their rivals, organised similar associations on the coast as also else-
where. 
The format ion of 'companies' for supplying cloth to the Dutch made 
some further progress in the later years of the century. In 1683, the 
local traders of Rajamahendri, without any prompting from the Dutch, 
organized a 'company' with a total share capital of 8,000 pagodas and 
offered to supply cloth to the Company. At Pulicat, the Dutch organized 
a company of suppliers on a somewhat larger scale. Set up for the 
purpose of procuring cloth for the Dutch from outside Pulicat on a 
10% commission, the new company had 55 shares of 200 pagodas 
each. The entire capital of 11,000 pagodas was invested in trade and 
managed by the Company's cashier. Similar companies organized at 
Palicol, Dacheron and Nagelwanse had assets varying between 4,600 
and 13,000 pagodas. An interesting conflict developed at Dacheron be-
o tween the Company of suppliers and the local weavers who tried without 
Success to subvert the monopsony of a single company, as it took away 
their bargaining power. The tendency in this period was to organize 
monopolistic companies of suppliers in every pi ace where the Dutch 
had factories. 268 Here was a development of considerable potential 
267 K.A.1l33, 22.6.1663, ff.1278-79, 1285; KA.1160, 28.6.1696, f.469. 
268 K.A.1271, 31.12.1683, f.228vo; KA.1253, 22.1.1682, ff.226-226vo; K.A. 
1262, 13.11.1682, f.394; K.A.132, 10.4.1689, ff.140-140vo; K Glamann, 
op. cito p.139. 
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significance for it might have led to a better organisation of the Indian 
merchants' scattered capital resources, giving them a greater control 
over both the buyers' and the sellers' market and perhaps eventually 
even over the machinery of production. But this form of commercial 
organisation does not appear to have extended beyond the field of 
middleman business. The Indian merchants evidently lacked the spirit 
of innovation and enterprise, a fact which goes a long way towards 
explaining the stagnation of the Indian economy. 
The procurement of the return cargo involved problems, partly tech-
nical in character, partly inherent in the local administrative, social 
and political organisation. Securing c10th of the right quality, for in-
stance, was no easy matter and dealing with the local manufacturers 
required considerable tact and vigilance. If not watched carefully, they 
used indigo of inferior quality for dyeing and there were frequent 
troubles over payment. The Company, as described above,269 was of ten 
forced to sell it wares to local governors and influential nobles, payments 
being made with inferior c10th for which there was no demand. The 
losses due to bad purchases of coast c10th amounted to 120,000 rials in 
three years (1611-1613) in the Bantam factory alone.270 In Coro-
mandel itself the losses were of ten augmented by bad debts. Whenever 
the factors were careless in choosing their middlemen or manufacturers, 
there was IittIe chance of securing the commodities ordered or recovering 
the money advanced. The middlemen were frequently in arre ars and in 
1614 a large amount had to be written off as bad debts. The Company 
toyed with the idea of seizing proportionate quantities of cargo from 
the defaulters' ships to make good its losses, but was not really strong 
enough to decide on such extreme measures, particularly because these 
would jeopardise its future relations with local suppliers on whom it 
was very much dependent. 271 Eventually, a better acquaintance with 
the local market enabled the Dutch to trade with the coast merchants 
and manufacturers more effectively. Wars, famines and official rapacity 
accentuated the difficulties of securing suitable return cargo on advan-
tageous terms. But compared to the basic issues of inadequate capital 
and the competition of commercial rivals, even these were but problems 
which belonged to the surface rather than the heart of the matter. 
The requirements of the freight trade and the increased volume of 
269 Supra, Chapters II-IV. 
21°K.A.967, Marcelis to Ysaacx, 17.5.1608, van Wesick to Ysaacx, 17.10.1608; 
K.A.968, 30.8.1613, f.163, K.A. 971, "Consideratien etc.," ff.67-67vo. 
271 K.A.969, 16.8.1614, ff.l36, 140; K.A.97l, "Consideratien etc." f.64. 
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return cargo created a new difficulty, namely, shortage of shipping 
space. Besides, Batavia could not spare enough ships for the Coromandel-
Pegu trade and for carrying food-crops from Bengal and Orissa to 
Ceylon. The Coromandel authorities at first tried to solve this difficulty 
by hiring small Indian boats. But in 1652, Batavia authorised them to 
undertake the building of small ships of 50 to 70 'lasts' and some skilled 
master craftsmen were sent to the coast for the purpose. Construction 
of ships and boats was started accordingly on a regular basis at Bimli-
patam, Naraspur, Masulipatam and Pulicat. The galliots and sloops 
built in these pi aces were found useful not only for navigation along the 
Indian coast, but also for commercial purposes in Amboina, Banda, 
Ternate and Malacca. Their average tonnage was not more than 70 
'lasts', but at least one ship of about 200 'lasts' was built in Bimlipatam. 
The expenses of ship-building in Coromandel were considered rather 
high by the Amsterdam authorities,272 and when the Coromandel factors 
went beyond their instructions to produce a fluyt at a cost of 36,463 
florins, Batavia objected strongly. Even the construction of ships which 
could be built as cheaply as in Holland was forbidden. 273 Shortage of 
shipping space continued to worry the Company, but the manufacture 
of ships in Coromandel was definitely stopped by 1661 as the expenses 
were considered exorbitant, only a small establishment being started at 
Vizagapatam for repairing ships.274 
Among the major problems which the coast factories' export trade 
had to face was the competition of private traders from their own 
country. This problem was accentuated by the fluctuations in the policy 
vis-à-vis the private traders. The large-scale participation of the Com-
pany's employees in private trade was, in the beginning, considered 
strictly illegal and punishable. The factors who participated in such 
trade naturally sacrificed the Company's interest to their own and of ten 
appeared in the role of commercial rivals to the Company. This evil 
had, however, become so much an accepted fact that on one occasion 
the Company purchased at Bantam cIoth brought illegally from Coro-
mandel by some of its employees. It was not easy to punish the offenders, 
because they could at any moment take shelter inland. The question of 
212 A ship of 60 lasts cost 14,403 florins in 1652. Sep. KA.456, 16.4.1658, f.25. 
273 KA.779, 23.4.1652, f.135; KA.780, 15.7.1653. f.201; KA.782, 21.7.1654, 
ff.289, 294; K.A.783, 26.3.1656, f.11O; KA.785, 3.8.1658, f.309; KA.786, 
29.8.1659, f.673; K.A.I056, 3.6.16-43, f.768; K.A.I060, "Verhael etc.," 
f.184vo; KA.I074, 24.1.1652, f.4; K.A.I086, 10.1.1652, f.469vo. 
2HK.A.1121, 11.10.1659, f.794vo; KA.1122, 16.12.1660, f.82, 26.1.l661,f.435. 
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legalising private trade, as the Portuguese had done, to promote in-
creased commercial activity was discussed as early as 1608. But it was 
shelved on the ground that there were few Dutchmen in the East at 
the time who had adequate means to undertake trade independently of 
the Company. In 1616, however, the Company's employees were granted 
the right of private trade, to the great pleasure of the Coromandel 
factors who confidently stated that this measure would help rather 
than hinder the Company's trade.275 But subsequent experiences proved 
such hopes to be unfounded. 
The years 1619-29 witnessed a new experiment in the colonial 
policy of the Dutch East India Company which had important bearings 
on the Company's trade in Coromandel. It had been the accepted 
policy of the home authorities to conduct the Asian trade through a 
numher of factories, protected by a few forts. But Governor-General 
Coen considered colonisation an essential prerequisite of commerce in 
Asia. Territories, acquired by force of arms, were to be populated by 
Dutch colonists, ready to undertake production of spices. The planta-
tions were to he worked by slaves secured from different regions, 
through kidnapping, if necessary, and, until the colonies were self-
sufficient, food was to be imported from abroad to maintain their 
growing population. Slaves and victuals were thus the chief commodities 
required to implement this new policy; Coromandel was considered a 
fruitful source of supply for bath. For a time, even the demand for 
textiles was relegated to a position of secondary importance. Slaves 
were what Coen wanted from the coast above everything else.276 
A new commercial system was closely interlinked with Coen's colonial 
policy. Under it, cloth from India, silk from Persia, cinnamon from 
Ceylon, porcelain from China and copper from Japan would he ex-
changed against the spices which constituted the Company's chief export 
to Europe. "The profits of the commerce that would center in the port 
of Batavia would be sufficient to pay for the quantities of spices and 
pepper that had to be exported to Europe. The consequence of the 
system would he that shipping between Europe and Asia would be 
limited to a few ships a year, but these would he ships laden with cargo 
worth millions, while a brisk Dutch shipping and trading would go on 
all along the Asiatic coast from Persia to Japan".277 This idea of 
275 K.A.967, MateJief's "Discours etc.", 1608, van Wesick to Bantam, 15.6.1610; 
K.A.973, 29.3.1616, ff.176vo---l77, Koromandel, pp.144ff. 
276 Coen, 111, pp.I77-78; C.S.P., 1622-24, pp.97 ff; From AkbaT 10 
A urangzeb, p.63; Lannoy et Linden, pp.69-70; Nusantara, pp.117 ff. 
277 Nusantara, p.120. 
JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 151 
Coen was only partly implemented at the time, at least so far as Coro-
mandeI was concerned. In 1625, the return cargo for Holland was 
ordered to be sent via Batavia, - and not directly from the coast as 
before, - partly to ensure greater safety at sea. Exceptions were aIlowed 
from time to time; specially, if there was enough cargo to fiII more 
than one ship, CoromandeI was authorised to send it direct to Europe.278 
Encouragement to Dutch colonists to participate in the inter-Asian 
trade was an essential feature of Coen's policy. This would be an 
inducement to colonisation. Besides, the capitaI invested by the free 
burghers would supplement the limited resources of the Company and 
thus help to keep the inter-Asian trade in the hands of the Dutch. 
Partly from similar motives, partly to supplement their poor income, the 
employees and dependents of the Company in CoromandeI, - like the 
refugees from the Portuguese settlements, - were permitted to under-
take private trade within strictly defined limits, sometime before Coen's 
Governor-GeneraIship. And in 1622, Coen aIlowed some free burghers 
from Batavia to go to Coromandel to purchase slaves.279 
A far more radical measure was adopted on January 21, 1623 when 
the Council of the Indies, by resolution, granted freedom of trade to 
the Batavia burghers, subject to payment of tolls. The Seventeen 
approved this policy in 1624, but excluded the employees of the COIll-
pany from enjoyment of the privilege. The burghers' private trade with 
CoromandeI was subjected to elaborate regulations meant to safeguard 
the Company's interests, check fraudulent practices and prevent undesir-
able competition .H, for instance, the burghers were interested in the 
same commodities as the Company, they would he aIlowed to purchase 
only in quantities specified by the local factors. The toII payable to thc 
Company at Masulipatam was fixed at 2 % for export and 1 ~ % for 
import. In Bengal, Pegu, Arakan and other countries round the Bay, 
the burghers were permitted to trade freely so long as the Company 
had no trade there. No one was to be aIIowed to settIe in Coromandel 
without express permission from the Company.280. 
With the arrivaI of eight private traders to Coromandel in 1624 began 
218 K.A.997, 24.9.1625, ff.159vo ff; K.A.184, Resolution October/November, 
1628. 
279 K.A.978, A. Thomasz to Amsterdam, 8.5.1617; K.A.981, de Haze's instruc-
tions to A. Thomasz, 21.7.1619; Coen, I, p.781; Nusantara .• p. 118. 
280Coen, 11, 960; K.A.452, Amsterdam to Batavia, 17.10.1624; K.A.754, 
25.6.1624, ff.74vo-76; K.A.999, Ysbrantsz to Batavia, 16.10.1625; Realia, 
p.320. 
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a steady flow which continued until the time when the system was 
abolished. At times they were called upon to fill the gaps left hy the 
Company's limited resources. During the great scarcity of rice at Batavia 
in 1628, for instance, some burghers were induced to go to Coromandel 
to buy iron, tobacco etc. and therewith procure rice from Arakan. The 
Council of the Indies was of ten inclined to listen sympathetically to 
their complaints against the coast factors and ask the latter to redress 
the grievances.281 
Coen's policy regarding the private traders suffered from one basic 
inadequacy: there was no clear line to mark out the settlers' sphere of 
activity from that of the Company. In Coromandel, as aresult, they 
appeared as rivals to the Company. At times they would offer higher 
prices to the middlemen or buy up from thc manufacturers cloth for 
which the Company had already advanced money, and thus deprive 
the Company of her legitimate cargo. Of ten they invested money in 
ways prohibited by the regulations. Batavia's orders requiring the coast 
factories to provide the private traders with supplics of cloth added to 
the difficulties of the situation. For while the burghers were free to 
contact all merchants, the Company could normally deal only with the 
middlemen who had entered into contracts. The system also of ten acted 
as a cover for illegal private trade on part of the Company's employees, 
many of whom returned home with commodities which could hardly 
be regarded as personalluggage.282 
Strict measures were taken to deal with the growing problem. Lists 
of merchandise which the settlers had been permitted to export were 
sent to the governor of the coast factories. Persons exporting any cargo 
to Coromandel beyond what was spec:ifically permitted were severely 
punished. All spices exported by the burghers had to be handed over 
to the governor to be sold with the Company's own wares. From 1628 
onwards, the burghers were allowed to invest their capital only through 
the Coromandel authorities. To stop the illegal trade of the Company's 
employees, they were all forbidden to send goods to Europe during their 
stay in the East. Further, no one was allowed to return home with mer-
chandise worth more than two months' pay.283 
281 Coen, V, pp.335--36, K.A.755, Batavia to Coromandel, 24.9.1625, 26.7.1625; 
K.A.756, 27.6.1626, f.SS. 
232 Coen, VII, p.363, VII2, p.l1S4·, K.A.452, Amsterdam to Coromandel, 
15.12.1623; K.A.997, Ysbrantsz to Batavia, 21.1.1625; K.A.999, Ysbrantsz 
to Batavia, 16.10.1625. 
283 Coen, IV, p.709, V, pp.305-06; K.A.452, Batavia to Coromandel, 
15.12.1623; K.A.1001, 27.6.1626, ff.S1 ff. 
JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 153 
The system of private trade was basically incompatible with the 
Company's monopolistic policy. The problems arising from it could not 
be solved within the existing set up short of completely abolishing the 
system. Under different conditions and with clearer demarcation of its 
scope, it might have helped the Company in its competition with other 
nations. But as things stood, it merely added to its difficulties. By the 
'thirties, the activities of the private traders had developed into a 
formidable threat to the Company's trade in Coromandel. Their offer 
of high prices and greedy purchase of poor quality cloth rejected by 
the Company undermined the latter's control over the cloth market 
throughout the coast.284 Vis-à-vis the Company, the private traden 
enjoyed the same advantage as the Portuguese and the Asian merchants, 
viz., that their establishment cost being insignificant they could afford 
comparatively high purchase price and low sale price. The increasingly 
monopolistic tendency of the Company's policy rendered the situation 
all the more anomalous and, in 1632, the Seventeen withdrew their 
sanction for private trade granted in 1623. 
The decision was not popular at Batavia where it was felt that the 
continuation of private trade, involving as it did the investment of a 
larger capital by the Dutch, would have helped in the eventual expulsion 
of the English from the Coromandel trade. Now, on the contrary, while 
all foreign competitors continued to enjoy the benefits of this trade, 
only the Company's own subjects were excluded from it. Besides, the 
new measure implied loss of revenue from tolIs and freights, amounting 
on an average to some 44Y:z % of the capital annually invested by the 
burghers. But such considerations failed to sway the Seventeen. 
The majority of Dutch settlers in Coromandel, now deprived of their 
means of livelihood, either entered the Company's service or returned 
to Batavia, but a few sought shelter and settled in territories outside 
the Company's sphere of influence. Some, who had sold their houses 
in Coromandel and invested their money in cloth, were allowed to 
bring their cargo to Batavia and the 30,000 rials sent by some Batavia 
burghers for investment in Coromandel shortly before the publication 
of the prohibitory order were returned to them.285 
Private trade, once more made illegal, could not, however, he crushed 
out immediately. In 1639, Coromandel diamonds reached Holland 
284 K.A.I012, 4.12.1630, f.132vo, 26.12.1630, f.142. 
285K.A.I016, 1.12.1632, ff.11-14; K.A.I017, 20.10.1632, f.186vo; KA.I019, 
15.8.1633, f.20, 25.12.1633, f.42; KA.I021, 26.12.1632, f.302vo; KA. 1023. 
27.12.1634, ff.42 ff; KA.1023, 27.12.1634, f.92. 
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through mysterious channels and, in 1641, the order prohibiting private 
trade had to be re-circulated. In the latter year, a number of Coro-
mandel factors were sent to Batavia to stand trial on charges of private 
trade, but were treated with great leniency at the suggestion of governor 
Gardenys. Apparently, both Batavia and Pulicat were inclined to look 
upon the crime of private trade as a very human and understandable 
frailty.286 In 1647, the 'placcat' against private trading was re-circulated, 
but there were strong reasons to believe that this particular crime was 
rampant in Coromandel and Bengal even during the 'fifties. Some of the 
highest officers of the Company like Laurens Pit, Adriaen van der 
Meyde and Govert Cracketow, were inclined to compromise with this 
evil. In 1643, Laurens Pit himself sought and was granted permission 
to lend out money on interest, though forbidden to take part in any 
other form of trad ing. In 1657, it was decided that all employees posted 
in places other than the Company's colonies would be permitted to 
have only funds essential for their house-keeping. Any income or 
capital in excess of such amounts was to be deposited with the Com-
pany, interest being paid for the same. Even this stringent measure was 
later found inadequate to cope with the ubiquitous evil of private trade. 
Participation in private trade was not the only form of official 
corruption among the coast factors. In fact the failure of the human 
element was indeed a contributory factor in the eventual decline of the 
Company. The morals of the factors and assistants employed on the 
coast were by no means above reproach and their drunkenness and 
debaucheries at times led to serious difficulties with the local people. 
Officers, otherwise very able, were of ten found guilty of various mal-
practices and in 1610 a number of rules had to he drawn up to check 
the excesses of the officers who were in charge of the factories. In 1615, 
Director van Berchem was accused of living in too regal a style and held 
responsible for the supply of inferior cloth. Sometimes later, chief 
accountant Anthony Schorer was dismissed and sent to Bantam for 
trial charged with multiple delinquencies. It was generally felt that 
Coromandel was badly provided with assistants, but little was done to 
remedy this drawback.287 The circumstances which necessitated van 
286K.A:774, 21.5.1647, f.228; K.A.778, 14.9.1651, f.359; K.A.782, 30.6.1655, 
ff.323-4; K.A.784, 8.9.1657, f.465; K.A.I056, 3.6.1643, ff.774vo---75; 
K.A.1060, "Verhael etc.," f.222vo. 
287 K.A.967, Bourgonje to Wesick, 26.7.1610, Resolution, Pulicat Council, 
16.11.1610, Matelief, "Discours etc.," 1608, Bourgonje to North Coromandel, 
15.2.1609; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, ff.133vo--134, 139-139vo; van Dijk, 
pp.57 ff. 
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Meydregt's enquiry in the 'eighties, and the unwholesome state of 
affairs which it revealed, prove beyond all doubt that the life and 
morals of the coast factors were not very congennial to honest trading. 
It is extremely doubtful, however, if their successful rivals in commerce 
observed any higher ethical code. Given more capital and a better 
commercial organisation, - less shackled by uninformed and vacillating 
control from above, - the Dutch in Coromandel would probably have 
survived all the onslaughts on their position, despite their notorious 
devotion to Bacchus and Venus. 
CHAPTER VIII 
TIIE ITEMS OF EXPORT 
The Coromandel coast, "the left arm" of Dutch commerce in Asia, 
was initially important to the Company as a supplier of the chief media 
of exchange, textiles, for procuring the return cargo of spices from the 
archipelago. This single dimensional interest in the coast trade had new 
strands added to it with the passage of time, as markets for other coast 
products, - though quantitatively less significant than the c10th market, 
- were explored and developed in different regions of Asia as also in 
Europe. The sidelines in the export trade were in fact started from the 
very beginning, though to a very limited extent. 
Tbe pattern of textiles export itself underwent important changes in 
course of time. As Dr. Glamann's analysis of the sales at the Kamer 
Amsterdam has shown,288 the proportion of textiIes, silk and aIlied 
commodities to the total sale rose from 17.54 % in 1648-1650 to 
43.45 % in 1698-1700. In course of a half-century, in other words, 
textiles etc. had surpassed spices in importance in the total pattern of 
Dutch exports to Europe. For the Coromandel coast, this meant the 
expansion of a hitherto inadequately exploited export market to which 
however the English contributed more than the Dutch. 
In the earlier half of the century, the c10th exports to Europe from 
the coast remained comparatively unimportant and, in view of the 
highly specialised character of the Asian market, particular varieties of 
c10th had to be secured from particular centres where alone they were 
available. Before the establishment of the Tierepopelier factory, both 
plain and patterned c10th were procured at Masulipatam and Petapuli, 
the latter variety being obtained from south Coromandel through Gol-
conda middlemen who took away 20 % to 25 % of the profit. Later, the 
Company purchased most of its printed c10th directly from the southern 
merchants and manufacturers and depended on the northern factories 
mainly (or the supply of plain cloth. Petapuli provided the famous red 
c10th dyed with Tambreve chay-roots, whiIe the bulk of the painted 
288 Kristoff Glamann, op. cit., p.14. 
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varieties required for Malay and Java came from the southern factories. 
Occasionally, the return cargo also included quantities of Gujarat cloth, 
probably procured from Indian merchants who obtained the stuff, not 
directly from Gujarat, but from Achin.289 
Textile products continued to dominate the export trade in the 
'twenties despite the new emphasis on the supply of slaves as the chief 
item sought from Coromandel. In fact, there was a considerable increase 
in the demand for cloth, partly in response to the Company's expanding 
market in South-East Asia. In 1622-23 it was decided to purchase all 
spices in future with rice, cloth etc. and reserve the limited supply of 
specie and precious metaIs for regions where the demand for commod-
ities was very limited. Besides, the coast factories were of ten called 
upon to fill the gaps in the return cargo to Holland which was of ten 
far below expectation, and they contributed the bulk of their quota in 
cloth.290 The orders for the Asian market were, however, given priority. 
The volume of supply may be gauged from the fact that 1037 and 1685 
packs were exported in 1624 and 1625 respectively. The Company now 
regulated its supplies to South East Asia in accordance with the highly 
specialised nature of the demand.291 The demand in the home market 
was also specialised though to a less marked dgree: Guinea cloth, sail 
cloth and bethillas were chiefly in request. The marked increase in the 
export of Guinea cloth, which accounted for nearly a quarter of the 
total arders from 1621 onwards was a notabie feature of the cloth trade 
of this period. 
Owing to the abnormal situation both in Golconda and the Carnatic, 
the Dutch took a direct part in organising production of cloth. In order 
to avoid depending on Masulipatam, they encouraged textile manufac-
tures in the southern factories, a considerable part of which was carried 
on under the protection of Fort Geldria during the years of war. The 
Company exercised a large measure of con trol on the textile producers 
settled in Pulicat: in 1627 they were forbidden to undertake production 
of any variety except those ordered by the Company; the Indian 
289 K.A.967, L. Ysaacx's 'Informatie', 1608, van Wesick to Bantam, 15.6.1610, 
Bourgonje to Ysaacx, 6.2.1609, Marcelis to Amsterdam, 31.5.1610; KOTO-
mandel, pp.171-72. 
290 Coen, 111, pp.287, 323. Also see Supra, Chapter VII. 
291 The fact that yellow tapi sarassas could be sold only in Banda indicates 
the degree of specialisation. Tapi eh indo and goulong for Java, peta, dragam, 
saraSSQ malaya, gobar etc. fro Moluccas and Jambi were among the chief 
lines of export in this period. The Dutch also discovered now the great 
demand for Guinea c10th throughout Asia. 
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exporters to Pegu, Siam, Arakan, and Achin were deprived of theil 
supplies in consequence. In an important sector of the buyers' market, 
a near monopsonistic con trol had tbus been established. At times the 
Dutch provided the weavers with the special material necessary for 
their work, like gold yam required for the manufacture of goulongs,292 
and thus fostered a new type of development within the putting out 
system providing scope for qualitative improvement beyond tbe reach 
of manufacturers without support from merchant capitalists. 
In 1617-18, the Dutch were for tbe first time faced with a sudden 
decline in tbe demand for Coromandel cloth in Java, a problem which 
became serious in the last quarter of the century. The large sales in the 
previous years, according to the Java factors, had depressed current 
demand in the market. Probably what had really happened was that 
large supplies, based on wrongly anticipated high demand in accordance 
with the market conditions of earlier years, had resulted in a glut. The 
facilities for holding inventories were also apparently inadequate, other-
wise the glut could have been avoided by withdrawing the supplies from 
the market. Tbe Javanese were beginning to use their own manufactures 
around this time in larger quantities than before; and quantities of 
coast cloth, imported by Asian merchants, were cheaply procurable 
from Malacca. Besides, the poor quality of some luxury items like goulong 
and tapi sarassa affected demand. The consequent decline in sales 
seriously handicapped the Company's purchase of pepper. To meet the 
situation, the Dutch concentrated on procuring "exquisite" goulongs for 
the rich, and cheap rough tapis for the poor and stopped the practice 
of paying the soldiers partly in cloth, in order to revive demand. Orders 
for Java were reduced and those for other regions in the Indies 
proportionately increased. By the mid-'twenties, the problem appears to 
have receded into the background, partly as a result of such skilul 
manipulations.293 
In the 'thirties, the demand for coast cloth underwent a spectacular 
increase. The increasing volume of cloth export to Japan, the brisk 
trade of the Chinese, Malays and other Asian traders with the ports of 
Java and the prolonged blockade of Malacca which closed an important 
2112 K.A,452, 18.9.1621, f.69, Amsterdam to Coromandel, 15.10.1621, 15.12.1623, 
12.11.1626; K.A.757, 17.3.1627, f.42vo; K.A.994, Ysbrantsz to Batavia, 
21.10.1624; K.A.I001, 27.6.1626, ff.81 ff, 85-89; Coen, I, pp.59, 283, 
447, 11, p.292, 111, p.73, VII, pp.236, 477, VII!!, p.1l86, D.R.1624-29, 
pp.133, 189, 211, 221. 
293 Coen, I, pp.337-38, 11, pp.293, 294, 296. 
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source for the supply of coast cloth to South East Asia all contributed 
to this development. The eventual fall of Malacca and the arrival of 
the East Javanese to sell rice and make purchases at Batavia further 
intensified the demand. In Holland, too, by the early 'forties the 
demand for Coromandel cloth had reached a high level. 
The rate of increase in demand during these years may be gauged 
from the fact that 1189 packs of coarse white cloth were ordered in 
1633 as compared to 752 packs the previous year. New items were 
added to the list of orders from time to time. Shirts for the Company's 
soldiers used to be manufactured at home by the wives of the Batavia 
burghers. But as the quality of these products had become very poor, 
Coromandel was called upon to supply 8,000 to 10,000 shirts annually. 
By 1639, the total orders for Coromandel cloth were raised by a third 
in order to maintain the Company's hold on the Asian market. In view 
of the increasing demand in Holland for fine bethillas, parcalles, salam-
puris etc., the coast factories were also asked to procure for Europe as 
much as was possible without curtailing the supplies for Asia. The rate 
of profits on coast cloth, though not uniform throughout the period, 
remained consistently high. In 1633, coarse white cloth rendered a gross 
profit of 125 % in the Indies and Java cloth gave an average profit of 
60% to 100 % throughout these years. 294 
The Company's trade in Asia became increasingly dependent on the 
supply of cloth from Coromandel, and any failure to provide the coast 
factories with adequate capital had immediate effects on all sectors of 
that trade. In 1639, for instance, the small supply of coast cloth, 
consequenced by shortage of capital, resulted in a dangerous situation. 
Purchase of spices in Banda and Amboina and of pepper in J ambi and 
Palimbang had to be reduced to a minimum. The trade in Siam and 
Cambodia also suffered a considerable depression. The Coromandel 
merchants, taking advantage of the situation, flooded the markets of 
Achin, Tenasserim, Perak, Queda and the neighbouring places with 
their own supply of coast cloth. In Coromandel itself, the weavers and 
'painters', unable to find work with the Company, began to concentrate 
on the production of the varieties which were in demand in the local 
market, while some turned to other occupations. The Company's export 
of Coromandel cloth had obviously become an important factor, not 
294 For the volume of c10th export, ~ee K.A.759, Batavia to Coromandel, 
28.6.1633; K.A.762, f.1l3; K.A.765, 11.7.1639, Cf.405, 409, 30.9.1639, 
f.605; K.A.768, 3.4.1641, Cf.67, 73, 28.4.1641, f.l74; K.A.769, 9.8.1641; 
f.324. 
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only in the pattern of its own trade, but in the organisation of produc-
tion on the coast itself.295 
In the 'forties and 'fifties, supplies to the Archipelago and the Far 
East were further increased, while in some years as much cloth was 
sold at Malacca as at Batavia and in Persia also a very profitable 
market was found for the textile products of Golconda and Bengal. The 
demand in Europe remained high most of the time. Black guinea cloth 
was exported in quantities for Brazil and Angola, and a particular 
variety of cloth, manufactured near Masulipatam, was found to be in 
good demand in Turkey. The rate of profit on coast cloth in the Indies 
was roughly the same as before, and in Persia it ranged from 50 % to 
75% on different varieties. The pivotal position of the Coromandel 
textiles in the Company's South East Asian trade may be gauged from 
the fact that a delay in the arrival of supplies from the coast in 1647 
reduced the profits at Batavia by 14,000 florins owing to a compara-
tively large export. The periodical slumps in the demand for cloth in the 
Indies which had worried the Company in the preceding period were, 
however, not altogether a thing of the past and became a serious threat 
in 1654--56.296 
Procuring the required supply of cloth was, however, not an easy 
task, particularly during the 'forties. The wars and famine affected 
production in more than one way. Many weavers and painters, unable 
to bear any longer the sufferings caused by prolonged anarchy, had 
fled from northern Carnatic to safer places. The country was further 
depopulated as the invading annies of Golconda and Bijapur took away 
some 150,000 people as captives. By 1647, according to one estimate, 
the agricuIturists and handicraftsmen in the Carnatic and Gingi regions 
were reduced to a quarter of their original number. The effects of this 
depopulation were feIt most severely in connection with the procuring 
of 'pintadoes', for there was an acute shortage of skilled painters. 
Besides, there was also a dearth of chay-roots, because a large number 
of the dye-stuff cultivators had died or fled. The handicraftsmen who 
undertook to manufacture the best quality material for the Company 
in 1647 and later were new-comers to the field and it was some time 
295 K.A.I039, 18.12.1639, ff.75vo-77, 30.7.1639, f.l091. 
296 K.A.455, 21.9.1644, f.7, 16.9.1646, f.66; K.A.770, 20.8.1643, f.590; 
K.A.772, 15.3.1645, f.lIl; K.A.780, 15.7.1653, ff.198 ff; K.A.I051, 
22.12.1643, f.3; K.A.I055, 20.1.1645, ff.6vo, 7; K.A.I056, 3.6.1643; f.773; 
K.A.1064, 31.12.1647, f.67; K.A.I066, 18.1.1649, f.87; K.A.lIOO, 7.6.1655, 
f.339. 
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before they could produce 'pintadoes' according to specification. For a 
while the Company was forced to abandon its policy of purchasing only 
varieties which gave high profits, partly with the object of maintaining 
its hold on the market. Despite the general improvement in political 
and economie conditions af ter 1649, the high price of cotton, Mir 
Jumla's monopolies, Indian competition and the hostility of the Portu-
guese in the southern regions continued to hamper the supply of cloth. 
But there was a relaxation in Mir Jumla's monopolistic policy af ter 1650, 
owing to his failure to supply the Company with the cloth he had 
contracted for, and the Company's increasing investments attracted 
many displaced handicraftsmen to the coastal ports, particularly those 
of Tanjore and Madura. Thus, by 1658, ample supplies were once more 
available, not only from Tanjore and Madura, but from Golconda and 
northern Carnatic as well.297 
The volume of cloth export remained high in the 'sixties, despite the 
decline in demand in the East Indies and the poor prices fetched in 
Persia in the early years of the decade. The sales in Java improved, 
following a reduction in prices, and the growing requirements of the 
European market more than filled any possible gaps in the orders to 
Coromandel. In the mid-'sixties, supplies brought by the English were 
reaching different parts of Europe, and the Company also decided to 
profit by the increased demand, especially for patterned cloth. So the 
orders from Holland for Coromandel cloth were unusually large by the 
early 'seventies and the different varieties fetched 65 % to 160 % gross 
profit in Europe. In Persia, too, the trade in Coromandel cloth once 
more became profitable at this time and gave a profit of 61 % to 81 % 
on the different varietics. Procuring cloth was rendered difficult around 
1660 by the famine in the south and the high price of cotton in the 
north. Though the situation in these respects improved before long, 
shortage of capital and the consequent arrears in payment to the weavers 
affected the quality of supply. Besides, the brisk purchases by the 
English and the Dutch pushed up the price of the varieties procured 
for the European market.298 
297 K.A.I062 (vervolg), 24.8.1646, f.832; K.A.I064, 31.12.1647, ff.67vo; 
K.A.I066, 5.10.1647, ff.517vo, 523; K.A.I068, 31.12.1649, f.59; K.A.1071, 
19.10.1649, f.217vo: K.A.I079, 24.1.1652, f.234; K.A.ll04, 6.5.1656, 
ff. 231 ff; K.A.I115, 14.12.1658, f.n. 
288K.A.795, 20.4.1668, f.170; K.A.797, 30.7.1670, f.431; K.A.799, 14.4.1672, 
27.7.1672, f.644; K.A.1122, 14.8.1660, f.383vo; K.A.1123, 14.7.1660, f.42vo; 
K.A.IH6, 25.1.1667, f.209; K.A.1147, 15.11.1666, f.659. 
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The competition of the Indians and the English did not merely 
undermine the Company's chances of profitably purchasing cloth on 
the coast, it also undermined their con trol over the seller's markets in 
Asia and Europe. In Europe, as already noted, the Dutch could not 
afford to sell cloth as cheaply as the English and thus lost their hold 
over the market. In many parts of South-East Asia, they were gradually 
ousted by Indian competition. A new factor, - first encountered in a 
mild form in the second decade of the century, - also contributed to 
the decline of the Company's cloth trade in Java and adjacent regions. 
In the early 'eighties, the Batavia authorities reported that the Javanese 
had begun to prefer the painted cloth manufactured in their own 
country to the stuff imported from the coast. The prolonged wars in 
Java frequently isolated the inland areas from the coastal towns and 
prevented the transport of imported wares to those regions. The growth 
of a native cloth industry was fostered by this circumstance, and though 
the early products were not comparable in quality to the Coromandel 
ware, they were cheaper and probably more durable. In the face of this 
new competition, Batavia's efforts to revive the demand for coast cloth 
was not very successful. By 1683, the store-houses in Batavia lay over-
stocked with unsold Coromandel ware. Hopes that the demand would 
again improve were not given up and, accordingly, the orders to Coro-
mandel were not refused for some years. But by 1687, Batavia no longer 
saw any ground for optimism. So the coast factories were instructed 
not to send any cloth above the quantity specifically ordered. At about 
the same time, similar orders were received from Holland, and Batavia 
decided to meet part of the requirement for the European market from 
her own inventory.299 The quantitative data available are not adequate 
to authorise any definite statement regarding measurable trends in the 
Dutch cloth export from the coast. It is, however, clear that even in 
Europe, where the market as a whole was expanding, the Dutch were 
losing ground to the English. For Coromandel, it surely meant a reduc-
tion in the total volume of exports by the Jan Company, though the 
English exports almost certainly more than compensated the losses 
suffered. 
The item next in importance to cloth among the Dutch exports from 
Coromandel was indigo which was in great demand in the Netherlands. 
Masulipatam and its hinterland, the chief source of supply on the coast, 
299K.A.812, 14.8.1683, f.1236; K.A.814, 15.8.1684, ff.331vo-332; K.A.815, 
l.5.1685, ff.200-20t; K.A.817, 24.7.1687, f.520. 
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could provide three to four hundred bahars [1 bahar = 480 Dutch lb] 
of indigo every year, but owing to its limited capital and the competition 
of Indian merchants who purchased large quantities at high prices, 
chiefly for export to Persia, the Company could secure only small 
quantities. Af ter the opening of the Tierepopelier factory, the Company 
was no longer entirely dependent on Masulipatam for its supply of 
indigo, but the quality of the stuff procured at Tierepopelier was rather 
poor and the Dutch exported very little of this variety. The bulk of the 
Pulieat indigo was used by the local weavers for dyeing cloth. Still a 
certain quantity was available for the Company and 200 bahars were 
procured in 1615-1616.300 
The export of Coromandel indigo increased as the result of a growing 
demand in Holland. In 1616, Amsterdam asked for an annual supply of 
900 to 1000 fardel [1 fardel = 170 Dutch lb] good quality Coromandel 
indigo, or even poor quality stuff, if nothing better was available. Af ter 
a brief interlude during which Surat indigo was preferred, the home 
authorities finally decided in 1625 that Coromandel indigo, specially 
the Tierepopelier variety, was the best. At the instance of the Seventeen, 
and to meet the problems regarding adequate supply which arose out 
of troubles in Golconda and wars in the south, the Dutch encouraged 
large-scale indigo cultivation in South Coromandel, made specifie con-
tracts with the middlemen and cultivators regarding the quality to be 
supplied, and tried to ensure that seeds were sown accordingly. Experts 
were engaged to guarantee good purchases and at least one expert was 
brought from Holland in 1621.301 
The export of indigo from Coromandel, which had been rather limited 
in quantity in the earlier years, assumed considerable proportions af ter 
1632, again mainly as a result of the steadily increasing demand in 
Holland. The rising price of indigo in Surat and North India, the riyal 
sources of supply, was also a factor. In 1633, 100,000 Ibs of indigo were 
ordered from Coromandel while in 1637 the orders were for 150,000 to 
160,000 Ibs. The average annual supply, however, was only around 
23,000 Ibs. Procurement was rendered difficult by the fact that the 
indigo cultivators, as producers of cash crops, had been among the first 
casualties of the famine and in many areas production had ceased for 
years in consequence. While the return to normal economie life helped 
3uoK.A.967, Bourgonge to Ysaack, 6.2.1609, K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff.157, 162vo; 
K.A.973, 29.3.1616, f.178, Relatio71s, p.52. 
301 K.A.450, 11.4.1616, f.355; K.A.452, 18.9.1621, f.69; K.A.997, "Memorie" 
of Raphael Olyva, ff.90 ff; K.A.997, Batavia to Coromandel, 26.7.1625; 
Coen, 11, pp.162, 213, 292, 303, IV, p.368, VII, pp.228-29, 352-53, 357. 
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the resumption of indigo cultivation, the Dutch played an active and 
vital role in this particular sector of Coromandel's agriculture. Very high 
prices were offered for some time to induce the peasants to resume 
cultivation, and, by 1636, production had returned to normal in the 
Masulipatam area largely as a result of the Company's increased 
demand. In the south, too, production reacted quickly to increased 
demand and presently the Dutch concentrated on procuring southern 
indigo in order to circumvent the competition of the English and 
Bijapur merchants which pushed up the prices of Masulipatam indigo. 
But the orders from Batavia could not be supplied in full and the 
attempts to procure indigo from Bengal and Arakan proved useless, 
because the samples sent to Holland were found unacceptable. The 
prices of different types of indigo varied considerably in Holland: a 
pound of Tegenapatam indigo, which cost lO-ll stuivers, sold at 80 
stuivers in Europe, while the Pulicat variety fetched no more than 41~ 
stuivers per pound.302 
The annual demand for Coromandel indigo in Holland eventually 
suffered a decline and was somewhere around 30,000 Ibs in the 'fifties. 
Af ter some initial difficulties owing to the Company's shortage of 
capital, which induced the merchant-middlemen to export their unsold 
stock overland to Persia, over 44,000 Ibs were procured in 1644. Subse-
quent shortage resulted mainly from the competition of Indian mer-
chants who purchased large quantities for the Bijapur and Burhanpur 
markets.303 
A revival of demand in the Netherlands took place in the 'sixties and 
the Tegenapatam variety yielded a gross profit of 234 % in 1667-68. 
But production had suffered severely in Southern Coromandel as a 
result of the wars, and only small amounts could be exported to Europe 
af ter meeting the requirements of the Company's dyeing establishments 
in Coromandel and Ceylon. The high prices in Europe were partly 
caused by the shortfall in supplies,304 rather than an expansion in the 
actual volume of demand. 
302 K.A.760, 29.1.1635, f.274, 13.8.1635, ff.485; K.A.762, 31.7.1637, f.554; 
K.A.765, 28.12.1639, f.120; K.A.767, 14.4.1640, f.128; K.A.768, 28.5.1641, 
f.175; K.A.1019, 25.12.1633, f.37; K.A.1022, 15.8.1634, f.34vo; K.A.I023, 
27.12.1634, f.95vo; K.A.1028, 4.1.1636, fAl; K.A.I031, 8.10.1636, f.1123; 
K.A.I041, 3.10.1641, ff.269 ff. 
303 K.A.051, 22.12.1643, f.38vo; K.A.I054, 23.12.1644, f.538vo, 4.5.1644, 
f.568vo, 3.10.1643, f.798vo; K.A.1068, 13.4.1649, f.547vo; K.A.1079, 
ff.256-57. 
304K.A.1122, 5.2.1661, f.629; K.A.1152, 24.6.1667, f.603vo;K.A.797, 31.10.1670, 
f.709. 
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The great emphasis on the procuring of slaves was the distinctive 
feature of the Company's trade in the 'twenties. "If the slaves are pur-
chased at reasonabie price," wrote Coen to Coromandel in 1622, "they 
render incomparably more profit than cIoth... If we could secure 
some hundred thousands, not one would be refused." In 1625, the 
Council of the Indies confirmed these sentiments in even stronger terms: 
"At present no better and more lasting service can be rendered to the 
Company than to populate and thus secure her territories". 305 
The early efforts to secure slaves were not very successfui. A ship 
sent in 1621 with enough accommodation for two to three thousand 
slaves brought back only 124. Af ter repeated prodding by Coen, 1123 
slaves were procured in 1623 and 928 in 1624. But the subsequent years 
witnessed a decline in suppIies, and though the Company tried to tap 
the rich sources in Arakan and BengaI, the resuits were inconsiderable. 
Nothing came of an agreement with the govemor of Calitura who 
undertook to supply 100 slaves per month. In 1628, the Company could 
export only 73 slaves from the coast. By then the prices had gone up 
from 4-5 pagodas to 12-14 pagodas per slave. Improved political and 
economic conditions in Coromandel and difficuities in Arakan were the 
main reasons for the slump in supply. Besides, though some Indian 
traders had a regular traffic in slaves, there was a strong feeling in the 
country against the practice.306 
The conditions in which the trade was carried on were far from 
humane. Many of the slaves were people kidnapped on the highways 
or forcibly taken from their parents by the dealers with the connivance 
of the Duteh. As aresuIt, the people from the countryside stopped 
frequenting the Pulicat markets and many inhabitants of Pulicat with-
drew to safer places. The rate of si ave mortality in Coromandel and the 
transport ships was very high. Of a consigment of 1167 slaves, 69 died 
on their way in 1623 and of the 1300 procured in 1625 nearly half the 
number perished even before they could be shipped. Many of the deaths 
on board ship in 1624 were due to the slaves being fed on raw rice and 
water for several days. In the Indies, too, the slaves died in large num-
bers through failure to acclimatise themselves. Some ran away to the 
forests and there perished from starvation. The horror of it all is brought 
home by the fact that many of the slaves were of ages varying from 8 
305 Coen, 11, p.446, 111, pp.75, 177-79; K.A.756, 28.10.1626, f.141vo. 
308 Coen, I, pp.708, 781, V, pp.29-30, V1I2, pp.1220-21, 1351, 1446; 
K.A.995, Pulicat to Batavia, 6.6.1624; K.A.996, Batavia to Ysbrantsz, 
26.7.1625, ff.123 ff; D.R., 1624-29. pp.33, 99, 221, 239, 290. 
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to 20, - the age-group preferred by Batavia. NaturaIly, this trade 
brought the Dutch into disrepute in Coromandel and the local factors 
recommended greater circumspection in future.S07 
The export of slaves fromCoromandel, which had featured so promi-
nently in the Company's trade during the 'twenties, became aItogether 
unimportant by the 'thirties. The demand for slaves was still consider-
able, as they were essentiaI for the maintenance of the Company's fac-
tories and settlements. But freed from Coen's continual pressure, the 
Coromandel factors slackened their unpopular efforts to procure slaves, 
a task which was never too easy. Some slaves were procured during the 
famine and immediately afterwards.S08 But the supply dried up aImost 
completely af ter 1635 and the few slaves that were available sold at 
18 to 20 rials each, a price that was considered too high.s09 
Supply of slaves from Coromandel, which· had been reduced to 
insignificant proportions by the late 'thirties, had a temporary boom in 
the 'forties. In 1643, Gardenys stated in reply to Batavia's angry queries, 
that slaves could still he secured from Gingi and Tanjore, but only at 
uneconomic prices. Attempts to induce Krishnappa to permit the pur-
chase of 800 to 1000 slaves each year in Gingi failed completely, he-
cause the generaI considered the sI ave trade 'a great sin in the eyes of 
the gods'. Still, in 1644, some 100 slaves were procured from the inland 
areas, besides another 58 from Bengal. But the big boom came in 1646 
when, as a result of the famine, 2,118 slaves were shipped to Batavia, 
of whom 572 died on the way. The prices were as low as ~ pagodas 
per head. As the ample supplies secured in 1646 were expected to meet 
the requirements for some years to come, purchases were slowed down 
in 1647 and orders to Arakan and other places considerably reduced. By 
1652, the demand for slaves in the Indies revived once more, but the 
end of the famine in Coromandel had terminated the boom in supply, 
and not more than 19 could be exported that year.S10 
During 1659-61, the purchase of slaves in Coromandel, which had 
practicaIly stopped for years, had a short-lived boom owing to the famine 
a07Coen, I, p.781, 11, pp.214, 447, V, p.296; E.F.I., 1622-23, pp.l05, 122, 
141, 147, 229; K.A.754, 26.3.1624, f.36vo; K.A.998, 3.2.1626, ff.3-3vo. 
308 100 slaves were purchased in 1630, and 91 in 1635. 
309 K.A.I012, 4.12.1630, f.134; K.A.I017, 20.10.163.2, f.187vo; K.A.I029, 
19.6.1635, f.668; K.A.I047, "Verhael etc.," f.447vo, 4.10.1642, f.714. 
810 K.A.770, 1.4.1643, f.127; K.A.779, 21.5.1652, f.281; K.A.I054, 3.3.1644, 
f.574; K.A.I056, 17.2.1643, ff.743-43vo, 3.4.1643, f.764; K.A.I059, 
5.10.1644, f.279; K.A.I062, 15.1.164·7, f.9; K.A.I064 (vervolg), 2.8.1647, 
f.678vo, 20.4.1647, f.685vo. 
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in Tanjore. In about a year's time, 5000 slaves, most of whom were 
peasants and handicraftsmen, were purchased at Negapatam at the rate 
of 1 rial per head. And this figure represented hardly a quarter of the 
total available supply, which the Company could not afford to buy up 
owing to a shortage of provisions. Practically all the slaves were sent 
to Ceylon, where the Company tried to organise production of cloth 
under its own jurisdiction by the handicraftsmen purchased as slaves in 
Coromandel. This experiment, however, did not prove a great success. 
Besides, the supply of slaves stopped with the return of normal con-
ditions and none could he procured in the mid-'sixties despite the great 
demand in Banda and Batavia.311 
The need for larger food supplies created by Coen's new colonial 
policy also led to an increased demand for Coromandel rice. As early 
as 1618, the Company, faced with a shortage in Java, asked the Coro-
mandel factories to send as much rice and paddy as possible. Despite 
the objection of the coast factors on grounds of increased prices and 
limited capital, 1000 lasts were again ordered during the scarcity of 
1624-25 and 536 lasts actually exported. The shortage at Batavia con-
tinued till 1628 and ships were sent from there to Arakan in order to 
procure rice. When conditions improved in 1629, the orders to Cora-
mandel were reduced. Besides rice and paddy, quantities of butter, oil 
and honey, partly procured from Orissa, were exported to Batavia, but 
attempts to export meat met with littie success. Occasionally the Dutch 
appeared as sellers of rice in South Coromandel, which was not always 
self-sufficient in food, and sold quantities of imported Arakan rice. In 
1621, they also sold some Masulipatam riee at Pulicat at a profit of 40 % 
to 50 %.312 
Batavia's requirements of rice supply from Coromandel remained high 
in the 'thirties, specially because the Company now undertook the 
manufacture of arak for the provision of its ships. During the famine 
years, sm all quantities procured from Orissa were shipped to Batavia, 
though the demand for rice in Coromandel itself was very high. Even 
later, supplies came mainly from Bengal, Orissa and the south, specially 
in the early 'forties, because the sar-i-khail established a temporary 
311K.A.794, 29.3.1667, f.142; K.A.1121, 11.9.1659, f.795; K.A.1122, 14.8.1660, 
ff.382 ff. 
312 Coen, 11, p.450, 111, p.96, V, pp.295, 299, 382, 516, 580, VII, p.828, Vlh, 
pp.1184, 1214; D.R., 1624-29, pp.99, 133, 189, 211; K.A.754, 25.6.1624, 
f. 72vo; K.A.994, 27.1.1625, f.136vo; K.A.995, Masulipatam to Batavia, 
2.7.1624; K.A.997, 27.7.1625, ff.123 ff. 
168 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
monopoly of the rice trade at Masulipatam. In 1641, orders to Coro-
mandel were temporarily written off in view of the ample supplies from 
Arakan and Mataram. But the very next year, export from Mataram was 
prohibited by the king and a failure of crop in Java further complicated 
matters. So the Coromandel govemment was asked to procure 600 to 
800 lasts [1 last = 3,000 Ibs] from Bengal and Orissa. As regards wheat, 
147,238 Ibs were exported in 1641 and the annual order was fixed at 
120 lasts that year.313 
Despite the great dearth on the coast itself during the famine years, 
the Coromandel govemment was called upon to supply rice in quantities 
much larger than before. The chronic shortage in Batavia, owing to 
unfriendly relations with Mataram, one of the chief sources of supply, 
and the requirements of the Ceylon and Malacca factories explain this 
increasing demand on the coast. In 1643, Coromandel supplied 536 
lasts of rice with great difficulty, but during and, for several years, af ter 
the famine, Pulicat had to depend chiefly on Bengal and Orissa. By 
1652, the situation on the coast had improved and 1000 lasts were 
shipped to Batavia, besides 500 lasts to Ceylon. In 1653, the exports 
to Batavia rose to 1300 lasts and, in 1655, Ceylon also received 1000. 
The volume of wheat exported was comparatively small and does not 
appear to have exceeded 120 lasts in any year.314 
The requirements of the gun-powder factory at Amboina, the be-
ginning of gun-powder production in the Coromandel factories and high 
demand in Europe during the Thirty Years' War led to a great increase 
in the Company's purchase of Coromandel saltpetre, at first in demand 
mainly as ballast, - which had begun in the earliest years of the Com-
pany's trade with the coast. In 1624 and 1625, 270,000 Ibs and 286,434 Ibs 
respectively were shipped to Batavia from CoromandeI. At Tierepopelier, 
the chief source of supply, saltpetre was available at 6 to 8 rials per 
bahar (460 Ib). In Holland, when the prices rose by some 100 % in 
1628, it sold at 1 florin per pound; and when the country enjoyed 
comparative peace, the prices feil by 25 %. The wars and Danish com-
313K.A.760, 13.8.1635, f.481; K.A.765, 11.7.1639, f.413; K.A.768, 3.4.1641, 
Dl; K.A.769, 9.4.1641, f.132, 31.5.1642, f.285, 20.10.1642, f.714; K.A.I012, 
4.12.1630, f.142; K.A.I015, 9.12.1631, f.132vo; K.A.I047, "Verhael etc." 
f.420, 4.10.1642, ff.705vo-706. 
314K.A.770, 11.6.1643, f.377; K.A.774, 21.5.1647, f.224; K.A.779, 23.8.1652, 
f.563; K.A.783, 26.3.1656, f.ll5; K.A.I051, 22.12.1643, f.37; K.A.I056, 
3.6.1643, ff.767 ff, 3.10.1653, f.797vo; K.A.I062 (vervolg), 9.6.1646; f.797, 
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petition affeeted the supplies in CoromandeI, and for some years the 
Company was handieapped by the Iaek of arrangements for refining 
saltpetre. But by 1624, refining kettles imported from Holland were 
instalied, and it was deeided to export only refined saltpetre henee-
forward. 315 
Around the same time, the Coromandel faetories hegan to export gun-
powder, while previously they had to import it for their own use from the 
Indies and Holland. As adequate supplies to meet the Company's growing 
needs were no Ionger available, Coromandel was asked in 1617 to 
proeure gun-powder Ioeally; and it was soon diseovered that enough 
quantities to provide all the Asian faetories eould he seeured on the 
eoast, if the sulphur required for its manufaeture was regularly supplied. 
The priees were only 15/16 florins per toO Ibs. From 1624-25, the 
necessary supplies of sulphur and vats required for shipping were pro-
vided by Batavia; even an expert was sent from Holland. The quantity 
exported rose from 10,000 Ibs in 1625 to 22,000 Ibs in 1627.316 
The demand for saltpetre was praetieally unlimited so long as the 
Thirty Years' War eontinued in Europe. In 1634, orders were placed 
for 300,000 to 400,000 Ibs for Holland and 100,000 Ibs for Batavia, but 
as the Company's purehases during the preeeding years had been some-
what irregular, produetion had deelined proportionately, and only 
to3,407 Ibs could he shipped that year. In the late 'thirties, saltpetre 
from Bengal supplemented those from the eoast. At first, unrefined 
Bengal saltpetre was brought to Tegenapatam for refining, but in 
1640-41, a refinery was set up at Pipli with copper kettles imported 
from Holland.311 
The growing requirements of the Asian faetories also led to an in-
erease in the export of gun-powder whieh rose from about 12,000 Ibs in 
1631 to 50,000 Ibs in 1635 and eventually to 70,000 Ibs in 1642. Even 
toO,OOO Ibs, Batavia pointed out in 1642, could he used to provide 
315 Coen, 11, p.297, 111, p.209, V, pp.30, 515, VII, p.360, Vlh, pp.1183-84; 
KAA51, 12.4.1617, f.199; KA.452, Amsterdam to Coromandel, 15.10.1621; 
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316 KA.451, 12.4.1617; K.AA52, Am..terdam to Coromandel, 15.10.1623, 
12.11.1626, same to Batavia, 8.12.1625; K.A.755, Batavia to Coromandel, 
26.7.1625; K.A.756, 27.6.1626, f.87; Coen, V, pp.28, 118, 516, VlIs, 
p.1184. 
31T KA.767, 14.4.1640, f.131; K.A.I025, 20.9.1634, f.324vo; K.A.I029, 
10.6.1635, f.676vo; K.A.I042, 3.3.1640, ffA29v0---430; K.A.I044, 10.3.1641, 
ff.269 ff. 
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adequately the Company's ships and factories. As the manufacture of 
gun-powder was carried on for the most part directly under the Com-
pany's auspices, production could he maintained on a high level despite 
wars and famine. The main difficulty encountered in connection with 
the export of gun-powder was a shortage of earthenware vessels required 
for shipping, and as a make-shift arrangement, wooden caskets with 
leather tops were at times used for the purpose. Sulphur, a necessary 
ingredient, as a1ready noted, was also not locally available in adequate 
quantities, and supplies had to be provided from Holland.3lS 
With the growth of the Company's trade in BengaI, the problem of 
saltpetre supply was solved satisfactorily, despite the efforts of some 
Bengal nobles to monopolise the sale of this commodity to the Dutch. 
As Gingi, one of the chief sources of supply, was badly affected by the 
war, attempts were made on the coast to procure it from places further 
south like Trimelevas. But Bengal definitely replaced Coromandel as the 
chief source of supply, and large quantities, procured mainly from Patna, 
and refined at Hugli or Pipli, were of ten shipped direct to Batavia. The 
end of the Thirty Years' War does not appear to have vitally affected 
the demand for saltpetre in Holland, which was still about 800,000 Ibs 
in 1652. Earlier, in 1649, 840,000 Ibs were actually procured at Patna 
and a fall in prices in 1655 further facilitated procurement.319 
The demand for gun-powder a1so remained consistently high, as 
Coromandel was called upon to provide not only for Batavia, but a1so 
other factories in Asia, particularly those in Malacca, Persia and Ceylon. 
Part of the supplies from the coast was a1so shipped to Holland during 
this period. In 1655, 'factories' for producing gun-powder were started 
in Batavia, - as it was not a1ways convenient to depend onthe coast, -
and two years later the Ceylon factories also started manufacturing for 
themselves with saltpetre from BengaI. Still, the factories on the coast 
were asked to produce 200,000 Ibs per annum, so that there should he 
no shortage in the supply of this vitally important commodity. The bulk 
of the gun-powder required for Asia apparently continued to be supplied 
from Coromandel. In 1644, and again in 1652, fires in the godowns at 
Pulicat and Masulipatam resulted in temporary dislocation of produc-
tion. But matters were soon set right, and a shortage of proper packing 
318K.A.760, 29.1.1635, f.274; K.A.769, 9.4.1642, f.129; K.A.I015, 12.7.1631, 
f.135vo; K.A.1037, 20.3.1638, f.169vo; K.A.I047, 4.10.1642, f.711. 
319K.A.I054, 4.5.1644, f.565; K.A.I056, 17.2.1643, f.747; K.A.I064, 27.6.1647, 
f.755vo; K.A.I066, 18.1.1649, f.92; K.A.I079, ff.256-57; K.A.I091, 
13.2.1653, f.275; K.A.ll00, 24.12.1655, f.92vo. 
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material remained the chief difficulty with regard to the supply of gun-
powder.320 
In 1615, the lucrative diamond trade of Coromandel and the adjacent 
regions attracted the attention of the Company, and chief factor Willem 
den Dorst submitted a report about the prospects of this trade in Gingi. 
It was not from Gingi or Vellore, however, that the Company tried to 
procure diamonds in this period. In September, 1615, factor Leonard 
Wolff was sent to Bijapur to secure from the king the right to trade in 
diamonds in his country. But Wolff's mission proved an expensive 
failure and Pieter Gillisz, who was sent to replace him, did not achieve 
much either. The Company decided to purchase in Coromandel 6/700 
pagodas worth of diamonds in March, 1616. Beyond that, the Dutch 
made little headway in this line of trade until the early 'twenties.321 
Though the earlier prospecting missions in South Coromandel had 
heen of little use, by 1621, following the discovery of some new mines 
in Golconda, the diamond trade was organised on a fairly stabie 
basis. 1788 ca rats of Golconda diamonds exported that year secured 
high profits in Holland and Coromandel was asked to procure as much 
as possible. But in 1622, the king temporarily closed the mines partly 
with the object of intensifying demand, and consequently prices rose by 
some 100 %. Still the Dutch continued their purchases, even raising 
loans for the purpose. Though the mines were reopened in 1623, dia-
monds were declared a royal monopoly, no traders being allowed to 
purchase them. Still, in 1624, the Dutch managed to export 1561 carats. 
When, in 1627, the purchase of diamonds was again allowed, the prices 
were still prohibitive, and the merchants were afraid to bring supplies 
to Masulipatam, because of the governor's rapacity. Prices feIl with the 
resumption of the old custom of farming out the mines, but they did 
not return to their earlier level. In 1629, only 63 carats were exported to 
Batavia and it was made clear that it was impossible to supply diamonds 
worth 100,000 florins as ordered by Amsterdam.322 
320 KA.771, 23.9.1644, f.634; KA.779, 23.8.1652, f.570; K.A.782, 16.4.1655, 
ff.126-27; KA.783, 26.3.1656, f.112; KA.1059, 5.10.1644, f.289, KA.I060, 
"Verhael etc.," f.213vo; KA.I066, 7.10.1648, f.462; KA. 1086, 16.10.1652, 
f.521vo; KA.l111, 28.9.1657, ff.590 ff. 
:rll KA.973, 14.12.1615, ff.161vo, 173, 202, 209, Resolutions, Pulicat, 26.4.1616, 
21.9.1615, 22.1.1616; "De Nederlanders in Voor Indië etc.", De Indische 
Gids, 1915, p.335. 
322 Relations, pp.31 ff; Coen, I, pp.611, 753, 111, p.209, V, pp.30, 95, VII, 
pp.748, 829, Vlh, pp.1065, 1069, 1178, 1184, 1218, 1346, 1447, 1761; 
KA.452, Amsterdam to Batavia, 18.10.1623, same to Corornandel, 15.12.1623; 
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The insecurity of the roads to the mine district affected the Company's 
diamond trade during the famine in the early 'thirties. Later, in 1635, 
as a result of the large purchases by the merchants from Goa, Arakan 
and Achin, prices at Masulipatam were nearly as high as in Europe. In 
1636, however, diamonds worth 45,566 florins were procured by the 
Company. But soon afterwards the Golconda king again prohibited 
digging for diamonds for some time in order to increase the demand, 
and it was not until the early 'forties that the condition of this trade 
improved once more. The blockade of Goa stopped the export of dia-
monds to Europe by the Portuguese and this led to a decline in demand. 
Prices feil sharply at Masulipatam as the Goa banians were no longer 
interested in large purchases. In 1639-40, Amsterdam wanted some 
100,000 to 150,000 florins to be invested in Golconda diamonds and in 
1642 diamonds worth 86,143 florins were exported by the Coromandel 
factories. But a change in the market conditions in Europe soon termi-
nated this short-Iived boom.323 
The demand for diamonds in the European markets revived not 
long af ter this slump. But, for a variety of reasons, Batavia now de-
pended more on purchases made at Surat and Succadana than on 
supplies from the coast. Of a total supply worth 100,000 florins in 1643, 
the diamonds supplied from Coromandel were worth only 42,000 florins. 
The mass exodus of labourers from Gingi had affected diamond mining 
in that area. Besides, the capita! at the disposal of the Coromandel 
factories was required to procure cargo for the more important Persian 
trade. And, during the years of tmce, the Portuguese and banians from 
Goa once more began to purchase large quantities of diamonds in 
Golconda, which were eventually exported to Europe. Prices went up by 
20 % to 25 % in consequence and they retumed to their former level 
only af ter 1651, when the Portuguese slackened their efforts to procure 
diamonds. In 1652, Coromandel diamonds once more fetched high 
profits in Europe and the coast factors were again, af ter many years, 
to invest 100,000 florins in this precious stone.324 
K.A.451, "Remonstrantie" of Franco van der Mt'er, f.199; K.A.997 j 
Masulipatam to Batavia, 26.6.1625; E.F.I., 1622--23, pp.48, 221, 229, 247: 
L.T., 1., L.M., xv, 18.2.1622, f.192. 
3113 K.A.767, 14.4.1640, f.126; K.A.768, 3.4.1641, f.75; K.A.I017, 20.10.1632, 
f.184; K.A.1022, 15.8.1634, f.34vo; K.A.I029, 19.6.1635, f.666; K.A.I031, 
28.12.1636, f.62; K.A.1034, 9.12.1637, ff.174-··75, 25.5.1637, f.673vo; 
K.A.I039, 18.12.1639, f.81; K.A.1047, "Verhael etc.," f.423; K.A.I048, 
12.12.1642, f.59vo. 
1124 K.A.772, 8.7.1645, f.301; K.A.779, 23.8.1652, f.561; K.A.1051, 22.12.1643, 
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The demand for diamonds in Europe, subject to sharp fluctuations, 
rose steadily in the 'sixties, and those procured in Coromandel sold at 
a: gross profit of 166J12 % in 1661-62, while the supplies from Surat 
fetched not more than 118 % profit, because of the comparatively 
higher purchase price. But the brisk purchase by the English private 
traders raised prices to an uneconomic level, and, in view of the shortage 
of capital, the Company did not buy any diamonds in Coromandel for 
some years. In 1688, diamonds worth 116,198 florins were again ex-
ported to Holland, but the profits were no longer so large owing to bad 
purchases and it was decided in 1670 to reduce this line of trade to a 
minimum.325 
The market for iron nails and steel, exported by the Dutch in small 
quantities to the Archipelago, appears to have been somewhat limited 
at least in the initial phase, for the comparatively large supply brought 
by the ship Eendracht in 1608 created a slump and so affected the 
prices that "profit turned into loss".326 
Export of these items shared in the general increase in the 'twenties. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that by this time the Company's know-
ledge of the market conditions rather than the market itself had under-
gone a significant expansion. In 1623, 96,000 Ibs of iron and 20,000 
pieces of steel were shipped; in 1628, 77 bahars [1 bah ar = 480 Ibs] of 
iron were procured. As J apanese iron bars had a good market in the 
Indies, attempts were made to have the Coromandel bars manufactured 
af ter samples from Japan. However, attempts to capture the Sumatra 
market from the hands of the Asian competitors were not very successful 
and, by 1626-27, Batavia recommended reduction in the quantity of 
export, as supplies had exceeded the optimum level.327 
The export of iron and steel was reduced to a minimum in the 
'thirties in view of the very limited demand in the Indies. Iron, in 
f.3vo; K.A.I054, 13.5.1644, ff.603-4; K.A.I056, 3.10.1643, f.796vo; 
K.A.I074, 24.1.1652, ff.llvo-I2; K.A.1086, 14.7.1652, f.499, 16.10.1652, 
f.516. 
:r-5K.A.789, 14.8.1662, f.343; K.A.792, 21.7.1665, f.296; K.A.795, 9.11.1668, 
f.791; K.A.797, 31.10.1670, f.710; K.A.798, 29.4.1671, f.412; K.A.1122, 
14.8.1660, f.385; K.A.1159, 15.12.1669, f.362. 
~6 K.A.967, L. Ysaacx' 'Infonnatie', 1608. 
:m K.A.452, Amsterdam to Coromandel, 15.10.1623; K.A.994, Masulipatam 
to Amsterdam, 4.10.1624; K.A.997, Masulipatam to Batavia, 29.12.1624; 
K.A.I001, 27.6.1626, ff.81 ff; Coen, VII2, pp.l064, 1215; Coen, 11, pp.209, 
444; K.A.452, 18.9.1621, f.69, Amsterdam to Coromandel, 15.12.1623; Coen, 
11, p.447, 111, p.74; K.A.451, 19.10.1617, f.126, 18.9.1621, 00; K.A.999, 
Pulicat to Batavia, 16.10.1625, Masulipatam to Amsterdam, 8.3.1626. 
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particular, hardly fetched the cost price. But a good market was soon 
found in Persia for some varieties of Coromandel steel. In 1634, 6,684 
pieces of steel and 9,600 pieces of iron were exported, while the follow-
ing year the exports were increased to 15,440 pieces of steel and 5,039 
pieces of iron. In 1636, Batavia ordered 18,000 to 20,000 pieces of 
steel.328 The export of iron and steel appears to have increased by the 
mid-'fifties. 329 
The export of Coromandel iron, never of any great importance earIier, 
featured prominently in the Company's trade during the 'sixties. The 
difficulties of iron supply from Europe during the wars were the chief 
factor behind the Dutch efforts to procure as much of this metal from 
the coast as possible. Pig iron, iron bands, iron bars and cannon balls 
were required in large quantities, not only for the factories in the East 
Indies and Ceylon, but also for the Company's trade with Arakan and 
Tonkin. Coromandel iron bars were also exported from Batavia to 
Manila. The manufacture of these articles was therefore organised on 
a large scale in several factories under the supervision of Dutch experts, 
and by 1667 the exports reached a peak.330 The different varieties 
yielded 80 % to 100 % gross profits in the East Indies. In 1672, a 
Swedish expert sent from Batavia taught the Indian blacksmiths a 
quicker method of manufacturing nails and cannon balls which would 
quadruple the rate of production. But the local authorities disallowed 
the introduction of this new method as it might eventually deprive 
many blacksmiths of their livelihood, - an incident which throws an 
interesting side-light on the economic policy of the government.331 The 
export of steel, except for small quantities shipped to Ceylon and Japan, 
almost ceased in the 'sixties. 
But in 1671, Batavia again placed an order for 20,000 Ibs.332 The 
328K.A.758, Batavia to Coromandel, 2.5.1630; K.A.761, 13.2.1635, f.90, 
21.7.1636, f.502; K.A.1025, 29.5.1634, f.319; K.A.I029, Ysbrantsz' Dagh-
register, 1635, f.676vo. As the records clo not mention the weights but only 
the number of pieces, no exact estimate of the volume of iron and steel 
export is possible. 
329 In 1644, 5,560 Ibs of steel were exported to Batavia; in 1657, the exports 
incIuded 10,109 Ibs of steel and 15 bahars of iron. See KA.I059, 5.lO.1644, 
f.281; K.A.1086, 4.3.1657, fo448. 
330 In 1667, 105,000 Ibs of iron nails, 188,000 Ibs of eannon balis, 189,000 Ibs of 
iron bars and 10,000 Ibs of iron bands were exported from Coromandel. 
Sec K.A.1152, 6.12.1667, f.151vo. 
331 K.A.789, 22.9.1662, f.525; K.A.795, 2004.1668, L178, 9.11.1668, f.786; 
K.A.801, 19.10.1674, f.501; K.A.1128, 26.12.1662, ff.221-22; K.A.1175, 
31.1.1673, ff.308 ff. 
332 KA. 1144, f.1765; KA.1156, 25.6.1668, f.755vo; KA.798; 13.11.1671, f.828. 
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exports {rom the coast also included a miscellaneous variety of minor 
items. Cotton yam from Pulicat, bezoar stones, coir-ropes and sail-
c10th were exported from Coromandel as early as 1616, though not in 
any considerable quantities.333 The exports to Holland included cotton 
yam as also cotton. The quantity of cotton yam supplied in 1618, we 
are told, was very small and Amsterdam ordered 5/6,000 fardels in 1621. 
In 1623, 5/600 Ibs cotton were ordered as sample. From 1617 onwards, 
a small quantity of borax was annually exported to Europe, though it 
fetched very poor prices there; still Coromandel occasionally ex-
ported very small quantities of this commodity. 20 seers of borax were 
sent in 1626, as no other commodity could be secured from some mer-
chants indebted to the Company. Bengal sugar, purchased in Coro-
mandel or at Balasore at about 12/3 stuiver per pound, fetched a high 
profit in Europe, specially 1624 onwards, when troubles in Brazil 
affected an important source of supply. Part of the Bengal sugar ex-
ported to Batavia apparently went to Persia even in the 'twenties, -
a line of trade whieh assumed considerable importance later on.334 
The minor items of export to the Indies included a number of 
articles required for packing and shipping cargo, e.g., gunny sacks, eoir 
rope etc. Some coir rope was apparently manufactured in the factories 
and, in 1628, Batavia recommended an increase in production. Large 
earthen vessels procured from Bunna and known as "Martavan" af ter 
their place of origin were in great demand for shipping vietuals.335 
In spite of uneconomic prices, the Dutch invested a small amount 
of capital in Coromandel pepper, in order to prevent the English and 
the Danes from exporting it to Europe. About 5/6000 bahars of pepper 
were available per annum on the coast, part of which was imported stuff 
brought by Muslim traders from Achin. Aehin peppf'r cost 18 pagoda 
per bahar (480 lb) at Masulipatam. The main source of local supply 
was Peta, near Tranquebar, and the price there was as high as 32 rials 
per bahar (460 lb). In 1626, Batavia discouraged further purchases, 
while recommending efforts to prevent the Danes and the English from 
securing the commodity.336 A small quantity of opium was available 
in Coromandel at very high prices. In view of the great demand in 
333 K.A.973, 29.3.1616, f.178, Resolutions, Pulicat, 22.1.1616, 26.4.1616; 
Relations, p.52; "De Nederlanders in Voor Indië etc." De Indische Gids, 
1915, p.336. 
334Coen, 111, f.75, V, f.384, V1I2, f.1440; K.A.995, Pulicat to Batavia, 6.6.1624; 
K.A.997, 256.7.1625, ff.123 ff. 
335Coen, 11, pp.214, 447; 111, p.75; V, p.381; VII2, pp.1223, 1365. 
330 Coen, 11, pp.214, 447. 
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Batavia, 450 Ibs of opium were exported in 1626, but this line of export 
never attained any considerable proportions.337 Red wood from Cali-
tura, which the Portuguese used to export very profitably to the Far 
Bast, was expected to have a good market in Japan and among the 
Chinese in Java. In 1619, a quantity was sent for the first time as ballast. 
This was the beginning of a line of export which became very profitable 
later on.338 The exports in this period also included 80,000 roof-tiles 
shipped in 1624.339 
Of the minor lines of export trade, the supply of cotton yam suffered 
a set-back as the prices went up by 40 % to 80 % during the famine 
of the early 'thirties and even afterwards the continued high price of 
cotton affected production.340 Of the articles required for packing, only 
small consigments of gunny sacks and Martavan jars could be exported, 
though these were still in great demand.341 The other items of export 
included opium required for the Malabar trade, bezoar stones and 
buffalo homs. Some of the goats from which bezoar stones were extrac-
ted were sent to Holland as curios. Batavia appreciated very much 
some spotted deer exported from Coromandel and asked for more as 
presents for the Govemor-General and for breeding them in Banda.342 
In 1635, 774 pieces of Calitura wood were sent for FortDosa, where 
there was a growing demand for this item.343 
The export of skins and leathers also developed in the 'thirties to a 
certain extent. Ray-skins, available in quantities at San Thomé and 
further south, had a good market in Japan where fancy articles were 
manufactured from them. The Portuguese regularly exported them to 
Macao, and the Indian traders to Siam, whence they were carried by 
Chinese traders to Japan. The Dutch first exported 1511 pieces in 1635 
and they fetched a good profit in Japan. The Company's attempt to 
buy up the total available supply and thus prevent the Indian mer-
337 K.A.995, Masulipatam to Batavia, 2.7.1624; K.A.997, Batavia to Coromandel, 
26.7.1625, ff.123 ff; D.R., 1624-29, p.239. 
338 Coen, VII, p.421. 
339D.R., 1624-29, f.99. 
340 K.A.1023, 27.12.1634, f.96; K.A.I025, 20.9.1634, f.329; K.A.1031, 8.10.1636, 
f.1124. 
341 K.A.759, Instructions to Coromandel, 28.6.1633; K.A.762, 17.2.1637; 
K.A.1025, 20.9.1634, f.329. 
342 K.A.760, 13.8.1635, f.490, 29.1.1635, f.275; K.A.764, 11.8.1638, f.373; 
K.A.767, 31.7.1640, f.392; K.A.I023, 20.2.1634, f.268; K.A.I029, 19.6.1635, 
f.668; K.A.I037, 14.5.1638, f.218vo; K.A.I039, 6.5.1639, f.1078; K.A.1047, 
"Verhael etc.," f. 436vo. 
343 K.A.1029, 2.11.1635, f.683vo. 19.6.1635, f.66B. 
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chants from exporting the best quality produets to Siam, was, however, 
not successful.344 
Japan also provided a good market for coloured leather and some 
red, black and yellow leather were exported from Coromandel. Signifi-
cantly enough, the Dutch failed to induce the local craftsmen to 
manufacture green and blue leather, for this was not a part of their 
traditional craft. Besides these, 292 pairs of shoes for the use of the Com-
pany's soldiers and a small quantity of deer-skins and tiger-skins were 
also exported to Batavia in the 'thirties.345 
In the 'forties, the growing demand for ray-skins in Japan helped 
develop a line of export which had a rather feebie beginning earlier. 
In 1643, 30,000 to 40,000 pieces of ray-skins from San Thomé were 
ordered for Japan, partly in order to undermine the trade of the Danes 
who were exporting large quantities to the Far East. The old problem 
with regard to the ray-skin trade, viz., large supplies by Indian mer-
chants to Siam, which eventually reached Japan, was still very serious 
as late as 1654.346 The market for another commodity, Calitura wood, 
continued to expand in the Far East. In 1643, 1000 to 1500 pieces were 
ordered for Formosa. But in Batavia itself, the profit on this article was 
small compared to the shipping space taken up by it. Still, in 1655, 
Coromandel was asked to send as much as possible as ballast.347 The 
export of opium and tobacco, procured in Bengal and Coromandel 
respectively, for supporting the Malabar pepper trade, also increased 
in this period. 10,000 Ibs of opium were required in 1647, but the 
Coromandel authorities did not apprehend any shortage. The Golconda 
authorities at first objected to the export of tobacco and the necessary 
permission was secured only with difficulty. Tobacco in small quantities 
was also exported by the Company to Bengal.348 No significant change 
in the export of minor items is noticeable in later years. In 1655, we 
come across an interesting item, viz., 20 donkeys exported to Java for 
:l~ K.A.760, 13.8.1635, fA86; K.A.761, 13.2.1636, f.81; KA.765, 28.2.1639, 
f.118; K.A.1029, 19.6.1635, f.668; K.A.1027, 9.5.1638, f.200vo. 
3411 KA.761, 13.2.1636, f.90; KA.1025, 20.9.1634; f.329; KA.I031, 25.9.1636, 
f.1155; KA.I037, 14.5.1638, f.212vo; K.A.I029, 30.7.1639, f.l094; K.A.1042, 
30.5.1640. f.463. 
348 KA.770, 1.4.1643, f.132; K.A.771, 17.4.1644, f.136; K.A.I094, 15.9.1656, 
f.450vo. 
34T KA.770, 11.6.1643, f.381; K.A.782, 1.7.1655, ff.320-21; K.A.783, 26.3.1656, 
f.112; K.A.ll02, 13.9.1655, f.117vo. 
343 K.A.774, 27.7.1647, f.380; K.A.I064 (vervolg), 2.8.1647, ff.683 ff; K.A.I066, 
1410.1648, f.447vo, 5.10.1647, f.520vo. 
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purposes of cultivation.849 In the 'eighties when a shrinking market for 
the Company's exports severely affected the trade of the coast factories, 
the minor items were among the first to feel the blow. 
As the Bengal factories were under the Coromandel "government" for 
a number of years one may briefly discuss here some items of export 
from Bengal which soon acquired great importance in the Company's 
trade. From 1634 onward, the volume of Dutch trade with Bengal 
increased steadily. The capital employed in this trade in 1634 was only 
about 54,600 florins while as much as 113,381 florins were invested in 
1639. The volume of Dutch exports from Bengal may be gauged from 
the fact that the return cargo in 1639-40 was valued at 95,643 florins. 
Even in 1636, a much-troubled year, the Company made a profit of 
more than 26,000 florins in Bengal. 
Sugar, refined saltpetre, rice, cloth, ginger and raw silk wt're the 
main items exported by the Dutch from Bengal, while quantities of 
Gingelly oil, white cummins, wheat, butter, beeswax and lac were also 
shipped from time to time. Bengal sugar was eventually exported to 
Persia and Europe, and the saltpetre used for the manufacture of gun-
powder on the coast. Dried ginger and silk from Bengal rendered very 
good profit in Europe, and 338]'4 Ibs of Bengal silk sent as samples to 
Japan in 1640 marked the beginning of a very important line of trade. 
Slaves constituted an important, but irregular item of export: only 19 
were secured in 1640, but as many as 314 in 1642. 
The major change in the pattern of export trade in the 'forties so 
far as the Coromandel government was concerned, was in connection 
with two products of Bengal, silk and sugar. The export of Bengal silk 
to both Holland and Japan had started in the preceding decade, but its 
volume was insignificant. By 1649, the quantity exported in an average 
year was as much as 60,000 to 70,000 Ibs; and by 1654, the average 
annual investment in Bengal silk was about 250,000 florins. While the 
profits on Bengal silk in Holland remained consistently high, they never 
reached the same level as in Japan, where the average rate of profit 
was about 100 % and could be as high as 200 % in an exceptionally 
good year. Despite a slump in the Japanese market in 1650, it was 
decided to reserve the bulk of the silk supplies from Bengal for Japan, 
because the profits there were still higher than in Holland. Besides, it 
was now the accepted policy of both Amsterdam and Batavia to give 
first priority to the Company's inter-Asian trade, so that the profits 
349 K.A.782, 16.4.1655, f.152. 
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therefrom could eventually cover the cost of the return cargo to Europe 
without any capital supply from Europe. The fact that the Northern 
Indian merchants transported Bengal silk overland to Surat via Agra 
at great expense and still made large profits, induced the Coromandel 
government to send some of their supplies to Surat by sea in 1646--47. 
But this experiment was soon abandoned as the profits secured were a 
mere 13r'2 %, despite the lower cost of transport. The higher profits 
of the Indian merchants were ascribed to their direct contact with the 
manufacturers. The Company's subsequent attempt to eliminate the 
middlemen in their dealings with producers of silk does not appear to 
have been a great success. 
The volume of sugar export, mainly for the Persian market, also 
underwent an enormous increase in the 'forties. In 1644--45 and 1648, 
the destruction of the sugar-cane crop by heavy floods caused a slump 
in the supplies. In anormal year, the average shipment to Persia was 
between 400,000 to 450,000 Ibs, and some sugar was also regularly 
exported to Mokha, Ceylon, Batavia and Holland. 
The enormous increase in the volume of export from the coast in the 
'forties and 'fifties is only partly explained by the increase in the export 
of coast cloth. A substantial proportion of this increase refers to silk, 
sugar and saltpetre from Bengal, and altogether this Mughal province 
now featured very prominently in the pattern of the Company's trade. 
The Dutch investment in Bengal rose steadily from 117,407 florins in 
1643--44 to 451,441 florins in 1648 and to as much as 635,462 florins 
in 1653. Thus in 1653 the capital invested was more than five times 
the amount invested in 1643. The total volume of the return cargo for 
Batavia, Persia and other regions in 1653 was valued at 492,120 florins 
which, too, indicates an increase of more than 400 % as compared with 
the figures for 1639--40. The gross profits in Bengal varied considerably 
from year to year, as they were very much dependent on governmental 
policy and other extraneous factors. In 1649, the profits fell to a mere 
22,802 florins, while in a good year, like 1651, they could be as high as 
107,775 florins. 350 
The evailable 'quantitative data regarding the items of export from 
the factories under the Coromandel government prove one point beyond 
doubt: the volume of export all along the line was expanding steadily 
during the seventeenth century, - until the mid-'eighties, - so far as 
3150 The references for these statistical data are the same as those for the 
Company's activities in Bengal in lhis period mentioned in Chapter 111, 
supra. 
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the Dutch Company was concerned. If this was particularly true of the 
main item of export, textiles, the rate of expansion, though not the 
absolute volume of export, of less important items, was hardly less 
spectacular. In the later years of the century, as the ascendancy in 
Coromandel's export trade passed from the Dutch to a Company much 
better provided with capital, and the participation of local merchants 
in this trade also increased substantiaIly, it is reasonable to assume that 
the upward trend in the volume of export was maintained. Since there 
is nothing to indicate that the expansion of export was achieved at the 
cost of the producers' standard of consumption, or of supplies to the 
internal markets, or through a marked increase in population, the con-
clusion that there was an absolute as weIl as a per capita increase in 
production in the regions supplying the staples of export seems equaIly 
valid. 
It is a significant fact that the upward trend in exports persisted 
through the years when there was a dislocation of production in exten-
sive parts of the country. To assume that the volume of production 
continued to increase in the parts directly affected by war and famine 
would be obviously incorrect. One is left to conclude that in response 
to the steadily expanding demand created by the European investments, 
a region, comparatively insulated from the effects of anarchie conditions, 
producing both raw material and finished products, had developed 
around the centres of export. The increasing product ion in such are as 
was capable of compensating, - no doubt only partially, - the loss 
of production in others in times of anarchy. The coastal regions were by 
no means free from the ravages of war and the attendant evils. But 
there, as the tide of war receded, the dislocated machinery of produc-
tion was quickly set right by adequate investments of capital, - an 
advantage which the in land are as did not enjoy equaIly. Whatever the 
magnitude of increase in production in the context of the Indian 
economy as a whoie, its qualitative significanee is indeed considerable. 
The qualitative significanee consists particularly in the fact that the 
existing machinery of production, despite the incongenial institutional 
framework, was capable of sustaining an expansion in production, given 
adequate capital investment. Besides, the European Companies' procure-
ment of the return cargo involved certain changes in the organisation 
of production to a quantitatively limited extent. The impact of European 
merchant capital implied in effect a penetration of capital into pro-
duction, both directly and indirectly. The putting out system was now 
developed to a considerable extent. Inducements were offered to the 
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cultivators for the production of cash crops for an export market. In 
some cases, the production of indigo was so exclusively dependent on 
the export market that in the absence of the external demand for a 
few successive years, the producer changed over to the cultivation of 
some other crop. Under the control of the Companies' own factories, 
production or processing of certain items was organised on the basis 
of wage labour, and new techniques were introduced. As a matter of 
fact, in a limited sector of the economy, new production relations were 
emerging. The development of a production organisation, oriented to 
the market, and not at all based on production for use, was one of the 
outstanding facts in the new situation. Coromandel's export trade was 
by no means primarily dependent on the surplus from the self-sufficient 
villages. These developments, we know, did not lead to a spectacular 
expansion of production under the con trol of merchant capital, as was 
the case in early modern Europe. The failure of the local merchants to 
invest in production, the limited penetration of European capital, the 
eventual establishment of monopsonistic con trol, - all these factors 
probably contributed to the negative result. Their relative importance 
is a question which needs further investigation. 
CHAPTER IX 
TUE IMPORT mADE 
If in the economy of the Coromandel coast in the seventeenth cen-
tury, the one outstanding feature was the expansion of the export trade 
and consequently of production, a corresponding increase in impOI·U 
was one of the results of that development. The increase in imports, 
however, primarily meant an increasing flow of cash specie, because 
the commodity market for imports does not appear to have undergone 
any substantial expansion. 
For the Dutch, interested only to a very Iimited extent in the profits 
of the import trade on the coast, the imports were significant chiefly 
as investments. Their worry about the Iimited commodity market derived 
mainly from their inability to supply adequate quantities of cash specie 
and bullion, the items chicfly in demand. The profit and loss on the 
sale of the Company's wares in the coast factories were important only 
in so far as they increased or decreased thc available supply of capital 
for the procurement of the return cargo. And in their eagemess to in-
crease this supply, they imported, of ten experimentally, every Iikely item 
from the different countries of Asia and occasionally also from Europe. 
Since increasing the supply of capital was the Company's main object 
in the import trade, a relevant phenomenon was the expenditure on 
the maintenance of the coast factories. The tendency of the establish-
ment cost to increase steadily was among the Company's major problems 
and eventually a contributory factor in its decline. 
The volume of imports, including specie, bullion and merchandise, -
in other words the Company's investment in Coromandel, - was not 
considerable during the early years of Dutch activities on the coast. 
Silver rials, popularised by the Portuguese throughout Asia, then con-
stituted the bulk of the Dutch imports to Coromandel. For the rest, 
they imported spices, - mace, cloves and nutmeg, - sandal wood, eagle 
wood, tin, spelter, alum, some Chinese wares like porcelain and fancy 
c10thes etc. procured from different parts of south-east Asia, besides a 
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quantity of lead and some types of cloth from Holland.35t It is not 
possible to form any precise idea regarding the exact quantities of 
merchandise imported by the Company in the first and second decades 
of the century. The silence of the records, however, suggests that initially 
they were too small even to cause any slump in the very limited com-
modity markets, a phenomenon encountered as early as 1616-17.352 
An increase in the volume of imports dictated by the requirements of the 
growing export trade took place by the 'twenties. As the demand for 
imported commodities was limited and highly inflexible, this increase 
consisted mainly in a larger supply of coins and precious metals, which 
too was subject to severe limitations. In Java, only small quantities of 
gold were available at very high prices. Japan supplied a quantity of 
silver. But, for the bulk of their requirements, the Coromandel factories 
were dependent on Holland. The Dutch, though by no means free 
from mercantilist inhibitions, were fortunately not "so curious to forbid 
exportation of money as the English". 
In the context of the poverty of the masses, the volume and variety 
of demand for imports was not insignificant in Coromandel. This 
demand, however, was adequately met in the past by the Asian and 
Portuguese merchants trading with various parts of Asia. As the total 
demand apparently had not increased, the arrival of the Dutch and 
the English with their fresh imports caused a slump in the market.,353 
The monopolistic policy of the Dutch in relation to their competitors 
can be partly explained in the light of this fact, though the tendency 
was built into the Mercantilist system itself. 
By the 'twenties, however, the Dutch had succeeded in securing a 
351 K.A.967, L. Ysaacx's "Infonnatie", "Memorie" of l'Hennite, Bantam, 
15.10.1609, Bourgonje and Marrelis to Ysaacx, 3.3.1610, Bantam Council to 
van Wesick, 13.12.1610. 
au A document, probably dated 1614, gives the following list of commodities 
as being necessary for the Company's trade in Coromandel in an average 
year, but the available data regarding the import of capital in this period 
definitely suggest that only a fraction of this total requirement was actually 
imported by the Dutch: 
100 candi (1 candi = 500 Ib) cloves, 500 sokel (1 sokel = 154 lb) mace, 
200 candi nutmeg, 6000 packs of Bantam pepper, 150 candi sandal wood, 
4 candi China silk, 200 candi Achin suIphur, 20 candi eagle-wood, 80 candi 
benzoin, 300 candi tin, 300 candi spelter, 200 candi lead, 200 candi alum, 
10,000 lb gun-powder, 2 candi quicksilver, 2 candi vennilion, 100 lb musk, 
50 lb camphor, besides a quantity of porcelain, gold yarn, crystal glasses, 
clock-works, pistols, muskets, pearls and cora!. See K.A.968, "Generale 
memorie van de coopmanschllppen etc.", ff.140--401. 
3113 K.A.4051, 'Remonstrantie' of Franco van der Meer, 12.4.1617, f.201. 
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comparatively wider market for their imports, including bullion. The 
gross profits on the sales of the Company's wares in Coromandel rose 
from about 132,000 florins in 1625 to 225,000 florins in 1628, while the 
expenditure on the coast factories rose from 50,000 to 60,000 florins 
during the same period. Two alternative explanations of this develop-
ment are possible. The Dutch, by undercutting prices, might have 
succeeded in capturing a considerable portion of the existing market. 
Since, however, they actually suffered a handicap in competition with 
their rivals so far as prices were concerned throughout their commercial 
career on the coast, this seems to be an unlikely explanation. It is more 
probable that the market for imports, particularly specie, continued to 
expand, so that the inercase in Dutch imports need not have been 
achieved at the cost of their rivals. One is, therefore, left to conclude 
that with better acquaintance with the market, the Company succeeded 
in exploiting a demand that had remained partly unsatisfied earlier and 
was now increasing. The investment of European merchant capital on 
the coast stimulated commercial activity and production. The consequent 
expansion in demand was chiefly concentrated in the bullion market 
where the main purchasers were the Indian merchants and middlemen 
who had profited directly or indirectly from the European trade. 
The annual profits on the coast continued to increase in the 'thirties 
and early 'forties, though the inclusion in the Coromandel accounts of 
the profits made in Bengal and Pegu made them appear bigger than 
they were. In 1637-38, for instance, of the total gross profit of 285,000 
florins, Pegu and Bengal provided 48,561 and 13,115 florins respectively. 
Insecure political conditions still at times adversely affected the demand 
for merchandise, resulting in a sudden fall in profit as in 1638-39 and 
1641-42. The total volume of expenditure for the Coromandel govern-
ment rose hy some 33 % owing to the establishment of the factories in 
Burma and Bengal. 
The import market appears to have been subject to sharp fluctuations 
from time to time, and even the much sought bullion and specie were 
not immune from their effects. The poor demand for the Company's 
wares and the heavy losses on silver resulted in a steady decline in the 
profits of the Coromandel factories during the late 'forties which was 
in strange contrast to the buoyant export trade.354 During 1647 to 1649, 
the coast factories actually suffered some loss on the sale of their wares, 
and though the conditions improved af ter the famine ended in 1650, it 
354 See in/ra, Appendix B. 
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was not always possible to make any profit because of the low price of 
silver and, af ter 1655, also of gold. But now, as before, the Company 
was ready to ignore the inadequate returns from the sale of its wares on 
the coast, in view of the supreme importance of the return cargo from 
Coromandel.355 
In the 'sixties and early 'seventies, the demand for commodities in 
general suffered a decline owing to the fiscal policy of the Golconda 
government in the north, and the wars and famine in the south. But 
the new factory established in Golconda provided a passage to the north 
Indian markets for the Company's wares, - except during the years 
when the approach of the Mughal army blocked the normal trade 
routes, - and thus helped ease the situation.356 
Af ter the opening of the Golconda factory, the total demand for 
commodities returned to the level of the 'fifties.357 The gross profits 
on some items were still very high. In 1660, vermilion and quicksilver 
sold at a profit of 79~ % and 1121/3 % respectively. But the attempt 
of the authorities in Holland to fix a minimum price for some com-
modities, spices in particular, of ten created difficulties. In 1673, Batavia 
had to permit a reduction of 10 % to 12 % in the price of spices in 
order to revive the demand.358 
The Company's chief imports, buIIion and cash specie were procured 
from a variety of sources. The bulk of the specie imported from Holland 
consisted of silver rials. From 1616 onwards, a progressive decIine in the 
price of rials throughout Coromandel seriously threatened the finances 
of the Company. The rials, valued at 48 stuivers, formerly sold at 10 
to 11!4 % fanums each. In 1616--17 the price feil to 8~/9~ fanums; 
355 K.A.I062, 15.1.1647, f.ll: K.A.I064, 31.12.1647, f.70vo; K.A.I066, 18.1.1649, 
f.92; K.A.I072, 10.12.1650, f.57; K.A.llIO, 17.12.1657, f.46vo; K.A.l11l, 
16.1.1658, ff.40---40vo. 
358 K.A.1122, 29.7.1661, f.722vo; K.A.1l23, 10.1.1660, f.7Ovo; K.A.1l24, 
22.12.1661, f.112; K.A.1152, 5.10.1667, f.56. 
:157 The orders from Coromandel to Batavia for thc supply of merchandise in 
1667 and 1669 were as fo\lows: 
1667: 400,000 lb ]apanese copper, 100,000 lb Malacca tin, 50.000 lb lead, 
8,000 lb vermilion, 4,000 lb qllicksilver, 10,000 lb alum, 40,000 lb cloves 
and 2,000 lb sandalwood. 
1669: 300,000 Ib ]apanese copper, 120,000 Ib Malacca tin, 50,000 lb spelter, 
30,000 Ib lead, 2,000 Ib quicksilver, 1,000 Ib sandalwood, 4,000 lb eagle 
wood, 2,000 lb tortoise shell, 20 soek el mace, 8,000 Ib nutmeg, 20,000 lb 
cloves, 100 black hats for Pegu, 1,100 mirrors, 1,000 pieces of ]apanese 
porcelain, 72 pieces of European cloth and lOme stationery etc. for the 
factories, See K.A.1l55, 10.2.1667, f.368; K.A.1160, 1.2.1669 f.433. 
358K.A.I1l9, 16.12.1659, f.47vo; K.A.1l22, 26.1.1661, f.433; 19.1.1661, f.418vo; 
K.A.797, 14.7.1670, f.423; K.A.800, 27.7.1673, f.633. 
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by 1626, it came down to 7~ fanums, eventually reaching some sort of 
an equilibrium at 9 tanums in 1627. In the Pulicat region conditions 
were worse than elsewhere, and even in 1628, a rial fetched no more 
than 7~ tantlms there. 
A change in the relative value of gold and silver and the poor 
quality of its alloy probably explain the fall in the price of this specie. 
To make matters worse, the rials, no longer accepted by traders, had to 
be first exchanged for pagodas before any investment could be under-
taken. The pagoda was valued at 90 stuiver, but under these circum-
stances, it actually cost much more, and the loss on rials varied from 
10 % to 20 %. The consequent repercussions on the price of cloth were 
very serious indeed. 
The one variety of specie which was acceptable and rendered profit 
throughout Coromandel during these years was the Hungarian ducat, 
probably because of the high quality of its alloy and its comparatively 
low oost price. For all foreign coins were valued in Coromandel strictly 
according to their metallic content. In 1627, 114,000 Hungarian ducats 
were imported and these were accepted by the Company's middlemen 
at the rate of 15~ to 16 tanums each, while in the open market they at 
times fetched as much as 20 fanums. 359 
To cut the loss on riais, the Coromandel factors asked for larger 
supplies of gold, which was expected to render profit. But the high 
hopes entertained in 1617, - viz., 20 % profit on unminted gold, -
proved to be unjustified. Between 1620 and 1623, the profits on gold 
varied from 3 % to 4 % at Pulicat and were somewhat less at Masuli-
patam. But from 1623-24, there was a sudden change in this respect. 
At Pulicat that year the profit on guinea gold rose to 6 % or even 7 % 
and on other varieties to 5 % or even 5~ %. By 1626, Pulicat yielded 
~ 1 % to 12 % profit on gold. But throughout this period, there was a 
steady loss on gold as weIl as ]apanese silver at Masulipatam. The scar-
city of foodstuff in the Golconda region in the late 'twenties led people to 
disgorge their hordes of precious metals, creating a situation comparable 
to inflationary condition, in so far as it led to a fall iJl the value of the 
media of exchange. Besides, while in normal times, these metals were 
betfer distributed, now a few big financiers were able to corner them 
359 Coen, I, pp.237, 283, 296, 611, 781, 796; VII, pp.236, 243, 359, 470; 
VIh, pp.1174, 1176, 1185, 1215: K.A.994, 27.1.1625, f.l38vo; K.A.995, 
Pulicat to Batavia, 28.1.1624; K.A.997, Pulicat to Batavia, 14.6.1625, 
Masulipatarn to Batavia, 26.6.1625; K.A.998, 3.2.1626; K.A.I012, 4.12.1630, 
f.132vo. 
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buying them up cheap and then, as the only buyers in the market, could 
dictate prices to the European importers. All these facts, however, point 
to an important conclusion, viz., that the demand for precious metals 
was neither uniform throughout India nor in any way unlimited. 
While the sharp fluctuations in their prices were caused largely by 
exceptional circumstances and artificial manoeuverings, they were almost 
certainly related in some measure to the increased volume of supply, 
and the limitations of the existing market. 
The nature of the import trade remained relatively unchanged in 
the 'thirties. Dnly, as compared to the earlier periods, a larger propor-
tion of the capital was now provided by the Asian factories and Coro-
mandel was no longer primarily dependent on Holland for the supply 
of capital. Silver ducats and abbasis from Persia, Chinese gold from 
Formosa and Batavia, bar silver, taels and gold coubangs from Japan 
and gold from Siam and the west coast of Sumatra constituted, in ever 
increasing proportion, a substantial part of the Company's imports to 
Coromandel. 
The low price of gold and silver, which had characterised the late 
\wenties, continued to embarass the Company in the subsequent 
decaded. The exact mechanism of these price fluctuations is not clear. 
But the fact that the price of the pagoda, the legal tender, was artifi-
cally fixed at a high level in Golconda, while that of the imported 
specie and precious metals rose and feIl, of ten in proportion to the 
volume of supply, was largely responsible for the situation. In 1630 
the pagoda, officially valued by the Company at 90 stuivers, actually 
cost more than 100. Silver and silver coins were the most affected by 
fluctuations in price and couid he sold only at a los8 till 1639. There 
was a temporary improvement during 1639-42, when some varieties 
of silver and silver specie actuaIly yielded a profit. But by the end of 
1642, the decline in prices had again set in. The Company's general 
poliey was to ignore the loss on silver, so long as it helped procure the 
all-important return cargo. Part of silver supply was diverted to Bengal 
where there was a good demand for it. 
The position with regard to gold and gold coins was somewhat 
different. These were the only commodities almost universally in de-
mand, though the prices varied considerably from region to region and 
were subject to fluctuations. While in the Golconda kingdom the prices 
were lower and generally led to losses, in the south, the Company could 
sell gold at a profit. The price of the different varieties of gold depended 
on the quality of their alloy, but the rate of profit or loss, of course, 
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was dependent on the purchase price. Thus though Siamese gold, being 
finer, fetched somewhat higher prices, it was comparatively less profi-
tabie, because the purchase price was also very high. The Chinese gold 
purchased in Formosa rendered most profit, but its price feU after-1639 
with a deterioration in the quality of its alloy.360 
The crippling effects of war and famine on the demand for the 
Company's wares modified to some extent the nature of Dutch imports 
to the coast. By the mid-'forties bullion and cash specie accounted for 
an even larger proportion of the total volume of imports than before.361 
360 The available data regarding the profit and 105S on coins and previous 
metals in the 'thirties and 'forties are as follows: 
Price of rials feil to 7% fanums each at Masulipatam in 1631. Japanese 
silver taels, valued at 70 stuivers each, gave a loss of lOl/,! % to 12 % 
at Masulipatam and 6!14 % at Pulicat in 1640, but towards the end of 
the same year rendered a profit of 4112 % at Pulicat and 9112 % loss 
at Masulipata,n. By 1642, the profits rase to 613!20 % at Pulicat and a 
Iittle less at Masulipatam. Abbasis rendered a loss of 18 % and Persian ducats 
of 22 % at about the same time. Towards the end of 1642 silver again 
sold at a loss of g25/32 % at Masulipatam and priees feil by 10 % in the 
south. 
In 1630, some articles of gold, melted and converted into pagodas, rendered 
a 1055 of 2l/,! % to 3 % at Masulipatam. In 1634, a mark of 24 carat 
gold fetched 65~ pagodas (1 Masulipatam pagoda = 90 stuivers) at 
Masulipatam and 82!14 pagodas (1 Pulicat pagoda = 84 stuivers) at Pulicat. 
Chinese gold, purchased at Batavia, rendered a profit of 3 % to 8 % at 
Pulicat during 1636-39, and a loss of 20 % to 22 % at Masulipatam in 
1639. Chinese gold from Formosa sold at a profit of 356/8 % to 38 % at 
Pu:licat and of 11 % to 15 % at Masulipatam during 1636-39. Later, 
the profits at Pulicat dropped to 25 % in 1641 and to 8 % in 1642, while 
at Masulipatam there was a 5111js2 % 1055 in the latter year. Japanese gold 
coubangs fetched a profit of 3 % to 8 % at Pulicat in 1640--41, but 
their supply was soon stopped for some years because of a decline in the 
Company's trade in Japan. 
For the prices of coins and metals, see K.A.767, 31.7.1640, f.390; K.A.768, 
28.5.1641, f.178, 9.8.1641, f.324; K.A.769, 31.5.1642, ff.286-87; K.A.I015, 
3.2.1631, f.13Ovo; 12.7.1631, f.136; K.A.I012, 4.12.1630, f.132; K.A.I025, 
29.5.1634, ff.315vo, 316; K.A.I031, 28.12.1636, f.62, 2.7.1636, f.I112; 
K.A.I034, 10.2.1637, f.622; K.A.I029, 18.12.1639, ff.71-71vo, 30.9.1639, 
f.973, 6.5.1639, f.I078, 30.7.1639, ff.l091; K.A.I042, 5.4.1640, fA36, 
10.3.1640, f.4Hvo, 19.5.1640, f.454, 14.4.1640, f.457vo, 30.5.1640, ffA60, 
463; K.A.I0H, 3.10.1641, ff.269 ff, 25.8.1640, ff.292 ff; K.A.I047, 4.10.1642, 
ff.706-706vo; K.A.I048, 12.12.1642, ff.58vo--59. 
381 In 1643, bullion and specie worth 1,377,000 florins were imported to 
Coromandel, while the value of the merchandise imported that year was 
a little over 228,000 florins; tbe proportion of merchandise imported in 
1644 was considered too negligible to be mentioned specifically. The situation 
in this respect does not appear to have changed radically during the years 
that followed. From the Far East in particular almost the entire supply 
consisted of bullion and cash specie. 
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Generally, the Company tried to supply the cash and bullion require-
ments of the Coromandel government in gold as far as practicabie. But 
as silver was more easily procurable, Batavia was forced to provide the 
capital for the coast mainly in silver from time to time, - for instance 
in 1646 and again during 1655-57. For Bengal, however, it was found 
necessary to provide almost the entire cash capital in silver, as there was 
little demand for gold. The bulk of the cash capital now came from the 
Asian factories, the supply from Europe mainly consisting of rials. 
Japanese silver bars, Persian abbasis and gold ducats, Chinese and For-
mosan gold, as also gold procured in Java, Malacca, Laos and Indragiri, 
now constituted the staple of the Dutch imports to Coromandel. In the 
'fifties, in order to find some employment for the capital Iying idle in 
Pegu, gold and silver were procured from that country as well, though 
it occasionally meant heavy loss for the Company. Af ter 1652, part of 
the capital sent to Surat was at times transferred to Golconda through 
bills of exchange payable in riais. The heavy loss on silver and a com-
parative shortage in gold supply from China and Formosa during 1655 
to 1657 led to an increased demand for gold from Holland, but this 
was essentially a temporary phase. 
The price of precious metals declined steadily in Coromandel almost 
till the very end of the 'fifties. In the opinion of the coast factors, this 
tendency was mainly a result of the artificial market conditions created 
by the nobles interested in commerce, who hampered the free sale of 
the Company's wares and thus forced the Dutch to import increasing 
quantities of bullion and cash specie with adverse effects on their prices. 
The worst effects were feit in connection with silver coins. The demand 
for silver in Golconda was very poor because the government had stop-
ped minting silver coins except for a small quantity required as tribute 
for the Mughal emperor. The price of the metal was in sharp decline 
throughout the coast owing partly to the large supplies of rials brought 
by the English. The loss on Persian silver coins was indeed so heavy 
that at one stage it outbalanced the profit on the sale of Coromandel 
cloth at Gombroon. By 1655, the silver distributed among the Company's 
middlemen could not be disposed of even at a loss of 8 % or 9 %. 
There was a revival in the demand for silver in Golconda af ter 1656, 
when the minting of silver coins was resumed to cover the increased 
tribute payable to the Mughal. But in 1658, Qutb Shah tried to impose 
a monopoly on the purchase of silver and was dissuaded only by the 
Company's threat to close the Masulipatam factory. As a result of the 
increased demand in that year the Dutch actually made a profit on 
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silver In Golconda af ter a long time, hut their stock at Pulicat still 
could not he disposed of. In BengaI, on the other hand, the position 
was very different. Japanese silver bars, minted into rupees, gave a 
high profit there, while rials fetched a slightly lower rate of profit. 
The declining profits on gold in Coromandel was attributed partly 
to the increasing purchase price in the Asian markets and the deterio-
ration in the quality of the aIloy. By 1652, nearly all varieties of gold 
sold at a loss throughout the coast. The decision taken in 1652 to fix 
the value of the rial at 51 stuivers, i.e., 3 stuivers more than the previous 
rate, showed an adverse effect on the price of gold in the accounts of 
the coast factories. The cost price, estimated in riais, now appeared 
higher than before in terms of florins, the value of which remained 
unaitered. But the saie price on the coast was estimated first in pagodas 
and later computed into florins. The loss on the saie of gold, as estimated 
by the Company, thus assumed a slightly exaggerated character. 
A new danger which later hecame far more serious was the artificially 
high price of old pagodas in Golconda in relation to the Pulicat pagodas 
and new Golconda pagodas. The preposterous demand that all dues to 
the government must he paid in pagodas minted in previous reigns, the 
quantity of which was naturally Iimited, was at the root of the trouble.362 
Though the intrinsic value of the Pulicat pagodas was 2 % higher than 
the old pagodas, in Golconda the former rendered a loss of 17 % to 30 % 
when exchanged for the latter; and, by 1649, tOO old pagodas cost 130 
new, which resulted in heavy losses, as part of the Golconda trade could 
he carried on only with old pagodas.363 
The position with regard to imports improved to some extent by the 
'sixties, because gold once more sold at a profit. This was partly owing 
36'2 For a more detailed explanation of this policy and its consequences, see 
supra, Chs. 111 and IV. 
303 The following data are available regarding the profit and loss on buUion 
and cash specie during 1643-58; 
By 1647, ]apanese silver bars and rials were sold at a loss of 6 % to 7 % 
at Pulicat, and 15 % in Go1conda. In 1656, the loss dwindled to 2 %. 
Pegu silver sold at a 1055 of 30 % to 32 % in 1653. The loss on abbasis 
was 4 % to 5 % in 1656, and 9 % to 10 % in 1657 (in Pulicat). In 1658, 
silver gave a profit of 32 Y2 % in Golconda. 
On Chinese gold, there was a profit of 21 % to 30 % in 1643; it came 
down to 6 % to 9~ % in 1648 and a mere 1/16 % in 1653. In 1652, there 
was a loss of 131/11 % on gold procured at Batavia; in 1656 the loss on 
this variety amounted to 3511/18 %. The loss on Laos gold was 12~ % in 
1643, and on Persian gold ducats 5~ % in 1644 and 1656. The loss on 
gold from Holland was 7 % in 1655 and 2 % the following year. Gold 
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to the fact that the Mughal emperor wanted his tribute to be paid in 
gold pagodas, which immediately created a demand for gold. The new 
valuation of the pagoda in relation to the florin also showed an increase 
in profits in the Company's account, for the sale price as computed into 
florins now appeared to he comparatively higher. Some gold coins, like 
Persian ducats, and Pegu gold, however, continued to sell at a loss for 
some years. But, by 1667, the average profit on different varieties of 
gold was as high as 137'2 %. In 1669, some varieties procured in 
Batavia sold at a profit of 59 % while the profit on Japanese coubangs 
was also over 35 %. Only the gold from Macassar caused a loss of over 
40 % in 1672 owing to poor purchases, and special measures were taken 
to stop any repetition of such mistakes. Supplies from Sumatra, Tonkin 
and Europe had to be increased during the period when imports from 
the Far East were affected by disturbances in China, though some 
coubangs were smuggled from Japan even at that time. To improve the 
procurement of gold pagodas, Coromandel traders were allowed to pay 
on the coast the price of elephants purchased in Ceylon, equivalent 
amounts being deducted by the Ceylon authorities from the silver 
imported from Persia. The problem of gold supply for the coast was 
more or less solved when Japan permitted unlimited export of the 
metal in 1668, especially because the coubangs could be easily minted 
into pagodas, as their metallic content was nearly the same. 
The demand for silver, which sold at 7 % profit in Masulipatam in 
1659, again suffered a decline af ter the Mughal emperor wanted his 
revenue in gold coins, and the minting of silver rupees in Golconda was 
nearly stopped. Tbe demand for silver in the south continued to be as 
poor as before. The poliey of accepting payments in silver for the Com-
pany's wares and procuring bills of exchange from Surat payable in 
from Pegu rendered a 1058 of 3 % in 1657 and 9 % in 1658. Manilla gold, 
purchased at Batavia and Macassar, sold at a 10ss of 151/8 % in 1652 and 
127/s % in 1657. 
For the import of bullion and cash specie during the period, see K.A.772, 
17.4.1644, ff.141-42; K.A.783, 26.3.1656, f.116; K.A.I051, 22.12.1643, 
ff.36, 59vo; K.A.1054, 23.12.1644, f.543; K.A.1056, 3.4.1643, ff.765, 770, 
9.7.1643, f.783; K.A.I058, 17.12.1645, f.39vo, "Verhael enz.", fI.212vo, 214, 
220vo; K.A.1062, (vervolg), 28.2.1646, f.803; K.A.I064 (vervolg), 2.8.1647, 
ff.679 fI; K.A.I066, 18.1.1649, ff.85vo, 91, 14.10.1648, f.452, 3.3.1648, 
f.489vo, 5.10.1647, ff.516 ff; K.A.I068, 31.12.1649, f.57vo; K.A.1071, 
11.12.1649, ff.273vo fI; K.A.1086, 8.6.1652, If.475, 476vo, 14.7.1652, f.493; 
K.A.I091, 5.2.1653, ff.262vo, 265vo; K.A.I094, 20.6.1654, f.43Ovo, 15.9.1654, 
ffA36 ff; K.A.I099, 7.1.1654, f.73vo; K.A. 11 00, 24.12.1655, f.83, 7.6.1655, 
ff.339vo---40; K.A. 11 04, 6.5.1656, f.234; K.A.I110, 17.12.1657, f.46; 
K.A.I115, 14.12.1658, f.74; K.A.1117, 31.7.1658, f.65vo. 
192 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
rupees, which were then exported to Bengal, was partly prompted by 
the intention to revive the demand for silver bullion and specie in 
Golconda. But as the Company had to pay for their purchases partly 
in silver, owing to the inadequate supply of gold, the expected results 
were not achieved. With the increase in the supply of gold and the 
prohibition of silver export from Japan, the Coromandel factories 
invested part of their gold bullion in silver for export to Bengal. But this 
was not continued on any large scale af ter 1668 when rupees became 
scarce in Golconda and gold became acceptable in the Bengal market 
as a medium of exchange. 364 
The demand for silver had definitely revived by the mid-'seventies 
in Golconda where some rixdollars yielded 37 % profit in 1678. But 
this was due to a purely fortuitous circumstance, viz., the fact that the 
king of Golconda had to pay a heavy tribute to the Mughal emperor 
in silver coins. Though the coast factors took a rather cynical view of 
the prospects of steady profit on silver, they made the best of their 
opportunity while the boom lasted. In fact, later, the proximity of the 
Mughal army, paid in silver coins, gave a certain stability to the demand 
for silver in Golconda and this proved very convenient for the Dutch 
as export of silver from Japan was permitted once again.365 
The history of Dutch bullion and specie import to the coast under-
lines two related facts: the flexibility of demand for these items and the 
close link between this market and the state policy with regard to 
coinage. The effective demand for the precious metals was to a large 
extent equivalent to the state demand for the purposes of minting and 
the metal preferred by the state at any given moment enjoyed a booming 
market. It is also significant that the increasing volume of bullion and 
specie import does not appear to have had any serious effect on the 
general price level, but mainly affected the price of the precious metals 
themselves. We do not have on the coast aprice revolution of the Euro-
pean variety. Despite the growth of the export trade, the degree of 
monetisation must have been extremely limited. 
In the list of merchandise imported by the Dutch to the coast, spices 
:164 K.A.790, 3.5.1663, i.91; K.A.791, 11.4.1664, i.32vo, 21.7.1664, ii.261 fi, 
3.9.1664, f.335vo; K.A.795, 13.7.1668, f.411; K.A.796, 24.4.69, ff.307 ff; 
K.A.798, 24.6.1771, f.411; K.A.799, 16.4.1672, f.257, 3.12.1672, f.1012; 
K.A.1119, 16.12.1659, ff.47 ff; K.A.1122, 26.1.1661, f,43Ovo; K.A.1124, 
29.11.1661, ff.157vo-58; K.A.1132, 12.1.1664, f.765; K.A.1156, 16.2.1669, 
ff.898-9; K.A.1160, 1.2.1669, f.429vo, 28.6.1669, f.471vo. 
3611 K.A.1222, 10.11.1678, f.547, 7.3.1678, f.560vo; K.A.1273, 16.1.1683, f.33. 
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were the chief item for a long time. According to their estimate, in the 
'twenties, Coromandel could annually consume spices worth about 
180,000 to 200,000 florins. In terms of weight, this came to about 
70/80 bahar cloves, 100 bahar nutmegs, 50 bahar mace, a quantity 
of pepper as also some benzoin. The last item, however was mostly 
re-exported by Muslim merchants to Mokha. The above figures, com-
pared to those for the preceding decade, indicate a shrinking market 
for the Dutch spice imports. Import of pepper by the Indian merchants 
from Achin and Queda, and of various spices from Amboina and Macas-
sar by the English and the Danes, were the chief obstacles to the Dutch 
spice trade in Coromandel. Specially, the low prices at which the Danes 
offered their wares at times seriously embarrassed the Company. The 
demand for spices being more or less inflexible, the prices reacted 
violently to extreme scarcity of supply. Following the Dutch withdrawal 
from Masulipatam in 1619, the price of nutmeg went up to 5 pagoda 
per man, i.e., by more than 100 %. In their spice trade with Coro-
mandel, the Dutch had to be specially careful on two points. First, 
they had to avoid offering prices so low that their European competitors 
might buy up the imports and profitably re-export them to Europe. 
Secondly, as a large part of the spices sold at Wingurla and Surat and 
in Coromandel eventually went to Northern India via Burhanpur, large 
supplies of the same varieties to both regions had to be avoided,366 
otherwise the sales in one pI ace affected the demand in others. 
The demand for the Company's merchandise suffered a general 
decline in the 'thirties as a result of wars, famine and large supplies 
brought by the other European companies and Asian merchants. The 
Company imported only small quantities of spices to Coromandel in 
the early 'thirties in order to revive the demand. Still, the excessive 
~upply of cloves by the Danes from Macassar kept the price as low 
as 30 stuivers per pound. As price-cutting ran counter to the Company's 
general policy of not selling spices very cheaply for reasons already 
explained, the Coromandel factories were burdened with 107,00 Ibs of 
unsold cloves by 1634. The Company was hence forced to reduce the 
price of cloves to about 27 stuivers per pound in 1636 and, as aresult, 
91,736 Ibs were sold in a year at a gross profit of about 19 stuivers per 
pound. The demand for nutmeg and mace also improved on prices 
366 Coen, V, p.297, VII, pp.94, 231, 359, 372, 421, 474, 478, 829; VII2, 
pp.1176, 1436; K.A.450, 26.11.1616, f.446; K.A.I00l, 27.6.1626, ff.81 ff; 
K.A.I002, 4.6.1626, f.244 
Verh. dl. 38 13 
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being reduced. But large imports of cloves by the English in 1638-39 
again caused a slump. Still, in 1640, the Company imported over 
84,000 Ibs of cloves in order to retain its hold on the market.367 
While the total volume of capital supply had increased enormously 
by the 'fifties, the import of at least some of the major items decreased 
in comparison with the preceding period, as a result of the poor demand 
for the Company's wares. The sale of spiees, largely an article of luxury, 
suffered badly. 50,000 Ibs of cloves were ordered for 1644; in 1653 and 
1654, the orderes were for 5,000 Ibs and 10,000 Ibs respectively. True, in 
1650, 160,000 Ibs were imported to Coromandel, but this was a measure 
meant to dispose of a bumper crop in Amboina, and it caused a sharp 
fall in prices. The import of nutmeg and mace also suffered a propor-
tionate decline. Only the supply of pepper was increased to meet the 
requirements of the Bengal and Pegu markets. The price of some 
varieties went up considerable by the 'fifties, probably owing to the 
reduced supply and the general rise in the price level caused by eco-
nomie disloca#on. In 1644, nutmeg sold at 30 pagodas a bahar, while 
the price for the same amount in 1656 was 70 pagodas. A man (24 Ibs) 
of cloves sold at 5}'2 pagodas in 1644 and at 13 to 15 pagodas in 1656. 
But the total volume of sales was not large enough to make any material 
difference, though the profit per unit had increased. Towards the .very 
end of this period, however, the demand for spiees improved with the 
return to normal conditions and the relaxation of monopolistic mea-
sures.368 
A variety of cargo in small quantities were always included in the 
D~tch imports to Coromandel. Chief among these were copper from 
Japan, spelter from Malacca, lead from Holland, sandalwood from 
Solor and Timor, besides camphor, alum, porcelain, vermilion, quick-
silver, tortoise-shell, eaglewood, etc. Individually of ten of little impor-
tance, together these items helped to supplement the Company's limited 
cash capital. In the second decade of the century, there was a good 
demand for Japanese copper which sold at 90 to 108 rials per bahar. 
367 K.A.760, 13.10.1635, ff.575-76; K.A.762, 31.7.1637, f.549; KA.765, 
11.7.1639, f.406; K.A.767, 14.4.1640, f.l34, 5.9.1640, f.596; K.A.768, 
3.4.1641, f.74; K.A.I019, 15.8.1633, f.19, 25.12.1633, fAO; K.A.1023, 
?7.12.1634, f.96; K.A.I028, 4.1.1636, ff.42-3; KA.I031, 28.12.1636, f.54; 
K.A.1034, 9.12.1637; K.A.I036, 22.12.1638, ff.170, 176vo; K.A.I039, 
18.12.1639, f.81. 
868K.A.I051, "Eysch enz.", ff.665; K.A.I054, 4.5.1644, f.568vo; K.A.I072, 
10.12.1650, f.62; KA.I087, 19.1.1654, f.262vo; KA.ll02, 1.2.1656, f.IOvo; 
KA.llll, 16.1.1658. 
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Lead, too, was in considerable demand, but the market for spelter was 
seriously undermined by the large imports of tin by the Indian mer-
chants. Good quality sandalwood could be sold up to 20/25 bahars a 
year at 100 pagoda per bahar. Some fancy doths from Holland, velvet, 
Chinese armosin etc. also sold at a profit. Tortoise-shell sold at 10 
pagodas per man and was much in request, but the supply was rather 
limited. In 1616, some pearls from Holland fetched more than 100 % 
profit and Amsterdam was informed that pearls worth 30,000 rials could 
be sold annually. But this lucrative trade could not be developed through 
lack of supplies. Some weapons, mirrors, docks, jewellery etc. were also 
sent from Holland to he sold as curios, or presented to the princes and 
nobles. The weapons were in litde demand, but metal cannon, sold by 
weight, fetched high profit.369 
The genera! decline in demand in the 'thirties affected all items. 
Quantities of vermilion, quicksilver, alum, lead, sappan wood, cardamom 
and porcelain remained unsold for long periods. The demand for 
spelter, as a suitable substitute for Japanese copper, improved from 1638. 
There was a good market for it in Bengal and Golconda, but the strong 
competition of Achinese traders undermined all prospects of profit. 
Sulphur, required in large quantities for the manufacture of gun-powder, 
was also in great demand in Coromandel and Burma, but only Dutch 
sulphur, and not the Achinese variety, could he sold, because the latter 
was of very poor quality. Following the English lead, the Dutch also 
tried to develop a trade in red coral and European textiles, but were 
not very successful. The import of Chinese silk proved more profitable. 
Besides these, rattan and chillies from Banjer Masin, and elephants and 
large dogs for purposes of presents were occasionally shipped to Coro-
mandel.370 
Among the miscellaneous items of import, Chinese and Formosan 
velvet fetched 32 % profit in 1643. Coal from Formosa and Japanese 
camphor were added to the list of imports around this time. The former, 
apparently, was required not for sale, but meant for the Company's 
gunpowder factories. The attempt to develop a market for China tea 
was not very successful. A significant development in the import trade 
369 eoen, J, pp.237-283; 11, 297; VII, 94, 98, 99, 237, 241, 242, 283, 359, 
419, 421, 425; K.A.451, 19.10.1617, ff.125-26, 12.4.1617, f.200. 
3TO K.A.I017, 20.10.1632, f.194; K.A.I019, 25.12.1633, f.39; K.A.I025, 
20.9.1634, f.327; K.A.I029, 19.6.1635, f.666vo; K.A.I031, 8.10.1636, f.1l29, 
28.12.1636, f.69; K.A.I037, 9.5.1638, f.197vo, 14.5.1638, f.210; K.A.I039, 
25.12.1633, f.39; K.A.I042, 2.11.1639, f.420; K.A.I044, 3.10.1641, ff.269 ff. 
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of the Coromandel government was the considerable increase in the 
sale of elephants in Bengal, the supplies being provided by Malacca, 
Batavia and Ceylon.SH 
The importance of copper as an item of import increased with the 
passage of time. Until Japan again permitted the export of this metal 
in 1646, supplies of Hungarian and Swedish copper were regularly 
brought to the coast, and 30,180 Ibs of these varieties were imported in 
1644. The average annual requirement in the 'fifties was between 
40,000 and 50,000 Ibs. Af ter 1645, Japan hecame the chief source of 
supply. Besides, small quantities were occasionally procured from Pegu 
for the ,Bengal market. The price of copper, - 55 to 60 pagodas a 
hahar, - was fairly steady on the coast throughout the period. Besides 
copper, tin was in good demand. The annual requirement was estimated 
at 140,000 Ibs in 1643, and 60/70,000 Ibs in the 'fifties. Malacca and 
Queda were the main sources of supply. In a good year, the Company 
could also sell 50,000 Ibs of lead. But even the demand for copper, a 
much sought af ter commodity, was very poor around 1661 and part of 
the unsold stock had to be sent to Surat where it was more in request. 
The demand revived in the mid-'sixties and 40,000 Ibs were ordered in 
1667. In 1668, the trade in copper had to cope with a double problem. 
Exports from Japan, the chief source of supply, had to he severely 
reduced as the emperor ordered that the bulk of what was available 
should be minted and desposited in the treasury. In Golconda, the king 
prohibited the free sale of copper, as he sought to monopolise it for 
minting nevels. But export from Japan was again permitted in 1669 and 
the orders of the Golconda king were also relaxed about this time. 
During 1670-72, copper sold at tOO % profit in Coromandel despite 
strong English and Indian competition.37'2 
During the years when Bengal was under the Coromandel govern-
ment, the imports to the coast included the capital for the Bengal trade. 
While silver coins and Japanese silver were the commodities chiefly in 
demand, the Company also imported to Bengal quantities of spices, -
specially cloves, Ceylon cinnamon and Malabar pepper, - lead, tin, 
quicksilver, spelter, ivory, sappan wood, Coromandel tobacco, Persian 
371 K.A.1051, 22.12.1643, ff.25vo, 39vo, "Eysch enz.", f.665; K.A.I054, 
13.5.1644, f.604; K.A.1056, 17.2.1643, f.747vo; KA.1068 (vervolg), 
13.4.1649, f.546vo; KA.I076, 6.7.1651, f.234vo; K.A.I087, 19.1.1654, 
f.262vo; K.A. 1104, 6.1.1656, f.214vo. 
3'l2 K.A.1l24, 22.12.1661, f.112; K.A.1155, 10.2.1667, f.368; K.A.1l56, 
16.10.1668, f.735; K.A.II60, 1.2.1669, f.432vo; K.A.797, 22.4.1670, f.193; 
KA.799, 3.12.1672, f.l000. 
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rose-water, J apanese lacquer works, silk stuffs and curios. The know-
ledge that cowries imported from the Maldives wre accepted as currency 
in Bengal and gave a profit of 14 % to 18 %, induced the Dutch to 
decide on a reconnoitring voyage to those islands in 1640, but nothing 
came of it until many years later.373 
The one striking fact about the pattern of Dutch imports to Com-
mandel, - and in fact of India's import trade in general, - during 
this period, is the relative stagnation of the market for imported 
commodities. The major items of import, other than bullion and specie, 
were in the nature of luxury items. The non-precious metals, - copper, 
tin, spelter etc., - imported in limited quantities were an exception 
and may be described as the basic raw material for the manufacture 
of certain commodities. The fact, however, remains that the coast's 
increasing export trade secured no mentionable increase in the return 
flow of consumer's goods or raw material. The increase in import being 
mainly equivalent to an incerase in the flow of specie and bullion, it 
affected the producer and production only in so far as it enlarged the 
volume of money in circulation. The expanding foreign market, despite 
the expropriation of the bulk of the surplus by the foreign companies 
and Indian merchants, almost certainly meant an extension of employ-
ment and increase in real income for the producer. Such increase, 
however, was not enough to secure substantial expansion of the import 
market. As to the bullion import, a significant proportion, though not 
the bulk of it, went into luxury consumption or hoarding and, to that 
extent, did not even contribute to the process of monetization. While 
from the point of view of the individual hoarding was a rational 
activity, in so far as it ensured economic security, from the point of 
view of the economy it was a wastage of resources. That precisely was 
the end product of a considerable proportion of commercial activity 
in this period which otherwise might have contributed to the expansion 
of the country's productive capacity. 
373 For the trade with Bengal during 1634--42, see K.A.I025, 29.5.1634, 
ff.316vo---317vo; K.A.I031, 28.12.1636, ff.58-60, 2.7.1636, f.1l17; K.A.1036, 
22.12.1638, ff.171, 177vo; K.A.1039, 18.12.1639, f.79vo, 8.1.1639, f.1045; 
K.A.I042, 3.3.1640, ff.429-29vo; K.A.I047, "Verhael etc." ff.414, 434; 
K.A.767, 31.7.1640, f.393; K.A.768, 28.5.1641, ff.172-3. 
CHAPTER X 
ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL LIFE 
The administration of the Company's factories on the coast was 
organised roughly along tbe same Iines as in otber places outside the 
Company's domains. During the earliest years of the Dutch connection 
with the coast, the two factories at Masulipatam and PetapuIi were 
independent of each other. In 1608, this mutual independence was 
aboIished and MasuIipatam given the status of the superior factory. In 
1610, tbe Coromandel factories were organised into a directorate with 
Pulicat as its headquarters. In 1615, the Coromandel directorate was 
raised to tbe status of a government.374 Normally, 'govemments' were 
organised only in territories where tbe Company had sovereign authority, 
but an exception was made in favour of the Coromandel coast in view 
of its special importance. The Masulipatam factory, as the chief centre 
of the Company's trade in northern Coromandel, retained a position 
of special importance, and the chief factor in charge of the factory had 
tbe status of the 'second officer' on the coast, tbe Governor, .residing at 
PuIicat, being tbc first. In 1621, this special position of the MasuIipatam 
factory was recognised by a new administrative arrangement. The coast 
factories were divided into two groups, northem and soutbern, - the 
northem factories being made directly dependent on Masulipatam. The 
chief factor in charge of the Masulipatam factory was given tbe title 
of President, but he and the northem factories still remained subordinate 
to the authority of the govemor who continued to con trol directly from 
Pulicat the affairs of the soutbern factories.375 
Before the institution of tbe office of the govemor-general, the fac-
tories in Coromandel as elsewhere functioned as independent units, and 
tbe local factors and tbe officials on board the visiting ships togetber 
constituted a council for considering matters of importance. In 1610, 
witb the appointment of a govemor-general and tbe formation of a 
supreme council, all tbe establishments in Asia were brought under a 
single and permanent authority. The directors and Govemors of the 
374 See supra, Ch. II; Lannoy et Linden, HiJtoire de l'expansion coloniale des 
peuples europüns, Nürlande et Danemark, p.201. 
375 K.A.1242, 29.4.1681, f.282vo. 
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coast factories were considered representatives of the governor-general-
in-council. In theory, the Coromandel government was under the control 
of Bantam, and later, of Batavia, but in practice this con trol was diffi-
cult to exercise, in view of the slowness and infrequency of communi-
cation. During unfavourable monsoons, there was no contact for several 
months. Therefore, normally, the authorities at Batavia had to remain 
satisfied with sending instructions from time to time and reprimanding 
or recalling officers in cases of grave delinquency. The Fiscal of the 
Indies, the chief law offieer of the Company in the East, and the 
Council of Justice (Raet van Justitie) at Batavia had the authority to 
try all employees of the Company posted in different parts of Asia. 
Besides, the Visitor-General (Visitateur Generael) checked the accounts 
of the subordinate governments and directorates before they were trans-
mitted to the general accounts. Occasionally he went on tours of inspec-
tion to check locally the accounts of the Coromandel factories. In 1626, 
the authorities in Holland instructed Batavia to appoint two Com-
missioners (commissaris) who would annually inspect all the subordinate 
factories, in order to check illegal private trade and other forms of 
corruption among the Company's officers. In actual practice, Cora-
mandel was visited by Commissioners from Batavia only at long inter-
vals, and at times the governor-elect was required to function as Com-
missioner as weIl. Occasionally, when it was necessary to send an 
embassy or mission to some Indian court, the governor or the visiting 
commissioner was authorised to act as Batavia's ambassador. The 
manner in which the Council of the Indies was organised provided 
another point of contact between Batavia and the coast. Normally, all 
the members of the Council did not live in Batavia, and some heads 
of dependent governments were chosen to act as members. The choiee 
feIl frequently on the governor of the coast factories as the head of one 
of the most important governments.376 
The relations between the Coromandel government and the authorities 
at home was, for the most part, indirect, and occasional letters to and 
from the Heeren XVII and sometimes the different 'chambers' (Kamer) 
constituted the chief point of contact. At times, the Heeren XVII would 
issue instructions to the coast government concerning maters of internal 
administration without referring to Batavia. Their increasing concern 
at the growth of illegal private trade of the Company's employees in 
3T6Van Dam, 111, pp.41 ff, 72 ff, 78 Cf, 81 ff. 99 Cf, 128 ff, 161-164; K.A.1242, 
29.4.1681, f.270; Havart, II, 154-164; Lannoy et Linden, op. cito pp. 
201-202. 
200 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
many parts of Asia led to the appointment of Adriaan van Rheede van 
Meydregt tot Drakensteyn as Superintendent in 1684 with extraordinary 
powers of supervision, enquiry and punishment which, in Coromandel, 
caused a great deal of unnecessary suffering among the Dutch factors. 37'7 
The coast factories were staffed by officers of several distinct classes 
- chief factors (opperkoopman) , factors (koopman), under-factors 
(onderkoopman ), book-keepers (boekhouder), clerks and assistants. The 
division of the employees into several classes was not strictly hierarchical 
in nature, nor did it represent any specialisation of functions, except in 
the case of book-keepers. It was mainly an honorary classification and 
implied little more than differences in salary. In the later decades of the 
seventeenth century, the governor of the Coromandel coast had a 
monthly salary of 200 florins, while the chief factors, factors and under-
factors were paid 80, 60 and 36 florins respectively per mensem. The chief 
employee in charge of a factory, called the Opperhoofd, might belong to 
any of the three classes of factors. Only at Pulieat and Masulipatam 
chief factors were appointed heads of the factories. The highest officers 
in most other places were factors, while at Sadraspatam, Nagelwanse 
and Bimlipatam under-factors were in charge. In each factory, one of 
the employees was given the status of second officer; he and the opper-
hoofd were jointly responsible for all affairs of the factory. The principle 
of joint responsibility was introduced at a very early stage of the Com-
pany's connection with the coast in order to check any possible excesses 
by the chief officers. The opperhoofd in each factory generally conducted 
business with the local merchants, made the necessary arrangements 
for the manufacture and procurement of cloth and supervised all finan-
cial matters. The second officer was responsible, among other things, 
for drawing up the invoices for the cargo exported from the factory. If 
there was a third officer, his chief duty was to go out on official tours. 
The clerks, book-keepers, and assistants were of ten entrusted with 
specific functions, and had separate designations such as cashier, keeper 
of invoices, ledger-keeper etc. The Dutch offieer who collected toll 
from the outer town of Negapatam, was known as the adigar, alocal 
name for revenue officials in Tanjore.378 Besides the factors, assistants 
3TTK.A.450, 21.11.1614, f.90; Havart, I, pp.35, 58 ff; see intra, Bibliography, 
the discussion on the "Copieboek van brieven, instructies en andere papieren 
van de XVII etc ... " 
3T8 K.A.805, 24.7.1678, ff.289vo--291; K.A.967, Resolution, Pulicat Council, 
16.11.1610; van Dam, 111, p.234; Havart, I, pp.11-22, 24; Lannoy et 
Linden, op. cit., p.201; Terpstra, De Nederlanders in Voor-Indii, p.55. 
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etc., the Coromandel factories were served by a large body of miscella-
neous employees, including a priest, a school-teacher, sacristans, chief 
surgeons, under-surgeons and trumpeteers. The Indian employees of the 
Company included interpreters, Persian-knowing clerks, blacksmiths, 
carpenters and a number of menials such as domestic servants, palan-
quin-bearers, stable-boys, torch-bearers etc., many of whom were em-
ployed for purposes of display, intended to impress the local people. A 
garrison of Dutch and Indian soldiers was maintained at Fort Geldria 
under a Captain. Some Dutch soldiers were also posted at Masulipatam 
for the protection of the factory. At other places, the Company chiefly 
depended on Indian 'peons' for the purposes of defence. In 1678, as a 
part of the general economy drive, the number of employees in Coro-
mandel was drastically reduced. The garrison at Fort Geldria was now 
reduced to 100 Dutch soldiers, besides 13 officers and 30 Indian 
'peons'.379 
All matters of importance concerning the coast factories were dis-
cussed in a Council, which was similar in character to the Council of 
the Indies. lts members were selected by the governor and it had the 
power to nominate the lower officers. Some of the subordinate factories 
like Masulipatam also had councils of their own. The affairs of the 
subordinate factories were to some extent controlled by the govemor who 
went on tours of inspection from time to time. Another centralising 
factor in the administrative structure of the Coromandel government was 
the office of the hoofd-administrateur, i.e., chief administrator, who 
supervised the accounts for the entire coast before these were sent to 
Batavia. Besides, there was the Council of Justice for the coast which 
had powers to judge and punish the Company's employees in Coro-
mandel. lts members, chosen from among the local factors, did not, 
however, give up their normal functions. The coast factories also had a 
fiscal, or law-officer, who charged and prosecuted delinquent employees 
before the Council of Justice. The Coromandel government had powers 
of life and death over the local employees, and some actual cases of 
execution by order of the Council of Justice are on record. In some 
cases, especially when the accused was a powerful official, the whole 
matter was referred to Batavia.380 
In Coromandel, the territorial possessions of the Company were of 
little consequence. Part of Negapatam, - the area enclosed by the 
379K.A.805, 24.7.1678, ff.289vo-291vo. 
380 Havart, I, pp.22, 24; Terpstra, op. cit., p.55; K.A.968, 30.8.1613, ff160-
160vo; K.A.I019, 15.8.1633, f.22vo. 
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fortifications, - feIl into their hands af ter the expulsion of the Portu-
guese. Besides, the villages of Wansiwake and Erikan near Pulicat, the 
ten villages near Negapatam, formerly in the possession of the Portu-
guese, and Palicol in northern Golconda were about the only places 
acquired by the Company in course of the seventeenth century. The 
Negapatam villages passed into their hands as a result of their conquest 
of the Portuguese colony and they were confirmed in their possession 
by a grant of the Tanjore nayak. The other villages were obtained as 
gifts from local rulers. In the administration of these villages, the Com-
pany appears to have been generally guided by local customs. In Pulicat, 
for instance, the peasants had to pay five-eighth of their crop as tax to 
the Company in accordance with the old rate; besides, an annual 
capitation tax was payable by everybody, excepting the Brahmins and 
prostitutes. The Dutch tried to modify the harshness of this system of 
heavy taxation by allowing the peasants to sell their crop and pay in 
cash. In former times, payment in kind was insisted on and of ten the 
peasants were forced to buy at exorbitant rates, the grains they them-
selves had paid as tax.38 ! In the villages near Pulicat, the Company 
appointed some Indian employees to collect taxes in grains, but as they 
proved to he undependable, the Dutch, following the local custom, 
leased out the villages to the highest bidder in 1678.382 
In the latter half of the century, the Company also occasionally suc-
ceeded in securing the lease of important coastal towns like Pulicat and 
Sadraspatam and thus acquired temporary administrative authority in 
some parts of CoromandeI. Besides, at Negapatam the right to collect 
tolls from the 'outer town', i.e., the part which was outside the area of 
the fort, was granted to the Company by the nayak of Tanjore. The 
Dutch apparently interfered very little with the administration of these 
places and remained satisfied with collecting the revenue through their 
Indian employees. At Pulicat, the Company enjoyed a position of advan-
tage through their possession of a strong fort, and the Eurasians, Indian 
Christians and many other inhabitants of the town and the neighbouring 
villages wiIIingly accepted its authority in order to be free from the 
oppression of the local chieftains.383 The contracts with the local 
potentates in some pi aces like Pulicat gave the Company the right to 
381 See supra, eh. VI, for the acquisition of the vilIages: for the administration 
of Palicol, see Valentijn, V, i, p.37; K.A.805, 24.7.1678, f.603. 
38'.l K.A.1222, 7.3.1678, ff.563-63vo. 
383 K.A.805, 24.7.1678, ff.616-617. 
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arrest and punish any weavers or painters who failed to carry out their 
contracts. 384 
In course of time, despite the fact that private trade was prohibited 
from the early 'thirties and the Dutch were not normally allowed by 
the Company to settle on the coast, small Dutch colonies had grown up 
in various pi aces in Coromandel, centring round the Company's fac-
tories. Batavia's orders permitting the Dutch employees to settle only 
in the territories where the Company had sovereign authority was 
promulgated as late as 1665, and all evidence seems to indicate that 
frequent exceptions to this rule were permitted, at least in Coromandel. 
The widows and children of deceased employees were of ten allowed to 
stay on. Besides, many factors served on the coast during the best part 
of their lives and thus became settlers for all practical purposes. At 
Pulicat, the Dutch colony was fairly sizeable and one entire quarter of 
the town was inhabited exclusively by the Dutch.385 
The development of Dutch colonies on the coast was helped hy the 
Company's policy of permitting marriages with Indian women adopted 
as early as 1614. The only condition laid down by the Company was 
tbat the prospective brides must first accept Christianity. In 1614, for 
tbe first time, a number of Dutch soldiers married Indian women. 
Again, in 1622, when tbe common practice of keeping concubines was 
prohibited by orders from Batavia, in one day 38 persons got married to 
their Indian mistresses at Pulicat, and the governor of the coast factories 
arranged a wedding feast to celebrate tbe nuptials. 
The policy of mixed marriages was highly commended by Wemmer 
van Berchem, during whose administration it was first introduced. "This 
is the only means," he wrote, "whereby we must hold and maintain our 
power in India, as the Portuguese have done before us". The married 
soldiers were treated with special favour and allowed to live in the fort, 
at least during the rainy season. In the latter decades of the century, a 
large proportion of the population at Pulicat consisted of mestizos, i.e., 
children of mixed Dutch-Indian marriages, and castizos, or quadroons. 
Nieuhof mentions one particular caste called 'Thiola' which frequently 
inter-married with the Dutch.386 
384 Heeres, I, pp.100 ff. 
3S5 K.A,456, 23,4.1665, f.795, Havart, I, pp.l05-106; van Dam, 11, ii, 117 ff. 
386K.A.968, 30.8.1613, f.166; K.A.969, 16.8.1614, ff.127vo, 132vo; K.A.973, 
16.3.1616, ff.ln, 178, 205, and Resolution, 15.10.1615; E.F.I., 622-23, 
p.14 7; Nieuhof, p.112; van Dam, 11, ii, pp.117 ff. Nieuhof mentions marriages 
between 'Thiol' men and Dutch women, but I failed to trace any instanee 
of such marriages in the records. 
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A letter from the English factors at Pulicat, written in 1622, thus 
sums up the manner of living of the Dutch men who were married to 
Indians. "All those thatt soe marry heere to blackes are bound and tyde 
to everlastinge service in India and cannot returne to there cuntrye ... 
and to speake truly most parte of this base nacion desyer nott to see 
moore there owne cuntrye; yea, there carryadge and manners of lyvinge 
is more heathenlicke then the people of the cuntry themselves, whoe 
take much notice thereof; to which brutishness we leave them".387 
Marriages between Dutch men and women on the coast were not 
infrequent. In fact, the Coromandel factories were a very good marriage-
market for Dutch maidens. In 1625, six Dutch girls stopped at Pulicat 
on their way to Batavia and five of them got engaged to local Dutch 
employees within a few days.388 Married employees were given an 
additional allowance, and many of ten got married just to be able to 
claim this allowance and then got rid of their wives. In order to check 
this practice, Hans de Haze recommended in 1619 that as few persons 
as possible should he given permission to get married. 389 
In some of their settlements on the coast, the Dutch lived in great 
style. At Golconda, hefore the economy measures were introduced in 
1678, the opperhoofd of the factory kept open house for all Christians 
in the city. A large number of Indian palanquin-hearers, horn-blowers, 
trumpeters etc., were employed at that factory in order to impress the 
local inhabitants and the royal court with the wealth and power of the 
Dutch Company. The factory was situated in the best part of the town, 
not far from the royal palace. When Thévenot visited Golconda in 1666, 
he found that the Dutch chief factor was escorted by standard hearers 
and trumpeters whenever he went out. 
At Pulicat, the Dutch quarter of the town had houses built in the 
Dutch style and even an avenue with three parallel rows of trees. The 
fort was situated in the middle of the town and surrounded by a wide 
moat. It had four stone bastions and a stone wall. The houses of the 
chief officers were inside the fort wall and furnished weil. There was 
also a church within the fort where the Dutch minister used to preach 
regularly every day. The assistants and soldiers for the most part had 
their lodings outside the fort. 390 
In the subordinate factories, the employees and their families were 
387 E.F.I., 1622-23, 147. 
288 K.A.999, Pulicat to Batavia, 16.10.1625. 
38IK.A.981, De Hal.e's instructions to A. Thomas, 21.7.1619. 
~80 Havart, I, i.l05; Gautier Schouten, Voiage aux lndes Orientales, I, pp.489 ff. 
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usually provided with accommodation within the factory houses. The 
factory at Masulipatam was not large enough to accommodate the 
numerous employees, many of whom lived in houses nearby. The opper-
hoofd had a very fine house, built in the local style. The factory itself 
was made of planks of palm-wood, plastered with mud. The Company 
had a pleasure-house in the middle of a garden in the outskirts of the 
town, where the opperhoofd retired in times of extreme heat. It was 
also a common rendez-vous lor all the local Dutchmen.391 
Baldaeus, who was the minister on the coast during the 'sixties, left a 
detailed account of the daily habits and the manner of living of the 
Dutch in Coromandel. They had adopted many of the local habits, like 
washing the mouth af ter every meal and chewing betel leaves. In 
Coromandel, the Dutch also commonly took a siesta. The major meal 
was taken between 3 and 4 in the aftemoon. Their diet was on the whole 
the same as in Holland and a large proportion of the meat and bacon 
required for the Coromandel factors was supplied from Holland as 
hopes of procuring victuaIs cheaply on the coast had proved to be false. 
The usual drink at midday and in the aftemoon was a mixture of water, 
beer and sugar boiled together. Occasionally some Spanish wine or rum 
was added. Spanish, Rhenish and French wines were sent in limited 
quantities from Holland. Shiraz wine from Persia and Indian arak were 
also popular. Tea-drinking had recently come into fashion and Chinese 
tea was considered the best. According to Baldeus, some Dutch people, 
especially the women, drank too much tea; he also disapproved of the 
habit of mixing sugar-candy with it. Green tea-Ieaves were also used 
as salad in those days on board the Dutch ships.392 
Daniel Havart in his well-known work defended the Dutch employees 
on the coast against charges of drunkenness and debauchery, and attri-
buted their bad reputation to slanders spread by the English and the 
French. The records of the Dutch factories are, however, full of accounts 
of their inequities. As early as 1616, the Heeren XVII complained of the 
dissolute life of the employees on the coast and matters did not improve 
in this respect with the passage of time. Coromandel, in the opinion of 
a Dutch governor, "was more a prey to Bacchus and Venus than any 
other place in India", and many of the coast factors believed that "men 
must follow the ways of the land". Their zeal in this respect of ten 
involved the Dutch in serious difficulties with the local people and the 
391 Havart, I, pp.141-46. 
392Baldeus, Ch. XXV; K.A.758, Batavia to Coromandel, 24.8.1630; K.A.760, 
13.8.1635, f.534; K.A.768, 3.4.1641, f.76; K.A.1287, 9.3.1684, f.7Ivo. 
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other European companies. It was decided, in 1633, to pay the Coro-
mandel factors only the amount considered necessary for keeping house, 
the balance of their salary being paid when they returned to Batavia, so 
that they should have no surplus money in their hands during their stay 
on the coast. The measure was directed against both illegal private trade 
and habitual drunkenness and debauchery.393 
A clergyman, with his head-quarters at Pulicat, looked af ter the moral 
and spiritual welfare of the Company's employees in Coromandel and 
other Christians living under the protection of fort Geldria. In the 
subordinate factories, sacristans attended to the necessary religious func-
tions. As Portuguese was widely understood by the Indian Christians in 
Coromandel, the Dutch ministers were required to preach both in Dutch 
and Portuguese. Some clergymen like Baldaeus worked hard to spread 
the Protestant faith. Attempts were made from very early times to con-
vert the Indian Catholic fugitives from San Thomé to Protestantism 
and the Dutch minister at Pulicat baptised forty of their children in 
1615-16. The idea of developing a Christian colony at Pulicat under 
the protection of fort Geldria was approved by Coen and later accounts 
suggest that it was implemented to a certain extent. Not all the clergy-
men sent out to the coast were men of impeccable character. Nathaniel 
de Pape, sent to Coromandel in 1672, was recalled eight years later for 
his scandalous way of life. Another minister, Johannes Ruterus, feIl out 
with the Coromandel Council and was sent back to Batavia. Some of the 
clergymen were also suspected of participation in illegal private trade.394 
The attitude of the Coromandel factors to Catholicism was far from 
tolerant. Af ter the Portuguese church at Negapatam was handed over 
to the Company by the nayak, the Negapatam Council was in favour 
of destroying it. Batavia, however, took a more kindly view of the matter 
and also enjoined that the Catholics should be allowed to take possession 
of the church and practice their religion without hindrance. When a 
Portuguese priest, in accordance with the policy of Batavia, was allowed 
to perform religious service in the church, he was seriously manhandled 
by the local Dutch residents and his altar and cross were destroyed.395 
Notwithstanding governor Marten Ysbrantsz's comment that Muslims 
393 Havart, I, pp.134--35; K.A.967, Matelieff's "Discours", 1608, Bourgonje 
to North Coromandel, 15.2.1609; K.A.450, 26.11.1616, f.468; K.A.759, 
28.6.1633, "Instructie" to Coromandel; K.A.765, 11.7.1639, f.420; K.A.1133, 
22.6.1663, f.1312. 
394 Havart, I, pp.256, 31-34; Coen, VII, p.100. 
395 K.A.791, 9.10.1664, f.502-503; K.A.794, 29.3.1667, f.135; K.A.1143, 
12.5.1665, f.870. 
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·'finn ... in their false faith, look upon us the Christians as dogs," the 
relations of the Dutch with the local Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, 
were generally friendly.396 When the Dutch officers went on missions 
to Indian courts, they were always received with great éclat, and the 
Dutch, in their turn, tried to return the courtesy to the best of their 
ability. The visit of king Qutb Shah to Masulipatam in 1676 provided 
an occasion for a most spectacular display of Dutch hospitality. As the 
King had expressed his desire to go on a pleasure-trip on the sea, a 
special boat with a throne on it, was prepared for him. The Dutch also 
organised a mock sea-battle for his entertainment. The king was enter-
tained everyday with songs and music and on one occasion he also 
attended a church service, showing great honour to the Bible on the 
occasion. This grand reception helped to secure some very advantageous 
farmans for the Company.397 
The interest of at least some Dutch employees was not restricted to 
commercial matters. Several of them, particularly among the clergy, 
took an interest in the language and religion of the country. Abraham 
Rogerius, who served as minister on the coast from 1631 to 1641, wrote 
a standard work on the Hindu religion, De open deure tot het verborgen 
heydendom. Baldaeus' work on Malabar and Coromandel also includes 
authoritative accounts of the Tamil language and Hindu mythology. 
The famous linguist Herbert de Jaeger was posted in Coromandel during 
the 'seventies and he developed such a great interest in the languages 
of the region, that in 1676 he appealed against an order of transfer so 
that he might continue his studies.398 
The economy measures of 1678 came as a great blow to the Dutch 
employees. Some lost their jobs as being redundant while many others 
left of their own wiIl as the reduced salaries were no longer sufficiently 
attractive. A few years later, Superintendent Adriaan van Rheede 
ordered a further reduction in the number of officers, and all widows 
of Dutch officers as weIl as retired married men, with the exception of the 
chief factors, were sent to Batavia. The speed with which this measure 
was carried out caused great hardship to many, as they failed to sell 
the houses in which they had invested much of their capital. The policy 
henceforward was not to appoint any married men in the Coromandel 
factories. Af ter 1690, there was only a minium number of officials in the 
396 Coen, V, p.28. 
397 K.A.I011, 3.3.1631, f.28i K.A.1204, 30.9.1676, ff.41 ffi K.A.1205, 21.11.1676, 
ff.593 ff i Begin ende Voortgang, Voyage of yacht Delft, pp.66, 67, 69. 
398 K.A.803, 11.7.1676, f.263 i Havart, I, pp.132, 172. 
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different factories, while a large and expensive garrison was posted at 
the castle at Negapatam. The Dutch community in the greater part of 
Coromandel was now reduced to a small body of bachelor employees 
who came to reside there for short periods of service.399 
The administrative organisation of the Company's factories in Coro-
mandel and the social life of the Dutch community had hardly any 
impact on the society or economy of the region. They were significant 
only in so far as they provided the immediate social and administrative 
framework for a unit of commercial expansion in an alien setting. 
399 Havart, I, p.35; Diary and Consultation Book of Fort St. George, 1678-
1679, p.ll8; van Dam, lIl, pp.234--35. For the career of Herbert de 
Jaeger, lee J. Ph. Vogel, The Contribution of the University of Leiden to 
Oriental Research, (Leiden, 1954), pp.18-20. 
CHAPTER XI 
A RESUME 
In the early years of the seventeenth century, the Dutch came to the 
Coromandel coast in quest of cloth, a necessary medium for the pur-
chase of spices in the East Indies. Within a decade, this side line of the 
Company's trade became sufficiently important to warrant the creation 
of a separate 'government' for the coast. The importance of the Coro-
mandel factories increased as the policy of making the Asian trade pay 
for itself found acceptance in Batavia and Holland. If Dutch trade in 
the East was to be supported chiefly by its own profits with the least 
possible assistance from Europe, Coromandel cloth, a commodity univer-
sally in demand throughout Asia, would naturally feature more and 
more prominently in the pattem of the Company's commerce. During 
the period of Coen's govemor-generalship, fresh demands, - for slaves 
and victuals, - were made on the coast to support the new policy of 
colonisation, and, for a while, the demand for coast cloth was reduced 
in theory to a position of comparative unimportance. But the earlier 
pattem, with its emphasis on cloth, soon reasserted itself. 
By the sixteen 'thirties, the Coromandel factories acquired a pivotal 
position in the Company's trade with the countries round the Bay of 
Bengal. Having secured a firm foothold on the coast, the Dutch now 
extended their activities to Bengal, Arakan and Burma. The factories 
established in Bengal and Burma were placed under the authority of the 
Coromandel govemment. A separate directorate was created for Bengal 
as late as 1655, while the factories in Burma remained under the juris-
diction of the Coromandel govemment until they were abandoned in 
1680. 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had secured for 
themselves a commanding position in the overseas trade of the Coro-
mandel coast. With their con trol over the trade of the East Indies, they 
enjoyed an advantage denied to their rivals. The power of the Portu-
guese, a serious hindrance to Dutch activities in the earlier stages of 
their career in Asia, was everywhere on the wane. The English with 
their limited resources, were still lagging far behind. The Indian and 
Verh. dl. 38 14 
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Asian merchants, with their knowledge of local conditions and ability 
to trade for a low rate of gross profits, offered a more serious problem. 
But in all probability, the total volume of the overseas trade of tbe 
local Indian merchants was not as large as that of the Company. 
The Dutch were not destined to enjoy their ascendancy for long. The 
growing resources of the English and their increasing exports to Europe 
undermined the Company's control over tbe Coromandel cloth markets. 
In South-East Asia, the competition of Indian merchants lowered the 
demand for Coromandel textiles imported by the Company. Burdened 
witb heavy military and administrative expenses, the Dutch could not 
afford to trade for a small margin of gross profits like tbeir Asian rivals, 
and efforts to eliminate this competition by making use of the Com-
pany's superior naval strength had to be abandoned in view of the 
weakness of the Dutch factories on tbe mainland of India. In the last 
quarter of the century, the Dutch struggled hard to maintain their 
Coromandel trade as a paying concern, but to little purpose. Disastrous 
wars which dislocated the economic life of the region added to their 
difficulties. Economy measures and extensive enquiries into the corrup-
tion and inefficiency of the Company's employees made little difference 
to the basic problems. In the sixteen 'nineties, Dutch writers on the 
Company's Asian trade recognised the fact that the trade with Coro-
mandel was definitely in decline. The transfer of the headquarters from 
Pulieat to Negapatam in 1690 marked the beginning of tbe last inglo-
rious phase in the Company's career on tbe coast. 
The experiences of the Dutch Company on the coast were in many 
ways typieal of European commercial activity in 17th century Asia. 
Initially, their chief obstacle was an unfavourable institutional frame-
work, - unfavourable not merely to tbe trade of foreign companies, but 
to all economics activities which could possibly expand production or 
raise the producers' standards of consumption. The eagerness of the poli-
tical authorities and local merchants to see the European traders establis-
hed as a part of the economic map of the region, modified, but did not 
basically alter the situation. Rapacity of transferable local officials or 
revenue farmers, who had no care for tbe economie future of the people 
or the region under them, was part of the administrative system of the 
period and this fact affected adversely all concerned. 
The organisational weakness of the Dutch Company, to some extent 
a function of the Mercantilist system, accentuated its problems. Centra-
lisation of control and inadequate initiative in the hands of tbe man 
on the spot complicated matters no end at a time when commercial 
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intelligence flowed slowly and of ten inaccurately, decisions had to be 
quickly taken and local trade interests ran counter to wider policies 
of state. A top-heavy administrative set-up added to the costs to an 
injurious extent and handicapped the company in its competition with 
its rivals. An irrational policy of trading for a high rate of gross profit 
per unit, - the illogical conclusion of the universal mercantile effort 
to buy cheap and sell dear, - inhibited investments in sub-standard 
articles which had an extensive market, amply exploited by the Com-
pany's rivals. When, on top of all this, the English surpassed the Dutch 
in their capital resources and a general decline affected the Company's 
affairs, Dutch ascendancy in the coast trade came to an end. 
Starting as a mere accessory to the spice trade in the Indies, the Dutch 
trade with Coromandel developed before long into "one of the chief 
pillars" of the Company's Eastem commerce. The profits in the East 
Indies, Siam, Persia and the Malay peninsuia became increasingly 
dependent on the supply of Coromandel textiles. And cloth was not the 
only export from the coast which was of importance to the Company's 
Asian trade. Saltpetre for the manufacture of gun-powder was exported 
in quantities to meet the requirements of the Dutch factories all over 
Asia. From the 'thirties, the Company's factories and ships throughout 
the East depended for the bulk of their supplies on gun-powder manu-
factured in Coromandel. The volume of iron and steel export to the 
East Indies was also considerable in the latter half of the century. 
During the years of famine on the coast, the Dutch never missed any 
opportunity of procuring slaves for the factories and plantations in the 
East Indies and Ceylon. In times of necessity, Batavia also depended 
on the coast for its supply of rice and wheat, and a large proportion of 
the provisions required for Ceylon was supplied by the Coromandel 
govemment. Export of Bengal silk to Japan and Bengal sugar to Persia 
was first organised on a large scale in the days when the factories in 
that province were under the jurisdiction of the coast authorities. Ganza 
and pitjes for Batavia, catechu, hides and namrak, a variety of liquid 
lac, for Japan, gumlac and ivory for Persia were exported from Pegu, 
also as part of the return cargo from the coast. Ray-skins and wood 
from Coromandel fetched high profits in the Far Eastern markets. 
The return cargo from Batavia to Europe included increasing quan-
tities of Coromandel wares. Coast cloth, especially the finer varieties, 
were in great demand in Holland and other parts of Europe, and when 
the English began to import large supplies of this commodity, the Dutch 
also increased their volume of cloth export to Europe in order to 
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prevent their rivals from capturing the market. In the list of the Dutch 
exports from Asia to Europe, Indian textiles, particularly from Coro-
mandel, came to occupy a position even superior to spices in importance. 
Coromandel indigo was another important item of export to Holland, 
but the volume of supply declined in the latter half of the seventeenth 
century, though the demand in Europe Wli\S still high. Large quantities 
of saltpetre were exported in the earlier part of the century, when gun-
powder manufacture in Holland was to a great extent dependent on the 
supplies from the coast. Later, Bengal replaced Coromandel as a source 
of saltpetre supply. The Company's trade in diamonds from Golconda 
and the Carnatic, which of ten proved very lucrative, had an erratic 
career in Europe, and it suffered heavily from English competition 
during the latter decades of the century. 
It was primarily in the pattem of the Company's Asian trade that the 
Coromandel factories occupied a position of great importance. To 
obviate the difficulties arising from limited capital supply from Europe, 
the Dutch engaged in all branches of the inter-Asian commerce, and a 
large part of the profits from this trade was invested in Coromandel, 
mainly in the form of bullion and cash specie. In fact, the requirements 
of the Coromandel market, where only precious metals were in good 
demand, provided the impetus behind the Company's efforts in many 
parts of Asia. The chief purpose of the Far Eastern trade, in particular, 
was to procure Chinese and Formosan gold and japanese silver and 
copper for the coast trade. From the 'sixties, gold coins and bullion 
from japan effectively supplemented the supply of cash capital to the 
Coromandel factories. A large part of the profits eamed in Persia also 
went to the coast, in the form of silver abbassis and gold ducats. The 
purchase of elephants in the Company's territories in Ceylon by Indian 
merchants was encouraged mainly with a view to procure pagodas for 
the coast factories. Gold and silver from widely scattered regions of 
South-East Asia, - Sumatra, java, the Malay Peninsuia, Indo-China, 
Burma and Siam, - tin from Tenasserim, Malacca and the adjacent 
regions, different spices from the East Indies, dye-woods from Solor and 
Timor were imported to Coromandel to procure in exchange the all-
important 'Kustkleden' (Coast cloth) which constituted the staple of the 
inter-Asian trade. 
For the economy of Coromandel and the adjacent regions, the estab-
lishment of close commercial links with many parts of Asia, - and, to 
alesser extent, with Europe, - meant an increase in the volume of 
exports, though any accurate quantitative estimate of this increase is 
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not possible in the absence of adequate statistical data. The English, the 
Danes, the Indian and Asian merchants all contributed to this increase 
in the volume of exports. But as the Dutch, through their territorial 
possessions and political power, enjoyed a large measure of control over 
the South East Asian and Far Eastern trade, and for a long time enjoyed 
a superiority in capital resources, their share in the export trade 
from Coromandel to other parts of Asia was larger than that of any 
other European nation throughout the greater part of our period. The 
Dutch contributed to the increase in the volume of exports to Europe as 
weIl. For the first half of the century, in fact, the Company was the chief 
exporter of Coromandel wares to Europe, -- a position which they lost 
to the English by the 'sixties and 'seventies. 
The volume of imports, too, undoubtedly increased though this ex-
pansion consisted primarily in an increased supply of bullion and cash 
specie. The Company's experiences showed that the demand for precious 
metaIs in India was much more flexible than is usuaIly imagined and 
tied to the requirements of the State for purposes of minting. With the 
decline in the demand for silver, the Company concentrated on the 
import of gold to Coromandel. China, and later Japan, provided a 
very large proportion of the gold supply for the coast. Import of copper 
from Japan also increased as a result of the Company's efforts. Formerly, 
the Indians secured only smaIl quantities of Japanese copper from Siam, 
Pegu and the Malay peninsuia, where the metal was brought by the 
Chinese traders. Now the Dutch established direct contact between the 
coast and Japan, the chief source of copper supply. They also occasion-
ally supplemented their imports with Hungarian and Swedish copper. 
As regards the other items, - like tin, spelter, spices, dye-woods etc., -
it is difficuit to say if the Company's trade led to any increase in the 
total volume of imports. The market for these commodities was very 
limited and whenever supplies went beyond a certain point, there was 
a sharp decline in prices. The import of misceIlaneous commodities 
merely touched the fringe of the economy. The import of bullion alone 
was significant, but only in so far as it contributed to monetization. It 
was a social waste to the extent to which the bullion went into hoarding. 
One outstanding development in the economic life of the Coromandel 
coast in the seventeenth century, which was certainly related to the 
activities of the European companies, was the enormous expansion of 
Indian participation in the overseas trade. The increased flow of capital 
into the country, the profits made by the merchant-middlemen from 
their trade with the Europeans and, probably, a desire to emulate the 
214 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
lucrative efforts of the European companies contributed to this develop-
ment. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch, as the 
principal European nation trading in Coromandel, were one of the 
major contributors to this development. Later, the Indian merchants 
profited by the trade of the English Company as weIl. In the early 
decades of the century, the activities of the Coromandel merchants 
appears to have been chiefly confined to the countries round the Bay, 
the Malay peninsuia and the Celebes. The strict control exercised by the 
Portuguese in Malacca probably acted as a deterrent to any extensive 
commerce with regions to the east of that port. In the latter half of the 
century, we find the Indian merchants participating on a very large 
scale in the trade with Java, Borneo, the Celebes and regions as far east 
as the Philippines. In the 'eighties, the king of Golconda even sent a 
ship to Macao, though this reconnoitring voyage was not followed up 
by any further commercial effort. The Dutch efforts to curb or control 
this growing trade through the system of sea-passes, first introduced by 
the Portuguese, was of little avail, because unlike the Portuguese, the 
Company did not have strongly fortified outposts on the Indian main-
land. Moreover, trade backed by guns was not the chief plank of their 
commercial policy in India. The Indians at first took passes from the 
Dutch without much protest. But with the passage of time, confronted 
with the claims of riyal European nations and increasingly conscious of 
their own strength on land, they began to assert their right to freedom 
of navigation, and the Dutch were forced to accept this new situation. 
Controversies over the question of passes were among the chief factors 
in the conflict between the Company and the Indian powers. 
In the internal economy of the coast, the activities of the Dutch and, 
in the later decades, of the other European companies, provided a great 
impetus to production. Manufacture of cloth, - and, to alesser extent, 
of indigo, gunpowder and ironware, - increased in many places as a 
result of the large orders placed by the Dutch Company. It is a signifi-
cant fact that the volume of production could increase very substantially 
without any notabie change in technique. Evidently a consideralde 
proportion of the productive capacity remained idle through lack of 
markets and incentive. In some areas, the manufacturers of cloth be-
came so dependent on the Dutch Company that they took to agriculture 
whenever the Company failed to place orders for any prolonged period. 
Extension of indigo cultivation in the Masulipatam and Tegenaptam 
regions was effected through Dutch initiative and, on several occasions, 
production declined with a decline in the volume of the Company's 
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purchases. The increased demand and the competition between various 
purchasers, European and Indian, had a two-fold effect on the pro-
duction of cloth. First, they gave the handicraftsmen a greater bar-
gaining power and thus possibly inhibited the total expropriation of the 
surplus. A second result was a decline in the quality of cloth production. 
Freed from the necessity of producing strictly according to specifications, 
since the product was sure to be purchased by one buyer or another, the 
weavers and 'painters' no longer bothered to manufacture cloths of the 
very best quality: the Dutch frequently complained in the last quarter 
of the century that the cloth which fetched the highest prices was no 
longer available. As a typieal Company of monopolistic merchant 
capital, the Jan Company had tried to establish an exchisive control over 
both the buyers' and the sellers' market. Neither their capital resources 
nor their political dominion in 80uth East Asia was adequate for the 
purpose. 80 their con trol always remained partial. The producers on the 
coast consequently enjoyed the advantages of a competitive market for 
their products, at least until another Compnay succeeded where the 
Dutch had failed. 
The Dutch, at least as much as the English, were further responsible 
for introducing some significant innovations in the organisation of pro-
duction and commerce, though not on any very large scale. The putting 
out system was extended considerably under their auspices. In several 
places, they set up establishments for processing cloth, - bleaching and 
dyeing in particular, - and manufacturing gun-powder and iron-ware, 
where as many as fifty to a hundred artisans worked as wage labourers 
under the direction of the Dutch factors and experts. In India, where 
at best temporary organisations were set up for any large-scale industrial 
activity, this sort of establishment was something new. The royal 
karkhanas, manufacturing for the requirements of the court and the 
army, really produced for use rather than the market. The Dutch Com-
pany's activities provided a channel for the penetration of capital into 
production and the emergence of new and efficient forms of production 
organisation, though the sequel to this development was disappointing. 
The 'companies' of middlemen set up by the Dutch were another 
innovation whieh could have had an important sequel but for the poor 
quality of enterprise of the Indian merchants. 
The history of European commerce in Asia in the 17th century reveal, 
inter alia, the existence of regions in different stages of economie devel-
opment. 80me, like the Coromandel coast, achieved a high degree of 
commercialization within the framework of an agrarian economy. In the 
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specific instance of the coast, the activities of the Jan Company and 
other European nations pushed forward the process of commercialization 
and created a belt of specialized industrial and cash crop production 
linked to the foreign market around the centres of export. Their inter-
Asian trade fostered mutually complementary relationships between 
such areas on the one hand and regions on a lower level of industrial 
and commercial development on the other. With such vital processes 
at work, the economy of the Coromandel coast was qualitatively not 
stagnant in the seventeenth century. Even a substantial break-away from 
the system of self-sufficiency, - with all that it implied in the way of 
possible expansion of productive capacity, -- had been achieved. These 
results followed largely from the brisk activity and huge capital invest-
ments of the European companies. To put it briefly, the impact of 
European merchant capital on the economy of the region, - at least 
until the establishment of an exclusive con trol of a single monopolistic 
company - was "growth-oriented", if one may use a very modem term 
in a somewhat inappropriate context. But the new developments, quan-
titatively, touched the mere fringe of the economy. The initiative in 
introducing innovations remained till the very end with foreign com-
panies of monopolistic merchant capital. This at best was a very poor 
basis for the emergence of vital processes of change. 
APPENDIX A 
Directors and Governors of the Dutch factories 
In Coromandel 
In 1608, for the first time, it was decided to bring the Coromandel 
factories under one head. In 1610, the factories were organised into a 
directorate and in 1615 they were given the status of a government. The 
dates for the periods of administration of the different governors given 
below refer to the actual period of their administration, which frequently 
included several months of provisional governorship or presidentship 
before formal appointment by Batavia. The list includes the names of 
governors provisionally chosen by the Coromandel Council during inter-
regnums, whose appointments were subsequently set aside by Batavia. 
Pieter Ysaacx Eyloff 
Jan van Wesick 
Wemmer van Berchem 
Hans de Haze 
Adolff Thomasz 
Andries Soury 






























J uly-August, 1651 
1651-1663 
1663-1665 
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Anthoni Pavilioen 
Jacques Caulier 
Willem Care} Hartsinck 
Jacob Jorisz Pits 







Profit and 1088 account of the Dutch factories under the 
Coromandel govemment 1626-1690 
The following statistics (in florins) are taken from the 
"Generale Missiven". All fractional amounts have been left out. 
Net Net 
Year Gross prolit Expenditure Prolit Loss 
1626-27 ça 80,000 ça 50,000 ça 30,000 
1627-28 156,135 60,995 95,140 
1628-29 132,804 60,438 72,366 
1629-30 150,943 62,478 88,465 
1630-31 178,902 87,603 91,299 
1632-33 142,000 
1633-34 121,898 58,634 63,264 
1634-35 154,734 
1635~36 330,839 78,828 252,011 
1636-37 462,627 85,394 377;233 
1637-38 285,000 87,927 197,073 
1638-39 147,227 71,918 75,309 
1639-40 304,838 178,141 126,697 
1640-41 185,913 
1641-42 272,660 83,183 189,477 
1642-43 217,940 97,871 120,069 
1643-44 219,104- 99,024 120,080 
1644-45 186,884 114,872 72,012 
1645-46 195,168 146,011 49,157 
1646-47 151,767 125,647 26,119 
1647-48 58,416 126,309 67,983 
1649-50 302,049 
1650-51 230,830 138,464 92,366 
1651-52 113,146 237,269 124,123 
1652-53 233,799 190,907 32,892 
1653-54 138,832 226,022 87,190 
1654-55 396,681 243,279 153,402 
1655-56 267,513 222,555 44,958 
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Net Net 
Year Gross pro/it Expenditure Pro/it Loss 
1656-57 138,117 156,386 18,269 
1657-58 344,203 215,764 128,439 
1658-59 395,314 198,400 196,914 
1659-60 389,299 216,839 172,460 
1660-61 209,657 169,233 40,424 
1661-62 193,459 231,679 38,220 
1662-63 359,191 262,742 96,449 
1663-64 428,010 231,041 196,969 
1664-65 794,473 206,005 588,468 
1665-66 672,757 283,893 388,864 
1665-66 672,757 283,893 388,864 
1666-67 899,448 229,571 669,877 
1667-68 1,015,090 226,855 788,235 
1668-69 1,289,919 230,757 1,059,162 
1670-71 788,807 228,277 560,530 
1671-72 830,901 250,190 580,711 
1672-73 260,855 314,467 53,612 
1673-74 486,992 341,058 145,934 
1674-75 437,745 451,056 13,311 
1675-76 448,940 275,758 173,182 
1676-77 503,164 249,622 253,542 
1677-78 635,331 265,143 370,188 
1678-79 886,843 210,986 675,857 
1679---80 1,001,316 185,066 816,250 
1682---83 1,273,955 247,131 1,026,824 
1683---84 1,520,667 245,364 1,275,303 
1684---85 1,493,192 248,466 1,244,726 
1685---86 724,936 279,319 445,617 
1686---87 348,024 369,665 21,641 
1687---88 304,012 43,642 260,370 
1688---89 1,048,004 348,225 699,779 
1689-90 715,026 295,454 419,572 
The statistics for 1630-31 cover 18 months. 
The figures for 1631-32, 1669-70 and 1680---82 are not available. 
APPENDIX C 
A note cm some varieties of Coromandel c10th 
The main classifications of Coromandel cloth in the seventeenth 
century have been discussed above (Chapter I). The following descrip-
tion of some of the chief varieties is based on the 'Memorie' of Stalpaert 
van der Wiele (Rouffaer and Juynboll, De Batik-Kunst in Nederlandsch 
lndie en haar geschiedenis, Bijlage III; De Jonge, 111, p. 149) compiled 
in 1603, Dr. Stapel's note on the subject (see van Dam, I, i, pp. 
735-39), Hobson-Jobson, various references in "The English Factories 
in India" and J. Irwin, " Indian Textile Trade in the Seventeenth cen-
tury, 11 Coromandel Coast," Journalof Indian Textile Histor'Y, No. 2. 
Alleja: coloured silk piece-goods, of ten embroidered with gold yam. 
The name was also applied to certain varieties of coloured cotton 
cloth, striped or checkered or with gold embroidery, e.g. alleja 
bethillas. Usually red - and - white or black - and - white. 
Bafta: fine cotton cloth, usually black or white; ave rage length - 15 cubits. 
Balatiu: unbleached cotton cloth, white, black or bluish, used for manu-
facturing sails in Java and elsewhere. Average size 7 vadems [1 
vadem = 2~ cubits] 5 span [1 span = 2~ centimetres]. 
Bethilla, bethille: very fine musIins. Lengths varied from 15 to 25 yards; 
breadth usually 1 ~ yards. Sometimes dyed red, anal sometimes striped 
or embroidered. 
Cain or Kain: a general name for cloth. Cain goulongs: exported in 
rolls. " ... Apparently patterned in the loom and usually incorporated 
goldthread." ( Irwin) . 
Chavoni, Chaven: very light white cotton cloth embroidered with 
couloured silk, average size, 5 vadems 2~ spans. 
C helas: white or yellow cotton cloth with black stripes; also checkered; 
average size 4 vadems 5 spans. 
Chindos, chintz: cotton or silk cloth with coloured patterns. 
Drongans, dragons: cotton cloth in two colours - red and white, black 
and red, red and green, red and blue or white and green. Most in 
demand in Java. 
Ginghams: originally meant a variety of plain cotton cloth; somewhat 
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stiff, according to one authority. Dimensions -- about 20 x 1 yards. 
(for a detailed description, see Irwin, op. cit.). 
Gobar, gover: brownish blue cloth with whitish blue stripe across the 
middle. Sarassa gobar: gaily coloured silk cloth patterned with flowers 
and birds. 
Lungi: silk or cotton loin-cloth. 
Muri: according to van der Wiele, fine yellowish white cloth with a red 
stripe across the middle; average length - 4- vadems. But muris are 
described in Hobson-Jobson as "blue clothes, principally manufactured 
in the district of Nellore." Usual dimensions - about 9 yards x 1 yard 
8 inches. 
Parcalla, parcalle : closely woven cotton cloth, a sort of fine white cam-
bric. Dimensions - about 8 x 1· yards. Occasionally bought red. 
POillong: chequered cloth of various colours. 
Rambutin: white cotton cloth; ave rage length - 8 vadems. 
Salalu: bluish· or black cotton cloth with gold borders, average size -
2 vadems 5 spans. 
Salampuri: white cloth with red borders. Usual dimensions - 4- x 1 
yards. 
Taffachela: fine white cloth with stripes. 
Tapi: generalname for coloured piece-goods used as skirts by both men 
and women in many parts of South-East Asia. A well-known variety, 
known as tapi-sarassa, or sarassa-malaya, was patterned with birds and 
foliage. 
Turia: painted rough cotton cloth. 
APPENDIX D 
Currency and Weights * 
Weights 
As Moreland pointed out, "Here we meet a common Indian pheno-
menon, a uniform scale, with varying units." The scale throughout 
Coromandel was as follows: 
5 seTS = 1 viss 
8 viss or 40 sers = 1 man (maund) 
20 maimds = 1 bahar or kandi 
But the hahaT was estimated at 460, 480 and 500 Dutch Ibs respectively 
in different places. At Pulicat 17/ 10 seTS were equal to a Dutch pound; 
at Masulipatam 12/3 seTS were equal to a Dutch pound. In Bengal, the 
maund was equal to 68 Dutch Ibs. The Dutch pound was of 0.494 kilo-
grams, i.e. approximately 1.09 Ibs. 
Special units of weight were used for certain commodities. Indigo was 
bought and sold by the littel, containing 12 Masulipatam maunds or 
314 Ibs avoirdupois. Rice and wheat were sold by the last containing 80 
fJarra or 3840 Dutch Ibs at Pulicat and 72 parra or 3240 Dutch Ibs at 
Bimlipatam. The parra was equivalent to 48 Dutch Ibs at the former 
and 45 Dutch Ibs at the latter place. 
Of the measures current in Java and the Spice Islands, two - picol 
and sockel - are frequently mentioned in connection with the Com-
pany's Coromandel trade. The picol was equivalent to 100 catti or 120 
Dutch Ibs. The sokkel or sockel, a measure used mainly for buying and 
selling mace, was equal to 154 Dutch Ibs. 
Currenc'Y 
The coins minted in Golconda and the Camatic during the earlier 
part of the century were of gold and copper. Later, silver rupees were 
« This note is based on the anoymoul "Uytrekening van de Goude en Silvere 
munts, waardye, inhout der maten en .fwaarte der gewigten etc." (Middel-
burg, 1691). W. C. H. Staring's "Maten gewichten en munten" (Schoon-
haven, 1902), Relations of Golconda and various relerences in the Dutch 
and English factory records. 
224 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
also introduced. There were sharp fluctuations in the value of coins, for 
they circulated at their metallic value, and the price of metals was 
subject to frequent changes. The rising price of the old pagodas was 
also responsible for the fluctuations in the value of coins. 
The local name of the gold coin called pagoda by the Europeans was 
varaha, or hun. "The weight was approximately 52-53 grains, and the 
fineness about 21~ carats." The smaller gold coins were known as 
fanams or fanums. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, two 
varieties of fanums were minted - large and small. At Pulicat the 
pagoda was equal to 15 to 16 large or 24 small fanum; at Masulipatam 
the pagoda was worth 15 fanums in the early part of the century and 
12 large fanums in the seventeen 'eighties.400 
The commonest copper coin in the Golconda kingdom was the nevel, 
and a fanum was worth 8 to 9 nevels throughout the period. Smaller coins 
made of copper, or some base metal, were known as 'cash' to the Euro-
pean merchants, though the name denoted different varieties of coins 
in different places. In the early decades of the century, the fanum was 
worth 20-22 cash in Tegenapatam and 20-24 cash in Pulicat. In the 
'nineties, a fanum was worth 80 cash at Negapatam. 
The value of the rupee in relation to the pagoda varied from time to 
time. On an average, the pagoda was worth 4 to 4~ rupees. 
Of the European coins used by the Company on the coast, the Dutch 
rixdollar and the Spanish rial were the most common. Until 1665, the 
rixdollar was valued at 48 stuivers both in Holland and Asia. But in that 
year, the rixdollar was valued at 60 stuivers, i.e., 3 florins,401 for all the 
overseas possessions of the Company, while in Holland the old valuation 
was retained. Thus an artificial distinction was created between the 
'heavy' (swaar) money in Holland and the 'light' (ligt) money in the 
East, which showed an imaginary gain of 25 % on all overseas capital. 
The rial was now valued at 48 'light' or 38 'heavy' stuivers. The valuation 
of the new pagoda was fixed at 84 stuivers in the early part of the cen-
tury, but gradually raised to 120 stuivers by the late 'seventies. 
The various other coins imported by the Company were valued on 
the coast strictly according to their metallic content. 
400 Bowrey's statement that the pagoda was equal to 32 fanums in Madras, 
24 in Pulicat and 18 in Porto Novo, refers almost certainly to the small 
fanums. He, however, also mentions that in Go1conda the pagoda contained 
12 fanums. This is apparendy a reference to the large fanum. See Bowrey, 
p.114. 
401 The florin was worth a litde less than two shilling. 
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Koloniaal Archief, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague 
Overgekomen Brieven, 1607-1691 
Inkomend Briefboek, 1661-1691 (Koloniaal Archief, 965-1370) 
These two series of documents constitute the most important source 
of information for the Dutch activities in Coromandel. The Over-
gekomen Brieven contain originalletters from the Governor-General and 
Council of the Indies to the authorities in Holland, copies of letters 
from the subordinate governments and factories to the authorities in 
Batavia and Holland, memoranda and reports on particular subjects, 
copies of resolutions passed by the Coromandel Council and extracts 
from invoices, account-books and joumals (dagh-register) kept by the 
Company's employees on important occasions. The series also includes 
letters exchanged between the various factories on the coast. Copies of 
letters and resolutions from the subordinate governments used to be sent 
to Amsterdam from the Company's headquarters in Java as enclosures 
to the letters from the Governor-General and Council. Af ter 1660, 
partly in order to cope with the increasing volume of correspondence, 
the copies of letters received in Batavia from the subordinate govern-
ments and factories were classified under a separate name, "Inkomend 
Briefboek." Copies of resolutions of the Governor-General and Council 
before 1637, and of letters from the headquarters to the subordinate 
governments before 1621 are included in the "Overgekomen brieven". 
About half the total number of volumes in these two series for the period 
under discussion contain material relating to the Coromandel govern-
ment and its dependent factories. 
The letters from the Coromandel factories provide a detailed picture 
of Dutch activities on the coast - their trade, their relations with the 
various Indian powers and other European nations and their social life. 
A dozen or more letters from Pulicat every year kept the authorities in 
Batavia and Holland informed of the state of affairs on the coast. 
Besides, numerous letters, written from the subordinate factories to 
Pulicat, Batavia and Holland, povide us with first-hand information 
concerning the Company's activities in different parts of Coromandel. 
The letters, memoranda and reports contain not only accounts of events 
or developments which were of immediate interest to the Dutch, but 
226 JAN COMPANY IN COROMANDEL 
also of the economie and political conditions in the regions where the 
factories were situated. Partieularly valuable as source material for the 
economie and politieal history of these regions are the "Memories" left 
by the Dutch govemors for the guidance of their successors. Summary 
accounts of the Company's activities in Coromandel and connected 
matters are contained in the "Generale Missiven" (general letters), 
annually sent by the Govemor-General and Council to the Heeren XVII, 
giving a comprehensive picture, region by region, of the Company's 
affairs throughout the East. Though generally dependable, the 'Generale 
Missiven' of ten make mistakes in matters of detail and should be care-
fully checked in the light of information available in the letters from 
the particular regions concerned. In some years, narratives called "Corte 
Verhaelen" (short accounts), based on the letters from the coast and 
of ten running into a hundred or more folio pages, were prepared at 
Batavia for the guidance of the Govemor-General and Council. 
Bataviaasch Uitgaand Brie/boek, 1621-90. (Kolonial Archief, 753-
820). 
This series contains copies of letters, instructions, letters of appoint-
ment etc. from Batavia to the subordinate govemments. The letters to 
Coromandel from the Govemor-General and Council provide an ex-
cellent commentary on the Dutch activities in Coromandel and a clear 
picture of the evolution of the Company's policy, particularly with 
regard to its European and Asian competitors. They also contain 
valuable information conceming the markets for Coromandel wares in 
various parts of Asia as also in Europe. The "instructies" (instructions ) 
supply information regarding the administrative organisation, salaries 
etc. 
Resolutien van Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 1637-1690. (Koloniaal 
Archief, 563-605). 
This series contains the resolutions of the Govemor-General and 
Council of the Indies. The resolutions conceming Coromandel, though 
not numerous, are valuable for fixing the dates of partieular measures 
and the study of Batavia's policy, explained in detail in the letters 
of the Govemor-General and Council. 
Copieboek van brieven, instructies en andere papieren van de XVII en 
de Kamer Amsterdam aan de regeringen van lndie en de Kaap, 
1614-1690. (Kolonial Archief, 450-460). 
This series contains letters and instructions from the Heeren XVII 
to the Govemor-General and Council and the subordinate govemments. 
The letters to Coromandel are short and rather limited in number. The 
policies with regard to Coromandel and the demand for coast wares in 
Europe are explained in greater detail in the letters to Batavia. Inciden-
tally, these letters throw light on the frequently unrealistie attitude of the 
Heeren XVII who generally insisted that policies in the East should con-
form to Holland's relations with various nations in Europe and were 
inclined to be uncompromising with regard to the Asian competitors. 
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Resolutien genomen op de ordinairs en extra-ordinaris vergaderingen 
van Heeren XVII, 1611-30 (Koloniaal Archief 184) and 1631-90 
(Koloniaal Archief, 250-259). 
These resolutions of the Heeren XVII contain information about the 
prices of Coromandel wares in Europe, details of the annual require-
ments for the European market and, occasionally, policy decisions 
regarding the coast. The volumes in this series, unlike the rest, do not 
contain any fulllists of contents and there is only an outdated and very 
incomplete index available. The state of preservation is also poor as 
compared with the other series discussed above. 
Koloniale Aanwinsten. Aantekeningen van Arnoldus Buchelius over de 
Oost-Indische en West-Indische Compagnien, 1619-39. (Aanwinsten, 
1882, A VI, 8). 
This is a collection of notes on the East and West India Companies, 
chiefly based on secondary materials. It contains a brief account of 
Coromandel. The 17th century map of southern India reproduced in the 
present volume is taken from this manuscript. 
Verzameling (Buitenlandse) Kaarten. 
This collection of maps include several 17th century sketch-maps of 
the Coromandel coast and adjacent regions. 
India Office Library, London. 
Lisbon Transcripts, Livros das monçöes, 5 Vols. (1616----1651); English 
translations - 21 vols. 
This particular series of transcripts from the Lisbon archives contains 
copies of letters from the Viceroy of Goa to the king and occasionally 
the king's replies. It contains useful information regarding Dutch-
Portuguese relations in Coromandel. The English translations are very 
defective. 
The Hague Transcripts in the India Office Library contain copies of 
documents from the Algemeen Rijksarchief, mostly relating to political 
matters and Anglo-Dutch relations. I have not used these transcripts 
as I had access to the original documents. 
For the English Factory Records, I have depended mainly on the 
Calendars published by Sir W. Foster and C. Fawcett. 
Archives Nationales, Paris. 
Correspondance Générale, 1666-76 (Colonies, C 262). 
This register contains a number of letters from Baron, François 
Martin and others and provides first-hand information regarding the 
siege of San Thomé. 
Ceylon Government Archives. 
Diaries kept during the lJoyages of Rijcklof van Goens, 1673-74. 
(Colombo Records, 3398-3400). 
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Folios 725-851 in the second part ot these diaries (Colombo Records, 
3399) contain material relating to the siege of San Thomé, most of 
which is copies of letters and resolutions also included in the 'Inkomend 
briefboeken' (see above) for 1673-74. I used a microfilm copy of the 
diaries in the possession of Mej. Juriaanse, Archivist of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, The Hague. 
B Published records, travelIers' accounts etc. 
Philippus Baldaeus. Naauwkeurige beschryvinge van Malabar en Choro-
mandel. Amsterdam, 1672. 
Begin ende Voortgangh van de Vereenighde N ederlandsche Geoc-
troyeerde Oost Indische Compagnie. Collected by I. Commelin. 
(Amsterdam, 1646). 
T. Bowrey. A Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of 
Bengal. Edited by R. Tempie. (Cambridge, 1905). 
P. v. d. B [urg.] Curieuse Beschrijving van Verscheyde Oost-Indische 
Gewesten. (Rotterdam, 1677). 
Abbé Carré. The travels of the Abbé Carré. Translated by Lady Faw-
cett and edited by C. Fawcett. (London, 1947). 
Jan Pietersz Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indie. Edited by 
H. T. Colenbrander (Vols. I-VI) and W. Ph. Coolhaas (Vol. VII) 
(The Hague, 1925, etc.). 
Daghregister, gehouden int casteel Batavia. 1624-1682 (The Hague 
and Batavia, 1896-1919). 
Pieter van Dam. Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie. Edited 
by F. W. Stapel. (The Hague, 1927-1939). 
F. C. Danvers and W. Foster. Letters received by the East India Com-
pany from its servants in the East, 1602-1617. (London, 1896-
1902). 
M. de Faria Y Sousa. The Portuguese Asia. Translated by J. Stevens. 
(London, 1935). 
Peter Floris. Travels of Peter Floris. Edited by W. H. Moreland. 
(London, 1931). 
W. Foster. The English Factories in India, 1618-1669. (Oxford, 1906-
1927); New Series, 1670-1684, edited by C. Fawcett, (Oxford, 
1936-1955). 
Daniel Havart. Op- en Ondergang van Coromandel. (Amsterdam, 1693). 
J. E. Heeres. Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, Vols. 1-111. 
(The Hague, 1907-1934). 
Pierre du Jarric. Histoire des choses plus curieux. (Bordeaux, 1607). 
J. K. J. de Jonge. De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost 
Indie (1595-1610). (The Hague, 1862-1865). 
Inventaris der verzameling Kaarten, berustende in het Algemeen Rijks-
archief. Pt. I: BtlÎtenlandse Kaarten, by P. A. Leupe. (The Hague, 
1867). 
Eerste Supplement, by S. P. I'Honore Naher. (The Hague, 1914). 
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Huyghen van Linschoten. The voyage of Huyghen van Linschoten. 
Edited by A. c. Burnell and P. A. Tieie. (Haklyut Society, 1884). 
François Martin. Mémoires de François Martin. (1665-1696). Edited 
by A. Martineau. (Paris, 1931). 
Streynsham Master. The Diaries of Streynham Master, 1675-80. Edited 
by R. Tempie. (London, 1911). 
Johan Nieuhoff. Zee- en lantreize door verscheide gewesten van Oost-
Indien. (Amsterdam, 1682). 
S. Purchas. Purchas His Pilgrimes. (Glasgow, 1905). 
Realia, Register op de generale resolutien van het Kasteel Batavia, 
1632-1805 (Leiden, 1882). 
Records of Fort St. George, 1670-1690 (Madras, 1893-95, etc.) 
Renneville. Recueil des voyages... A translation of "Begin ende 
V oortgangh" with some additional matter (Rouen, 1725). 
E. Sainsbury. Calendar of State Papers. Colonial Series, East India, 
1516-1634 (London, 1862, etc.). 
E. B. Sainsbury. Calendar of the Court Minutes of the E. I. Company. 
(Oxford, 1907, etc.) 
Gautier (Wouter) Schouten. Voiage de Gautier Schouten aux Indes 
Orientales, 1658---1665 (Amsterdam, 1707). 
J. B. Tavernier. Travels in India. Edited by V. BalI (London, 1889). 
Jean de Thévenot. Indian travels of Thévenot and Careri. Edited by 
S. N. Sen. (New Delhi, 1949). 
François Valentijn. Oud en Nieuw Oost Indien (Amsterdam, 1724-26). 
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